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ABSTRACT 
 
What influence do financial crises exert on states’ security policies, specifically crisis-
stricken states’ military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects? This dissertation 
finds that, after the start of financial crises, the national security policies of crisis-stricken 
governments shift towards greater assertiveness or greater caution. Whether greater 
assertiveness or towards greater caution is realized depends on government exposure to high 
finance, that is the extent to which crisis-stricken governments rely on the largest transnational 
financial and business interests to solve the financial crisis. Specifically, the national security 
policies of a crisis-stricken government will move towards greater assertiveness if the 
government’s exposure to high finance is low, and towards greater caution if the government’s 
exposure to high finance is high. As a result, the national security policies of a crisis-stricken 
government having low affinity with high finance, namely a low predisposition to include the 
financial and economic preferences of high finance in its policy agenda, will be inflated when 
the government has a low exposure to high finance and curbed when the same government has 
a high exposure to high finance. Differently, the national security policies of a crisis-stricken 
government having high affinity with high finance, namely a high predisposition to include 
the preferences of high finance in its policy agenda, will become extra cautious when the 
government has a high exposure to high finance. The theoretical foundations underlying the 
argument of this dissertation do not allow determining the character of the national security 
policies of a crisis-stricken government having a high affinity with high finance and a low 
exposure to high finance. Relying on archival research, process tracing, text analysis, 
numerical data analysis and counterfactual analysis, I demonstrate these relationships over a 
total of 14 instances of financial crises affecting the security policies of a total of six states—
Japan, Italy, the United States, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Great Britain—in the period 
between 1880 and 1940.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
FINANCIAL CRISES AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES 
 
 
"It's a global (financial) crisis. [...] I think it will impact on our national  
security in ways that we quite haven't figured out yet." 
 
Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1, 20091 
 
 
What influence do financial crises have on national security policies, 
specifically military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects?2 This crucial 
question remains unasked and unanswered, and yet present and past historical 
evidence indicates that national security policies are no longer the same after 
financial-crisis outbreaks, and that the origins of these changes are unclear. After the 
onset of the global financial meltdown (GFM), the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, and France all endorsed deep cuts in their military arsenals, with Germany 
announcing the biggest reductions in its military forces since World War II.3 
Concurrently, Russia, China, and India defended more ambitious military budgets—as 
did Indonesia, which, interestingly, had responded to the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crisis (AFC) by pursuing drastic defense cuts. During the AFC, Thailand behaved like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Tom Philpott, “Military Update: Official. Financial Crisis a Bigger Security Risk than War,” The 
Gazette, February 1, 2009.  
2 “Financial crisis,” in this work, is a three-dimensional variable having objective, subjective and inter-
subjective meaning. Refer to the third section of the chapter for a description of how these different 
meanings come into being in practice. Military spending refers to national defense allocations; threat 
assessment refers to the extent to which a potential adversary is perceived as dangerous; war prospects 
refer to the perceived probability of interstate war. 
3 Stephen Fidler and Alistair MacDonald, “Europeans Retreat on Defense Spending,” Wall Street 
Journal, August 24, 2011; “Ministers Work to Reassure US Over Cuts in Defense Spending,” Western 
Mail, October 16, 2010; Richard Norton-Taylor, “Russia Overtakes Britain and France in Global Arms 
Spending League Table,” The Guardian, April 16, 2012; SIPRI Yearbooks 2004-2009-2011-2012; 
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook; “Mark Thompson, “The Proposed Defense Budget: ‘Shaving the 
Balloon,’” Time, February 14, 2012; Barney Frank, “How to Save the Global Economy: Cut Defense 
Spending,” Foreign Policy, Special Report, January-February 2012; “Big Cuts in Store for 
Bundeswehr,” The Local, October 26, 2011.  
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Indonesia whereas Singapore and Australia did not.4 Threat assessment and war 
prospects similarly vary after financial-crisis outbreaks, as both the AFC and the GFM 
show. In 1998, Russia pulled back from its pre-crisis militant Asian policy while 
China and the United States strengthened their own conciliatory policies in the 
region—to the detriment of Japan.5 Reversing the cautionary military posture 
maintained since the late 1990s, Russia responded to the GFM by embarking on an 
ambitious foreign policy agenda. By contrast, the United States withdrew its forces 
from Central Asia, moved further away from any presence in European defense plans, 
and transferred its military and diplomatic focus to the Far East and the Pacific.6 
Variation in national security policies after a financial-crisis outbreak is not a 
novel feature in world politics. Before the British financial crisis of 1901–05 (or the 
South Sea Bubble of 1720), and before the Ottoman banking and debt crisis of 1875–
76, Great Britain and Turkey were both engaged in designing and pursuing ambitious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “Asia Defense Spending to Overtake Europe,” Financial Times, March 7, 2012; Keith B. Richburg, 
“China Military Spending to Top $100 billion in 2012, Alarming Neighbors,” Washington Post, March 
4, 2012; Richard Norton Taylor, “Russia Overtakes UK and France in Global Arms Spending League 
Table,” The Guardian, April 16, 2012; “India in Defense Spending Spree,” BBC News April 8, 2012. 
On the increase in Indonesian military spending during the Global Financial Meltdown see “Shopping 
Spree,” The Economist, May 24, 2012. On military spending in East Asia following the AFC, see 
Simon (2001: chapter 2), and Hartfield and Job (2007). Cuts to military spending in the West were not 
uncontroversial or entirely desired by governments. Compare, for instance, Martin Feldstein, “Defense 
Spending Would Be Great Stimulus,” Wall Street Journal, December 24, 2008, with Robert Kagan, 
“No Time to Cut Defense Spending,” Washington Post, February 3, 2009, and with Fareed Zakaria, 
“Yes, Let’s Cut Defense,” Washington Post, August 4, 2011. The French government during a first 
stage of the crisis attempted to raise defense spending, to no avail; see Edward Cody, “France Boosts 
Spending on Military,” Washington Post, October 30, 2008. 
5 See Dibb, Hale and Prince (1998); Johnson (1999); Robert and Kelikov (2000); Denoon (2007). 
6 John Gray, “A Shattering Moment in America’s Fall from Power,” The Observer, September 28, 
2008; Balkan Devlen, “Geopolitical Consequences of the Economic Crisis,” Today’s Zaman, October, 
20, 2008; Mark Mazzetti, “Global Economy Top Threat to U.S., Spy Chief Says,” New York Times, 
February 12, 2009; Helene Cooper, Michael Wines and David E. Sanger, “China’s Role as Lender 
Alters Dynamics for Obama’s Visit,” New York Times, November 14, 2009; “Rebalancing America’s 
Forces: The Downgrading of Europe,” Economist, January 14, 2012; Ian Bremmer, “The Recession 
Won’t Moderate Russia’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, March 25, 2009. See also Friedberg (2010), 
and Burns and Price (2010). 
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national security agendas. Yet, Great Britain ditched its expansionist plans after 1905 
and 1720, whereas Turkey doubled down on its military ambitions after 1876, waging 
war on Russia in 1877.7 Exhibiting a different national security solution—historically 
a most memorable one—Japan, Germany, and Italy upturned their military postures 
from caution to aggression during, and in the aftermath of, the global financial crisis 
of 1927–33. In contrast, following the outburst of the Latin American debt crisis 
(August 1982), Argentina’s belligerent national security agenda—which had peaked 
with the Falklands War just a few months earlier (April 1982)—was quickly 
overhauled. Overall, evidence shows that, after the outbreak of financial crisis, 
national security policies change: the pre-crisis national security agenda is either 
overhauled or accentuated. What explains this variation in post-financial crisis 
national security policies? Why are some states, or better, governments, after 
financial-crisis outbreaks able at times to double-down on their pre-crisis assertive or 
conciliatory national security policies but need, at other times, to pull back from them? 
More simply, to emphasize once more a question that has long deserved an answer in 
academic and policy circles: what influence do financial crises have on national 
security policies?  
This study embarks on a systematic analytical and empirical investigation into 
the national security influence of financial crises. Its main argument is that financial 
crises cause a severe shock to crisis-stricken governments’ financial and security 
policies—also referred to as financial-security agenda(s)—and that, during the process 
of crisis response, national military spending, threat assessment and war prospects are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 On the British experience, see Carswell (1960:271–72) and Friedberg (1987:15–37). On the Turkish 
experience, see Pamuk (1987:72); Blainey (1973:chapter 12). 
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inflated, curbed, or further softened compared to their pre-crisis equivalents.8 Which 
outcome ensues, this dissertation finds, depends on the relationship between crisis-
stricken governments and high finance during the process of financial-crisis response.  
A few conceptual clarifications will make these assertions clearer. High 
finance in this work indicates the largest transnational financial houses and the largest 
industrial and trading firms that are aligned with them. These houses and firms, due to 
their profit-seeking objectives, transnational business connections, and resources are 
primarily interested in the preservation of a fully functioning international financial 
system and effective and rewarding international financial cooperation.9 As 
demonstrated in the literature—and this is a point that will be developed later in the 
chapter—because of these preferences, the largest transnational financial houses and 
the largest industrial and trading firms aligned with them highly cherish international 
peace and fear the prospect of war. In the years between 1880 and 1940 members of 
high finance were individuals like London-based banker and financier Nathan 
Rotschild, German-French banker Mayer de Rotschild, German bankers Gerson Von 
Bleichröeder and Max Waburg, American banker J.P. Morgan, American banker and 
industrialist Jacob Schiff, Scottish-American industrialist Andrew Carnegie, and 
German shipping magnate Albert Ballin. 10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The influence of financial crises on the policies of states that do not directly experience a crisis are 
discussed in this dissertation only to the extent that they relate to and help illustrate changes in the 
financial-security agenda(s) of crisis-stricken governments.  
9 The key element here is that these institutions are privately owned; they are not tied to the fate of any 
particular nation; are multinational in form; and are “market-oriented,” that is they influence but not 
dominate markets.  
10 Completing this list were American industrialist and railroad executive E.H. Harriman, American 
industrialists John D. Rockfeller and Henry H. Rogers, and Canadian-American railroad tycoon James 
J. Hill. On occasion, the demarcating line separating these business elites from politicians was thin—
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At times, high finance has the ability and desire to influence governments’ 
crisis response strategy.11 At other times, this ability can be either dormant or non-
existent. The commitment to defend the financial system and international financial 
cooperation, and the ability and desire to influence governments’ strategy of financial 
crisis response might or might not be included in standard definitions of high 
finance.12 Not necessarily included in standard definitions of high finance are also two 
aspects that are linked to the mentioned components. A first is the confidence of high 
finance in the virtues of international financial exchange (or at least the prospect of it), 
and related dislike for, or fear of, international financial instability. A second 
component is the “fungibility” of high finance across time and space. High finance 
takes on different forms depending on whether the elites that compose it are located in 
the crisis-stricken state or outside of it, and whether the crisis-stricken state is either in 
a position to interact with high finance or instead entirely insulated from it. Thus, for 
the purposes of this work, high finance is best conceived as a chameleon with the 
power to filtrate into and out of different domestic political settings, always with the 
objective of defending international financial stability. This trait sets high finance 
apart from governments and private, domestic financial actors, although some overlay 
is occasionally possible.  
In agreement with a number of works in political science, national security 
policies are here classified as assertive or cautious, and governments—which are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Cecil Rhodes, for instance, is an example of prominent businessman and politician—but for the most 
part major financial/business representatives and state officials belonged to different groups. 
11 For an idea of who these financial elites are, see Polanyi (1944), Chernow (1990), Ferguson (1999), 
and Ahamed (2009).  
12 In standard uses, high finance simply stands for powerful formal or informal cohorts of financial 
elites or bankers.  
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understood here narrowly as the main political authorities that decide states’ primary 
economic and security policies—tend to pursue either cautious or assertive national 
security policies and are very often classified as having a statist-nationalist or liberal-
cosmopolitan character or disposition.13 Statist-nationalist governments tend to act 
autonomously from non-state domestic forces and international actors, and resort to 
rent-seeking economic policies as well as assertive military and diplomatic means to 
defend the national interest (Krasner 1978:10,313,14; Nordlinger 1988:881; Young 
2007:109-111). By contrast, liberal-cosmopolitan governments are generally keen to 
safeguard the interests or well being of non-state individuals and groups, and, to this 
purpose, they opt for internationalist policies and commit to the maintenance of 
international peace (Kant 1789:29; Bull 1977:81; Appiah 2006:xv). 
This dispositional diversity also informs government low or high affinity with 
high finance that is low or high predisposition to include the preferences of high 
finance in their economic and security policies and decisions.14 After the outbreak of 
financial crises, statist-nationalist and liberal-cosmopolitan governments tend to 
respond exactly on the basis of this affinity, doubling down or attempting to redouble 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Various expressions of statist-nationalist and liberal-cosmopolitan governments exist in practice. 
Totalitarian governments and confessional or theocratic governments, for instance, provide two 
different examples of a statist-nationalist government. Similarly, the welfare-state governments, and the 
governmental members of an international federation of states are two different examples—or at least 
two not necessarily overlapping examples—of liberal-cosmopolitan governments. For a simultaneous 
treatment of both kinds of governments in political science see, in particular, Solingen (1998:18-61). 
Rather than “liberal-cosmopolitan,” Solingen uses the label “internationalist.” This work offers a more 
fine-grained approach than Solingen’s to the distinction between liberal-cosmopolitan and statist-
nationalist governments by postulating that the affinity with high finance of either kind of government 
can be high or low. On government affinity with high finance, refer to the following sentence and the 
rest of the chapter.  
14 Government affinity with high finance therefore tells us how much governments respect high finance, 
which is, in turn, an indication of governments’ behavioral intentions in the spheres of finance and 
security.  
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on their pre-crisis financial-security agenda.15 Not always, however, governments’ 
intended crisis strategy is either possible to implement after the onset of the crisis or 
possible to sustain until its end. Specifically, the realm of available strategies of crisis 
response is defined by governments’ high or low exposure to high finance, that is the 
necessity or choice to consider the preferences of high finance despite or in addition to 
national leaders’ intended economic strategy of financial crisis response.16 Hence, 
unlike affinity, exposure is a variable that does not exist without the presence of a 
financial crisis.   
The interplay between crisis-stricken governments’ affinity with and exposure 
to high finance after the outbreak of financial crises—this work argues—determines 
whether the crisis-stricken government(s) or high finance leads the process of financial 
crisis response, and ultimately how pre-crisis national security policies change 
following the outbreak of financial crises. Explicitly, this work identifies three 
scenarios of financial crisis influence on national security policies based on three 
possible combinations between government affinity and exposure to high finance. The 
security policies of a government having low affinity with high finance are likely to be 
curbed when exposure to high finance after the start of the crisis is high, and to be 
inflated when such exposure is low. By contrast, the security policies of a government 
having high affinity with high finance are likely to become extra prudent when 
exposure to high finance after the start of the crisis is high. The theoretical foundations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 I clarify why this occurs later in the chapter. For now, keep in mind that what I define as “double-
down movement” finds its origins in the field of psychology, and particularly the theory of escalating 
commitments, which holds that, after having endorsed a position, one feels compelled to defend it. 
Stiglitz (2010) recently used this theory for explaining policymaking after the outbreak of financial 
crises. 
16 Why government affinity with and exposure to high finance are either high or low is clarified later in 
the chapter.  
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underlying the argument of this manuscript do not allow determining the character of 
the national security policies of a crisis-stricken government having a high affinity 
with high finance and a low exposure to high finance. In each scenario, however, 
including this latter one, financial crises change state governments’ ability or interest 
in pursuing their pre-crisis policy agendas, resulting in a departure from pre-crisis 
national security policies.17  
Some clarifications are important. To begin, defining government affinity with 
high finance in terms of national economic policies and national security policies 
when national security policies is also the variable to be explained is not 
methodologically problematic because the pre-crisis national security policies that 
contribute to defining a government’s affinity with high finance remain constant 
throughout each examined financial crisis instance. Pre-crisis national security policies 
are clearly distinct from the change in national security policies to be explained, which 
materializes after the outbreak of financial crisis and thanks to the selected economic 
strategy of financial crisis response. Also, the inclusion of a constant variable on the 
character of national security policies before financial crisis outbreak is inevitable if 
the research objective is, like the one of this manuscript, mapping the character of the 
shift in national security policies over a period of time. Finally, government exposure 
to high finance is coded based exclusively on the economic strategy of financial crisis 
response that is needed to solve the crisis, and not on the economic and security 
strategy of financial crisis response that are needed to solve the crisis. It is this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See the tree diagram drawn later in the chapter. 
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economic strategy that explains the changes in national security policies that occur 
after financial crisis outbreak.  
The four scenarios, and the logic and theoretical underpinnings that explain 
them are the subject of this chapter. The chapter starts with a short account of the 
national security influence of military-security crises, noting that some pivotal aspects 
characterizing the process of resolving these crises are also essential ingredients of the 
influence of financial crises on national (security) policymaking. It then offers a step-
by-step explanation of the above-sketched argument. After an overview of the 
distinctive challenge to national security policies that financial crises pose, by 
affecting crisis-stricken governments’ hold on power and their incentives to respect or 
close the door to international financial market, the argument develops in three 
sections. The first section explains the ideal-typical blueprint of financial crisis 
response recommended to governments by high finance. The second section examines 
the components of high or low government exposure to high finance during the 
process of financial crisis response and clarifies how different combinations of 
government affinity with and exposure to high finance produce three scenarios of 
influence of financial crises on governments’ financial-security agendas. The third 
section portrays the change in military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects 
resulting from each of the three scenarios. The national security change that is realized 
in a forth scenario, and which the framework cannot capture, is also considered. Case 
selection, methods, and data are then discussed.  
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MILITARY-SECURITY CRISES AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES 
 
 The literature on crisis decision-making has amply documented that interstate 
military-security crises are pivotal moments where national security policies—and 
particularly war prospect, threat assessment, and military spending—are susceptible to 
fundamental reevaluation and adjustment. Reevaluation and adjustment occur because 
it is in the nature of military-security crises to threaten a state’s position or status in 
the international system. Specifically, military-security crises present state 
governments with three concurrent challenges: a threat to one or more basic values; 
uncertainty; and a shortened shadow of the future (Hermann 1969:414; Hermann 
1972:13; Holsti 1972:9; George 1979:104; Bretcher et al. 1997:3–10).18 Responding to 
the crisis in this context of emergency, rising insecurity, and pressured decision-
making, government officials move towards a new consensus on existing problems as 
perceptions are transformed, policy options become more limited or more numerous, 
and different approaches to military spending, threat assessment, and war are adopted 
(Baddeley 1972:537–546; George 1975:284; Jervis 1976:172–202).  
 Although threats to basic values, finite time for response, and uncertainty are 
attributes that all military-security crises share, military-security crises do not affect 
national security policies equally. For instance, military-security crises have stricken 
states and governments committed to the pursuit of assertive national security agendas 
as well as states and governments maintaining cautious national security postures. In 
either case, crisis response was reached via doubling down on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In the crisis decision-making literature, uncertainty has at times been associated with the surprise 
provoked by military-security crises. At other times, it has been linked to the heightened probability of 
war.  
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assertiveness/cautiousness or withdrawing from it altogether. Four examples illustrate 
these claims: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; the military crisis of 1914; the Suez 
crisis of 1956; and the Korean crisis of 1950. In 1962, the resolution of the thirteen-
day Cuban Missile Crisis put brakes on escalating Soviet-American military 
competition, and paved the way for conciliatory national security policies as the 
United States agreed to dismantle all US-built Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles (IRBMs) deployed in Italy and Turkey, and the Soviets agreed to remove 
their medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and ICBMs) 
from Cuba.19 The opposite outcome occurred during six critical weeks in 1914, when, 
fearing for their national survival, governments across Europe gradually abandoned 
cautious military and diplomatic agendas, and spiraled into mobilization and war. 
 In contrast to the 1962 and 1914 crises, the Suez crisis of 1956 stirred British 
and French cautionary (pre-crisis) national security agendas towards greater caution, 
whereas the Korean crisis of 1950 pushed ambitious American policies of containment 
towards greater assertiveness. Between July and October 1956, British and French 
attempts to regain control of the nationalized Suez Canal by supporting an Israeli 
attack and bombarding Cairo both escalated and faded, with London and Paris 
eventually resuming a more conciliatory security posture in the fall.20 Vice versa, a 
few days after the June 1950 crossing of the 38th parallel by North Korea, perceiving a 
threat to the promise of withstanding aggression recently enunciated in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Competition had escalated since1958, following the American deployment of IRBMs in the UK, Italy 
and Turkey. A similar military-security crisis is the Berlin Blockades of 1948–49. 
20 Note that British and French national security policies in the 1950s were “cautious” due to the United 
States’ power to maintain them so—not necessarily because they were inherently peaceful or conducive 
to peace. On this point, see Curtis (2007). On the Suez crisis see in particular Kunz (1991). 
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containment doctrine, the United States intensified its military involvement in the 
peninsula, embarking on a three-year-long war to repel the invasion.  
 Since its inception, scholarship on crisis decision-making has been bound to 
confront a natural question that applies to these examples and many other cases: what 
does explain the different origins, escalations, and responses to military-security 
crises?21 Why did the Great Powers discard pre-crisis military restraint to adopt an 
increasingly assertive national security posture in 1914? Why did Britain and France 
in 1956 end up continuing a policy of non-confrontation? And why were American 
rearmament policies traded for diplomatic negotiations in 1962, but refueled to wage 
war in 1950?  
 A consistent result across much of the literature is that the reconfirmation or 
curbing of assertive or prudent pre-crisis national security policies hinge on crisis-
stricken governments’ high or low affinity with or exposure to compromising or non-
compromising strategies of crisis response. These strategies are based on a number of 
factors, which scholarship has identified as dominant beliefs, leaders’ personality, 
civil-military relations, institutions, cultural and historical experience, cognitive 
assumptions and signaling, technology, and coercive diplomacy. Governments’ 
affinity with and exposure to compromising or non-compromising strategies of crisis 
resolution after the outbreak of military crises determines the character of the military 
and diplomatic responses—that is, whether pre-crisis national security agendas are 
intensified or rebutted. For instance, it is conventional wisdom that throughout the 
summer of 1914, European government officials became highly exposed to preparing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See, for instance, Azar (1972), Herek, Janis and Huth (1987), Richardson (1994), Schultz (1998), and 
Wilkenfeld, Young, Asal and Quinn (2003). 
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for a major military conflagration (as opposed to diplomatic reconciliation) after 
developing an affinity, or becoming more and more accustomed with policies that 
prioritized offensive military weapons and doctrines, the fear of late mobilization, 
“bandwagoning” behavior, the misperception that the war would be short and limited, 
and flawed civil-military relations—policies that undermined ongoing attempts to 
resolve the crisis diplomatically (Hermann 1972:61; Snyder 1984:110; Van Evera 
1984:62,68). By contrast, it is commonly acknowledged that nuclear escalation was 
restrained in 1962 because American and Soviet government officials re-evaluated 
past historical experience, institutional procedures, and the odds that a surgical strike 
would succeed in ways that made them more obliged or exposed to conceding military 
and diplomatic measures, and choked the spirals of nuclear brinkmanship (Sorensen 
1963:31; Abel 1964:19; Allison 1969:697-698; Hermann 1972:64,65).  
 Finally, Britain and France deflected their ambitious strategic plans in 1956 
when an exercise in American monetary statecraft made them more willing to embrace 
international conciliation, and highly exposed to the negative consequences of refusing 
it (Kirshner 1995:63–80; Andrews 2006:7,19),22 whereas, in 1950, memories of the 
Munich experience (1938–39), perceptions of growing Soviet nuclear capability, and 
concerns over the domino effects deriving from the failure to contain a North Korean 
invasion resulted in a low exposure of the Eisenhower administration to diplomatic 
compromise, thus enhancing American nuclear “boldness” and affinity with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In 1956, a US-sponsored UN resolution called for immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of military 
forces from Egypt. Both goals were obtained when, in early November, the pound sterling came under 
sustained market pressure, and the US threatened to block British access to its own reserves in the 
International Monetary Fund. From the start of the crisis up until November 1956, the exposure of the 
British and American governments had been low, suggesting that there might be different crisis stages 
and different vulnerabilities throughout different crisis episodes. I touch upon this point later in the 
chapter.  
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confrontational policies, and ultimately accelerating ongoing nuclear races (Dingman 
1998:51–54; James and Wells 1993:1–8).23 In each of these four crisis years, state 
authorities responded to mounting crisis pressures and tense international climates. 
Yet, their different affinities with or exposures to compromising and non-
compromising means of crisis resolution changed the course of their respective 
national security policies by virtue of an overhaul or intensification of pre-crisis 
national security agendas. As the following paragraphs clarify, military-security crises 
are not the only crises that change the course of national military spending, threat 
assessment, and war prospects, nor are they the only crises that affect states’ exposure 
to compromising and non-compromising strategies of crisis resolution. 
 
FINANCIAL CRISES: JUST ANOTHER TYPE OF SECURITY CRISES 
 
Financial crises and military-security crises share a number of objective, 
subjective, and inter subjective attributes. Both crisis contexts are characterized by 
objective, subjective, and inter-subjective elements—specifically, a material loss or 
change; a high threat to important values; increased uncertainty, and shrinking 
decision-making time. Three necessary, specific components of financial crises clarify 
why, during them, a material loss occurs, important values are threatened, and 
uncertainty and time constraints prevail. One: as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
Bordo (2001) have noted, in any financial crisis some financial assets or institutions 
suddenly and tangibly lose part of their value, signaling the end of a period of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The “limited” character of the Korean War does not change the fact that the assertiveness of 
American national security policies increased from the summer of 1950. 
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economic growth or accepted stability.24  Amongst the unpleasant and so-called 
“deadly” conditions that can appear are GNP growth, liquidity, reserve availability, 
the value of the exchange rate, deficit and debt levels, credit rating, the rate of bank 
failure, and price and interest rate levels are all susceptible to significant deterioration 
(Burton 1910; Fisher 1911; Minsky 1972; Kindleberger 1973; Bordo 1986; Capie and 
Wood 1986:190-239; Calvo 1995; Bordo et al. 2001; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). 
Two: as critical national financial variables deteriorate and the prospect of greater 
economic damage materializes, national leaderships at the head of the crisis-stricken 
state (or states) start losing confidence in the workings of the financial system, 
doubting the validity or desirability of existing policies and institutions, and fearing 
their removal from power.  
Until a solution to the crisis is found, a climate of economic and political 
uncertainty will remain. Concern or confusion over the status of the affected (national 
or international) financial system and pre-crisis national agendas increase not only for 
national leaders or within crisis-stricken governments, but also for high finance.  
Finally, confidence in status of the financial system declines amongst domestic private 
financial investors, domestic audiences, and private financial market forces 
(Eichengreen 1996a). Three: a series of measures involving, at least potentially, 
governmental and non-governmental actors is undertaken in the attempt to respond 
quickly to the crisis and restore financial and economic stability, confidence, and 
growth. As much as the reaction to the sudden fall of financial and economic assets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In the datasets assembled by Bordo and Reinhart and Rogoff, financial crises are calculated through a 
weighted average of changes in exchange rates, short-term interest rates, and reserve availability 
relative to the United Kingdom or the United States. 
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above mentioned, the success or failure of crisis response measures hinges upon 
objective economic changes, and subjective and inter-subjective changes in economic 
perceptions.  
These considerations buttress the existing scholarly conclusion that financial 
and economic crises produce a “shock effect” or cast a shadow on the value and 
sustainability of existing state policies while also testing governments’ capacity to 
survive to the crisis by either holding on to their domestic power and agendas or 
adjusting them to new circumstances (Katzenstein 1978:15-22; Gourevitch 
1986:17,35; Pepinsky 2009:2,3). At times, governments’ crisis response efforts 
succeed. At other times, they fail and newly empowered domestic forces are installed. 
There is no difference between the threat that local and global financial crises pose: in 
either case, government leaders are called to select crisis countermeasures and their 
affinity with high finance and exposure to high finance—both of them objective, 
subjective and inter-subjective variables—will drive their policy response.  
Systematic thinking and empirical research on the influence of financial crises 
on crisis-stricken governments’ military spending, threat assessment, and war 
prospects should take all of the three, described components of financial crises into 
account. The few, recent scholarly works on the geopolitical implications produced by 
the AFC or the GFM have focused on the first, objective component, and emphasized 
the repercussions on international security that financial crises produce by engineering 
relative, interstate economic gains and losses or balance-of-power-shifts (Dibb, Hale 
and Prince 1998:5; Devlen 2008; Friedberg 2010:32,35). This approach, which is 
essentially an application of structural realism to the study of international relations 
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during financial crises, suffers from two limitations. First, it is inapt to evaluate the 
character of states’ national security policies after the outbreak of financial crises. As 
Kenneth Waltz (1979) reminds us, interstate balance-of-power shifts have little to say 
on national foreign policy or diplomatic and military decisions. Second, alterations in 
interstate economic gains and losses are not, per se, a distinctive component of 
financial crises, since technological innovation or a recession might produce just the 
same result.  
A more appropriate investigation on the national security influence of financial 
crises starts with examining the shock, collapse of confidence, and crisis response 
strategies that state and non-state actors experience once that financial assets and 
institutions have begun to deteriorate. Since government authorities and high finance 
are at the forefront of these developments, and since they are the main actors that have 
potentially the ability to resolve the crisis, it makes sense to focus on their relationship 
to understand the destiny of national security policies after financial crisis outbreak. 
From this perspective, financial crises, and the crisis-resolution processes that 
accompany them, are best regarded as moments wherein crisis-stricken governments 
are called to redefine their participation or non-participation in the international 
financial system, and to re-establish the credibility of their financial policies vis-à-vis 
those advocated by high finance.25 Two caveats are in order. One: the enthusiasm with 
the international financial system of liberal-cosmopolitan and statist-nationalist 
governments will vary. This variation is displayed in the financial and security policies 
adopted before, during, and after the financial crisis outbreak by either type of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 I construct this interpretation based on Kindleberger (1978:17,91,92,94,172), and Eichengreen 
(1992:3-12).  
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government. Two: related to the former point, the power between a crisis-stricken 
government and high finance will vary across financial crises and political contexts. 
After the onset of a financial crisis, the government’s ability to continue its pre-crisis 
agenda given the increased likelihood of domestic unrest and political realignment 
alters the relative costs and benefits of pursuing that agenda, as well as those of taking 
part in or being excluded from a liberalized international financial order. As a result, 
crisis response is a power game between state authorities and high finance, with 
variations in the former’s financial and security preferences and policies, and the 
ability of the latter’s ability to exert successful policy pressure.26	  
Elaborating on these caveats, this dissertation makes three claims that are 
foundational to the framework here developed. The first is that financial crises and the 
measures undertaken to respond to them affect the destiny of national financial 
policies and national security policies alike, traditional and interdependent 
requirements of any government and policy agenda. Having failed to forestall the 
crisis and the collapse of confidence that is impeding financial and economic stability 
and growth, pre-crisis national financial policies have lost credibility. Extant national 
security policies come under scrutiny too, however, because they have jeopardized, or 
are now jeopardized by a weakened national financial system. Thus, financial crises 
challenge crisis-stricken governments’ financial-security agendas, which are, in turn, 
re-established or surrendered during the process of crisis response, with inevitable 
implications on the course of military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This project focuses especially on states’ responses to financial crises. The immediate effects of crises 
on national security policies, for instance the fall in military spending deriving from GNP deterioration, 
are relevant to the extent that they elicit a certain kind of response from crisis-stricken governments. 
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The second claim that this work advances is that the national security measures 
that governments having a high affinity with high finance—generally liberal-
cosmopolitan governments—and governments having a low affinity with high 
finance—generally statist-nationalist governments—tend to select after the outbreak 
of financial crises are likely to be different: the former will be keener on resolving the 
crisis via further downplaying military ambition in an effort to restore financial 
confidence and economic stability and growth. By contrast, government having a low 
affinity with high finance will attempt to defend pre-crisis security agendas, 
subordinating financial measures of crisis response to those agendas, delinking them 
from national crisis response measures. The third claim that is foundational to the 
framework presented in the following pages is that while governments have either 
high or low affinity with the pressures of high finance before the onset of the financial 
crisis, this affinity can change after the financial crisis outbreak depending on crisis-
stricken governments’ high or low exposure to high finance. 
Justifying this distinction (affinity vs. exposure), which goes beyond semantics, 
are the political stakes with which financial crises present governments and domestic 
interests. After a financial crisis outbreak government authorities are urged to redefine 
their pre-crisis financial and security policies. While governments can rely on their 
control over domestic institutions and societal support to implement their intended 
crisis countermeasures, the role, power, and success of high finance in the process of 
financial crisis response can reinforce or weaken those countermeasures. Moreover, 
governments and high finance hardly have the same economic and security 
preferences. As a result, their preferred strategies of financial crisis response—and the 
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strategies of financial crisis response that they will try to implement—will be 
different. This power game, in turn, tends to galvanize domestic non-financial forces 
too, and push them towards or against high finance or crisis-stricken governments.27 In 
sum, after the outbreak of financial crises crisis-stricken governments’ autonomy vis-
à-vis high finance—and non-financial domestic constituencies, as a result—is 
fundamentally amended. 
 
The Alarm of High Finance and Its Orthodox Medicine 
 
 It is no secret that high finance dislikes financial crises. Powerful members of 
the transnational financial community—including the Rothschilds, Morgans, 
Warburgs, Bleichroeders and Rockefellers—are driven by profit and investment 
opportunities that flourish under conditions of financial stability or, in the language of 
Hyman Minsky or Charles Kindleberger, the confidence that financial stability will be 
preserved. Because high finance would not even exist in the absence of a shared 
international faith in the virtues of capital mobility, and the projection of private 
financial interests from their home bases, this confidence must hold nationally as well 
as internationally. By upsetting both financial stability and confidence in financial 
stability, nationally or internationally, financial crises challenge what high finance 
most cherishes: high returns on investment, and the prospect that these returns will 
continue and possibly increase in the near future. Global and local financial crises are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Accordingly, this work does not deny the importance of non-financial interests in influencing crisis-
stricken governments’ strategy of financial crisis response, but rather derives it from the interaction and 
shifts in balance of power between government authorities and high finance after the onset of the crisis. 
This primacy of governmental and financial forces in driving the process of crisis response hinges on 
their greater material and ideological assets to spur recovery compared to the assets of practically any 
other domestic and international actor. 
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both sources of concern.28 During such crises high finance loses out, although “losing 
out” is always preferable to the harsher fate of being “wiped out,” which smaller 
business is more likely to face. 
 The recipe for crisis response recommended to governments by high finance is 
uniform. Crisis-stricken governments should tighten their belts: they should act pro-
cyclically to the benefit of the financial sector, defend the value of the exchange rate, 
lower interest rates, restore a sound (=balanced) budget and credit rating, and deflate 
the economy by pursuing more stringent or austere monetary and fiscal policies 
irrespective of the negative implications for employment, wages, and output growth.29 
A first justification for this medicine, which derives from classical liberalism, is that 
declines in demand, prices, costs, and wages will redirect the flow of resources into 
private hands and reinforce private incentives to invest, eventually bringing the 
economy out of its downward spiral (Smith 2008). A second, related justification is 
that deflating prices and the economy, and defending the value of the exchange rate, 
signal national financial creditworthiness, and foster restoration of an aura of 
confidence or “seal of approval,” which thriving international financial markets, a 
sound international financial system, and ultimately prospering national finances need 
(Hayek 1945; McClosky 1966:122-158; Cooper 1968:148-173; Helleiner 1994:170). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Note, however, that financial crises striking states that are popular destinations for international 
investments are of more concern to high finance than financial crises affecting states that remain rather 
marginal in the global economy. Also, global financial crises are of particular concern because of the 
direct threats to the international financial system and to future financial gains—threats that are less 
serious in the case of local financial crises. 
29 Especially following the growth in states’ budgets in the 1940s and 1950s, this recipe has become 
increasingly compatible with the presence of international lenders of last resort, such as, for instance, 
the International Monetary Fund, or the European Central Bank, as well as with cooperation amongst 
foreign central banks and measures of “quantitative monetary easing.” The International Monetary Fund 
and the European Central Bank can be regarded as institutional improvements on the Bank for 
International Settlement founded in 1929 to promote the stability of the world’s credit structure. 
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The ultimate message is that governments should express or restate their commitment 
to free market principles and international financial cooperation, while creating a 
hospitable environment for encouraging national and international private 
investment.30  
 This pro-cyclical response to financial crises that high finance supports can be 
regarded as a defense of the rules of the existing international financial or monetary 
system, rules from which crisis-stricken governments have strayed.31 The prescriptions 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund on the Asian economies following the 
AFC, and the discipline of fiscal austerity endorsed by most European capitals 
following the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009 are symptomatic examples of 
the high-finance-style crisis-resolution toolkit.32 Although the appropriateness of the 
toolkit has already been questioned (Feldstein 1998; Willet 2000; Watson 2002), and 
although debate over its (un)suitability continues to this day, the final words on the 
general adequacy of crisis medicine prescribing national financial austerity, and 
respect for international financial rules favorable to mobile capital, will very likely 
remain unwritten. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 In this dissertation, “orthodox” stands for “in agreement with international financial cooperation 
(=financial orthodoxy), and a liberal international financial order.” Heterodox refers to any financial 
principle/doctrine that challenges international financial cooperation and a liberal international financial 
order. With “greater orthodoxy” or “greater heterodoxy,” I intend greater propensity to, respectively, 
abide by or deviate from the rules of the international financial system. On the use of “orthodox(y)” and 
“heterodox(y)” see, for instance, Ruggie (1982), Gourevitch (1984:95-129), and Helleiner (1994:181). 
31 On this response see, for instance, Gourevitch (1986:37-40); Broz (1997:59); Fischer (1998:103-106); 
Eichengreen and Temin (2000:18). 
32 The crisis response unveiled by US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in early 2009 was 
driven by a similar objective of refueling international financial cooperation and putting national and 
international credit markets in the position to reverse the sharp slowing in global financial and 
economic activity. See Ben Bernanke, “The Crisis and the Policy Response,” January 13, 2009, Stamp 
Lecture, London School of Economics, UK. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm.  
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 An implication of the use of this toolkit has remained in the shadows. The pro-
cyclical medicine requires an extremely prudent approach to national military 
spending, threat assessment, and war prospects. One could argue that the ideal typical 
blueprint of financial crisis response desired by high finance comes with a security-
conditionality.  The carving out of defense funds to face existing or mounting threats 
would simply backfire on the crisis-resolution efforts that high finance recommends.33 
Similarly, lowering defense spending, downplaying existing threats, and avoiding war 
entanglements are measures that promise to buttress the success of the fiscal 
straitjacket that high finance desires of governments during financial crises. In other 
words, restoring financial confidence and national creditworthiness demands 
reductions in existing military spending. Reduction in military spending requires, in 
turn, the downplaying of threats, whereas rising threats pave the way for increases in 
military budgets and decreasing market confidence. The downplaying of threats 
implies, in turn, decreased war prospects. Thus, the advice of high finance to 
governments struggling with financial crises is a universal call to tame national 
security ambitions or fears, no matter the status of existing commitments to national 
security (or of the economy).  
 The classical or neoliberal crisis-response medicine suggested by high finance 
is not far removed from its ordinary, or orthodox, financial and security preferences. It 
is, indeed, an established finding in the literature that high finance prizes stable 
macroeconomic conditions and cautious national security policies. In this regard, Karl 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Assertive national security policies, particularly wars, have historically been associated with 
distressed financial markets, weakened financial confidence, and a series of negative repercussions on 
economic stability and growth.  
	   24 
Polanyi (1944:10,13,14) has noted that, by awarding and renewing loans to 
governments based on good fiscal behavior and creditworthiness, financial elites 
significantly contributed to international peace in central Europe during the hundred 
years preceding World War I. More recently, Jonathan Kirshner (2007:9) has found 
that high finance is reluctant to risk and initiate war because of its deleterious 
macroeconomic consequences. And Benjamin Cohen (1986:14) has observed that the 
firm interest of high finance in peaceful diplomacy has affected the conduct of 
American foreign policy more than once.  
 Yet, only occasionally throughout history have the customary financial and 
security preferences of high finance been translated into policy. In the hundred years 
of peace that Polanyi describes, states often propped up their military budgets and 
pursued expansionary colonial policies to the detriment of national macroeconomic 
variables, thereby escaping from a strict observance of financial orthodoxy. At the 
height of the gold standard, only Great Britain constantly maintained full 
convertibility, and even Great Britain itself did not uphold perfectly balanced budgets 
at all times (De Cecco 1974:1; Eichengreen 1985:2; 1987:16,19; 1996:20; Friedberg 
1987:15; Bordo and Kydland 1990; Broz 1997:53). Interestingly, as the Boer Wars 
demonstrate, British governments were not strangers to escalating defense budgets and 
military adventures (Friedberg 1987).   
 Moreover, while governments’ policies often deviate from the prescriptions of 
financial orthodoxy, high finance itself cares more about the existence of heterodox 
national financial and security policies at certain times than others. For instance, the 
tendency of high finance to get caught in financial bubbles and economic booms on its 
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quest for profit maximization (Kindleberger 1978), temporarily losing sight of 
macroeconomic fundamentals and financial stability, suggests that its commitment to 
financial orthodoxy is not constantly and staunchly defended. More exactly, financial 
elites have few incentives to meddle with governments’ policies when markets are 
buoyant. By shattering the expectation of forthcoming high returns to investment, 
financial crises awaken the demands of high finance. They are not the sole event to do 
so—security crises and impending wars are others, for instance—but certainly a 
notable one.  Ultimately, financial crises present high finance with extra opportunities 
to reassert the value of financial orthodoxy and national security caution. Likewise, 
governments are similarly offered additional chances to show high finance how 
seriously or poorly they stand for these values.  
 
Crisis-Stricken Governments: Exposure to and Affinity with High Finance  
 
 In posing a threat to financial-security agendas, increasing political uncertainty 
and demanding for an urgent response, financial crises call crisis-stricken governments 
to redistribute the costs of adjustment between society and the state as well as amongst 
societal sectors. 34  Amongst various societal groups, the role and behavior of high 
finance versus governments during financial crises are very much acknowledged by 
existing literature. Several works in international political economy have shown that 
financial and economic strategies of crisis response are indicative of a variously 
fought and resolved power-game between crisis-stricken governments and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 As later pages will acknowledge, and as the literature on the political economy of financial crises has 
widely shown (Gourevitch 1986; Pepinsky 2009), the domestic political realignment that occurs during 
financial crises involves societal actors other than crisis-stricken governments and high finance.  
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international financial markets over the kinds of interests or ideas to be defended or 
endorsed (Haggard and Maxfield 1996:214-216; Blyth 2003; Helleiner 1994:169-191; 
Stiglitz 2010). Shaping this game is the autonomy of crisis-stricken governments to 
undertake and complete their intended strategy of financial crisis response: an 
autonomous crisis-stricken government will either successfully resist the pressures 
posed by financial elites or accept these pressures only to the extent that they respect 
the intended strategy of financial crisis response.  
 The sources of this autonomy—here defined as high or low government 
exposure to high finance—have been suggested by existing scholarship on the 
domestic responses to financial crises, exogenous economic shocks, and international 
liberalization, and they involve coalitional, institutional, and ideational factors born 
out of specific domestic, regional, and international contexts.35 For example, the 
coalitional strength or “embedded autonomy” of governments has been linked to the 
triumph of the leadership’s intended crisis-strategy, and a low government exposure to 
the pressures of transnational financial markets after the financial crisis outbreak 
(Pepinsky 2007; Haggard and Kaufman 1992:23–28). Along similar lines, the 
centralization of domestic institutions (MacIntyre 2001), the limited dependence on 
international financial markets, the scarce domestic or regional clout of neoliberal 
mental frameworks (Solingen 1998), and the absence, or extreme political weakness, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Amongst these factors are, for instance, coalitional cohesion, the degree of centralization of state 
structures, the distribution of veto authority, the type of business-government relations, the strength of 
the army or state bureaucracy, the power of neoliberal mental frameworks, and the degree of capital 
openness. See, for instance, Katzenstein 1978 and 1985:19-27; Gourevitch 1986; Rogowski 1989; 
Haggard and Kauffman 1992; Garrett 1995:658; Milner and Keohane 1996; Winters 1999; MacIntyre 
1999b, 2001; Kirshner 2006; Pepinsky 2009. 
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of a domestic financial sector (Frieden 1991), have been associated with greater 
independence of crisis-stricken governments versus transnational financial elites. 36 
 Building on these findings, this dissertation considers a (crisis-stricken) 
government highly exposed to high finance when the government’s strategy of 
financial crisis response rests on the following three elements: the domestic relevance 
of orthodox mindsets (1); the presence of powerful (private) domestic financial actors 
(2);37 and the effective mobilization by high finance of the financial and political 
resources that are needed to respond to the financial crisis (3).38 In contrast, a crisis-
stricken government has a low exposure to high finance when its strategy of financial 
crisis response is shaped by the domestic relevance of heterodox mindsets (4); the 
absence of powerful (private) domestic financial actors (5); and the non-effective 
mobilization by high finance (and effective mobilization by governments) of the of the 
financial and political resources needed to respond to the financial crisis (6). These 
two sets of elements tend to “hang together.” It is rare, for instance, that heterodox 
mindsets are popular in a national setting where financial actors are powerful, or that a 
government having a low exposure to high finance is in power when orthodox 
mindsets are popular.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This point is in line with the widely held conclusion across much of the literature on capital mobility 
and state autonomy that states have not surrendered to, or retreated from, global finance but maintain 
significant freedom to maneuver and have often been at the forefront of financial liberalization. On this 
point, see Katzenstein (1985), Frieden (1991), Goodman and Pauly (1993), Helleiner (1994), Andrews 
(1994), Quinn and Inclán (1997), and Oatley (1999). 
37 Note that while a well-functioning international financial system strengthens the power of financial 
interests in the crisis-stricken state, the system is no guarantee of the presence of financial interests in 
the crisis-stricken state.  
38 The material assets that high finance has during financial crisis are ample liquidity, and the political 
endorsement of the major social forces of the crisis-stricken state. 
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 A transposition of the Mundell-Fleming trilemma (Mundell 1963) in the 
context of financial-crisis response suggests that it is particularly meaningful, 
theoretically, to consider government exposure to high finance in the process of 
financial crisis response as either high or low, and with no equilibrium possible 
between these two extremes. 39 One element of the policy triad that the Mundell-
Fleming model considers, namely the target of maintaining a fixed exchange rate, can 
be thought of as equivalent to the objective of financial crisis response. During 
financial crises, governments may strive for only two of the following three 
objectives: exchange rate stability or crisis resolution; fiscal and monetary 
sovereignty; and respect for high finance and capital mobility. Hence, working on a 
solution to the financial crisis will demand either the full exercise of state fiscal and 
monetary sovereignty or the support of high finance and capital mobility. Government 
exposure to high finance can change from high to low or from low to high during 
financial crises, like it occurred in Japan in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These 
episodes are very rare, however.   
 Financial crises have historically affected statist-nationalist and liberal-
cosmopolitan governments.40 For instance, the statist-national government of George 
W. Bush and the liberal-cosmopolitan government of Angela Merkel have both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The Mundell Fleming model assumes that a state cannot simultaneously sustain fixed exchange rates, 
capital mobility, and independent monetary policy. 
40 An overview of the type of governments that have been affected by banking crises in the last twenty 
years can confirm this statement. For a list of these crises see Reinhart and Rogoff (2009:345-392). As 
clarified earlier in the chapter, the statist-nationalist or liberal-cosmopolitan nature of government is 
based on national financial/economic and security policies. Either kind of government could also be 
thought of as a large category encompassing various international or statist-nationalist solutions. The 
Latin American military-populist governments of the 1970s, for instance, and many confessional, 
Middle Eastern governments, during the same period, offered different expressions of the statist-
nationalist ideal-type. 
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succumbed to the GFM. In the late 1880s, financial crisis hit the statist-nationalist 
(French) government of Georges Ernesto Boulanger as well as the liberal-
cosmopolitan (Dutch) government of Joan Röell.41 Although the national security 
principles on which liberal-cosmopolitan ruling coalitions or parties thrive tend to 
make financial crises a harsher challenge for this type of government than for a statist-
nationalist government, both statist-nationalist and liberal-cosmopolitan governments 
may experience a low or high exposure to high finance during the process of financial 
crisis response.42  
 For instance, Suharto’s statist-nationalist Indonesian government in financial 
crisis year 1998 and Berlusconi’s liberal-cosmopolitan Italian government in financial 
crisis year 2011 both became highly exposed to high finance. Neither of them was able 
to withstand its power against overriding orthodox financial ideas, hold its ground vis-
à-vis powerful domestic financial interests, and mobilize the political support and 
financial resources necessary to resolve the crisis. Both Suharto and Berlusconi lost 
their battle with high finance: the former was forced to abandon its auspicated plan for 
a currency board; the latter was compelled to accept the advent a more financially 
sound ruling party or coalition.43 Differently, Portillo’s statist-nationalist Mexican 
government in financial crisis year 1982 and the American liberal-cosmopolitan 
government of FDR in financial crisis year 1933 both resorted to monetary and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 France experienced a financial crisis in 1889, the Netherlands in 1897. 
42 For a statist-nationalist government, national financial strain might be a rather common element of the 
political context in which national agendas are crafted. 
43 On Suharto’s abandonment of its auspicated plan for a currency board in 1998 see Grabel (2003:43). 
In 2011, the technical government of Mario Monti replaced Berlusconi’s, and the latter’s more 
remarkable commitment to national financial stabilization.  
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financial heterodoxy as part of the strategy of financial crisis response, indicating low 
exposure to international financial markets.44  
 While statist-nationalist and liberal-cosmopolitan governments can be highly 
exposed or minimally exposed to high finance after the outbreak of financial crises, 
before crisis outbreak the affinity of each government to international financial 
markets tends to differ. Government affinity with high finance is discernible from the 
pre-crisis financial-security agendas of crisis-stricken governments. If this agenda 
benefits sectors like liquid-asset holders that gain from unprotected international 
financial competition, government affinity with high finance is high.45 Similarly, 
affinity is high if this agenda envisions the taking of explicit steps towards 
international peace. By contrast, government affinity with high finance is low if state 
entrepreneurship prevails domestically over international financial markets. It is also 
low if the government commits to the sustained extraction and mobilization of 
domestic resources for increasing military power and national security. Changes in 
government affinity with high finance obviously occur when a government is replaced 
with another belonging to a different regime or having a different political orientation.   
 Because of variation in the specific principles and domestic institutional 
features that filter the relationship between national authorities and global finance 
(Polanyi 1944; Katzenstein 1978:3–22; Keohane and Milner 1996:16–22), statist-
nationalist governments tend to face lesser constraints to pursue assertive national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Portillo introduced capital controls in 1982. FDR did not need to do that—significant amounts of 
capital did not enter the United States in the early 1930s—but he similarly undertook a series of 
heterodox financial policies. See Chapter IV on this point.  
45 On the domestic distributional impact of the national policies favoring international financial and 
economic liberalization, see Rogowski (1989:3–21); Haggard and Maxfield (1996:209–236); and Quinn 
and Inclán (1997:771–813). 
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Legend:	  	  
Government:	  Statist-­‐nationalist	  or	  liberal-­‐cosmopolitan	  
NSP:	  national	  security	  policies—military	  spending,	  threat	  assessment,	  and	  war	  prospects;	  
High/Low	  Affinity	  (to	  high	   finance):	   government’s	  predisposition	   to	   include	   the	  preferences	  of	  
high	  finance	  in	  its	  financial-­‐security	  agenda;	  
High/Low	  Exposure	  (to	  high	  finance):	  government’s	  necessity	  to	  include	  the	  preferences	  of	  high	  
finance	  in	  its	  financial-­‐security	  agenda	  to	  solve	  the	  financial	  crisis;	  
Scenarios:	  HA–HE	  à 	  High	  Affinity	  and	  High	  Exposure;	  HA–LE	  à 	  Low	  Affinity	  and	  Low	  Exposure;	  
LA–HE	  à 	  Low	  Affinity	  and	  High	  Exposure;	  LA–LE	  à 	  Low	  Affinity	  and	  High	  Exposure.	  	  
Figure 1.1. Three Scenarios of Influence of Financial Crises on National Security Policies  	  
security than liberal-cosmopolitan governments do, while, oppositely, liberal-
cosmopolitan governments tend to face stronger incentives than statist-nationalist 
governments to pursue prudent diplomatic and military policies. As a result, the pre-
crisis affinity of liberal-cosmopolitan government is likely to be high, whereas the pre-
crisis affinity of statist-nationalist government is likely to be low.  
 
	     
                                                                                                	  
  
                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
High
%Exp
osur
e% 
NATIONAL%SECURITY%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%High%Affinity%
POLICIES:%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%High%Exposure%
EXTRA%PRUDENT%%
ORTHODOX'APPROACH'!
!!
NATIONAL%SECURITY%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Low%Affinity%
POLICIES:%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%High%Exposure%
CURBED%%
ORTHODOX'APPROACH'
% %% %%%%%%%%%%%%!
NATIONAL%SECURITY%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Low%Affinity%
POLICIES:% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Low%Exposure%
INFLATED%%
HETERODOX'APPROACH'!
% % % % %  !
%%%%%%%%%%Government%%
FI
NA
NC
IA
L%
CR
IS
IS
 
%%%%%Scenario%
!!
 
   
                                                                                                                            
             
 
 
 
                
                                                                       
                                                                                   
 
 
 
                            
            
                                    
                                                                 
                                      
 
                                                                                !
INDETERMINATE%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%High%Affinity%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Low%Exposure%
 !
%%%%%%%%Low%Exposure% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Low%Affinity%
%%%
%%%%%%
%
%%%%%%
%%%%%%
%%%%%%
%Hig
h%A
ffin
ity 
High
%Expo
sure%
 
%Low%Exposure% 
	   32 
For both reasons of simplicity and empirical relevance, the theoretical framework 
proposed here assumes that the affinity with high finance of the financial and security 
policies of the same government overlaps. The interplay between government pre-
crisis affinity with and post-crisis-outbreak exposure to high finance produces four 
possible scenarios of influence of financial crises on national financial-security 
agendas that are displayed in Figure 1.1, specifically “HA–HE,” “HA–LE,” “LA–HE,” 
and “LA–LE.” The four-letter labels refer to the values assumed by government 
affinity and exposure to high finance in each scenario. Three of these scenarios, as it 
will soon be clear, imply a shift towards greater or lesser caution in national military 
spending, threat assessment and war prospects. 
  Before examining why this is the case and how this occurs, I offer two 
cautionary notes.  First, while the theoretical framework assumes that national 
financial and security policies express a synchronized affinity with high finance, and 
that liberal-cosmopolitan and statist-nationalists governments tend to exhibit, 
respectively, high and low affinity, this synchrony is occasionally absent in practice. 
The Nordic welfare model, for instance, is a liberal-cosmopolitan government 
combining a conciliatory approach to military spending, threat assessment, and war 
prospects, with a financial and economic program heavily weighted towards non-
financial domestic groups. High finance is not ostracized, nor it is glorified.  Similarly, 
the statist-nationalist government of George W. Bush (2001–2008) pledged itself to 
deep, pro-finance tax cuts, financial deregulation, and an explicitly “anti-finance” 
assertive foreign policy.                                                                 
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Second, in a similar vein, during the process of financial crisis response, there might 
be moments in practice when government exposure to high finance appears contested, 
the adopted strategy of crisis response having failed to bring about successful crisis 
resolution. With little doubt, this occurred during the Great Depression, starting from 
financial crisis year 1933 (Schlesinger 1957:457)—after that the orthodox medicine 
had repeatedly failed, and after the power of high finance had shrunk—and it is 
possibly occurring today, in the midst of the banking scandals that have punctuated the 
GFM (Grabel 2011; James 2012).46 During these moments, crisis resolution strategies 
are susceptible to change, as are orthodox or heterodox mindsets, the power or 
weakness of the domestic financial sector, and the ability of governments and high 
finance to mobilize the financial and political resources needed to respond to the 
financial crisis. 
 Before explaining the character of the change in military spending, threat 
assessment and war prospects that occurs in each scenario, it is important to point out 
that the three, defined, national security outcomes sketched in Figure 1.1 are a result of 
the battle between government and high finance during the process of financial crisis 
response.47 Recall that crisis-stricken governments and high finance tend to have 
different strategies of financial crisis response at the onset of the financial crisis and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The Ferdinando Pecora investigations of January 1933, so-called after the American lawyer and judge 
who instituted them, sealed the loss of power of high finance, and a shifting national and international 
financial consensus. The investigations were part of a large American legal scrutiny into the practice of 
banking. Today, sluggish recovery, trading fiascos, and scandals like the LIBOR affair might indicate a 
similar turn of the tide. See, for instance, Heleen Mees, “The Zero Man,” Foreign Policy, April 3, 2012; 
David Rothkopf, “Bleak House,” Foreign Policy, April 23, 2012; Rana Foroohar, “How Barclays 
Rigged the Machine,” Time, July 23, 2012; and Jennifer Steinhauer, “Enduring Drought, Farmers Draw 
the Line at Congress,” New York Times, August 12, 2012. 
47 On describing disagreements over economic beliefs and policies as “battles” see, for instance, 
Seabrooke (2006:1).  
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are battling to see their strategy implemented. Whether crisis-stricken governments or 
high finance will win the battle depends on whether the former or the latter exerts 
control over the resources that are needed to solve the crisis, and specifically two 
resources: financial mindsets and domestic financial actors.  
Table 1.1 The battle between governments and high finance 
 FINANCIAL MINDSETS 
 
Orthodox 
 
Heterodox 
 
 
 
 
 
DOMESTIC 
FINANCIAL  
ACTORS 
 
Strong 
 
High Exposure: High Finance Wins 
(Governments Lose) 
 
Low Affinity à NSP: CURBED 
High Affinity à NSP: EXTRA-
PRUDENT 
[Security Dilemma Lessened] 
 
N/A 
 
Weak 
 
N/A 
 
Low Exposure: High Finance Loses 
(Governments Win) 
 
Low Affinity à NSP: INFLATED 
     [Security Dilemma is Exacerbated] 
High Affinity à INDETERMINATE 
      
 
When orthodox mindsets are dominant, and domestic financial actors are 
strong, high finance tends to control the resources to solve the financial crisis and 
obviously governments tend to be exposed to high finance. In this context, 
governments having low affinity with high finance will tend to endorse the orthodox 
medicine and the security conditionality linked to it, curbing their pre-crisis 
assertiveness. Government with high affinity with high finance will be urged by high 
finance to go past the point of redoubling on an agenda based on conciliatory national 
security policies. National security policies will tend to shift towards greater caution, 
and the security dilemma will be lessened as a result. Differently, when heterodox 
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mindsets are dominant and domestic financial actors are weak, crisis-stricken 
governments tend to control the resources of financial crisis response, and have a low 
exposure to high finance. Governments with low affinity with high finance will inflate 
their national security policies, and the security dilemma is likely to worsen in this 
context. The framework does not suggest a specific behavior for the national security 
policies of crisis-stricken governments having a high affinity with high finance. Table 
1.1 sums these considerations.  
 
Scenarios of Influence 
 Because of the value that they attribute to their pre-crisis financial-security 
agendas, and because national leaderships’ political survival rests on them, 
governments are likely to respond to financial crises by redoubling on their pre-crisis 
policies. Namely, governments pursuing assertive national security policies will strive 
for greater assertiveness while governments practicing conciliatory diplomatic and 
military policies will attempt greater restraint. They make this choice for at least two 
interrelated reasons. To begin, while financial crises display a problem in 
governments’ policies and policymaking, denying the existence of a problem based on 
the validity of a financial-security agenda that has shown to work in the past is an 
appealing, low-cost strategy of political self-preservation. Moreover, the pre-crisis 
agenda comes with an ideational baggage over the “best” or “most apt” financial, 
military and diplomatic policies. Abandoning them and rapidly transitioning towards 
alternative solutions becomes unfeasible even if the threat to governments’ survival, 
the shortened time-horizon, and the uncertainty posed by financial crises cause 
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concern. Recent experience with financial crises confirms the doubling-down 
hypothesis. Following the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, for instance, policy 
analysts and observers around the world, members of governments of the affected and 
unaffected states, and international institutions like the IMF denied that a crisis was 
under way in East Asia. The existing financial policies were pushed ahead with greater 
strength, as the crisis spread to Latin America and Russia. A very similar response has 
occurred, and in some regions of the world is still occurring, since the 2008 onset of 
the GFM. In the early months of the crisis, the Bush administration denied that there 
was any serious problem, declaring that it was acting pragmatically in rescuing 
financially bankrupt firms.48 
  Although this “double-down movement” is the strategy for crisis response 
envisioned by either kind of government, crisis-stricken administrations—for reasons 
explained in the earlier section—are not always able to implement or pursue it until 
the end of national financial difficulties. Since the financial and security components 
of governments’ policy agendas are interdepend, two important implications follow: 
after the outbreak of a financial crisis, the course of national security policies is likely 
to change, and this change will depend on the particular scenario within which crisis-
stricken governments operate.  In each scenario, governments committed to assertive 
or cautious military spending, threat assessment and war prospects will have to 
choose, or be forced to choose, between the “compromising” solution of validating 
(or-revalidating) international financial openness, and the “uncompromising” solution 
of delinking, or continuing to delink national financial and security policies from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 On this point, see especially Stiglizt (2010). 
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imperative of international financial coordination, primarily deflation, implied by 
participation in an international financial system.49 The incentives and constraints to 
select one route over the other will vary.  
 Imagine a government in scenario “LA–LE.” The government in question is 
committed to the pursuit of assertive national security policies when a financial crisis 
strikes. Government affinity with high finance is low, as pre-crisis financial policies 
have been adjusted to meet this national security agenda, privileging heterodoxy over 
orthodoxy. Relatedly, national dependence on the international financial systems is 
limited or inexistent; a domestic financial sector has not yet developed or is powerless; 
and neoliberal mental frameworks are absent. The coalition or party in power is statist-
nationalist in kind—an acceptable hypothesis in view of the lesser constraints to the 
pursuit of assertiveness that statist-nationalist coalitions or parties encounter. The 
government is also well positioned to rely on highly centralized institutions; extract 
financial resources from the people; minimize the social consequences of political 
dissonance; and deflect to the domestic private financial sector the adjustment costs of 
crisis response. In sum, government exposure to high finance is low. In this scenario, 
government authorities have no incentive to abandon existing national security 
policies and pursue fiscal and monetary deflation to signal credibility to domestic and 
foreign investors. The reasons are various.  
 To begin, responding to the crisis by maximizing domestic resource extraction 
is possible and in line with existing mercantilist-protectionist frames of mind. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 A state’s participation in the international financial system, a system made by states and for states, 
will last as long as the state perceives that remaining in the system is beneficial to national financial and 
economic growth. Financial crises test the value of international financial systems. On this point, see 
Eichengreen (1996:35). 
	   38 
Secondly, a strong domestic financial sector, and the increasing permeability of 
domestic borders to foreign capital, are a hindrance to the inward-looking strategy of 
accelerated economic and industrial development sustaining, and, in turn, being 
sustained by, a well-oiled commitment to strengthening national defense. Thirdly, 
redressing the extreme skepticism of high finance towards the status of national 
finances would require abandoning the ambitious approach to military spending, threat 
assessment, and war prospects propelling the military-industrial complex that 
maintains the government in power. Fourthly, the experience of exclusion from the 
international financial system, and possibly the relevance of a regional context that is 
similarly insulated from international capital markets (Solingen 1998; Katzenstein 
2005), will cement government leaders’ belief that rival states will not be deterred 
from taking advantage diplomatically or militarily of a window of opportunity opened 
by the financial crisis. The collapse of national financial institutions located abroad 
could further increase the perception of forthcoming diplomatic and military losses. In 
this context, the domestic private financial sector, if at all present, will not be capable 
of persuading the government of the benefits of the orthodox medicine. High finance 
will not dictate the conditions of recovery, and heterodox financial ideas will 
predominate. This scenario is popular when military governments are in power, and a 
state-led program of accelerated development and military prowess captures the hearts 
and minds of the ruling oligarchy. 
 Consequently, softening national defense policies is an extremely unappealing 
strategy, whereas inflating militant national security policies and transferring rising 
percentages of GNP to national rearmament promises to reduce domestic opposition 
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arising from the representatives of the military-industrial complex. Government 
authorities are therefore likely to focus their energies on counteracting the weakening 
of existing national security policies, and minimizing the potential or real diplomatic 
or military losses caused by the crisis. Defending and reinvigorating the national 
financial system, the fiscal and monetary sovereignty of the state, the government’s 
financial bases abroad, and the success of existing national security policies will take 
priority. Governments will redouble the pace of investment in national defense, and 
further emphasize the risks of existing threats. The increase in military spending will 
be decreed in an attempt to resupply existing military plans and activities as well as 
spurring government-led investment and economic growth. Concern over the solidity 
of existing alliances will increase and government authorities will deem war prospects 
to be more likely than before the crisis.50 Overall, the crisis-stricken government will 
adopt a more assertive set of national security policies than in the absence of the crisis 
(Fig.1), exacerbating the existing or perceived security dilemma. Even if the objective 
of national authorities is to prevent a worsening of the security dilemma and to defend 
but not radicalize pre-crisis military and diplomatic policies, governments are very 
likely to inflate their bold pre-crisis national security plans. The national security 
context proximate to the Russian-Japanese War of 1904–05 exemplified this logic, as 
both participants embarked on greater assertiveness following the onset of a financial 
crisis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Note that this interpretation of the influence of a financial crisis on war prospects is distinct from the 
diversionary theory of war, in which economic instability persuades governmental elites to initiate a 
diversionary war with an opponent in the attempt to divert public attention from domestic troubles that 
threaten the survival of the regime. In the interpretation offered here, governmental elites might even be 
concerned for their political survival, but the chief problem lies in diverting the expectation of foreign 
opponents that the financial crisis has weakened the government and its national security policies. 
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 Imagine now the same statist-nationalist government in “LA-HE.” The 
government wants to continue its assertive security plans, and might even strengthen 
them after the outbreak of the crisis. The costs of the maneuver are now politically 
daunting, however. High finance, a powerful domestic financial sector, members of 
the opposition, and a majority of domestic forces will oppose unsustainable trends in 
military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects, pointing at their deleterious 
effect on national financial creditworthiness or the national economy. Abidance by the 
norms of financial orthodoxy is presented as essential for crisis response and the 
restoration of financial stability. As the costs of exclusion from international financial 
markets and possibly of foreign financial dependence soar, the political and financial 
resources available to national financial institutions to fend off the crisis decrease 
sharply. High finance, possibly but not necessarily united with domestic finance, will 
attach conditions to fund disbursement, and will not lend or stop lending without a 
stronger commitment to fiscal and monetary deflation and to a conciliatory diplomatic 
and military agenda.  
 This scenario is likely, for instance, when the domestic institutional support 
and ideational drive behind a statist-nationalist government fade away as the crisis 
unveils no-longer bearable adjustment costs and reveals the increasing advantage of 
defending national financial credibility, placing national finances on a sustainable 
path, and upholding the principles of a liberal financial order. Heterodox financial 
models are likely to be rejected, and emerging domestic financial forces are awarded a 
stronger role within existing institutions. The crisis-stricken government is likely to 
reach a political compromise with emerging political forces or be replaced by a 
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government enjoying the approval of high finance. The timing and character of the 
transition towards a liberal-cosmopolitan security agenda are likely to vary across 
politico-institutional contexts. Political debate or unrest resulting from the financial 
crisis might quickly lead to government rearrangement or replacement. Alternatively, 
political dissent will find its expression through electoral channels, favoring 
candidates and parties who support sound finances and a compromising military 
agenda.  
 Institutional differences apart, if the financial crisis ushers in an increase in the 
exposure to high finance of a statist-nationalist government, the national security 
agenda will tilt towards greater caution or internationalism. Old or new state 
authorities are likely to recognize that assertive security policies have been pushed 
beyond the state’s financial means, and that greater commitment to strengthening 
national finances requires overhauling pre-crisis plans. Cuts in military spending will 
be endorsed. Threat assessment will be softened to signal financial investors at home 
and abroad that the national economy is on its way to recovery, and that no military 
ambition or distraction will interrupt it. War prospects will decrease (Fig.1). The 
security dilemma will ease, and national security policies will display greater prudence 
than in the absence of financial crisis. The peaceful resolution of the 1907 military-
security crisis between United States and Japan, for example, was strongly reinforced 
by the materialization of this scenario triggered by the global financial crisis of 1907.  
 In “HA-LE” the picture is exactly opposite. A government that has opted for 
prudent diplomatic and military policies is shocked by financial crisis, but knows or 
discovers that it is impossible to stop the detrimental effects of the crisis on national 
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wealth and welfare by resorting to the orthodox medicine in a bid to entice financial 
markets. In this scenario, a crisis-stricken, liberal-cosmopolitan government 
acknowledges the costs of domestically unpopular orthodox measures, and gains 
significant freedom from high finance and domestic financial interests. Finance writ-
large is either disinterested in the country either because of the dismal opportunities 
that it offers to global capital, or because it is weakened by the financial crisis itself. 
Concurrently, the release of the pre-crisis constraints which international financial 
markets were posing on the exercise of assertive national security policies empowers 
domestic groups supporting heterodox financial policies. How important the release of 
the constraints posed by international capital markets is for the course of national 
security policies after financial crisis outbreak is highly dependent on how the 
diminished power of finance modifies specific political contexts. More pointedly, the 
decreased power of international financial markets—and international economic 
markets—leaves governments that before the crisis subscribed to a cautionary 
financial-security agenda with lesser constraints but not necessary more incentives to 
include financial, economic, diplomatic and possibly military experimentation in their 
strategy of crisis response, steering away from their conciliatory national security 
policies. As a result, on the basis of the framework here developed, the change in pre-
crisis national security agendas underpinning this scenario is indeterminate and so is 
the security dilemma in this context (Fig.1).51  Governments in this scenario face 
substantial incentives to develop strong ties with the real or non-financial sectors of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 It is noteworthy that this theoretical framework would be much less interesting if most financial-crisis 
episodes in history had resulted in “HA–LE,” and this scenario only. I can state quite confidently that 
both the empirical evidence gathered in this work and the existing scholarship on financial crises 
suggest that this is not the case. 
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the economy, and take on a more active monetary and fiscal role. Both elements, along 
with the decreased relevance of international financial markets, will likely keep 
national defense spending much less under check than they had before. Similarly, the 
decreased power of orthodox mental frameworks will likely encourage government 
authorities to see the dangers, rather than the benefits, of pursuing an unreservedly 
dovish foreign policy, and recognize, even amplify, the threats to national security 
posed by the behavior of other states. Like national financial and economic policies, 
national security policies will enter a phase of experimentation. This occurred in the 
United States during the Great Depression: President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
approach to military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects injected novel 
assertiveness into a largely restrained national security posture. Differently, in those 
politico-institutional contexts where the fall of high finance and domestic financial 
elites empowers previously restrained confrontational interests, cautionary forces will 
be silenced, threats enlarged, and war and military spending embraced as an engine of 
national economic growth and prosperity.52 This development decided the 
international political orientation of Italy between 1932 and 1934, as the constraints 
posed by financial interests on Mussolini’s intentions came off, and so did the 
exposure of the government to high finance.53 
 Finally, in “HA–HE,” a crisis-stricken, liberal-cosmopolitan government 
makes prominent sacrifices in its national security agendas because crisis resolution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This interpretation is distinct from and possibly antithetical to the explanation offered by the 
diversionary war hypothesis. The matter is not “diverting attention” as much as finding more 
appropriate tools to resolve the financial crisis.  
53 It is also possible that pro-finance governments and their cautionary security policies are trumped by 
the increase in relative power of national or subnational military forces, like it occurred in Japan in 
1931.  
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must be achieved by rescuing financial confidence and national financial credibility 
through greater deflationary policies. The government is likely to be at the head of a 
financially and politically decentralized domestic structure where orthodox financial 
mindsets are dominant. It is also likely to be limited in its ability and willingness to 
deflect the cost of the crisis to powerful, domestic financial elites, having long 
experienced the benefits of subordinating national security ambitions to cross-border 
capital movements and neoliberal mental frameworks. In this scenario, high finance 
will play a direct, important role in the process of crisis resolution, as the government 
will need, in order to solve the crisis, to bend its financial-security agenda under the 
pressure of unfettered capital mobility.54 Pre-crisis national security policies included 
a military budget kept under watchful observance, the downplaying of threats to 
national security, and a general commitment to international peace. After the crisis 
outbreak, however, pre-crisis military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects 
are pushed to new conciliatory extremes, because the prevailing wisdom amongst 
domestic political circles is that mobile capital is the key to crisis resolution.55 
Creating more suitable conditions for the thriving of business impels further 
disarmament, and the further downplaying of threats and war prospects (Fig.1). Like 
in LA–HE, the security dilemma is lessened.  
 Notably, intrinsic belief in the virtues of unfettered free markets is not even 
necessary, although, if present, would explain exceptionally conciliatory national 
security undertakings by liberal-cosmopolitan governments and their disinterest in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Note that while in LA-LE government cohesiveness is an asset, in HA-HE domestic support for 
orthodox financial policies is an advantage. 
55 The number of parties and political forces involved in, or benefiting from, this decision is likely to 
vary across different contexts. 
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their potential consequences. What is necessary is that high finance and financial 
orthodoxy are considered by government authorities as the most powerful or 
convenient tools for crisis resolution for the time being.56 The military and diplomatic 
responses by various governments to the 2009 European sovereign debt crisis fit this 
scenario. 
 To sum up, when government exposure to the pressures of high finance is low 
after a financial crisis outbreak, (statist-nationalist) governments pursuing assertive 
national security policies are likely to double-down their pre-crisis agenda, whereas 
(liberal-cosmopolitan) governments pursuing prudent national security policies are 
likely to enter a period of uncertainty and policy experimentation. When government 
exposure is high, neither liberal-cosmopolitan nor statist-nationalist governments 
pursuing, respectively prudent and assertive national security policies are likely to see 
their optimal strategies for crisis response realized. Liberal-cosmopolitan governments 
will be urged by high finance to go past the point of redoubling an agenda based on 
financial orthodoxy and conciliatory national security policies. The result is likely to 
be an extra prudent and super orthodox financial-security agenda.57 In contrast, statist-
nationalist governments will be impelled by high finance to pull back from their 
intended doubling-down of an assertive, financially heterodox pre-crisis agenda 
(Fig.1). The inflation, curbing, or extra-cautionary reshuffling of pre-crisis military 
spending, threat assessment, and war prospects is the influence that financial crises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For an instrumental understanding of the role of mental frameworks in decision-making, see 
Goldstein and Keohane (1993), Chapter 1. 
57 This occurs because increased pressures from high finance to resort to financial orthodoxy are 
compounded by the shift towards greater financial orthodoxy than government B, a cautionary 
government with a high affinity with high finance is, already on its own, willing to implement.  
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produce by requiring crisis-stricken governments to respond to an urgent political and 
financial threat and redefine their relationship with high finance.  
 The shift towards greater assertiveness or greater caution does not necessarily 
affect all three branches of national security decision-making, although this 
development seems likely to occur in LA–HE, when the pre-crisis security agenda is 
curbed rather than inflated. More importantly, crisis resolution can entail a number of 
scenarios. For instance, government exposure to high finance might remain high 
throughout the first stage of a crisis, when well-known financial and security measures 
are applied in greater doses and change in fundamental beliefs or perceptions remains 
difficult.58 Yet, repeated strategic failure will induce greater updating in existing 
beliefs and greater likelihood of policy overturn. In this respect, the American and 
Italian local financial crises of, respectively, 1893 and 1896–98 first tilted the national 
security policies of both states towards greater caution. Later, in both states, liberal-
cosmopolitan governments realized incumbent threats or severely prejudiced military 
dreams, and frantically responded to the newly acquired military-diplomatic weakness 
by slating a cautionary posture. In sum, the process of financial-crisis response is best 
regarded as developing through a series of stages in which national security decision-
making concerning military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects could take 
a different direction each time.  
 Shifts towards less assertive and more assertive (or less cautious and more 
cautious) national security policies can both occur before a new equilibrium in the 
national financial-security agenda is found. Until then, perceptions of the security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 On the difficulty of replacing existing beliefs see, for instance, Tetlock (1991:27-31). 
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dilemma, and eventually the real dilemma, will evolve. Notably, the essence of the 
argument of this dissertation is not that the influence of financial crisis on national 
security policies is best judged by the degree of disparity in national security policies 
before and after a financial crisis. Rather, the argument advanced here is that financial 
crises leave their mark on national security policies; that the characteristics of that 
mark vary based on the interaction between government affinity with and exposure to 
high finance; and that the resulting changes in military spending, threat assessment, 
and war prospects would either not have occurred, or occurred differently had 
financial crises been absent.59 As the chapters of this dissertation show, the direction 
of the changes is not more important than the very fact that these changes occur. 
Importantly, while governments undertaking them were induced to affect the security 
dilemma in a certain way, their perceptions were not always correct, especially when 
change entailed a paramount abdication to military and diplomatic conciliation. 
 
CASE SELECTION  
 
 The bulk of this dissertation rests on the comparative analysis of four large, 
heuristic case studies.60 I call them “large” not because of their length but because they 
either cover a long temporal span or study the national security influence of financial 
crises across multiple countries. Three of the case studies apply the theoretical 
inferences so far illustrated to the national security influence of financial crises in, 
respectively, Japan, Italy, and the United States between 1880 and 1940. The fourth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 This point has important implications for the research methods used in this work, as clarified later in 
this chapter.  
60 Case studies here are “heuristic” in that they are the raw material for the theoretical foundations of 
this chapter. On heuristic case studies, see Greenstein and Polsby (1975:104-108). 
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portrays the influence of the 1914 global financial crisis on decision-making 
concerning military spending, threat assessment and war prospects in Austria-
Hungary, Germany and Great Britain. The main cases—Japan, Italy and the United 
States—were chosen with several aims in mind. To begin with, although the precise 
influence of financial crises on national security policies differs from case to case as 
well as within cases, all three states were recognized as significant financial and 
military powers during the analyzed period. They experienced financial crises—at 
times the same financial crisis—and they approached decision-making on military 
spending, threat assessment and war prospects with assertiveness as well as caution. 
Related to this point, the power of high finance and government exposure to the 
pressures of high finance varied in each state across the timeframe (1880–1940) as 
well as across financial crises. Moreover, in each state, financial crises affected statist-
nationalist governments and statist-nationalist financial-security agendas, as well as 
liberal-cosmopolitan governments and liberal-cosmopolitan financial-security 
agendas.  
 While these elements indicate that each of the three selected states offers, 
individually, appropriate terrain for analyzing the national security influences of 
financial crises in the considered period, Japan, Italy, and the United States are 
representative candidates for this study even when collectively considered. The 
national political and financial systems of each case and, more broadly, their cultures, 
histories, military traditions and geographic locations are significantly distinct. As a 
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result, Japanese, Italian, and American financial-security agendas rested on different 
ingredients, broadening the latitude of the theoretical inferences of this work.61  
 Three diverse backgrounds also informed the affinity with and exposure to 
high finance of the Japanese, Italian, and American governments, whatever their 
international political orientation and national security agendas. Japanese political and 
financial institutions were strong, centralized, and significantly apt at saving, taxing, 
and fighting. The Japanese constitutional monarchy legitimized, under divine 
supervision, the authoritarian rule of an oligarchic cabinet, thrived on the repression or 
exclusion of dissonant political voices, and rested on a powerful and independent 
military, directly answerable only to the emperor. The emergence of party government 
and bipartisan competition, which reached their most satisfactory operation in the 
1920s but developed long before then, did not alter the exclusive access and exercise 
of power to which Japanese rulers were accustomed. Similarly, the Japanese financial 
system was hierarchically structured around the Bank of Japan and several specialized 
banks and corporate financing organizations (“zaibatsu”), under the direct regulation 
and guidance of the government. The system worked by steering household savings to 
the treasury and national industries to serve the developmental and military purposes 
of the state (Ranis 1959:440–454; Patrick 1965:187–213; Tsutsui 1990; Francks 
1992:29–40; Pauly 1994:351–55; Tamaki 1995:10,62,64; Beasley 2000).62 Overall, 
the presence of a strong army, commonly unconstrained by civilian influences, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Some of these different ingredients are widely acknowledged in the literature on comparative political 
economy. See particularly Gilpin (1975:37–50); Katzenstein (1978:4,20,21,22); Strange (1988:23–34, 
64–73); Sakakibara (1993); and Hall and Soskice (2001:88,92,94,100,170,459,461). 
61 On the relevance of this mission for theory development, see Locke and Thelen (1998:11); and 
George and Bennett (2004:12,19–22). 
62 This model also informed the Japanese projection of power abroad. On the continuing relevance of 
this Japanese model today, see Pauly (1994) and Helleiner and Pickel (2005). 
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commitment to national financial and monetary autonomy rendered Japan a scarcely 
hospitable environment for foreign high finance and the internationalization of 
financial investments. High finance could only be a c force within the Japanese 
government and, even in that case, the traditional power of military authorities often 
trumped it. No wonder, a group of powerful, private financial and business actors 
emerged very slowly in Japan. 
 Differently from Japan, the institutions of the Italian government were 
moderately centralized (or moderately decentralized), and historically exposed to 
foreign interference—political and financial.63 Rather than being organized around a 
small number of oligarchs, Italian governments were commonly coalitional in nature, 
reflecting political consensus across a diversity of loosely connected forces or parties 
(Mack Smith 1997:97–103; Verzichelli 2007:2,6,9,10). Consensus amongst different 
groups was obtained by charismatic and difficult-to-replace leading figures and, 
occasionally, by the king. Only in 1934 did Mussolini’s totalitarian regime undermine 
the exercise of consensual or parliamentary politics. The Italian economy was highly 
reliant on foreign borrowing, and the national financial system was, as much as the 
political system, only moderately centralized. Specifically, the state’s development 
and industrialization rested on a few domestically located commercial banks that were 
private and often in competition with one another. Differently from Japan, a private 
and politically independent domestic financial sector developed early in Italy. 
Relatedly, Italy was never the militarized state that Japan was. The Royal Italian Army 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 It is noteworthy that neither a civil war (United States) nor unification by military conquest (Japan) 
“made” Italy. The process of Italian unification stemmed from the increasing dissatisfaction with 
foreign domination and was enabled by diffused social and insurrectionary movements. See, for 
instance, Ziblatt (2006:chapter 5).  
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was an expression of the Italian model of moderate centralization. Used only rarely to 
repress popular unrest, and lacking a solid esprit de corps, the Italian Army remained, 
until the early 1930s, fairly regularly under civilian control. Its track record made it 
more popular for its startling military losses than for its modest military victories, or 
heroic instances of military resistance. Still, Italian armed forces found constant 
support in the monarchy and enjoyed the respect of an all-but-insignificant share of the 
political class.  
 Italy’s perpetual position as military alliance partner—albeit a volatile one—
also made national armed forces all the more necessary, while the penchant for 
colonial adventurism never faded, even when liberal forces were in power (Rochat and 
Massobrio 1987:37,60,128,268; Lowe and Marzani 2002:6,7,22). Although an 
ambitious foreign policy never lost its appeal amongst Italian elites, the Italian 
government remained unable to compel the banks (or the public) into coordinated 
action or resource-extractive plans for national purposes, like Japanese state 
authorities were able to do. Similarly, neither Italian financial authorities nor Italian 
private banks had ever the power to join foreign high finance, like it occurred in the 
United States, or create their own high finance domestically, like it occurred in Japan. 
Although the Italian government regarded the domestic private banks as the engine of 
national economic growth, the survival of both entities depended on British, French, 
German, or American capital (Posner 1978: 225,229,234,235; Serra 1987:611–612; 
Goodman 1992:142–143; Fratianni and Spinelli 1997:88). Ultimately, Italian borders 
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were much more permeable than those of Japan, and Italian private or public financial 
forces not as mighty as their American and Japanese counterparts could be.64  
 Finally, the American political and financial systems were considerably 
decentralized, although presidential government and a vibrant judicial system 
counteracted extreme decentralization. Political decentralization found expression, for 
instance, in the absence of a specialized, politically insulated American bureaucracy; 
the trimness of the diplomatic apparatus; and the access of American citizens to 
congressional and presidential representation through regularly held elections (Bensel 
1990:5,117; Friedberg 1992; Zakaria 1995:40,46,47). The overturning of a cabinet (as 
in Japan) or complete government reshuffling with or without government overturns 
(as in Italy), both expressions of centralized bureaucratic government, were impossible 
in the United States. The American state was also scarcely interventionist in a variety 
of spheres ranging from national development to colonial occupation. American 
military forces were unequivocally under civilian control, and their involvement in 
foreign lands or share of the national budget was modest in comparison to the 
immense economic and industrial strength of the American state and the behavior of 
other states (Graebner 1985:202–203; Hung 1987:16–18,43; Kennedy 1987:202,203; 
Eloranta 2003). From this perspective, the American state was much weaker than that 
of Italy or Japan.65 Not irrelevantly, it was also much less exposed to external threats.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Italian financial elites were neither as powerful as their British, French, German and American 
counterparts—the representatives of high finance—nor as “compact” a front as Japanese financial elites 
were when they climbed to power. 
65 It is noteworthy that American institutional weakness did not apply to important spheres of statehood 
like enforcement. With regard to the latter, for instance, American institutions were much stronger than 
those of Italy or Japan. On this point see, for instance, Fukuyama (2004).  
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 Financial decentralization accompanied political decentralization. American 
financial and economic wealth rested on a deregulated market-based system that 
continued to operate in the absence of a centralized or semi-centralized financial 
structure until 1913.66 Thereafter, a system of weakly coordinated federal banks was in 
place until 1934 when, finally and thanks to the Great Depression, financial 
centralization was achieved (Meltzer 1958:55,140–45; Zysman 1983:12,18; Chernow 
1990; Gordon 2008). 67  Because of these delayed, and never completed, efforts at 
strengthening national financial institutions, and because of the bottom-up nature of 
American involvement in the international financial system, powerful American 
private financers effectively acted as the United States’ central bank throughout most 
of the period between 1880 and 1940. Differently from Japan, high finance in the 
United States was not a state matter but a private matter. American bankers were high 
finance. They were high finance always that is the financial officials of the American 
state could never be high finance. At most, they could be aligned with it. Moreover, a 
powerful high finance was a constant feature of American politics, not an occasional 
feature as in Japan.  Differently from Italy, high finance in the American case had both 
a foreign and a domestic component. During financial crises, high finance played its 
game versus the American government both at home and abroad.  
 The distinct politico-institutional contexts of Japan, Italy, and the United 
States, and the specific place of, and interactions between, high finance, governments, 
and domestic financial actors in each context are especially suited for an application of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Financial deregulation was not complete in that the federal government maintained firm control of the 
money supply.  
67 The American financial system was completely reorganized in 1934. Only thereafter could one claim 
that the US finally had a central bank with the powers it needed to function.  
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the “most-different-systems” design (or Mill’s Method of Similarity). If the analytical 
framework here discussed is correct, the adoption of this research design should lead 
to the same conclusion that, in all three cases, financial crises were followed by a 
change in national security policies, and that the character of the change conformed to 
the combinations of government affinity with high finance and government exposure 
to high finance outlined in 1.1. These considerations apply not only to the first three 
Chapters, but also to Chapter Five since the focus of that chapter, once again, is on the 
national security influence of financial crises in three different politico-institutional 
contexts.  
 Data for the case studies consist of primary historical documents, primary and 
secondary literature on financial, diplomatic, and military history, and numerical series 
on financial and military indicators. Importantly, excluded from this dissertation are 
episodes of financial crises that occurred during war. Since the “urgent” and 
“threatening” character that accompanies financial crises in peacetime—making 
financial crises real “crises”—is diluted or legitimized in wartime, addressing wartime 
financial crises is outside the scope of the analytical framework that this dissertation 
proposes. “Wartime financial crisis” might indeed be an improperly used word 
combination. More apt seems the word choice “wartime financial pressures,” since in 
wartime “crisis” becomes the permanent operating status of policymaking. As one 
scholar fittingly described it, “during wartime financial control is inevitably relaxed 
and the administration of financial departments is marked by a certain lack of grip and 
strength especially in regard to the control of expenditures. Things have to be done 
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and done quickly, [with] formulae and conventions brushed aside.” 68 Not belonging 
to the category “wartime financial crises” are those financial crises that occurred 
weeks before crisis-stricken governments’ participation in major war. Those crises are, 
by all means, like any other military-security crisis, and they find systematic treatment 
in this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Shirras (1936:5). On the challenge posed by war on state finance and the normal conduct of decision-
making, see Keynes (1914:460–486); Blainey (1973) pp.193–194; De Cecco (1974:127–170); Capie 
and Wood (1986:77–116); Brewer (1988:xx). 
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CHAPTER II 	  
HOME RULES: 
JAPANESE GUARDIANS OF PUBLIC FINANCES  
AND UNTRADITIONAL MILITARY RETRENCHMENT 	  
Financial crisis of 1899-1901:  
“The public should take advantage of ongoing military plans to shape [new] bold plans for creating 
national wealth.” 
Midovi Komatse, May 1900.  
 
 
Financial crisis of 1927-31: 
                                                          “Japan should lead other nations in the promotion of international 
peace [and disarmament].” 
Saionji Kinmochi, July 1929   
 
For most of the time between 1880 and 1940, Japan earned a reputation for its 
resistance to foreign interference, its commitment to state-led economic and industrial 
growth, and its reliance on martial values and prowess in external as much as internal 
interactions. To a greater extent than cherishing Japan’s entrance and participation in 
the international (financial) system, Japanese political leaders treasured state 
independence and development, and the attainment of Japan’s economic sphere and 
empire. Membership in the international financial system was valuable to the extent 
that it provided Japan with greater resources to reach these goals as well as equal 
status with Western nations. The mercantilist slogan “rich nation, strong army” 
received enormous political support, and Japanese military achievements were 
remarkable, much more remarkable than any American, let alone Italian.69 They were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 On the relevance of the “rich nation, strong army” slogan in Japanese foreign policy, see Samuels 
(1994), pp.15-18. Note that in the 1930s the terms “national defense state” and “co-prosperity sphere” 
expressed the same logic. On this point, see Osaka (1941), p.80, and Miwa (1983), p.28.A few notes on 
Japanese military achievements. In 1894-95, Japanese armed forces crushed China. Ten years later, they 
defeated Russia. In 1914, the Japanese Army started an unchecked march to acquire territories in China, 
the Shantung province, and the Pacific. Between 1917 and 1921, Japanese forces took control of 
Siberia, and, by early 1932, they had extended their authority over Manchuria, threatening further 
advances in continental Asia.  
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also the reason why Japan could join the gold standard. Had Japan not defeated China 
in 1895 and obtained a large pecuniary indemnity for that victory, no gold standard 
would have been introduced a couple of years later. 
In this context, high finance encountered challenges: it could develop only out 
of the initiative of state authorities; it was more likely to appeal to state authorities 
under the presence of a party system and the incorporation of the preferences of the 
rich electorate in governments’ agendas; and it was accepted only as a means to 
increase the prestige and power of the Japanese state. Thus, high finance in Japan 
originated within state boundaries, and evolved with the Japanese government’s 
efforts to climb the international ladder, and with the development of an increasingly 
democratic society. It was a creature that emerged from and abided to home rules or 
needs. It was neither the collection of private financiers characterizing the American 
experience, nor the powerful, fixed, foreign variable that regularly pierced Italian 
governments. Japanese governments and high finance were not separate entities: either 
government officials desired to be high finance, or they were high finance, or high 
finance in Japan simply did not exist.   
For instance, up until the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), high finance existed 
in Japan in the form of continuous attempts, on the part of Japanese ruling oligarchy, 
to join the gold standard and thereby have access to invaluable (foreign) capital to 
finance Japanese economic and industrial growth, besides obviously enhancing 
Japan’s international status.70 Between 1906 and 1931, high finance was present in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 On the heterodox foundations of Japanese entrance in the gold standard see Smethurst (2007), p.122. 
Although Japan entered the gold standard in 1897, Western financial circles were traditionally hesitant 
of lending money to Japan. Between 1897 and 1904, key Japanese financial officials worked hard to 
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form of non-elected and elected key officials who defended their state’s continued 
access to foreign funds, and, to this scope, understood the value of financial 
internationalism and the necessity of a “negative” policy of cutting military spending, 
deficits, and inflation to restore or maintain sound finances. 71  Although tension 
existed between this course of actions and the classical, “positive” policy of state 
building through public spending in the industrial and military sphere, the officials of 
the Japanese state who represented high finance—people like Inoue Kaoru, Takahashi 
Korekiyo and Inouye Junnosuke—earned abroad similar reputation and respect to 
Montagu Norman and Benjamin Strong. Their respect for financial orthodoxy could 
go to incredible lengths, and their ability to obtain foreign capital for national financial 
and economic growth endowed them, from the late 1900s through the late 1920s, of 
considerable political fortune domestically. Differently from British or American 
banking elites, even when the benefits of  “negative” financial and economic policies 
were most appreciated and chased, Japanese representatives of high finance remained 
skeptical of an excessive reliance on foreign finance and foreign bankers.  As one of 
the fathers of Japanese finance Takahashi Korekiyo put it, it was “not necessary (for 
Japan) to listen to the opinion of foreign bankers in determining Japan’s system.”72  
From 1931 onwards, Japanese representatives of high finance were brutally murdered, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dispel foreign skepticism over the status of Japanese finances and establish a dialogue with the 
American and British financial circles. Notably, foreign high finance was persuaded to lend to Japan 
following Japanese military victories during the Russo-Japanese war. 
71 On the birth and coexistence of the “positive” (or Keynesian) and “negative” (or monetarist) 
expressions of Japanese economic policy see Smethurst (2007), pp.88-95, and Meltzer (2006), pp.67-
90. 
72 Takahashi’s words are from Meltzer (2006), p.32. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, some Japanese 
financial officials were ready even to be killed while defending financial orthodoxy. Inoue Junnosuke 
told a trusted official in 1930: “If I am killed, quickly lift the gold embargo.” See Meltzer (2006), p.199. 
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and Japanese politics continued without a thought about high finance until well after 
World War Two. 
 The rise, life, and demise of high finance in Japan between 1880 and 1940 is 
closely related to the influence of financial crises on Japanese national security 
policies.73 This chapter argues that, like high finance, this influence followed home 
rules. Financial crises were a fundamental reason of Japanese leaders’ attraction to, 
and disenchantment with the principles of international financial cooperation and the 
foreign capital that Japan earned (or could earn) by abiding to these principles.  
Between 1906 and 1931, financial crises in Japan regularly sparked the 
abandonment or further distancing from a nationalist agenda aiming at military 
expansion and assertive empire building. In this period, after financial crisis outbreak, 
an increasing number of Japanese officials recognized the advantage, for the Japanese 
state and for themselves, of becoming diligent members of the international financial 
system because the vital tasks of obtaining foreign capital and the votes of the (rich) 
electorate required it. One could argue that Japanese financial officials morphed into 
high finance. Sent to London, Washington and other major European capitals in times 
of financial need, to win precious capital to finance Japan’s economic and military 
development, Japanese (financial) officials clearly understood the burden of having 
unsound domestic finances or the mistake of concealing them. They also understood 
the increasing resistance of the rich electorate, and eventually of part of the Seiyūkai 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The career path of Takahashi Korekiyo, one of the main Japanese financial authorities at the time, 
give a sense of the rising power of financial interests in Japan between 1880 and 1931. In 1892 
Takahashi was an employee of the Bank of Japan; in 1898 he became vice president of a state bank, the 
Yokohama Specie Bank; in 1904-1905 he rose to a position of political preeminence within the 
Japanese cabinet by raising foreign loans after the Russo-Japanese war, and by 1913 he had become 
minister of finance, position that he recovered now and then until 1936, date of his assassination.  
	   60 
and then the Keinsekai (later Minseito) to increasing military budgets. As a result, 
during financial crises the power of financial internationalists within Japanese cabinets 
and the Diet increased, and military retrenchment and peaceful diplomatic means were 
introduced or doubled down. This occurred not only when crisis-stricken governments 
were pursuing military and diplomatic caution (1929, 1930), but also when they 
followed an expansionist agenda (1907, 1920), drastically changing the direction of 
Japanese foreign policy. Even when financial internationalism and cautionary foreign 
policies were temporarily suspended because they were associated with the financial 
crisis (1927-29), the stint away from caution was either brief or unappealing to leading 
political elites.  
Between 1880 and 1906, instead, before high finance and negative policies had 
become a force to be reckoned with in Japanese politics, financial crises tended to 
inflate Japanese national security policies.74 The ruling oligarchy denied that financial 
crisis existed, increased national defense spending and empire building plans, and 
encouraged the public to finance business ventures. During these years, the power of 
the rich electorate and private domestic financial forces was still limited.   
Finally, from 1932 through 1940, no financial crisis occurred. As the 
international financial system crumbled, Japanese representatives of high finance were 
assassinated, and removed was also the ability of financial crises to influence Japanese 
national security policies.  Notably, although these findings are in line with the 
argument that domestic politics shaped Japanese national security policies—argument 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 A first movement towards the gold standard and the spirit of international financial cooperation began 
in early 1880s with the Matsukata deflation, the expedient introduced by the Japanese Finance Minister 
to restore national finances to a sound basis. Soon afterwards, however, deflationary policies were 
quickly overhauled.  
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that has been advanced and defended elsewhere in much greater detail than I do 
here—the focus of this chapter is on the fact that financial crises were critical to bring 
about the domestic conditions that led to shifts in Japanese military spending, threat 
assessment and war prospects by either increasing or decreasing the power of Japanese 
state custodians of high finance versus the power of their political colleagues or 
opponents. 
The chapter is divided in three main sections that are dedicated to the influence 
on Japanese national security policies of, respectively, the financial crises of 1889-90 
and 1896-1901, the financial crises of 1907-09 and 1920-22, and the financial crisis of 
1927-31. Interestingly, financial crises in Japan tended to occur after the undertaking 
of major positive or negative national security decisions, which is a sign of the deep 
linkage between the two phenomena.75 The financial-crisis sample of this chapter, like 
the samples of Chapter Three and Four, was selected with an eye to covering as many 
combinations of government affinity with high finance and government exposure to 
high finance as possible.76 The three main sections of the chapter are preceded by a 
shorter section that extrapolates expectations on the national security influence of each 
of the selected financial crises based on assumptions derived from the analytical 
framework described in Chapter One.  Before focusing on what are the expectations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The financial crises of 1889-90, 1896-98 and 1900-01, 1907-08, 1917-18, and 1920-22 followed, 
respectively, the rearmament program launched at the beginning of 1889; the ten-year armament 
program announced in early 1896; the rearmament program of 1906; the six-year naval program 
launched in 1916; and the launching of the naval rearmament program initiated in 1919. Similarly, the 
financial crisis of 1914 occurred when past national military debts were falling due; and the financial 
crisis of 1927-31 worsened (in the second half of 1930) after the start of severe disarmament efforts in 
the spring of 1930.  Although overarching national security decisions were arguably not the only factor 
behind Japanese financial crises, they were undoubtedly a primary one.  
76 For a list of the total population of financial crises experienced by Japan between 1880 and 1940 
(minus those that occurred during a major war, which are excluded from this analysis) see Table 1, in 
the Appendix.  
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resulting from the domestic political contest surrounding each of the aforementioned 
financial crises, it is worth adding a few more words on the peculiarities of the 
Japanese case. 
Between 1880 and 1940, Japan presented many of the features of 
contemporary rent-seeking autocracies. The affairs of the Japanese state were 
managed by an oligarchic cabinet that had the task, ultimately by divine right, of 
building up an economically wealthy and militarily strong nation-state. Rather than a 
great power “by courtesy,” or geography, like Italy, Japan was an outcast by adversity, 
being situated far away from the epicenter of the international (financial) system, and 
in need of substantial catching-up or military success to be recognized as a great 
power worthy of the name. The Japanese commitment to catch-up rearmament and 
catch-up industrialization never faded, regardless of whatever government was in 
power.  The introduction of a constitution, restricted parliamentary elections, and, 
gradually, a partisan system hardly transformed the oligarchic nature of Japanese 
governments’ economic and military decisions.77 When the party representing the 
interests of high finance, the Minseito (later Keinsekai) was at the lead of Japan, a 
“negative” set of financial and military policies was at the lead, and when the Seiyūkai 
was at the lead, a “positive” set of financial and military policies was at the lead. The 
crafting of Japanese financial and military policies always remained the privilege of 
very few (which helps to explain the regular resort to domestic violence), and it would 
always penalize either financial elites or military forces by leaning towards “positive” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Throughout the 1900s and the 1910s, for instance, the costs of having a partially elected national Diet 
veto the national budget over and over increased significantly. On the centralization of the Japanese 
financial and economic system see Lockwood (1954), p.563; Martin (1962), pp.28,29; Patrick (1965), 
p.198; and Tamaki (1995), p.58. 
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or “negative” means of state development. As much as Italian politics thrived on 
compromise, Japanese politics thrived on disagreement.78 
Military elites or constituencies, particularly Japanese armed forces, were also 
much more used to inform and benefit from state policies than Japanese private 
financial actors. In Japan, rich people paid high taxes; armed forces were awarded 
political independence by the Constitution. That said, while the latter were widely 
more powerful than the former before 1906, between 1906 and 1931 this power was 
often curbed by Japanese governments’ conversion to the orthodox cause, which 
benefited private financial actors—a product of national economic development and of 
gradual democratization—to a far greater extent than the armed forces.  
Examining the influence of financial crises on Japanese national security 
policies means also analyzing the variation, throughout the process of financial crisis 
response, in the political advantage of military forces and the  “positive” policies they 
subscribed to versus the political advantage of Japanese private financial actors, and 
the “negative” policies they benefited from—at least up until the mid-1920s. 
Ultimately, however, even if each financial crisis triggered a different battle o type of 
interaction between military forces, Japanese private financial actors, and government 
authorities, this interaction was always an eminently domestic phenomenon: its result 
depended on whether most financial mindsets in Japan favored orthodoxy or 
heterodoxy and on whether the power of Japanese financial forces (both public and 
private) was weak or strong.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 On the importance of controversy in Japanese politics see, for instance, Smethurst (2007), pp.76-95. 
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EXPECTATIONS 
 
  Establishing the affinity with high 
finance and exposure to high finance of Japanese 
governments respectively at the onset and 
throughout each financial crisis episode will 
allow to derive sets of expectations on whether 
Japanese plans of empire building and expansion 
or military retrenchment were propelled with 
greater intensity or abandoned after the outbreak 
of each financial crisis.  According to the 
framework, Japanese governments who have taken on board the preferences of high 
finance should respond to financial crises by pursuing extra-cautionary national 
security policies when orthodoxy is the popular financial mindset domestically, and 
the power of private domestic financial actors is strong throughout the crisis (HA–HE). 
When the opposite occurs, Japanese governments who have taken on board the 
preferences of high finance should respond to financial crises by replacing cautionary 
national security policies with others that this work’s framework fails to outline (HA–
LE). On the contrary, Japanese governments who normally dismiss the preferences of 
high finance should respond to financial crises by inflating their ambitious military 
agendas when throughout the crisis, heterodox financial mindsets remain popular and 
the power of private domestic financial actors is weak (LA–LE), and by curbing those 
agendas when, throughout the crisis, the opposite occurs (LA–HE). 
Table 2.1 Japanese financial statistics  
                         1885-1893 
Year 
 
Surp/ 
Def 
 
nr. of 
banks GNP 
 
   
    
1885 100 218 649 
1886 98 220 712 
1887 100 221 692 
1888 -73 211 706 
1889 -235 218 726 
1890 -74 217 983 
1891 -77 252 880 
1892 -43 270 948 
1893 -19 545 988 	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 For about almost three quarters of the Meiji era (1868-1912), scenario LA–LE 
was very popular in Japan. Between 1880 and 1904, Japan experienced three financial 
crises—the currency crisis of 1880-81, the twin crisis of 1889-90, and the currency, 
stock market crisis and twin crisis of 1896-1901. All three financial crises were partly 
engineered by the government’s attempts at maximizing available national financial 
resources to push forward rearmament and industrialization efforts.79 Neither of them 
nor the process of financial crisis response stopped these efforts. For reasons of space, 
the inflation crisis of 1880-81 is not treated in this chapter but it is worth noting that 
the deflationary and retrenchment plan of crisis response realized by newly appointed 
Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi had strong heterodox roots behind its orthodox 
appearance. 80 The plan did not apply to military spending, which continued to grow. 
Matsukata himself recognized the necessity of putting Japanese finances in order to 
better expand the military budget and fulfill imperialist ambitions. The Japanese door 
to the gold standard was already partially open, but Japanese authorities continued to 
deal with state finances in their own way and even eminent financial officials were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Contributing to the crises were also external monetary shocks, violent fluctuations of silver prices, 
and poor harvests.  
80 On Matsukata’s deflation see Allen (1963), p.93, Morley (1974), p.140; Patrick (1965), p.198; and 
Smethurst (2007), pp.86,87. During that revolution, Japanese oligarchs’ main objective was limited to 
establishing a solid, centralized national apparatus for funding the country’s security needs and its 
industrial development. Ironically enough, national finances only needed adjustment to be more 
efficiently strained. As Matsukata put it, “at this time when specie is scarce, we still must provide for 
essential expenditures like those of the army and navy…therefore our present duty is to increase exports 
and provide for the accumulation of specie.” And also: “If we wish to provide ourselves with 
armaments and not feel ashamed of our independent empire’s military system, there must be an increase 
in imports.” In Morley (1974), p.140. 
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contrary to compromising their military ambitious for the sake of international 
financial cooperation.81  
 The financial crisis of 1889-90, Japan’s “first capitalistic crisis” in Hugh 
Patrick’s words (1965:203), had a primarily local nature. It started after that, in April-
May 1889, the Times announced the forthcoming foreign ownership of Japanese land 
in return for the suspension of the unequal treaties between Japan and the West that 
the former had sought.82 It also started because the Japanese government responded to 
the scarcity of liquidity and reserves, which fluctuations in world silver prices and the 
onset of the 1890 (global) Baring crisis compounded, by attempting to form an 
exchange fund in the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank—the Specie Bank 
instituted by the government to deal with foreign exchange—to facilitate loan 
disbursement from Europe and finance Tokyo’s military build-up and industrialization 
efforts.83 Between July 1889 and January 1890, panic developed in the domestic 
money market: banks stopped lending, some failed (Table 2.1), the Bank of Japan 
found itself uncomfortably placed to finance all ongoing industrial projects, and the 
deficit reached its highest value ever, as shown in Table 2.1.84 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 On their part, Western bankers in the 19th century were doubtful of lending to Japan.  See, for 
instance, Metzler (2006), pp.46.The first substantial loans to Japan were awarded by the West only at 
the time of the Russo-Japanese war.  
82 On this point, see Lebra (1973), pp.86. 
83 The Yokohama Specie Bank was one of the several specialized banks created by the Japanese 
government. The mission of this Specie Bank was to finance domestic and foreign trade. The share of 
the budget allocated to military expenditures for most of the period between 1880 and 1940 is just an 
indication of what was inspiring the creation of the exchange fund. With the exclusion of the decade 
between 1920 and 1931, Japanese expenditures in national defense remained extraordinarily high. Refer 
to later sections of the chapter for data on Japanese military expenditures over time.  
84 On the crisis and the economic context leading to the crisis see Patrick (1965), p.203; Tamaki (1995), 
p.71; Checkland, Nishimura and Tamaki (1994), p.8; Droppers (1998), p.163; and Ericson (1996), 
pp.126. Data in Table 1 is obtained or calculated from Koichi Emi, Government Fiscal Activity and 
Economic Growth in Japan 1868-1960, Tokyo: Kenkyusha Printing Co. (1963), pp.140-162, and 
Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy, Bank of Japan.  GNP is expressed in thousand yen. 
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 Before the onset of the crisis, the statist-nationalist governments of General 
Count Kuroda Kiyotaka (April 1888-October 1889) committed to the preservation of 
the silver standard, the accumulation of specie, and the pursuit of state development 
via rearmament, public works, and the protection of Japanese industry (shokusan 
kōgyō and kōgyō iken).85 Government affinity with high finance was low at this time.  
Although Japanese officials—first amongst them Takahashi Korekiyo—travelled to 
Great Britain and Europe with the hope of strengthening Tokyo’s international 
linkages and status, Japan was not yet a member of the international gold standard. 
Also, the democratization process was just starting up (a new Constitution was 
promulgated in 1890), and protecting private banks’ interests ranked lower than 
protecting national industries and harnessing non-financial energies for industrial 
growth.86 Finance Minister Matsukata was a strong believer in centrally directed 
industrialization and pursued a policy of high interest rates that prevented private local 
investment. Takahashi and Maeda Masana, the most liberal members within the 
Japanese government at the time, were ordered to scrap any audacious, bottom-up 
economic plan and dedicate their energies to drawing trademark and patent laws for 
the protection of Japanese artisans and inventors.87  
 This economic agenda explains the strategy of financial crisis response that 
the Kuroda government and the cabinets of Sanjō Sanetomi (October-December 1889) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See, for instance, Smethurst (2007), pp.77,78. 
86 Takahashi Korekiyo and Maeda Masana had started to develop interesting ideas to unleash the 
financial and economic power of Japanese regions but the time for the translation of these ideas into 
policy had not yet come. It is worth noting, however, that neither of them questioned the prevailing 
conviction that the government had a duty to stimulate economic growth through investment and 
infrastructural development.  
87 Ibidem, pp.76, 80 and pp.90-92. 
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and Yamagata Arimoto (December 1889-May 1891) selected at the time. This 
strategy—ideated practically in its entirety by Matsukata—entailed higher taxes, 
increased budget spending, the planning of strict banking regulations, and the set-up of 
stronger defenses for the Bank of Japan, and ultimately for the prestige and cash needs 
of the Japanese government.88 The Yokohama Specie Bank also became responsible 
for its own risk. Then, to impede the uncontrolled growth of private bank lending, the 
government passed the Bank Decree for ordinary banks of 1890—an act strongly 
resisted by the Tokyo Bank Association and which limited the number and liberties of 
Japanese commercial banks (Tamaki 1995:76-77). In addition, to restore the balance 
of payment surplus that the crisis had wounded, the government promoted the export-
dumping of Japanese manufactures to neighboring lands, exploiting Japan’s 
comparative advantage in low-priced, durable goods vis-à-vis with the British (Howe 
1999:195). These measures, which were selected with the specific purpose of 
returning to a budget surplus and accumulating specie, are a clear indication that 
government exposure to high finance was low in 1889-1890. The interests of private 
financial actors were quickly snubbed in view of the damage that the progress of 
commercial banks could bring to the Bank of Japan and the State.  
 Matsukata’s crisis policies penalized even big private banks like Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo (the Rothschild of Japan), which had recorded a remarkable 
growth up until 1889. Their lending practices were severely restricted between 1889 
and 1890. On their part, Japanese private financial interests could do little to stir the 
process of financial crisis response towards more orthodox solutions, penalized, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 All demands for monetary resources had to pass through the Bank of Japan, who responded through 
special discounting facilities.   
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they were by inadequate institutional channels to express their opposition.89 When the 
first-time-elected House of Peers complained about the skyrocketing budget in 
November 1890, obtaining a reduction in the estimated budget, Prime Minister 
Yamagata left the place to Finance Minister Matsukata and the budget newly 
escalated.90 Similarly, Japanese business could only trust state authorities. Thus, 
business leader Shibusawa Eichii declared that the panic of 1889-90 was nothing to 
worry about because monetary tightness was “not caused by a lack of national power,” 
but occurred “just as national power was increasing.” Similarly, private railroad 
stockholders urged the fast nationalization of private lines. 91 On the whole, the 
heterodox medicine of the Kuroda, Sanjō, and Yamagata, and Matsukata cabinets 
found no serious obstruction.  
 The financial crisis of 1896-
1901 was also, to a great extent, a local, 
domestically engineered, financial 
crisis. The crisis began in June 1896, as 
a result of a countercyclical reaction, of 
Japanese markets, to an unprecedented 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 In 1889-90, the Imperial Diet was still based on a minute franchise, emerging parties were still 
mistrusted by the oligarchy, and the Privy Council and the prime minister were both appointed by the 
Emperor. Along with the cabinet, and the Emperor the Privy Council was a foremost decision-making 
organ in Japan between 1880 and 1940. The Diet could not question or oppose the cabinet’s decisions 
until November 1890, when the first general election was held. Even then, and for about ten years, 
political opposition remained under check. See, for instance, Duus (1968), p.2; Uyehara (1910), pp.216-
17.  
90  The Finance Committee and the government negotiated to cut down 6,130,00 yen n out of a total 
estimated expenditure of 83,320,000 yen. The government preserved the powers to dissolve the Diet but 
the costs of doing so were rising. In the general elections of February 1892, the government freely 
employed police power and repressive laws.   
91 Ericson (1996), pp.126-30. 
Table 2.2 Japanese financial statistics  
                         1894-1902 
Year 
 
nr. of  
banks 
 
Specie  
reserves 
 
CGE/ 
GNP GNP 
 
    
     
1894 700 81,158 0.063 1,226 
1895 792 60,370 0.065 1,294 
1896 1,005 132,730 0.129 1,305 
1897 1,223 98,261 0.142 1,576 
1898 1,444 89,570 0.099 2,207 
1899 1,561 110,142 0.134 1,892 
1900 1,802 67,349 0.135 2,165 
1901 1,867 71,358 0.118 2,253 
1902 1,841 109,118 0.141 2,047 	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inflation-led boom that had developed since the end of the Sino-Japanese War 
(1895).92 Having embarked on a large program of state borrowing without the 
necessary financial instruments (Stein 1937:394; Kobayashi 1922:100), the 
government of Itō Hirobumi (1892–1896) was firstly responsible for the boom and the 
crisis. Once again, before the onset of this financial crisis, government affinity with 
high finance was low. The state-led growth in stock and bond market activity rested on 
very shaky foundations as 72% of bank emissions was in Bank of Japan notes—a 
privilege that soon awarded the Bank of Japan with significant profit but private 
investors with substantial risk.93 Quickly, the supply of capital dried out, specie left the 
country (Table 2.2), and runs on banks spread.  The crisis lasted until June 1898. After 
a year’s break, it resumed in late 1899 and continued until April 1901.94 
 The government’s resource-extractive, anti-orthodox, economic philosophy 
was displayed not only in the post-war boom that Itō and the official, constitutional 
party (the Seiyūkai) endorsed, but also in the means that Finance Minister Matsukata 
and Japanese financial bureaucrats resorted to, between 1896 and 1901, to terminate 
the financial crisis. The Seiyūkai cabinets of Itō (1896/06–1896/09; 1898/01–1898/06; 
1900/10—1901/05), ex-Finance Minister Matsukata (1896/09–1898/01), Ōkuma 
Shigenobu (1898/06–1898/11), and ex- Navy minister Yamagata Aritomo (1898/11–
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 The boom entailed a domestic institution-building flurry to improve Japanese industrialization, 
agriculture and manufacturing. In 1895 and 1896, respecting this design, the Hypothec Bank and the 
Agro-Industrial Bank were founded. See Tamaki (1995), pp.98,99. 
93 On this point see in particular Tamaki (1995), p.75. 
94 On the crisis of 1896-1901 see Ishii (1991), Giichi (1922), pp.186-195-197; Takafusa (1983), pp.8; 
Patrick (1922), pp.187-213; Hiroshi (1962), pp.94-5; Tamaki (1995), pp.74-78;90-96; Nakamura 
(1938), p.8; and O’Brien (2004), p.14. Data in Table 2.2 is obtained or calculated from Koichi Emi, 
Government Fiscal Activity and Economic Growth in Japan 1868-1960, Tokyo: Kenkyusha Printing 
Co. (1963), pp.140-162, and Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy, Bank of Japan.  GNP is 
expressed in thousand yen. 
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1900/10) responded to the crisis by seeking and obtaining further legitimization of 
their heterodox medicine of state development. 95  
 First above all was the decision, taken in March 1897, a few months into the 
financial crisis, of joining the gold standard and gaining first-class nationhood thanks 
to the indemnity received from having militarily defeated China.96 The decision was 
taken by Matsukata with the support of the Navy, and annulled the Diet’s indecision 
over Japan’s monetary future, as well as the opposition of the Japanese private 
business community. (Metzler 2006:30; Smethurst 2007:129,130). Unlike from the 
Navy, who desired a stronger (gold-based) currency to purchase foreign warships and 
equipment, most of Japanese private business had learnt to capitalize on the export 
benefits of a depreciated silver currency. Notably, Japan’s entrance in the gold 
standard was neither a way to empower domestic private financial interests and rely on 
them to drag the nation out of the crisis, nor a bow to the pressures of foreign bankers, 
who continued to remain cautious and even skeptical of Japan’s financial situation.97  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Notice that despite differences across the premiership—Matsukata for instance was much more 
conservative than Okuma—all cabinets abided to an oligarchic, absolutist system of government.  Real 
vestiges of caution regarding Japan’s credit status remained amongst foreign investors until 1904,1905. 
On this point see Hunter (2004), pp.188,189; Sussman and Yafeh (2000), p.442; and Smitka (1998), 
p.17. 
Japanese attempts at obtaining funds from abroad through the formation of a syndicate including the 
Bank of Japan, the (Japanese) Specie Bank in London, and other financial institutions like the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, 
are described in Tamaki (1995), pp.95,96.  
96 The Chinese money allowed Japan to open an account in London, at the Bank of England, so that 
Chinese authorities could disburse the debt in chunks, and Japan obtain it in Sterling. The final 
installment of the Chinese debt was by far the largest check ever drawn on the Bank of England up to 
that time.  Note that the conditions of Japanese entrance in the gold standard were entirely different 
from those of Italy or the United States.  On the Japanese entrance in the gold standard, see Nakamura 
1983:4-5; Tamaki 1995:83; Martin 1962:187. 
97 Real vestiges of caution regarding Japan’s credit status remained amongst foreign investors until 
1904,1905. On this point see Hunter (2004), pp.188,189; Sussman and Yafeh (2000), p.442; and Smitka 
(1998), p.17. 
	   72 
 A parallel response to the financial crisis that the aforementioned cabinets and 
Finance Ministers Matsukata and Yamamoto Tatsui selected, as shown in Table 2.2, 
was a dramatic increase in government spending (CGE), undertaken with the aim of 
building Japanese industry and empire. This expansionist or “positive” design 
included the creation of five public-policy banks for long-term industrial financing and 
protection against foreign control. Amongst them was the Bank of Taiwan (1899), 
which was meant to further the advance of Japanese commence and trade into South 
China and Southeast Asia.98 Since raising money abroad was a difficult and time-
consuming task,—foreign markets expected, as the Economist warned in April 1897, 
the adoption by Japan of “the same standard of values of first-class powers”—
Matsukata, Ōkuma, Yamagata, Katsura and Itō satiated the state’s borrowing needs by 
introducing domestically unpopular lending regulations and new taxes on land, sake, 
postage bills and personal income.99  
 The heterodox medicine encountered domestic resistance too. As visible from 
Table 2.2, the number of private commercial banks or “money-getting spirits,” as the 
oligarchy called them, continued to grow. Gaining the support of the emerging, liberal 
(Jiyuto then Keinseitō) or progressive (Shimpoto then Keisehonto) parties to have the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 On these designs see, for instance, Tamaki (1995), p.101; Uyehara (1910), p.242; and Metzler (2006), 
pp.33-35. 
99 The Economist, April 24, 1897. Between 1896 and 1900, emissaries like Takahashi were sent abroad 
to raise foreign loans but most approaches to foreign finance failed. On tax increases in these years see 
Duus (1968), p.10. Notice that despite differences from premier to premier existed—Matsukata for 
instance was much more conservative than Okuma—all cabinets abided to an oligarchic, absolutist 
system of government.   
Japanese attempts at obtaining funds from abroad through the formation of a syndicate including the 
Bank of Japan, the (Japanese) Specie Bank in London, and other financial institutions like the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, 
are described in Tamaki (1995), pp.95,96.  
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Diet pass increases in taxation bills was challenging, which explains why Seiyūkai 
cabinets frequently fell during these years.100 
 Up until 1900, however, the ruling oligarchy’s survival strategy worked.  
When liberal and progressive forces secured a large number of seats in the Diet, and 
threatened to mutilate the budget and form a party government—for instance, in 
December 1897, June 1898, August 1898, and November 1900—Matsukata, Itō, and 
Ōkuma either resigned to welcome an analogous cabinet or issued Imperial Rescripts. 
So government-led spending continued to progress, and inflation was let free to 
increase by 11.3% between 1896 and 1898 alone. Government exposure to high 
finance was low.  However, as national debt skyrocketed and bank runs continued, 
peaking in May 1900 and in April 1901, Yamagata’s late cabinet (1898/11–1900/10), 
and the cabinet of General Katsura Tarō (1901/06–1906/06) started to fear for Japan’s 
membership in the gold standard and the already difficult access to foreign loans.101 
Thus, while in May 1900, in line with the heterodox tradition, Secretary of the 
Japanese Legation in Washington Midovi Komatse denied the existence of a financial 
crisis, by April 1901 the Bank of Japan had turned the tables.102 Applying the orthodox 
medicine, the Bank raised its discount rates until gold reserves were increased in 1902, 
even though this was at the price of halting state-led expansionist policies and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 On these short-lived alliances and cabinet turnovers see Uyehara (1910), p.232 
101 Rapid and sustained domestic industrial growth and equilibrium in the balance of payments under a 
fixed exchange-rate system were in real conflict. 
102 Midovi Komatse went on saying that, on the contrary, the situation would have produced “a 
beneficial effect upon the national progress by affording the people a lesson that no good times should 
be abused by luxury or extravagance of any form.” "Japan's Financial Situation," New York Times 
(1901): May 3. 
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economic growth.103 Reserves were replenished and in 1902 the deflationary 
experiment ended. 
 Based on the described developments, a first set of expectations is easily 
stated. Since the Kuroda government and the Itō government each faced scenario LA–
LE during, respectively, the financial crisis of 1889-90 and the financial crisis of 
1896-1901, both governments should have redoubled on their pre-crisis assertive 
policies and intentions after, respectively, July 1889 and June 1896. However, 
between 1901 and 1902, these policies should have been kept at bay, as demanded by 
the BOJ’s endorsement of the orthodox medicine of financial crisis. 
The financial crisis of 1907-09 resembled 
the one of 1896-1901 in that it developed in 
reaction to another war-related boom, analogously 
engineered from government policies—the boom 
following the Russo-Japanese war.104 To a greater 
extent than the financial crises of the 19th century, 
this crisis and the boom preceding it had an 
international character, as the great powers of 
Europe and North America were all affected and, for the first time, a coordinated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See Ono (1922), pp.94,95; and Patrick (1956), pp.206-209. The same had happened in 1880-82 with 
the Matsukata’s deflation. 
104 After the war, namely from early 1906 to early 1907, a wave of speculation ensued. The wave of 
enormous speculation resulted in 3,336 newly established firms. All classes of people, even the poorest, 
engaged in buying unsound subscriptions, particularly those of the South Manchuria Railway Company. 
The stock market boomed; all classes of people, even the poorest, engaged in buying unsound 
subscriptions, particularly the stocks of the South Manchuria Railway Company On this crisis see the 
New York Times, July 29 (1907); Giichi (1922), pp.87, 206-207; Stein (1937), p. 396; Allen (1963), p. 
48; Hiroshi (1962), pp.95,103-104; Takafusa (1983), p.8, and Uyehara (1910), pp.256-58; Pooley 
(1917), pp.191. 
Table 2.3 Japanese financial   
                  statistics, 1904-1912 
Year 
 
Govt 
Debt 
 
Specie  
reserves GNP 
 
   
    
1904 32 83,581 2,530 
1905 49 115,595 2,373 
1906 151 147,202 2,863 
1907 174 161,742 3,327 
1908 177 169,504 3,361 
1909 153 217,843 3,268 
1910 153 222,382 3,181 
1911 147 229,154 3,883 
1912 142 247,023 4,509 	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international financial response was attempted. In Japan too, as it will be soon clear, 
the crisis resolution process differed in important ways from previous experiences. 
Troubles began in early 1907 with a liquidity crisis, an abnormal depreciation of 
shares and interest rates widespread bank runs, bank failures, a 20% increase in the 
price of rice, and the looming threat of sovereign default. 105  In March 1909, the price 
of commodities sank to the lowest level compared to any period after 1906 and the 
market experienced another wave of panic. 
 At the onset of the crisis, the Japanese government was in the hands of 
premier Saionji Kinmochi (1906/01–1908/07) and his party, the Seiyūkai. Government 
affinity with high finance was low.106 Although it included some liberal forces, the 
Seiyūkai was essentially an alliance of bureaucrats committed to big government and 
large-scale public spending. These plans were ideated by financial authorities like 
Finance Minister Sakatani Yoshio and first civilian governor of Taiwan Gotō Shinpei, 
and made possible by the hard work of financial authorities like Takahashi, financial 
official at the Bank of Japan and Japan’s Financial Commissioner in London, New 
York and continental Europe.107 In 1906, the Saionji government still financed its 
current account deficits by means of massive portfolio borrowing in London and other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 On the crisis of 1907-08 in Japan see Nakamura (1938), p.8; Ono (1922), pp.206-207; and Shinjo 
(1962), pp.97,102-104; the Economist, July, 20, 1907. 
106 On the heterodox post-war policies of the Japanese government and its low affinity with high 
finance, see Meltzer (2007), pp.52-57,82. 
107 On Takahashi support of Japanese foreign borrowing policy and his activities in foreign in Great 
Britain, United States and Europe, and, more broadly, on the fierce bond policy of the Saionji 
government, see Smethurst (2006), pp.142-187, and Meltzer (2007), pp.188-89. As Meltzer (2007:46) 
notices, foreign bankers started to trust Japan’s financial abilities during the Russo-Japanese war. This 
very fact is extremely interesting as it reveals that high finance became willing to finance Japan’s debt 
after Japan had started to defeat Russia militarily. Along these lines, Sussman and Yafeh have advanced 
the thesis that the reputation acquired by Japan during the war with Russia decisively strengthened 
foreign investors’ confidence about the sustainability of Japanese debt. See Sussman and Yafeh (2000), 
pp.442-467. 
	   76 
Western capital markets, and, contrary to international financial cooperation, 
promoted the circulation of yen notes in Manchuria, and set forth to transfer all 
economic rights there to a single, semi governmental corporation, the South 
Manchurian Railway Company.108  These policies contributed to the tremendous 
increase of Japanese debt between 1904 and 1907 (Table 2.3), which, by spooking 
investors at home and abroad, contributed to the financial crisis. 
Pretending it had a low exposure to high finance, the Saionji government 
initially addressed the monetary tightness and bank runs by doubling down on the 
usual “heterodox medicine.” The budget of 1907-08, the first budget of the Saionji 
government, renewed foreign loans and raised taxes, wholeheartedly shelving the 
Japanese promise, made after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war, of reducing 
taxation and redeeming the national debt.109  
After the onset of the financial crisis, this heterodox recipe of financial crisis 
response became politically intolerable. Abroad, a 
systemic financial crisis involving the main Western 
capitals posed already the conditions for a drastic 
curtailment of the flow of money to Tokyo.110 
Exacerbating them was the Saionji government’s 
disrespect of agreements concluded with foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Technically, American financial magnate E.H. Harriman on the premise that Japan would have 
allowed direct foreign participation in the Company awarded funds for the creation of the Manchuria 
Company to Japanese authorities. See Meltzer (2007), pp.55,56. 
109 On these measures see Pooley (1917), p.193; Connors (1987), p.29; Kobayahi (1922), p.102; Hiroshi 
(1959), p.97; Ishii (1991), pp.220-21; Meltzer (2007), pp.56,57; and “Japan’s financial position,” in 
New York Times, March 14, 1908. 
110 Refer to the next chapters for an account of the global financial crisis of 1907-08. 
Table 2.4. Borrowing 1916–1925 
Year 
 
 
    GNP 
 
Government 
Securities 
 
   
    
1917 6,834 16,984  
1918 10,052 50,355  
1919 14,924 19,090  
1920 13,125 75,631  
1921 12,140 53,032  
1922 12,355 26,925  
1923 13,053 35,041  	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investors. The latter expected direct participation in Japanese financial and economic 
activities in Asia and, seeing it denied, started to doubt Japanese creditworthiness 
despite the words of reassurance formulated by the British financial press.111  At home, 
the battle between the supporters of positive or negative economic policies resulted in 
a schism within the Seiyūkai, and the creation of the Dōshikai or the anti-Seiyūkai 
party, the party of finance, later named Keinsekai.  The “negative” front took control 
of the Diet, and firmly rejected the budget of a government accused to conceal the 
status of its finances and live to beyond its means.112  
Takahashi too started to call out loudly for fiscal restraint (Meltzer 2007:86; 
Smethurst 2006:189).  When the budget for year 1908-09 was approved, it featured 
cuts in public works, and the attempt to increase taxation resulted in a cabinet crisis 
that was solved, in July 1908, with to the resignations of the Saionji cabinet and 
ostracism against its crisis policy.  Exposure to high finance was high—the 
government could see it now—even highly ranked military officials could. By August 
1908 a new government, led by general Katsura Tarō (1908/07–1911/08) had 
committed to reducing the national debt and starting policy of retrenchment to relax 
the money market, support the stock market, and ultimately restore general financial 
credit.113 Between 1908 and 1913 (Table 2.3), floating foreign money and 
withstanding foreign investors’ concerns regarding the sustainability of Japanese fiscal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See The Economist (1907), p.2072; and “Japan’s Financial Troubles,” in The Washington Post, May 
13, 1908. See also Meltzer (2007), pp.56-58. Note that after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war, 
Japan had obtained the privilege of carrying on its own shoulders its nation al debt.  
112 See in particular Halliday (1975), p.111; and The Washington Post, May 13, 1998, on this point.  
113 Katsura issued a statement on being sworn in, in which he promised to not indulge in further 
borrowing except for loan conversion. See Pooley (1917), p.201. 
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deficit and national debt—that is the promotion of an international financial 
cooperation was a paramount national need.  
A situation of high government exposure to high finance despite the crisis-
stricken government’s positive wishes re-appeared in occasion of the global financial 
crisis of 1920-22, known in Japan as the Black Monday panic. For Japan and for the 
rest of the international financial system, the crisis was the result of the collapse of the 
post-Great War boom.114 In March 1920, Japanese securities and commodities markets 
collapsed simultaneously. By March 1921 general wholesale prices, silk and cotton 
prices had collapsed of, respectively, 41, 65 and 73 per cent. Bank runs and bank 
closures were rampant and industries feverishly formed cartels in self-defense. The 
wave of bankruptcies stopped in April-May 1921, but resumed in February 1922 (Ishii 
panic) and continued throughout the end of 1921.115 Once again, a Seiyūkai 
government was in place when the crisis started, although this time the premier (Hara 
Takashi) was an officially acknowledged party leader.  
Before the onset of the crisis, government affinity with high finance was low. 
Relying on the support and advice of Finance Minister Takahashi and BOJ director 
Kimura Seishirō, in 1918 and 1919 the Hara government refused to lift the gold 
embargo introduced during the War, dismissed warnings on the speculative nature of 
the post-war boom, and passed a grandiose, expansionary thirty-year expansion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 On the post-war boom and financial crisis in Japan see Nish (2002), p.14; Clark (1920), p.434-35; 
Inouye (1931), p.69; Lockwood  (1954), p.518; Tamaki (1995), p.140; Moulton (1931), p.240; 
Nakamura (1983), pp.142-153; Meltzer (2007), pp.129; National Archives and Records Service of the 
United States, "Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to internal affairs of Japan, 1910-
1929," (1961), file 0015. 
115 The Ishii panic was caused at the end of February 1922 by the bankruptcy of the Ishii Corporation, a 
lumber company engaged in speculative activities whose collapse triggered bankruptcies in related 
firms in the Kochi prefecture (Japanese southwest), the Kansai region (Osaka, Kyoto), and, from 
October through December 1922, Kyushu and Kanto, that is Tokyo and eastern Japan.  
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program to extend the rail network to every corner of the country, next to boosting 
public spending on harbors, dams, riverine works and supply-side policies (Duus 
1968:136,137; Meltzer 2007:115-121; Smethurst 2006:217,218).116 Although the 
discount rate was raised twice, in late 1919, once that Inoue became Governor of the 
Bank of Japan, positive, fast-paced, state-led investment in infrastructure dominated 
the government’s agenda.117 Things changed after the start of the financial crisis as, 
once again, a violent struggle between supporters of “loose spending policies” (or 
Seiyūkai-style economic policies) and advocates of financial and economic restraint 
(now gathered in the Keinsekai) took hold of the Diet (Silberman and Harootunian 
1973:241-44; Meltzer 2007:129,130). Kenseikai representatives such as Inoue 
Junnosuke and Hamaguchi Osachi blamed the policies of the Hara government for the 
financial crisis, particularly Takahashi’s “productionism.”   
As observable from Table 2.4, Hara and Takahashi initially stood by their 
supply-side policies, doubling down on the free issuing of government securities to 
bail out the national credit structure (March-April 1920), and dismissing the relevance 
of the tremendous rise in Japanese prices. But pressures for bringing down prices 
coming from the Keinseikai and an array of domestic radical forces were too strong to 
be resisted. Hara paid with his life for the skewed distribution of wealth and domestic 
political conflict that heterodox financial policies produced.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 For his part, Takahashi thought that Japan must seize the current, once-in-a-lifetime chance for rapid 
economic development vis-à-vis the rest of the world. On this point see Meltzer (2007), p.121. 
117 For instance, although it had raised its discount rate, the Bank of Japan had also greatly increased its 
lending to the private sectorOn Inoue’s The Hara government outlined this impressive plan in October 
1918, shortly after taking office, promising to continue the post-Russo-Japanese-war, Seiyukai agenda 
of state-led improvement of trade, industry, transportation and communication. 
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In 1921 and 1922, as panics continued intermittently and Japanese exports fell, 
the Hara government (1918/09–1921/11), and then the governments of Takahashi 
(1921/11–1922/06), new leader of the Seiyūkai, and Katō Tomosaburō (1922/06–
1923/08), ex commander in chief of the Japanese Navy, opted for “contracting the 
currency and lifting the gold embargo on gold exports,” namely an official policy of 
deflation and fiscal restraint in agreement with the orthodox medicine (Meltzer 
2007:136-145). As both Takahashi and Hamaguchi acknowledged, “controlled” 
growth and spending were impellent needs “because of the economic situation” and 
the “dangerous social climate” that the unprecedented increase in prices (that is the 
previous policy of financial crisis response) had caused (Smethurst 2006:219,227).   
The economic turnaround, it was also believed, would have awarded Japan the 
status of third economic power after the United States and Great Britain, expectations 
which Mori Kengo and Fukai Eigo, Japanese representatives to the Washington 
Conference on international financial stabilization held on to. For the following 
decade, the restrictive economic line of the Keinsekai/Minseito, dominated Japanese 
politics. Continuing bank failures—the earthquake of 1923 did not help national 
finances—were also addressed through collusive financial policies reminiscent of a 
positive line, like the issuing of “earthquake bills” and over lending to prevent 
bankruptcies.118 There was no question, however, that a turn in economic policy had 
occurred between 1920 and 1922.  Premier Katō even started a “Diligent and Thrift 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 The incentive for moral hazard was significant, and the escalating power of domestic financial 
interests accounted for the diffusion of pork-barrel politics across the nation. No wonder, banking crises 
continued to occur throughout the 1920s. As Tamaki (1995:151) put it, Japanese financial history in the 
1920s is widely “a history of failed bank management and corruption.” For an account of Japanese 
financial policies in the 1920s see Allen (1925), p.75; Allen (1934), p.545; Takafusa (1983), pp.140-
154; Smitka (1998), pp.103-104; Kirshner (2007), pp.58-88. 
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Campaign,” in 1924, using traditional Japanese values in the attempt to overcome the 
nation’s “desperate situation” that policies fomenting high prices and chronic deficit 
had produced.119 
 From the Japanese resolution of the financial crises of 1907-09 and 1920-22, a 
second set of expectations is easily derived. Since in both circumstances governments 
having low affinity with high finance 
found out to be highly exposed to high 
finance throughout the crisis, Japanese 
national security policies should have 
shifted towards greater caution (scenario 
LA–HE). In both instances, initial 
resistance to a turn in economic policy by 
ruling authorities should have precluded 
an immediate shift in security policies.  
Throughout the 1920s, the deflationary and belt-tightening policies 
implemented in Japan and the rest of the world to stabilize price and return to the gold 
standard did not have the hoped success. In Japan, more than in anywhere else, 
economic recovery was complicated by a speculative extension of credit and the 
related overinvestment in finance versus industry and manufacture. Government 
affinity with high finance had never ben higher. In the years leading up to 1927, the 
Keinsekai cabinets of Katō Takaaki and Wakatsuki Reijirō consistently restrained 
government borrowing and spending (CGE), and nurtured a highly liquid banking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 On the thrift campaign see Meltzer (2007), pp.154-55. 
Table 2.5. Japanese financial statistics,  
             1925-1933 
Year 
 
Govt 
Borr 
 
CGE 
(Real) 
 
Banks 
(nr) 
Bank 
loans 
 
    
     
1925 46 18,245 1,534 6,038 
1926 34 19,481 1,417 6,394 
1927 61 23,202 1,280 5,864 
1928 157 21,313 1,028 5,581 
1929 99 15,765 878 5,501 
1930 38 29,809 779 5,342 
1931 120 23,604 680 5,184 
1932 659 23,749 538 4,800 
1933 783 25,791 516 4,575 	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system, inclusive of numerous banks with unsound finances.120  In early 1927, as the 
problem of the earthquake bills repayment stirred panic within financial markets and 
conflict in the Diet, Kataoka Naoharu, Finance Minister of the Wakasuki cabinet, 
stroke a temporary deal with the Seiyūkai President Tanaka Giichi.121  
Despite these efforts to keep the lid on a boiling pot, the climate in the Diet 
remained politically charged and when, in March 1927, Kataoka hinted unwillingly to 
the unsound status of the Tokyo Watanabe Bank, the latter collapsed, followed by the 
collapse of Suzuki Shōten, a large Kobe trading company financed by the Bank of 
Taiwan, and by numerous bank runs across the country.122 The financial crisis of 1927-
1931, the most severe crisis in Japanese economic history, had so begun, right when 
return to the gold standard gained renewed legitimation internationally.123 In April 
1927, as infighting between the Seiyūkai and the Keinseikai continued, Seiyūkai leader 
General Tanaka Giichi (1927/04–1929/07) received the imperial mandate to form a 
new cabinet. Anti-finance economic policies returned. Newly nominated Finance 
Minister Takahashi depreciated the yen, leaving its value “to nature” (Meltzer 
2007:181), refused to lift the gold embargo (which the Keinsekai was about to do 
before the crisis), raised public spending, closed banks first temporarily (April 22, 23, 
1927) and then with a moratorium (September 1927), and introduced long-postponed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 On these negative economic policies see Faini and Toniolo (1992), p.130; Tamaki (1995), pp.150-
154; Kirshner (2007), p.67. 
121 The thorny issue of relieving “bad” debtors had already caused debate between the Keinseikai and 
the Seiyūkai in the lead up to the crisis. 
122 For an account of the origins of the crisis see Meltzer (2007), pp.178-180. 
123 In 1927 and 1928 Italy and France introduced the gold standard.  
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banking reforms.124  Government exposure to high finance turned from high to low, 
even if American high finance, particularly Thomas Lamont and Russell Leffingwell 
continued to push Japanese authorities to deflate.125  
The new phase constituted only a brief parenthesis, however. In July 1929, 
realizing that large government sterling bonds issued to help finance the Russo-
Japanese war were falling due, and observing that Japan was losing ground 
internationally now that had Europe entered a “new age of currency stability” with all 
major powers back on the gold standard, Mitsuchi Chūzō, the Ministry of Finance of 
the ruling Seiyūkai cabinet, concluded that lifting the gold embargo—the very policy 
that the same party had opposed in early 1927 and that had brought down—was now 
an “urgent necessity.”126 This way, Japan would have obtained the necessary 
international financial cooperation to refinance existing public loans and post-pone 
payment. 
As a result, Tanaka left the place to the Kenseikai (or Minseito) cabinets of 
Osachi Hamaguchi (1929/07–1931/04) and Wataksuki Reijirō (1931/04–1931/12), and 
the 1920s deflationary policies of balancing the budget and returning to the gold 
standard were resurrected (Allen 1934:547).127 Japan seemed to be collecting the fruits 
of this policy in January 1930, when it newly joined the gold standard. Soon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 In May 1927 the Special Credit Bill and the Financial Relief Bill issued by the Bank of Japan, were 
passed, and then in January 1928, the Bank Act came into effect. The Bank Act stipulated that ordinary 
banks and any other style of company were illegal. 
125 On American pressures to bring Japan back to the gold standard path, see Meltzer (2007), pp.185-
191. 
126 On the unwillingness of the Seiyūkai to pay for the existing government loans, and on the new shift 
towards negative economic policies, see Meltzer (2007), pp.192-193. 
127 In addressing the Diet, in January 1930 Minister of finance Junnosuke Inoue argued that lifting the 
specie embargo and returning to the gold standard would have deflationary effects upon the economy, 
enhance Japan’s international competitiveness, and eventually give strength to the economy. This vision 
turned out to be too optimistic. See Tamaki (1995), p.166.  
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afterwards, however, a gold rush and a drastic fall in export began. Showing its high 
exposure to high finance, Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke responded to the new 
financial crisis wave like the Hoover administration did in the United States: by 
placing the blame on external causes, and reiterating the value of the orthodox 
medicine, especially now that Japan had managed to enter the gold standard again. But 
gold outflow reached its worst historical value, Japanese exports continued to fall, the 
yen depreciated, and by the summer of 1930, much of the Japanese business world 
was demanding the reintroduction of the gold embargo.128 Domestic political struggle 
and violence flared up again. Later in 1930, Prime Minister Hamaguchi was shot at a 
station, and in the spring of 1931 Inoue was almost killed by a dynamite bomb that 
exploded in front of his house.  
By December 1931, after the British abandonment of the gold standard and as 
the international financial order crumbled, infighting within the Minseito between 
supporters of financial internationalism and more jingoistic party members over 
whether or not to suspend the gold standard had led to the fall of the Wakatsuki 
cabinet and Inoue’s deflationary policies course, and the Privy Council assigning the 
Seiyūkai the task of forming a new government. Under Inukai Tsuyoshi (1931/12–
1932/05) government exposure to high finance reverted back to low.129 This crisis 
response recipe ideated by new Finance Minister Takahashi (so-called Takahashi 
Zaisei) included setting a devalued exchange rate for the yen, increasing domestic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 On these developments see Meltzer (2007), pp.228,229. 
129 The American stock market crash in the fall of 1929 had an almost immediate impact upon Japan. As 
the best customer of the Japanese, the US was absorbing that year over 40 percent of Japanese exports. 
By the end of the year the silk market collapsed, and the price of Japan’s major export, raw silk, 
dropped by one-half. On these repercussions see especially Takafusa (1983), p.8; and Warner (1991), 
p.103; Yamamuro (1932), pp.53,57,58; Smitka (1998), p.113. 
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fiscal expenditures, introducing capital controls, suspending convertibility, and re-
issuing the gold embargo (Takafusa 1973:144; Myung 2003:12; Allen 1963:136; 
Schiffer 1962:19,20; Meltzer 2007:238-242). The medicine worked remarkably well. 
In early 1932 Japan’s industrial production index resumed growth, and the country 
escaped economic decline earlier than most countries. No pro-finance party returned 
to power afterwards, and for the next decade Japanese cabinets did not abandon 
interventionist economic policies. 
 Because of the low exposure to high finance of the cabinets of General Tanaka 
Giichi (1927/04–1929/07), Osachi Hamaguchi (1929/07–1931/04) and Wataksuki 
Reijirō (1931/04–1931/12), and because of the high affinity with high finance of the 
Wataksuki cabinet before the start of the financial crisis, the framework does not allow 
extrapolating specific expectations on the course of Japanese national security polices 
after the outbreak of the financial crisis. Still, whatever the direction of Japanese 
national security policies after the outbreak of the financial crisis, Japanese 
government authorities should face, after the outbreak of the financial crisis, fewer 
constrains for shifting existing national security policies towards greater assertiveness.  
 
DENYING FINANCIAL CRISES AND BOOSTING STATE POWER AND EXPANSION: 
 Financial components of Japan’s military proclivity 
 
 Analyzing the influence on national security policies of the Japanese local 
financial crises of 1889-90 and 1896-1901 offers a chance to contribute to the debate 
on the character of Japanese imperialism up until the Russo-Japanese War. The slogan 
“rich nation, strong army” (fukoku kyōhei) is a popular description of Japanese 
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ambitions throughout these years.130 Investing in catch-up industrialization and catch-
up rearmament was Japan’s strategy for avoiding Western subjugation (as Japan’s 
larger neighbor China had been forced to endure), while at the same time propelling 
Japan’s sway in the East and respect in the West.  More concretely, Japan aimed at 
obtaining a revision of the unequal treaties, and preserving the military and economic 
independence of the surrounding islands from China and Russia. To Japanese political 
authorities, building a rich state and a strong army were not only compatible but 
symbiotic national security goals: improving industrial activity was regarded as a 
major contribution to military strength while military activities were regarded as 
boosters of economic and business activities. In the words of Yano Fumio, political 
adviser to foreign minister Okuma Shigenobu (1888-1889): “if army and navy are the 
body, national wealth is the food we consume. Without food is impossible to maintain 
the body. […] However independent a country may be, the lack of wealth will 
extinguish it.” 131  
 This section adds a new element to this understanding of Japanese 
imperialism. The creation of a rich nation and a strong army was born out of the belief 
that defense and industry preceded finance. Or, better, catch up rearmament and 
industrialization practically implied weak finance and financial crises: the “rich nation, 
strong army” program was in truth a “rich nation, strong army, and weak finance” 
program. This was true not only in the sense that weak finance was functional to the 
achievement of the rich nation, strong army objective, but also in the sense that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See, for instance, Crowley (1966):xv, xvi; and Samuels (1994). 
131  In Samuels (1994), p.37.This interpretation is at odds with the orthodox wisdom for which military 
activities are hurtful to national finances.  
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rich-nation-strong-army-weak-finance program was the key to Japanese entrance in 
the gold standard and rising international status. Accordingly, heterodox solutions to 
financial crises had the upper hand, event though occasionally Japanese authorities 
stepped back from them when the latter risked compromising Japan’s international rise 
and future or present membership in the gold standard. This occurred, for instance, in 
1881-82 and 1900-01. Even then, however, a short resort to deflation, the orthodox 
medicine and cautionary international diplomacy did not prevent a return to ambitious 
military spending, threat assessment and war prospects once that the financial crisis 
war over. Besides doubling down on catch-up rearmament and catch-up 
industrialization, up until the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese crisis-stricken cabinets 
encouraged Japanese industrial to begin new project, and denied that a financial crisis 
existed at all. Japan’s private financial actors were possibly the clearest victims of this 
dominant strategy. 
 Before the start of the 1889-90 financial crisis, the Kuroda cabinet was 
working on an ambitious foreign policy agenda that transcended the parties and the 
reformist moment that the country was witnessing (Lebra 1974: 85; Beasley 1991:137; 
Steel 2004:164).132 One third of the national budget was being spent on defense (Table 
2.6)—a rearmament program had just been launched in January-February 1889—, and 
talks with Western capital over the abolition of the unequal treaties and the system of 
extra-territorial rights had been reopened by foreign minister Okuma Shigenobu, 
stirring intense domestic opposition.133 Crucially, domestic opposition was more an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 In February 1889 the Emperor promulgated the Japanese constitution. 
133 Diplomatic negotiation may appear as a weak, conciliatory card but they were not.  Bringing the 
great power to the negotiating table was a difficult task; Japan was alone against a number of 
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expression of the existing frustration with the unequal treaties, and an attempt of 
liberal and progressive forces (the Jiyuto and Kaishinto) to push forward their own 
interpretation of constitutional government, than an outcry against the government 
agenda of obtaining one of the world’s greatest military-industrial combines (fukoku 
kyōhei and shokusan kōgyō) on which the political oligarchy, including Kuroda’s 
erstwhile rivals, substantially agreed. Threats to national security were coming from 
“all countries,” and the national program of nurturing the Japanese industry for 
launching arms production and military build-
up was energetically and unanimously directed 
“against all countries” (Samuels 1994:37). This 
does not mean that the Kuroda cabinet, like 
any other Japanese cabinets that preceded it, 
was set on an inflexible, across-the-board 
belligerent path. The Japanese army endorsed 
the military theory principle that Japan should fight only the battles it could win. And 
in 1889-90 the nation was not ready to militarily confront China, even less Russia.  
Similarly, the civil-military oligarchy composing the Kuroda cabinet committed to 
avoiding any military or diplomatic maneuver that could provoke Western retaliation: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
adversaries, and negotiations were far from being friendly conventions since the powers continued to 
thwart Japan’s revisionist efforts. Unsurprisingly, in Japan treaty powers were perceived as “enemies,” 
and Okuma’s negotiation strategies aimed at reducing the number of adversaries at any given time to 
one showing dignity, aplomb and firmness. On this point see Lebra (1973), pp.85; and Perez (1999), 
pp.83 and 85. 
Table 2.6. Japanese military spending   
1886-1892 (real measures) 
Year 
 
 
GNP 
 
 
MS/GNP 
 
 
MS/CGE 
 
   
1886 712 0.03 0.30 
1887 692 0.03 0.30 
1888 706 0.03 0.30 
1889 726 0.03 0.30 
1890 983 0.02 0.30 
1891 880 0.03 0.30 
1892 948 0.03 0.30 	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alienating Western powers equaled to hijacking the ongoing process of unequal treaty 
revision and jeopardizing Japan’s economic and military ambitions.134 
 With these considerations in mind, in the months preceding the start of the 
financial crisis, Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu made financial and political 
overtures to the West, including the offer of allowing foreigners to hold property in 
Japan, a proposition that did not sit well with the Japanese public—including 
domestic, private financial actors—and which stirred fears of foreign encroachment 
even amongst Japanese civil-military elites. Still, Ōkuma’s deceivingly conciliatory 
treaty negotiation strategy was at heart only a way to realize the national security 
agenda of continuous diplomatic and military advancement that Japanese political 
authorities had pursued since the end of the Matsukata deflation of 1881-82.    
 In sum, when the financial crisis began, the Kuroda cabinet was advancing 
an ambitious national security agenda while dealing with the domestic consequences 
of a newly promulgated constitution and forthcoming Diet elections, and with an 
escalating anti-revision movement within national borders. Largely a product of 
ongoing negotiations with the West and not of the financial crisis, the political 
instability and conflict within the Diet that the movement fostered, and some of its 
sources—like the treaty negotiation process and particularly Ōkuma’s financial 
concession strategy—fomented the financial crisis. In agreement with what expected, 
after the start of the financial crisis (April 1889), Japan’s foreign policy towards the 
West shifted towards greater assertiveness. As much as it aimed at preventing a 
slackening of Japan’s catch-up economic development and industrialization, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 On this point see, for instance, Smethurst (2006), pp.53-44. 
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heterodox strategy of financial crisis response drafted by Finance Minister Matsukata 
also aimed at supporting Ōkuma’s efforts to obtain recognition for Japan’s improved 
international status. Japanese leadership endeavored as much as it could to keep the 
financial crisis and the domestic anti-treaty revision opposition both domestically at 
bay and concealed from foreign eyes.135 This explains Matsukata’s efforts, in the 
second half of the 1889 and the first half of 1890, to replenish the Bank of Japan’s 
exchange stabilization fund in London (Tamaki 1995:71), in the attempt to maintain 
an image of financial rectitude that successful treaty revision negotiations necessitated.  
 In the summer of 1889, as the financial crisis continued, and domestic anti-
treaty revision opposition grew to the point of gravely injuring Ōkuma, the top 
leadership’s security dilemma worsened. As international negotiations proceeded and 
political acrimony and financial losses intensified, Genrō member Itō Hirobumi 
warned of the risks of ruining Japan’s international reputation by continuing on the 
existing foreign policy course (McCain 
2002:322). High risks existed also 
domestically, as Japanese public and most of 
Japanese private economic actors expected a 
positive response to the financial crisis by state 
authorities.  Finally, backtracking from 
constitutional government or displaying 
Japanese financial difficulties and political 
struggle was too costly an option (McCain 2002:322). The newly found consensus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Financial crisis and political turmoil were hardly appealing developments for a state seeking to 
improve its international reputation.  
Table 2.7. Japanese military spending 
             1894-1902 
Year 
 
GNP 
 
MS/GNP 
 
MS/CGE 
 
   
    
1894 1,226 0.11 1.65 
1895 1,294 0.09 1.39 
1896 1,305 0.06 0.45 
1897 1,576 0.07 0.50 
1898 2,207 0.05 0.52 
1899 1,892 0.06 0.46 
1900 2,165 0.06 0.47 
1901 2,253 0.05 0.41 
1902 
 
2,047 0.04 
 
0.31 
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within the oligarchy, was to increase the jingoistic character of Japan’s treaty revision 
strategy. This would have healed domestic fears of foreign encroachment, and 
concurrently reassured domestic private economic actors that national finances were 
under control. The Kuroda cabinet resigned (October 1889), and, from the fall of 1889 
to the spring of 1891, the Sanjō and Yamagata cabinets were much harsher negotiators 
with the West than the Kuroda cabinet had ever been.136  
 Signaling the shift to a tougher foreign policy stance, in February 1890, in a 
memorandum to the Western states that held inequality treaties with Japan, Foreign 
Minister Aoki Shūzō explained that, from then onwards, equality would be a 
necessary condition of any future treaty negotiation, as the “new Japan,” namely the 
new Japanese constitutional monarchy would not tolerate anything harmful to the 
interests of its people or to its dignity as a sovereign state. To show that the new 
course was a change in policy and not simply a change in tone, the Foreign Ministry 
retracted the concession, proposed by Ōkuma and the Kuroda cabinet a few months 
earlier, of giving foreigners the right to hold property in Japan.137 Western states were 
now warned that “if the they did not give in to Japanese demands,” Japan would be 
urged to “act upon her reserved and inherent right and annul the treaties without [the 
powers’] consent.”138 Finally, in late 1889 and throughout 1890, the Sanjō and 
Yamagata cabinets shun attacks against their foreign policy and financial crisis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 On these developments see Fraser et al, (2013); Keene (2002), pp.427,428; Takeuchi (1935), pp.94-
97; Lebra (1973), p.87; Perez (1999), pp.83,-85,96; Scalapino (1975), pp.161-163; and Two Japanese 
Statesmen, pp.4,5. It is worth noting that the concession strategy of the Kuroda cabinet did not only 
entail financial concessions but also jurisdictional ones.  
137 Keene (2002), p.431. 
138 Exchange between Mutsu Mutnemitsu and Aoki Shūzō in Perez (1999), p.97. 
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policies by repeatedly dissolving the Diet and issuing imperial rescripts.139 Domestic 
calls and votes for a reduction of the (military) budget were ignored, and the 
percentage of total government spending allocated to the defense budget continued to 
be a full 30 % throughout the crisis (Table 2.6), and in the two years after its end.140  
 The fact that the anti-treaty revision movement and the birth of Japan’s 
constitutional monarchy developed or were crowned in financial crisis years 1889 and 
1890 does not undermine the role of the financial crisis and the process of financial 
crisis response in engineering the shift towards a more assertive Japanese foreign 
policy. Stopping financial losses, reassuring domestic economic actors, and 
jumpstarting economic growth were fundamental to the program of catch-up 
rearmament and catch-up industrialization that Japanese government authorities 
subscribed to. It was exactly the need of reassuring Japanese economic actors and 
public and preventing an intensification of confrontation and violence within the 
Diet—confrontation which the combination of financial crisis and constitutional 
upgrade promised—that created oligarchic consensus around replacing Kuroda’s 
treaty revision policy and its threatening international financial components. Although 
Japanese public economic actors were too weak to change the course of national 
(military) spending, let alone the direction of Japanese foreign policy, their fear of 
foreign financial interference right when their economic action was needed made the 
oligarchy very hesitant to pursue any strategy of diplomatic collaboration with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Fukaya xxxx, p.207; Scalapino (1975), pp.156,157,159; Lone (2000), pp.22-24. On the financial 
character of the opposition see Two Japanese Statesmen, p.6. Rejecting the budget was the only 
possible instrument that the Diet had at its disposal for exerting an influence on Japanese politics. The 
Diet had no other constitutional competence to initiate or regulate foreign policy.  
140 Data for Table 2.6 are obtained and calculated from Ko ̄ichi (1971), pp.140-162. GNP values are 
expressed in million yen. 
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West.141 The risk was furthering the financial crisis, allowing greater domestic conflict 
and violence, and losing the democratization battle at home, as well as the battle for 
international recognition.  
 Before the start of the financial crisis of 1896-1901 (June 1896), Japanese 
military spending and threat assessment were similarly exuding assertive state 
intentions. Japan had fought and defeated China over the control of Korea (March 
1894-June 1895), had extracted territorial and commercial concessions, and concluded 
revised treaties with Great Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Russia.142 The military victory against China had also endowed Japan of 
a colonial empire to defend economically and militarily or, as Yamagata dubbed it, a 
“line of advantage” beyond the “line of sovereignty.”143 To this scope, in early 1896 
the Itō cabinet used the war indemnity received from China not only for joining the 
gold standard but also for financing a new rearmament program, couched in a wider 
industrialization program.144 This explains why, as shown in Table 2.7, the high ratios 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 In this regard, there is evidence that in the second half of 1889, “prophets of disaster” frequently 
raised their voice. They fomented opposition movements against foreign encroachment and against the 
prospect of cheaper foreign capital driving out Japanese investment. These movements, in turn, 
promoted the anti-treaty-revision front, and, with it, Kuroda’s resignation and a stalled treaty-revision 
process. See, instance, Perez (1999), pp.91-92. 
142 With The Sino-Japanese war, Japan gained the Liaotung peninsula, Taiwan and the adjoining islands, 
the right of navigation on the Yangtze River, the opening of the cities and ports and the treatment of 
Japan as ta most favored nation, and a financial indemnity. On Japanese foreign policy in 1894, 1895 
and 1896 see Nish (1966), pp.19,35; Akagi (1936), pp.110-112; Beasley (1963), pp.46; Takeuchi 
(1935), pp.102-110; Halliday (1975), pp.85,86; Kajima (1976), p.24; Stein (1937), p.393; O’Brien 
(2004), p.2; Sussman and Yafeh (2000), p.446. On Japanese rearmament see in particular Crowley 
(1966), p.8. 
143 On these national security intentions see Akagi (1936), pp.172-174. Threatening Japan’s line of 
advantage were Russian military build-up in East Asia, revolutionary movements within China, and the 
possibility of new great powers’ interventions against Japanese interests like the one at the end of the 
Sino-Japanese war. In short, the Sino-Japanese war gave sudden impetus to the aggressive policies of 
the European powers towards China.  
144 On Japanese rearmament after the Sino-Japanese war see Ono (1922), p.109; White (1964), p.130; 
and Ishii (1990), p.219. Had the cabinet not been set on assertive set of national security policies, the 
Chinese war indemnity could have been employed to repay the national debt.  
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of Japanese military spending on GNP and total government spending in 1896, equal, 
respectively, to 6% and 45%.145 Japanese national security plans entailed investing in 
doubling the size of the army and the navy by capitalizing on the domestic economic 
boom and the wave of optimism resulting from Japanese military victory. Russia, 
Germany, and France had clear expansionist aspirations in the Asian mainland. In 
1895, the three powers had intervened to alter the terms of Japanese victory over 
Beijing, and their incursions in the region, like the entrance of Russian marines in 
Seoul in January 1896, warned Japanese authorities that they could not let their guard 
down.146 The line separating the acquisition of international prestige from international 
humiliation was thin.  Also, the military was in a most favorable political position, 
domestically.  
 In agreement with earlier formulated expectations, after the start of the crisis, 
Japanese military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects underwent an 
expansionist upgrade. Renewed investment in national defense was part of the 
economic and military plans, which Finance Minister Matsukata and the Itō cabinet 
had launched at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War. Between 1896 and 1898, 
after the start of the financial crisis, the assertive agenda informing these plans was 
further intensified by a newly formed coalition between the Finance Ministry and the 
Navy (Smethurst 2006: 129).  Empowered by Japan’s recent military victories, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Data for Table 2.7 are obtained and calculated from Ko ̄ichi (1971), pp.140-162. GNP values are 
expressed in million yen.  
146 The European powers confiscated Japan’s gains on the island by having Japan return the Liaotung 
peninsula to China for the “peace in the Orient.”  Also, between mid-1895 and 1899, the Russians 
seized the Liaotung; the Germans acquired the Shantung province (north China); the French expanded 
in the Yunnan and parts of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces (south China); the British advanced into 
the Yangtze valley and Weihaiwei (south China); and the Americans occupied Hawaii, Wake, Guam, 
and the Philippines.  See in particular Langer (1960), p.186.  
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Navy found itself penalized by the financial crisis. Being the state still on a silver 
standard, the currency crisis made the Navy’s budget especially onerous and the gold 
standard increasingly appealing. In turn, the Navy’s support of the gold standard and 
of a tightened state control over national economic and defense industry was just what 
the Finance Ministry needed to improve Japan’s financial conditions and international 
status. By March 1897, the Navy and the Finance Ministry had united their forces and 
decided to enact the gold standard into law, raise taxation, and invest new funds in 
Japanese catch-up industrialization and catch-up rearmament.147 
 Obviously, raising capital abroad on Japanese terms was at the core of this 
strategy of financial crisis response.148 So when J.P. Morgan and Company refused to 
accept Japan’s war bonds 1898, Japanese authorities moved to the British market 
where Takahashi managed to place the first really large loan (Meltzer 2007:34-36). 
London bankers awarded the ¥100 million loan for neutral and non-military purposes 
only, but the Japanese oligarchy had its military justifications in mind.  When General 
Yamagata was nominated premier in the second half of 1898, and the financial crisis 
continued, the cabinet responded with new tax increases, the exclusion of liberal 
forces from the Diet, and the authorization of a new rearmament programs  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Complains over taxation and the levels of military spending were popular in the Diet throughout 
these years but the cabinet’s response was, as articulated by Count Katsura, first governor of Taiwan, 
and by premiers Itō and Matsukata, “carrying through the post-war plans,” because “even if  [the 
cabinet is] repeatedly opposed and the Diet repeatedly disbanded,” [Japan’s] “necessary national 
defense projects cannot be neglected.” See Uyehara (1910), pp.231-255; Lone (2000), p.61; Hackett 
(1971), pp.179-211. 
148 To this scope, in March 1897, as the gold standard was enacted into law, Takahashi was promoted to 
Vice President of the Yokohama Specie Bank so that he could investigate into ways to provide access to 
British and European capital without the danger of foreign control. In the meantime, Kaneko was doing 
the same in North America. 
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 Overall, between 1896 and 1900, the Navy was greatly increased in size, 
with the addition of four battleships, sixteen cruisers, and twenty-three destroyers 
(Beasley 1963:164, 165). Six new divisions were also added to the regular Army, 
bringing the latter’s total divisions to thirteen, while linkages between the government 
and Japanese heavy industries (weapon, mining and railroad industry) were doubled.149 
As shown in Table 2.7, in early 1896 that is after the issuing of the first rearmament 
program and before the start of the financial crisis, the military budget corresponded to 
45% of the total budget. This percentage climbed to 50% and 52% during financial 
crisis years 1897 and 1898, indicating the cabinet’s determination to follow the 
heterodox medicine and capitalize on the national financial and economic benefits of 
increasing military spending. In mid-1900, a new rearmament program was 
authorized.  
 Similarly, Japanese foreign policy became more hawkish between 1896 and 
1900. Before the financial crisis, thinking that it was absolutely necessary to reach an 
understanding with Russia over Korea, Itō, Yamagata, and Inouye signed with 
Moscow the Waeber-Komura Memorandum of May 1896, and the Yamagata-
Lobanoff Protocol of June 1896.  In late 1897 and early 1898, after the start of the 
crisis, and after the start of the rearmament phase that the financial crisis (and the 
Finance-Navy alliance deriving from the crisis) had helped fueling, Japanese naval 
squadrons carried on naval demonstrations in and around Korea against the Russian 
lease, from China, of the ice-free Port Arthur.150 Earlier in 1898, British minister in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 On the strengthening of government’s direct control and linkages with the heavy industry in this 
period, see Ohara (1963), pp.33,38. 
150 The episode is better known as the Port Arthur crisis or Far Eastern crisis. The Liaodong had first 
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Japan Satow wrote to Lord Salisbury that the Japanese government was making 
“strenuous efforts” to upgrade Japan’s military and naval establishments (Satow 
1966:120). And in 1899, Japan stopped Russia from acquiring a strategic point on the 
southern coast of Korea (Masampo) by securing the land military before Moscow 
could intervene, providing one of the triggers of the Boxer rebellion (Nish 1977:52; 
Akagi 1936:113). Finally, between 1897 and 1898, an entire Japanese battalion (1,000 
soldiers) was stationed in Seoul and a newly established Japanese-Korean central 
bank, the Dai Ichi Bank, had the task of sponsoring the battalion. Russia and China 
were the most obvious targets of Japanese military measures, but Japanese financial 
and economic conditions were also a target. The government’s attempts and 
propaganda to bolster speculative economic activities and military adventurism in 
Korea and Manchuria as a means to escape from the financial crisis are amply 
recorded in the contemporary press.151  
 In the late 1890s and the early 1900s governor of the Bank of Japan 
Takahashi encouraged the public to take advantage of ongoing national military 
activities to “shape bold plans for increasing national wealth” (Duus 1968:144-46), 
and Japanese private financial actors were drinking this heterodox medicine.152 As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
been given by China to Japan in 1895, after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War. After the Triple 
Intervention of Great Britain, France and Russia, however, the peninsula and Port Arthur were 
subtracted from Japan. The matter of concern in 1897-98, for Japan, wereRussia’s intersts in a 
considerable part of the Chinese Empire (Manchuria plus Mongolia). In mid-1898, an agreement on 
Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in Korea was reached but the situation remained tense. On 
these developments, see Malozemoff (1958), pp.106, 110, 111; Beasley (1962), p.73.  
151 Japan weekly mail, I.V.I., XI (1904), p.18, Harrington (1944), p.305, Malozemoff (1958), pp.220-31, 
Clyde (1926), p.51; and Mercury, I.V.I., VIII (1903), pp. 485-90. 
152 These “bold plans” included obtaining concessions from recently conquered governments (mainly, 
Korea), and, more generally, complementing past and present military undertakings with industrial 
entrepreneurship. Giving the example, Japanese cabinets combined accelerated military presence abroad 
and unprecedented investment in railways, telegraphs, telephones, postal service, and economic 
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private financial magnate Shibusawa Eiichi reminded to the readers of economic 
newspaper Jitsugyō no Nihon, the Sino-Japanese war had been “a very effective helper 
for the [Japanese] economy.”   
 Surely, sources other than the financial crises exacerbated Japan’s security 
dilemma. Russian incursions into Manchuria after the end of the Sino-Japanese war 
and the conclusion of a secret treaty between Moscow and Beijing provided Japan 
with a strategic rationale for redoubling on a muscular foreign policy. But the fact that 
renewed resort to the military option was made in 1897, 1898, and 1899, that is during 
the heterodox phase of financial crisis response, is remarkable.  
 Even more remarkable is Japan’s withdrawal from this renewed militancy 
between 1899 and 1901. The financial crisis and the understanding that the heterodox 
strategy of financial crisis response would have compromised Japan’s access to 
foreign funds, and ultimately Japan’s economic development and military build-up, 
informed this military caution. Already in 1899, although the existence of a financial 
crisis was never mentioned in public and denied in foreign exchanges, a concerned 
premier (Yamagata) wrote to Matsukata that “financial conditions” were rendering 
difficult to complete the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railway—the railway line on 
which Japan’s economic strength and national security depended (Hackett 1971:205). 
In the summer of 1900, British authorities expressed their concern over Japan’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
institutions.  A few statistics make the picture clearer. Between 1896 and 1897 the total length of 
Japanese private railways increased of 1,000 km, about double the increase experienced by said 
railways between 1893 and 1895.152 Between 1897 and 1898, the total length of Japanese private 
railways kept increasing, moving from 3,680 km in 1897 to 4,267km in 1898. Investment in Japanese 
private railways increased much more modestly but steadily thereafter, with the total length of Japanese 
private railways reaching 5,070km in 1903. After 1903, railroad building declined dramatically. It 
reached 5,000km again only in 1926.  
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budgetary position and warned the Yamagata cabinet that it bore a “heavy 
responsibility” by delaying to send troops to the relief of Beijing (O’Brien 2004:15-
17). British statesmen also offered financial support to Japan, admitted that the latter 
set it on a suitable diplomatic and military. 
  Determined to defend Japan’s international financial status and relations with 
Great Britain and the London money market, the Yamagata cabinet decided to 
participate in the international intervention against the Boxer insurgents by sending the 
largest military contingent while repeatedly declining any British financial aid for that 
purpose (Shigeru 1957:13-19,50-59 and 1987:97; O’Brien 2004:15-17; Davis 
2008/09:160).153  Notably, Yamagata took the decision to leave Japanese ambitions 
aside (Beasley 1963:76-77) knowing that Russia had obtained a stronger hold in 
Manchuria and was determined to exploit the Boxer rebellion to occupy the whole 
region (White 1964:99,100). 154  Next to being a means to gain international 
recognition, this resolute refusal was meant to remove the doubts in London that the 
genrō would have used foreign financial capital to finance national security decisions, 
and served to signal the London market that the required conditions to have a flow of 
foreign cash to Japan were in place. The flow of capital, in turn, as Itō described in the 
summer of 1900 while the Japanese Finance Ministry was still seeking financial deals 
in London, would have solved the ominous financial problem, and facilitated Japanese 
industry, commerce, and railroad building in Korea and China, and (Matsukata 
1901:202). The foundations for a British-Japanese alliance were thus laid. In 1901, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 The Boxer rebellion, which demanded the expulsion if foreign and missionaries from Peking, started 
in late 1899 and culminated in the attack of Russian railway installations in Manchuria and in the siege 
of foreign legations from 20 June to 14 August 1900. 
154 By January 1901, Russia had occupied the whole Manchuria.  
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premier Itō, ex-premier Yamagata and the majority of the genrō, the most influential 
Japanese statesmen at the time who, until 1900, had opposed closer political and 
military linkages with Great Britain, now favored them. By November 1901, London 
and Tokyo were united by a military alliance (Akagi 1963:193-201). 
 Had Japan not faced a financial crisis and the pressing need of procuring 
foreign capital for national economic and security purposes, Japanese assessment of 
the Russian threat, and traditional diffidence for military collaboration with Western 
powers, including Great Britain, would have worsened, rather the eased the existing 
security dilemma. Resort to arms was substituted for a strategy of “securing 
commercial and economic privileges throughout East Asia” (Morley 1974b:17; Ishii 
1991:63). The temporary nature and the financial components of this turn were clear 
soon after the conclusion of the Alliance. In 1902 and 1903, when financial issues 
stood no longer in the way, the naval budget escalated tremendously as the cabinet of 
Katsura Tarō now judged Japan’s military expansion in the Far Eastern indispensable 
(Takeuchi 1935:46: Morley 1974:17).  For their part, Japanese capitalist forces had 
only one option left: relying on the exercise of state power, and particularly military 
power, to run their business. No wonder, when the Japanese-Russian war started, 
businessman Ikeda Kenzō (15th Bank) described it as the beginning of “a great 
commercial advance in the continent.” 155  Differently from the West, in Japan, war 
and commerce, still continued to be two sides of the same coin.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Duus (1966), p.146; Myers (1984), p.145.  
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ACKNOWLEGING FINANCIAL CRISES  
AND OVERTURNING EXPANSIONIST DREAMS 
 
Japanese heterodox strategy of financial crisis response suffered of one limit. It 
thrived on the preservation of a weak domestic financial sector and the limited 
influence of the orthodox medicine and international financial cooperation on 
Japanese financial policy. Both objectives were unrealistic to sustain in the long haul, 
being each incompatible with the parties’ increasing control of domestic political life; 
with continued access to foreign loans (which Japanese governments resorted to from 
the late 1890s onwards), and, more generally, with the realization of the fukoku kyōhei 
and shokusan kōgyō program (of unrelenting investment in catch-up industrialization 
and rearmament). After the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05), a stronger bourgeoisie 
having orthodox financial preferences, increasing pressures from foreign investors 
demanding Japanese respect of the orthodox medicine, and the increasing political 
need for and appeal of foreign capital created stalemates in the Diet (over the budget) 
that could not longer be as easily resolved as in the past—namely with the 
replacement of an oligarchic cabinet with another one similar in kind (Crowley 1966, 
p.15; Halliday 1975, p.111). The implications 
for Japanese national security policies of these 
developments were overriding.  
Before the start of the financial crisis of 
1907-09, the Katsura cabinet (1901–1905) and 
the Saionji cabinet (1906/01–1908/07) had 
pursued an assertive foreign policy that had 
Table 2.8. Japanese military spending 
             1905-1913 
Year 
 
GNP 
 
MS/GNP 
 
MS/CGE 
 
   
    
1905 2,373 0.31 1.76 
1906 2,863 0.14 0.88 
1907 3,327 0.07 0.40 
1908 3,361 0.07 0.38 
1909 3,268 0.06 0.38 
1910 3,181 0.06 0.38 
1911 3,883 0.06 0.39 
1912 4,509 0.05 0.38 
1913 
 
4,574 
 
0.05 
 
0.38 
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culminated, as established at Portsmouth in August 1905, with the conquest of 
Taiwan, Korea, Southern Sakhalin and Dairen-Port Arthur, and the recognition of a 
sphere of influence in Manchuria and in the Chinese province of Fukien.156 Following 
the conclusion of the peace terms, the Saionji cabinet committed to investing in the 
military protection and the economic development of the conquered regions (Allen 
1936:59; Barnes 1934:55). This included the development of Japanese independent 
presence in Manchuria as well, to adequately tackle the possible revival of Russian 
expansion in the Far East.157   
Assertiveness was somehow diluted by the genro’s desire to control the actions 
of belligerent Japanese troops still stationed in Manchuria, which risked to irk Great 
Britain and deprive Japan of the necessary (financial) support to confront Russia.158  
Counteracting the dilution, however, was the political independence and power of the 
armed forces, and the cabinet’s traditional policy of not interfering with that 
independence and capitalizing on the positive consequences of post-war national 
military and economic investment. Thus, the military spending authorized in 1906 had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 On the treaty of Portsmouth, and its necessity for Japan see Warner (1991), p.71; Moulton (1931), 
p.286; Halliday (1975), p.92; Ishii (1931), p.70-73; Hayashi (1915), pp.230-31. Japanese interference in 
Korean affairs was sanctioned by the Taft-Katsura agreement of July 1905 and the Japanese-Korea 
Agreement concluded shortly before the Saionji Cabinet was established. Already by then, Korea was at 
all effects a Japanese protectorate.  
157 Akagi (1936), pp.283-86. 
158 On this point see in particular Beasley (1963), p.95 and Crowley (1966), p.9. Although Japanese 
army authorities after the war kept regarding Manchuria as the army’s special province, the war had 
drastically altered the position of the Japanese government by disclosing its financial dependence on 
foreign money. In March 1906, for instance, Saionji, Yamagata, Ito and Matsukata managed to bring 
about several administrative changes to try to remove the military from the positions of command they 
had acquired in the Liaotung.  
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remained at very high levels—14% GNP and 82% of total spending (see Table 8)—in 
spite of an externally financed and rising aggregate national debt. 159  
Also, between March 1906 and February 1907, the Army, the Navy, the 
Saionji cabinet converged on an ambitious national defense plan that identified the 
strategic threats posed by Russia and the United States, and recognized the “prime 
security missions” of “protecting” and “enhancing” Japan’s interests in Korea, South 
Manchuria, the treaty ports along the Chinese coast, the home islands, and the Western 
Pacific. In February 1907, along with the plan, the cabinet endorsed an expansionary 
defense budget which provided exceptional funds for post-war troop establishment in 
Manchuria and Korea; allowed extensive sums for the development of heavy industry 
and communications; and, if maintained, would have enhanced the size of the army of 
8 divisions (to supplement the existing 17 divisions) and the size of the navy of 12 
capital warships by 1912.160 The financial crisis of 1907-09 started at about the same 
time (early 1907), possibly triggered, next to the factors considered earlier, by the 
shock that the decreed military budget provoked amongst domestic financial interests, 
now represented in Diet.  
As expected, Japanese military spending decreased significantly after the start 
of the financial crisis. As shown in Table 8, the ambitious military budget approved, in 
early 1907, by the Saionji cabinet thanks to the Emperor’s authorization remained 
dead letter throughout the year. At the end of 1907, the ratio of military spending over 
total government spending had more than halved compared to 1906, shifting from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 On the effects of high defense spending on Japanese finances in these years see Ono (1922), p.87, 
Stein (1937), p.396, Allen (1963), p.48, Shinjo (1962), p.95. GNP data in Table 2.8 is in million yen.  
160 See Tatsuji (1935), 162; Crowley (1966), pp.5,6; Morley (1974), p.24-27; Stein (1937), p.395. 
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88% (at the end of 1906) to 40% (at the end of 1907).  Things did not improve in early 
1908, as the Diet, the finance ministry, and a growing number of the genro oligarchs 
refused to champion any of the increases in armament spending which the Saionji 
cabinet had endorsed in 1906 and early 1907. Back then, the enchantment with 
capitalizing on the boom resulting from the Russo-Japanese war following the 
principle “national rearmament and industrialization first, financial policy last,” was 
still strong.  In mid-1907 the old creed no longer united or helped to solve cabinet 
crises. Unprecedented financial considerations stood in the way. Resorting to foreign 
borrowing had become increasingly difficult following the start of the global financial 
crisis.161 Foreign borrowing had also become very expensive, the national debt having 
reached such dangerous levels that just the repayment of the interests accrued on 
Japanese war loans amounted to 30% of the budget. This figure upset many members 
of the ruling class, who looked with worry at Japan’s increasing dependence on 
foreign loans. Besides its diminished appeal, the traditional, “positive” policy of 
financial crisis response was losing its old viability: balking at the costs of expansion, 
the bourgeoisie (now a staple in the Diet’s majority party, the Seiyūkai) repeatedly 
rejected the military budget, firmly resisted any tax increase, and started to demand a 
more balanced distribution of the national spending.162  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 The next paragraph develops this point in greater length.  
162 Morley (1974), p.27; Crowley (1966), p.11; Ono (1922), p.90. In the late 1900s the Seiyūkai 
included a significant proportion of urban business interests, even if the Keneihontō, the second party, 
was the more liberal of the two. In the late 1900s the Seiyūkai included a significant proportion of urban 
business interests, even if the Keneihontō, the second party, was the more liberal of the two. Only in 
1914 the Council of National Defense authorized an increase in the forces stationed in Korea by 2 
divisions plus 12 capital warships. In late 1911 heightened demands by the Japanese army led to the 
army minister and a major governmental crisis lasting into early 1913.  
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In view of all these considerations, and with Japan’s financial conditions 
worsening, in mid-1907 Saionji informed Emperor Meiji that the ambitious program 
of military expansion approved by the Emperor in April 1907 would have bankrupted 
the nation. Thereafter, he adopted a retrenchment policy that forced the army to post-
pone any military build-up for three additional years and the navy to suspend new ship 
construction. National security demanded achieving these two objectives before 
anything else: national financial (and political) stability, and the repayment of the 
national debt. In the following years—1908, 1909, 1910 and 1911—the Diet rejected 
the military budget and with it the army’s argument that the minimal security needs of 
the state required an increase in the number of army divisions to be stationed in Korea. 
Saionji’s resignations in favor of the Katsura cabinet in July 1908 and Saionji’s return 
to power in August 1911 after the resignation of the Katsura cabinet did not make any 
difference. In both circumstances programs of fiscal belt-tightening that cut deeply the 
army and navy budgets were imposed.163  
 Japanese threat assessment and war prospects similarly shifted towards greater 
caution after the onset of the global financial crisis of 1907-09. To begin, between 
1907 and 1909, Japan’s assertive policies in the Far Eastern mainland, preoccupation 
with the Russian threat, and preparations for a forthcoming war of revenge against 
Russia disappeared from the national security agenda. In 1906 and early 1907, that is 
after the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) and before the start of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 This decision was particularly frustrating for the army and bred a conviction in the army circles that 
the government was not abiding to tits moral and legal obligations to fulfill the estimates of forces 
sanctioned by the Emperor in early 1907.  On the shift in Japanese economic and military priorities see 
Crowley (1966), p.11; Halliday (1975), p.111; Ono (1922), pp.89,90; Edward (2009), pp.126-28, and 
Morton (1980), p.23.    
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financial crisis, the “forward party,” a group of leading politician composed by forces 
distrustful of Russia, controlled Japanese politics, determined to assuage the bitter 
disappointment felt at Portsmouth by pushing their claims concerning Japanese rule in 
the Far East, and particularly Manchuria and Korea, very far in ongoing negotiations 
with Russia.164 Japanese moderates were brushed aside; Japanese military presence in 
southern Manchuria continued (against the Portsmouth’s peace terms); Imperial 
ordinances disavowed international railway agreements and made of the South 
Manchuria Railway Company a Japanese property; and Japanese-Russian negotiations 
were deadlocked by the unyielding attitude of Japanese diplomatic representatives.165 
It is not without significance, as historian E.W. Edwards (1954:344) has written, that 
in January 1907 the Japanese Committee of Imperial Defense was occupied in 
considering the position of India in the eventuality of a war with Russia.166  Moreover, 
in early February 1907 the national defense policy of the Saionji cabinet had called for 
preparing military operations against Russia’s positions in northern Manchuria and the 
Pacific.167  
 After the onset of the global financial crisis, all these policies changed 
radically—and in agreement with my explanation. In early 1907, as panic spread 
through the core of the financial system, Japanese financial delegates struggled to raise 
sufficient foreign funds in the London and Paris markets to finance Japan’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 The Treaty of Portsmouth had left many issues for subsequent settlement.  
165 On these developments, and, more broadly, the political dominance, in Japan, of a tough stance 
against Russia after the conclusion of the peace treaty, see MacMurray (1921), pp.555-56; Pooley 
(1915), pp.258-62; and Treat (1928), pp.195-96. A notable agreement that was disavowed at the time 
was the one signed between Katsura and E.H. Harriman, the American railway magnate, in October 
1905. 
166 See also Brett (1934-38:II), pp.217-18.  
167 Beasley (1991), p.100; and Crowley (1966), p.11.  
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expansionist ventures (and pay the national debt).168 Eventually, a loan for Japan was 
found, but the offer, which the French government helped to set up, had the strings of 
the orthodox medicine attached. Investors and the French government demanded, as 
guarantee for their lending (and future links with the Paris money market), that Japan 
pledged to respect the principles of the open door in China, and reached a settlement 
with Russia to assure peace and security in the Far East (Edwards 1954:348,349).169   
 Similarly, throughout the rest of the year, as well as in 1908, international 
financial circles lectured the Saionji government on the dangers of “concealing the 
real status of national finances” while pursuing a military and naval expansion 
program that would “stagger a more populous nation.”170 Between June and July 1907, 
the Saionji government did exactly what foreign investors wished. It dropped Japanese 
claims to Southern Manchuria, committed to preserve the existing spheres of influence 
in the Chinese mainland, and finally reached an agreement with Russia, settling all 
questions that had been left open at Portsmouth.171 In 1908, and in 1909, Japan 
adopted a surprisingly cooperative attitude against China’s defiant policy of secretly 
assigning railway concessions to British companies in the attempt to checkmate Japan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Refer to discussions of the global financial crisis offered in Chapters III and IV of the dissertation.  
169 The support of the French government to the political preferences of high finance at this conjuncture 
should not surprise as Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia successfully responded to the 
financial crisis by embracing the orthodox medicine and international financial cooperation. See the 
discussion of this crisis offered in Chapter III in particular on this point.  
170 “Japan’s Financial Troubles,” The Washington Post, May 13, 1908; “Japan’s Financial Position and 
the Possibility of a Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 1908. 
171 Edwards (1954), pp.349,50; MacMurray (1921), pp.640-648;657-68; Akagi (1936), pp.289-90.The 
collusion between the Saionji cabinet and high finance was confirmed in the autumn of 1907, when 
permanent links between the Japanese government and the Basque de Paris et des Pays Bas were 
established.  
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in the construction of its railway enterprise on the Asian continent.172 These foreign 
policy decisions occurred in tandem with the earlier described adoption of a program 
of military retrenchment, and arguably benefited of the atmosphere of international 
financial cooperation (and restrained assertiveness) in central Europe that ensued after 
the onset of the global financial crisis.  
 That a shift in Japanese national security occurred policies between 1907 and 
1909 is also evident from the evolution of Japanese assessment of the American threat 
in this period. Between the end of the Russo-Japanese war and the start of the global 
financial crisis in 1907, the Yamagata and Saionji cabinets had, respectively, worked 
towards and approved an ambitious program of naval rearmament against the United 
States, believing in the political feasibly of the “big navy” agenda.  After the start of 
the financial crisis, the difficulty for Japanese authorities to sell state bonds while 
committing to the rearmament program, united with the political opposition to 
increases in budget spending at home, resulted 
in the dawn of a new financial-security agenda, 
and the replacement of Japanese-American 
naval rivalry with Japanese-American 
cooperation. When, starting in 1907 Japanese 
navy officials, civilian policymakers, and 
parliamentary forces clashed in the Diet over 
the distribution of limited funds, naval 
rearmament was blocked (Gow 2004:71-72). The defeat of the military party paved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Akagi (1936), pp.297-98. In particular, China secretly assigned to Pauling and Company the 
construction of a short line between Hsinmintun and Fakumen, a project that shocked Tokyo. 
Table 2.9. Japanese military spending 
             1918-1926 
Year 
 
GNP 
 
MS/GNP 
 
MS/CGE 
 
   
    
1918 10,052 0.07 0.66 
1919 14,924 0.07 0.87 
1920 13,125 0.07 0.72 
1921 12,140 0.07 0.61 
1922 12,355 0.06 0.52 
1923 13,053 0.04 0.38 
1924 14,403 0.04 0.36 
1925 15,112 0.03 0.36 
1926 
 
14,670 
 
0.03 
 
0.33 
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the way for important diplomatic victories. Between late 1907 and early 1908, after 
repeated failures during the previous year to find an international agreement over the 
regulation of migratory flows, the Japanese and American governments signed the 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement,” a milestone in Japanese-American diplomatic 
cooperation.173 This cooperative attitude was further consolidated later in 1908, when 
Japan and the United States pledged to share common aims, intentions, and policies in 
the regions of the Pacific Ocean and would “materially contribute to the preservation 
of the general peace (Akagi 1936:293,94).”174 As it will be clear after the reading of 
Chapter IV, the American government, like the Japanese government confronted 
scenario LA–HE during the global financial crisis, which, in turn compounded Japan’s 
turn towards greater caution.  
 Some of the existing scholarship on Japanese foreign policy seems of the 
opinion that this shift in Japanese foreign policy was impelled by the absence of a 
fundamental clash of interests (or a desire of confrontation) between the United States 
and Japan. Evans and Pettie (1997:150,151), for instance, argue that the ambitious 
Japanese naval rearmament policy arbitrarily selected the United States as a likely 
opponent in order to justify the scale of naval strength that the navy department or the 
Imperial government desired, but the United States had no intention to strike Japan. 
Along similar lines, Asada (2006:47) notes that the United States was nothing more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 As historian Ichiro Tokutomi explains, the agreement marked a watershed in Japanese-American 
relations, so much so that one could wonder: “Was this a cloak to cover up (Japanese) policy of backing 
down from the stand Japan had taken towards American up to that time, or was it because Japan 
believed in it with sincerity?” See Ichiro (1922), p.77. 
174 The pledge is better known as Takahira-Root agreement, based on the diplomats that concluded it. 
Baron Takahira Kogoro was the Japanese ambassador at Washington. Elihu Root was the US Secretary 
of State at the time.  
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than a “budgetary enemy,” a simple target for building a large fleet. The problem that 
this and similar arguments encounter is that they confuse policy outcomes and 
intentions. True, a great number of Japanese and American officials believed that there 
was no fundamental clash of interest between Japan and the United States in late 1907, 
in 1908, and in 1909. But the embrace of this wisdom, at this conjuncture, was due to 
the appearance of scenario LA–HE in both Japan and the United States. In Japan, 
rearmament intentions encountered too powerful opposition abroad and at home, and 
could no longer shape Japanese foreign policy as much as they had done in past 
financial-crisis conjunctures. 
As expected, Japanese assertiveness was curbed again during the financial 
crisis of 1920-22, and this time Japanese authorities endorsed military retrenchment 
and resorted to conciliatory international diplomacy to a much greater extent. One 
could say that Japanese national security ambitions were suspended after 1907 and 
overruled after 1920.  Before the financial crisis started in March 1920, the Hara 
cabinet, like the Saionji cabinet in 1907, sponsored an ambitious national security 
agenda. With the start of World War I, the Japanese leadership had resumed the 
imperialist policies that it had abandoned after the 1907-09 financial crisis.175 These 
included expanding in previously unclaimed Chinese territories, like the Shantung 
peninsula; financing Chinese warlords’ military adventures; perpetuating Japanese 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 The earlier described domestic and international circumstances that had forestalled an augmentation 
of military spending disappeared when Japan grasped the opportunity of profiting from the war as a 
major supplier to belligerent countries. Although the intervention in Siberia started as an internationally 
agreed intervention (amongst the Japanese, American, French, and British governments) on the model 
of the former intervention against the Boxers, the independent characters of the Japanese expeditions 
were soon unveiled.  On the revival of Japanese military expansionism after World War I, see Crowley 
(1966), pp.26; Stein (1937), pp.396; Halliday  (1975), pp.97; Warner (1991), pp.79; Kawakami (1917), 
p.39; Morton (1980), pp.28; Dulles (1937), pp.134,35; Nish (1977), p.139; Nish (2002), p.22;“Japanese 
Imperialism in Siberia,” The Nation, June 12, 1920. 
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presence in the Liaotung Peninsula and around the South Manchuria Railway; sending 
a military expedition against the Bolsheviks in Siberia, and extracting a series of 
concessions from China (the 21 demands). At the end of the War, Japan was the 
dominant military and political power in East Asia.176  
The promotion by Japanese authorities of forceful national security policies 
continued after the conclusion of World War I. Some cabinet members, including 
premier Hara, hoped to contain Japanese imperialistic spirits to avoid the worsening of 
Japanese-American (trade) relations and maintain a “strictly conciliatory attitude” 
towards the European leaders. Yet, the political weight of the military front, and its 
abidance by the principles of fukoku kyōhei and shokusan kōgyō was much greater.177 
In 1919 the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was in doubt, and the Hara cabinet 
supported new military operations against the Soviet communists in Siberia, and 
hugely expanded the Japanese naval budget, bringing the share of national military 
spending over total government spending to 87% (Table 2.9)—the highest share since 
the years of the Russo-Japanese war.178  
Early in the following year (1920), before the start of the financial crisis, the 
Hara cabinet gave its approval to the naval building program approved in 1919, which 
granted the funds for the construction of 8 battleships and 8 cruisers (10:7 ratio with 
the United States) to be completed by 1928. Hara even decided to support the advance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 See particularly Warner (1991:91) on this point.  
177 The United States was the major importer of Japanese goods. It was also the foremost financial and 
economic power and the preservation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance required the preservation of good 
Japanese-American relations. This, in turn, required more cordial relations with China. Premier Hara 
understood these needs but his understanding was not a game changer before the outbreak of the 
financial crisis. Also, although more moderate, Hara’s position, in principle, was not against Japanese 
expansion. See, for instance, Nish (2002), p.16 and Young (1972), pp.125, 141. 
178 The naval rearmament program authorized in 1919 established that Japan reached a ratio of 10:7 
with the American fleet by 1928.  
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of Chinese nationalists into Mongolia, offering military and financial support to 
Chinese warlord Chang Tso-lin.  By the spring of 1920, Japanese troops seized 
Vladivostok, an action that was a clear statement of the imperialist character of 
Japanese Siberian intervention, and an action that arguably helped to jumpstart the 
financial crisis. In the following months, Japan’s pre-financial crisis expansionist 
pathway registered a major setback as the disharmony of interests between the liberal 
and the military elements of the Hara government grew stronger and a “positive” 
economic strategy of financial crisis response failed to win the day.  
 The first indication that Japanese foreign policies were at a turning point 
appeared in late March, 1920, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs released the policy 
statement that Japan had no territorial ambition in Siberia and troops would be 
withdrawn as soon as possible. Two months later, at a conference that Hara had 
convened to assess the future of Japanese foreign policy, military and civilian 
authorities failed to achieve a consensus on Japan’s military strategy on the continent. 
Later in the year (summer of 1920), General of the Imperial Japanese Army Tanaka 
Giichi worked closely with Hara to promote Japanese demobilization in Siberia, and, 
in October 1920, Japan signed an agreement with Great Britain, the United States and 
France to support an international consortium of bankers making loans to China. In the 
Spring of 1921, the Hara cabinet resolved that the country’s floundering economy 
demanded withdrawal from Siberia, and, over the course of the year, as the financial 
crisis continued, Japanese military and civilian leadership Japan agreed on seeking 
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some form of diplomatic accommodation with the United States to prevent a naval 
arms race. 179  
 By the time that the Takahashi cabinet had replaced the Hara cabinet in 
November 1921, Japanese leading authorities had endorsed military retrenchment to 
support deflationary financial policies and the transfer of greater funds to rescur the 
national financial market. Hara Kei, leader of the majority party (Kenseikai) spoke of 
the emergence of a new (economic) diplomacy—later known as Shidehara diplomacy 
after the name of the Finance Minister who formulated it. This new diplomacy, or 
emergent financial-security agenda capitalized on the national security advantages of 
financial stability, and considered armed competition obsolete and economic 
competition as the new currency of international affairs.180 Crucially, the Shidehara 
diplomacy increasingly appealed to the military leadership and the civilian leadership 
alike. For instance, during the Ishii panic of 1922, new premier and ex-Navy 
commander Katō praised armament reductions on the grounds that (Japan’s) national 
defense was a composite of capabilities amongst which financial means ranked first.181 
Army authorities were not less forthcoming in opting for military retrenchment, as 
General Tanaka’s collaboration with Hara in the summer of 1920 suggests.  
Military restraint was further consolidated during the Ishii panic of 1922, when 
Japan, by signing the Washington Treaty that wrapped up the Washington Naval 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179  For a more detailed account of these developments, see Nish (1977), p.24; (2002), pp.22-28; Morley 
(1974), pp.46; Crowley (1966), pp.25-26; Young (1972), pp.141-42. 
180 Shidehara’s economic diplomacy took its name from Finance Minister Baron Shidehara Kijūrō. The 
diplomacy relied on the close interdependence between economic and military objectives and policies. 
On this point see in particular Kirshner (2007), p.68. See also Crowley (1966), pp.29,30; Burns and 
Bennett (1974), pp.208-210; and Silberman and Harootunian (1974), pp.244,45.  
181 Silberman and Harrotunian (1974), pp.241-44; Crowley (1966), pp.29-30. 
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Conference, agreed on giving up the Shantung, returning Kiachow to China, 
completing Japanese withdrawal from North Sakhalin and Eastern Siberia, endorsing 
multilateral military cooperation, and accepting a naval ratio of 10:6 between the 
Anglo-American fleets and the Imperial Navy.182 In a 1923 top-secret memorandum of 
the intelligence division of the General Staff, commanding officer and future General 
Iwane Matsui wrote that, to use old methods of expansion was out of the question. He 
stated:  “We must substitute economic conquest for military invasion, financial 
influence for military control, and achieve our goals under the slogan of co-prosperity 
and co-existence, friendship and cooperation.”183  
A look at Japanese military spending in these years similarly confirms the fast 
and radical triumph of retrenchment policies, in agreement with what expected. As 
shown in Table 9, the ratio of military spending on total government spending moved 
from 84% in 1919 to 72% in 1920, 61% in 1921, and 52% in 1922, and 38% in 1923. 
Cuts in national military spending continued in the following years as financial crises 
stroke repeatedly in the 1920s. In 1925, the standing army was even reduced from 18 
to 14 divisions against the army’s own estimate that at least 21 divisions were needed. 
Looking at these figures and at the contrast between Japanese pre-1920 and 
post-1920 national security behavior, scholars like Halliday (1975:99), Crowley 
(1966:29), Nish (1977:141), and Warner (1991:101), have considered the Washington 
conference as an anti-Japanese operation, emphasizing how Great Britain, the United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 The Washington Naval Conference commenced in November 1921 and ended in February 1922. 
Products of the conference were the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance through a four-power 
Pacific Treaty signed by the United States, Britain, France and Japan; the Shangtun treaty (for the return 
of the Shangtun and Kiachow to China), and Two Nine-Power Treaties that recognized the territorial 
and political independence of China. See for instance, Halliday (1975), p.99. 
183 Silberman and Harootunian (1974), p.244.  
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States, and France placed the Takahashi and Kato cabinets against a wall and extracted 
the maximum gain. Differently, Kirshner (2007:68,69) has attributed the watershed 
change in Japanese national security policies between 1920 and 1922 to the domestic 
power of Japan’s financial forces and their pressures for financial housecleaning—
pressures endorsed and encouraged by an increasingly powerful high finance. While 
all these factors created a ripe political environment in Japan for overhauling existing 
national security policies, the interpretation advanced here suggests that no overhaul 
would have been possible without the occurrence of a financial crisis. Western 
pressures on Japanese national security agenda would have been scarcely relevant 
without a transformation in the financial-security ideology that the Japanese leadership 
abided to, and the financial crisis and the process of financial crisis response triggered 
this transformation. In fact, in 1919, despite the presence of a strong domestic 
financial group favoring a conciliatory foreign policy, and the existence of 
international pressures against the use of force, Japanese national security priorities 
did not exhibit any element pointing to liberal internationalism.184 The Gaiko 
Chosakai, the Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs, staunchly opposed the “low 
posture” foreign policy approach that people like old genro representative Matsukata 
Masayoshi and future foreign minister Shidehara Kijuro auspicated.185  
Moreover, during the international negotiations of Versailles, ex-premier and 
genro member Saionji and Ambassador Chinda Sutemi sturdily defended Japan’s 
naval rearmament and military possessions. The Japanese delegation to Paris had been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Belonging to the liberal internationalist front were, for example, Matsukata Matayoshi, Shidehara 
Kijuro, Makino Nobuaki, and Kato Tomosaburo. Opposition to this group was offered by Inukai 
Tsuyoshi, Terauchi Masatake, and Ito Miyoji. 
185 Connors (1987), pp.66,67. 
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firmly instructed to not accept any compromise, and abstain from signing the 
Covenant unless the powers accepted the principle that any retrocession of conquered 
Asian land needed to be settled between Japan and China only.186 The Allies distinctly 
got the message that Japan would withdraw from the conference had its demands not 
been met. American President Woodrow Wilson reportedly commented: “[The 
Japanese delegation] will go home unless we given them what they should not 
have.”187 On top of that, in Japan, the military front and the business front were not 
explicitly at odds.188  
In fact, military advancement in the Chinese mainland, and the financing of 
Chinese-warlord Chang Tso-lin required the cooperation of Japan’s military and 
business interests and promised to reward both groups—at least within the frame of 
mind of catch-up rearmament and catch-up industrialization. Only in the spring of 
1920, and in the following months, when the effects of the crisis were patent, the 
cabinet appeared more uncertain and started to reconsider of existing national security 
objectives. Only then business interests started to strongly ostracize expansionism. 
And only from then on, military retrenchment was increasingly advocated and pursued 
by Japanese leadership. This timing also rules out the possibility that the Washington 
Conference—the international disarmament conference held from November 12, 1921 
to February 6, 1922 under the wish and direction of the United States and Britain—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186As Ambassador Chinta Sudemi told the American Secretary of State Lansing: “Regarding the good or 
bad, or the validity of the Japanese-Chinese Agreement, our government will not permit the meddling 
of another country [..]. IT is against the objectives of any Peace Conference to try to criticize the 
agreements existing between nations.”  See Connors (1987), p.73. 
187 In Baker (1922), p.265.  
188 Even Silberman and Harootunian  (1974:244,245) note that the Japanese decision to reduce military 
expenditures had not exactly matured out of the Versailles conference. 
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reversed the course of Japanese military expenditures. The point is the Hara 
government confronted a solid opposition who urged for reduction in armaments 
starting from the spring of 1920, long before the idea of an international conference on 
the reduction of armaments was even entertained by officials in Washington. Along 
with the banking panic of 1922, the Conference further consolidated the greater 
political resonance of the orthodox medicine and liberal internationalism—an 
important effect but definitely not a big enough effect to diminish the catalytic role of 
the financial crisis.  
 
BRINGING FINANCIAL-CRISIS DENIAL BACK:  
Retreat from the orthodox medicine and new conversion to expansionism 
 
In the years following the financial crisis of 1920-22, high finance and 
financial interests enjoyed an unprecedented position of political supremacy in Japan. 
Responding to the financial crisis of 1920-22 though military withdrawal from Siberia 
and defense cuts created the conditions for a tight alliance between Bank of Japan 
governor Inoue Junnosuke and eminent international financers like Governor of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Benjamin Strong and Morgan Chief Executive 
Thomas Lamont. Captivated by the prospect of placing Japan at the forefront of the 
international financial order along with the United States and Great Britain, members 
of Japanese high finance like Inoue urged Tokyo’s participation in the “Washington 
System” and the related endorsement of deep defense cuts and deflationary financial 
policies to return to the gold standard, abandoned after the beginning of World War 
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One (Humphreys 1995:44,45,60; Kirhsner 2007:61-69).189 The realization of this 
master plan was initially stalled by the emergency, positive financial and economic 
policies that Japanese political leadership had to embark on to address the widespread 
devastation produced by the great Kanto earthquake (1923). By mid-1924, however, 
the political fortunes, for the first time, of the Kenseikai, the party closer to financial 
interests, rewarded Inoue’s financial ambitions, and the master plan could officially 
start, first under a Seiuyukai-Kenseikai coalition government headed by Kenseikai 
leader Katō Takaaki (1924-1926), and then under an all-Kenseikai government headed 
by Waktsuki Reijirō (1926-1927).  
With a Kenseikai leadership determined to realize profound and urgent 
retrenchment policies to return to the gold standard no matter what—resignation of the 
coalition party included—before the onset of the financial crisis of 1927, Japan was 
abiding by a most cautious national security agenda. Prudence in international 
diplomatic and military affairs took the name of Shidehara diplomacy, under the name 
of the Keinsekai Foreign Minister that ideated it as early 1922 (Crowely 1966:29,30; 
Burns and Bennett 1974:208-10).  In the spirit of liberal internationalism, and in the 
conviction that financial deflation was the key to Japan future economic development, 
in 1925 the standing army was reduced from 18 to 14 divisions, nullifying the army’s 
own estimate that at least 21 divisions were needed for Japanese development and 
defensive purpose. Next to budget and military budget reductions, the Kenseikai 
cabinets sought to promote friendly relations between Japan and China. When in 1925 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 The Washington System, which the earlier introduced Washington conferences and treaties created, 
codified and extended a policy of cooperation between Japan and Western powers into the Far Eastern 
arena through a number of pacts. The Nine Power Pact, for instance, condemned the recognition of 
spheres of influence in China and upheld the principles of Chinese sovereignty and the Open Door. 
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and 1926, boycotts and anti-foreign feelings spread through China, Shidehara 
responded by ordering the withdrawal of Japanese nationals from dangerous areas, and 
upholding a firm opposition to any use of force. 190 In 1926 and in early 1927, before 
the start of the financial crisis, the Wakatsuki cabinet continued to abide by the 
principles of the Washington System castigating anti-Shidehara suggestions, and 
backing a policy of cooperation with China’s Nationalist Government and its political 
and military leader Chiang Kai-shek. This radical policy of restraint might have 
contributed to the Nanking incident of March 24, 1927, when ill-discipline units of the 
advancing Chinese Kuomintang Army deliberately killed several foreigners at 
Nanking, including some Japanese residents. 
Once again, the Chinese Navy held its fire 
(Nish 2002:66,67).  
Unfortunately, despite the deflationary 
efforts and a preponderant military restrain 
financial crises continued to occur in Japan 
throughout the 1920s, undermining the state’s 
ability to join the gold standard. In the attempt 
to stop them, between 1924 and 1927 the Keinsekai cabinets encouraged merger, 
legitimized collusive financial practices, and accommodated national financial markets 
with huge sums of liquidity. These expedients only ended up exacerbating moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 In 1925 foreign minister Shidehara expressed the future of Japan’s foreign policy in these terms:  
“Japan must make considerable efforts to maintain the cooperation of the United States and Britain;” it 
“must strictly refuse any intervention in Chinese domestic affairs;” and it must endeavor “to harmonize 
the ideal and the pragmatic to bring some kind of compromise,” that is compatible “with the real 
situation in China.” See Burns and Bennett (1974), p.201; Morley (1974), p.45; Nish (1977), p.155. 
Table 2.10. Japanese military spending 
             1925-1933 
Year 
 
GNP 
 
MS/GNP 
 
MS/CGE 
 
   
    
1925 15,112 0.03 0.35 
1926 14,670 0.04 0.33 
1927 14,611 0.04 0.34 
1928 14,852 0.04 0.34 
1929 14,799 0.04 0.35 
1930 13,850 0.04 0.35 
1931 12,520 0.05 0.38 
1932 13,043 0.06 0.42 
1933 
 
14,334 
 
0.07 
 
0.44 
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hazard and risky investments in what was already an extremely fragile financial 
system. Unsurprisingly, the financial crises of the 1920s hit Japan with extraordinary 
and unprecedented virulence. But no one did so more virulently than the Showa crisis 
of 1927. 
 As the Wataksuki cabinet prepared to address it through new disbursements in 
April 1927, as previously described, indignation at the maneuver escalated within the 
Diet, bringing the domestic political fracture between military forces and financial 
forces (which the political conflict between the Seiyukai and Kenseikai fostered) to 
extremely polarized levels and ultimately causing the Keinseikai leader’s resignation. 
In agreement with my expectations, once that the Emperor awarded the new 
premiership to General Giichi Tanaka (Seiyukai), Japanese economic and security 
agenda changed, and Japanese national security policies shifted towards ambiguity or, 
as Beasley wrote, “incompetence” (1963:122). Tanaka immediately took a number of 
decisions that conveyed an increased hostility towards China and the great powers. In 
May 1927, having declared that the cabinet was prepared to act in defense of Japanese 
special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia as anti-foreign hostility mounted in 
China, Tanaka dispatched a total of 4,200 troops to Shantung against the terms of the 
Washington Treaty System. The Shantung Expedition would have become the first 
step in the forthcoming Japanese military aggression on the Chinese mainland 
(Tamaki 1995:154). 
 Despite this renewed assertiveness, powerful domestic political pressures, and 
an international environment favoring international financial cooperation thwarted the 
complete abandonment of existing national security policies. As archival records 
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reveal, Tanaka’s efforts to move Japanese foreign policy on a less timid course were 
counteracted by the dominant pro-Shidehara beliefs of the Kenseikai and the genro, 
both of which acted to reinstate the China policy by which the Kenseikai stood. The 
policy results of these parallel efforts were certainly not minimal. In November 1927, 
with the help of a $30 million loan from the American Morgan & Co, Japanese 
financial forces urged and obtained a wide-ranging agreement with Chinese warlord of 
North Manchuria Chang Tso-lin. The agreement endowed Japan of new railways 
rights, closer economic cooperation with China and possibly, as the promoter of the 
agreement Japanese magnate and President of the South Manchuria Railway 
Company, Jotaro Yamamoto, put it, the indirect “[purchase] of the whole of 
Manchuria.”191 Similarly clashing policies were in place in 1928 too. In April 1928, 
Tanaka decided to dispatch another expedition to Shantung but, because of the 
popularity of the Shidehara diplomacy within the government, he ordered the Japanese 
troops not to intervene, and assured the Diet that no Japanese military or political 
intervention in Chinese domestic affairs would have occurred.  
 This ambiguous national security agenda only made the fracture between 
military and political forces deeper, since the neither of the two groups could 
obviously be pleased. It also helped to increase the disappointment of Japanese armed 
forces with the party system.192 In May 1928, in utter disregard of higher advice from 
the Tanaka’s government, Japanese troops clashed with Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 National Archives and Records Service of the United States, Records of the U.S. Department of State 
relating to internal affairs of Japan, 1910-1929, files 0252, 0324; "The Loan to the SMR," The North-
China Daily News, December 9, 1927. Jotaro’s quote is from Beasley (1991), p.182. See also Connors 
(1987), pp.114-117. 
192 On the skepticism of the Japanese armed forces towards the party system, despite a slight preference 
for the Seiyukai versus the Kenseikai see Kirshner (2007), p.80. 
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forces at the town of Tsinian (Shantung), and in June 1928 Japanese soldiers 
assassinated Chang Kai-shek. An international storm of protest followed, and Saionji 
warned Tanaka to “strictly enforce military discipline.” Alarmed, the Tanaka cabinet 
also issued an official apology to the Chinese government; signed the Renunciation of 
War treaty in Paris (Kellogg-Briand pact); and authorized Japanese participation in a 
forthcoming international naval disarmament conference to extend and expand the 
agreements on practical shipbuilding laid down at the Washington Conference of 
1921-22.193  By acting this way, Tanaka distanced himself and his party even further 
from the Japanese army, leaving the latter only one option to pursue: exit, that is exit 
from bending to a lame foreign policy that tarnished Japan’s interests in Manchuria 
and jeopardized national security.  
 Why did Tanaka lapse into the orthodox medicine and cautionary national 
security policies that he opposed?  The answer is most likely that a complete political 
departure from the orthodox medicine and the attached security conditionality was not 
feasible yet, as the appeal of participating to the international financial system 
remained still strong. Of the great powers only Japan was experiencing a financial 
crisis at this point in time (1927-1928). Also, by 1928 not only Great Britain but also 
the main European states had returned to the gold standard by 1928, leaving Japan 
isolated, and giving new impetus to Inoue’s master plan (and the thesis that Tanaka’s 
feisty policies got in the way). 
 Relatedly, it is also interesting to observe that the extra prudent national 
security agenda promoted by Japanese financial forces—which included the pursuit of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 "Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to internal affairs of Japan," files 0348 and 0351. 
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a “non-military” Japanese foreign policy towards China and a greater investment in 
international financial cooperation between Tokyo and Beijing and between Japan and 
the United States—was not a foresighted strategy for   preserving international peace. 
The tripartite collaboration between high finance, Japanese financial parties, and 
Chang Tso-lin irked not only the Japanese Army but the Chinese leadership too, 
fostering Chinese military radicalism and the prospects of a Sino-Japanese conflict. 
Indeed, the Chinese leadership alarmingly saw the tripartite collaboration between the 
Japanese, the Americans and Chang Tso-lin as an open invitation to all nationalities to 
participate in the exploitation of Manchuria in the name of improving the railway 
service. These concerns are well documented by contemporary British and American 
press and various records of the US Department of State relating to internal affairs of 
Japan. Alarmed by the agreement, representatives of the Chinese government 
protested with their American counterparts while the Chinese nationalist forces of 
Chang Kai-shek quickly initiated their march against Chang Tso-lin. Ultimately, the 
Japanese Army alarmingly saw the decreasing domestic political utility of their service 
right when this utility should have increased. The manifestation of Chinese 
nationalism was escalating and basic requirements of Japanese national security hardly 
demanded a sheer reliance on economic means—they rather suggested that the 
Japanese Army stay prepared to prevent incidents involving Japanese nationals.194 On 
the whole, Chinese political elites and Japanese military forces each perceived an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 "Wang Sees Menace in Japan Loan," Seattle Post Intelligencer, December 1,1927; "Nationalists 
Also Protest S.M.R. Loan. C.C. Wu Feels America is About to Change Her China Policy." The 
Shanghai Times, December 5, 1927; National Archives and Records Service of the United States, 
"Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to internal affairs of Japan, " files 0252,0285; 
Takeuchi (1935), pp.30-31. 
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increasingly adverse security dilemma, which also meant that there was a clear gap 
between the behavior of high finance and the outcome that high finance expected that 
behavior would facilitate.   
 Domestic and international political opposition to a militant Japanese foreign 
policy helps to explain why peace was preserved for a few more years.  In July 1929, 
when the pro-Shidehara cabinet of Hamaguchi was appointed, the new cabinet’s 
agenda called, once again, for improving relations with China and promoting 
multilateral arms controls and arms reductions.195 In agreement with what expected, 
greater caution was infused in the existing national security agenda. As Inouye 
(1931:153) and Kirshner (2007:58-88) have already remarked, conciliatory military 
measures were conceived by the newly-in-power pro-Shidehara front as necessary to 
let deflationary policies shine and allow Japan to return to the gold standard. Crucially, 
deflationary policies needed to succeed first of all because Japan’s international 
credibility was at stake, and Japan’s international credibility was at stake because of 
the status of Japanese finances. As influential genro member Saionji précised soon 
after the appointment of the Hamaguchi cabinet, “since a nation’s military 
preparedness […] depends first of all upon its financial status and policies, [it is] 
especially important now [that] Japan leads other nations to recognize her earnest 
promotion of international peace by voluntarily accepting a 60 per cent (ratio vis-à-vis 
the United States).”196 In other words, the spread of financial chaos in Japan required a 
stronger disarmament stance than the one that the country would have normally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 On the program of military retrenchment of the Hamaguchi cabinet see Kirshner (2007), pp.70,71,74. 
196 In Harada (1968), p.85. 
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supported, and also closer ties with the United States, Great Britain, and the 
signatories of the London treaties.  
 Hence, Finance Minister Inoue issued new disarmament cuts in the summer of 
1929, nullifying the budget that the Tanaka cabinet had passed earlier in the year, and 
promised more military cuts for the following year, during the naval negotiations 
taking place in London.197 Respecting this disarmament schedule, and discounting the 
hostility that further military sacrifices would have met across the country—even the 
proponents of arms controls thought that Japan’s share of the world naval forces 
should be increased by then—, on March 13 (1930), the cabinet helped the works of 
the Naval Conference by signing the widely appeasing Reed-Matsuidaira agreement. 
The agreement obliged Japan to remain below the ceiling of 50,768 new naval 
tonnages and not build a single heavy cruiser in the future. The cabinet ratified the 
agreement despite the unanimous objection of the Navy and the entire opposition of 
the Seiyukai. The measure ridiculed the Navy’s aspiration of reaching the 10:7 ratio 
sometime, and created a profound fracture between Japanese military and political 
forces, since the linkage between balanced budget and abandoned military 
expansionism was no secret.198 More pointedly, the reinstated financial-security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 The London Conference was called for extending and expanding the disarmament agenda that the 
Washington Conference had launched in 1920-22.  While the Washington Naval Treaty focused on 
battleships, the London Naval conference focused on warships and heavy cruisers. On the London 
conference see Takeuchi (1935), chapter IV; Crowley (1966), p.64; Nish (1977), p.68. 
198 Popular resistance to the signing of the agreement led to critical clashes in Tokyo and the cabinet 
found itself much more isolated thereafter. Under the terms of the Reed-Matsuidaira compromise, Japan 
could no build a single heavy cruiser while the US could construct 14 ones between 1930 and 1936. On 
the results of the London conference for Japan see Beasley (1963), pp.242-244. 
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agenda did little or nothing to solve the crisis. The financial crisis was also spreading 
internationally at the time, exacerbating financial conditions in Japan.199  
 The new resort to conciliatory measures seemed unstoppable. Complementing 
the reduction in tonnage with reduction in the strength of the Army, on April 2, 1931, 
the cabinet decided to decrease the number of its wartime divisions from 32 to 28.200 
In September 1931, as the status of Japanese national finances appeared newly 
jeopardized by the British decision to abandon the gold standard, the Wakatsuki 
cabinet proposed even more cuts in military spending. Hostility to the cabinet’s 
policies newly exploded, and the Japanese Army took extreme remedies to overrule 
the ideational and political rationale that was pushing the Japanese military forces to a 
position of impotence. The statutory and effective independence of the Japanese 
military made the resort to arms much quicker and far less controversial than 
anywhere else amongst the great powers. On September 18, 1931, the Kwantung 
Army, the branch of the Japanese army stationed in Manchuria precipitated the 
Mukden incident, commenced military action against the Chinese, and, in the 
following months, pushed into South Manchuria, doggedly and irrespectively of the 
cabinet’s orders to stop. A month later, another incident occurred, while radical 
military measures were gaining the support of larger sections of the Japanese public, 
particularly in the rural areas, which had been hit hard by years of financial and 
economic crisis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199  Japanese exports to the US and China collapsed dramatically between 1930 and 1931 due to the 
internationalization of the financial crisis.  
200 Crowley (1966), pp.33; Kirshner (2007), p.73; Morley (1974), p.10; 
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 In the meantime, as the financial crisis spread internationally, and the power 
of high finance decreased, Japanese society became violent and militarized and 
disillusion with the orthodox medicine grew within the Diet. Many members of the 
Japanese leading political class started to reconsider the cabinet’s conciliatory 
financial-security agenda. In two months’ time from the Mukden incident, the Inukai 
(Seiyukai) cabinet was sworn in and, in agreement with expectations, the main 
ingredient of Finance Minister Takahashi’s “positive” economic recipe of financial 
crisis response was military expansion.201 The new budget policy, the new cabinet, and 
the resounding popular support that the Seiyukai and an autonomous, independent 
Japanese policy received at the polls in early 1932 offered moral and practical support 
to the military operations of the Kwantung Army on the Asian mainland. Interestingly, 
allusions to the interdependence between Japan’s financial status and Japan’s 
international credibility were made lesser and lesser frequently.  
 Between late 1931 and early 1933 Japan’s financial-security agenda returned 
to where it had begun, namely to the denial of financial crises and the promotion of 
catch-up rearmament and catch-up industrialization. From September 1931 onwards, 
Japanese national security policies shifted from caution to assertiveness. Proponents of 
liberal internationalism quickly disappeared from the political arena in late 1931, and 
the clash of views amongst Japanese political leaders was minor compared to the 
political dissonance that existed between 1927 and 1929. Two factors explain this 
discrepancy. A first one is that a tentative foreign policy had been attempted and failed 
very recently (1927-29), creating a precedent that discouraged repetition. A second 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Military spending increased much more than any other voice of the budget of the Inoue cabinet. On 
this point see particularly Kirshner (2007), pp.78,79. 
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factor is the strong political and legal independence and prestige of the military sector 
in the Japanese society. Although the orthodox medicine had strenuous supporters 
amongst military ranks up to the late 1920s, when the Washington System started to 
crumble (1930-1931), disappointed military representatives and new forces joining the 
army and the navy transitioned towards a more assertive posture.  
 By early 1932, (Japanese) political and military forces had agreed on a new 
financial-security agenda. This point is of critical importance because the framework 
of the thesis concerns military forces and military policies only to the extent that they 
are a product of political decisions matured in response to urgent national economic 
needs. It is difficult to say how far into Manchuria the Army would have advanced 
without the cabinet’s support. Although resistance to the cabinet’s cautionary agenda 
had increased compared to 1927 due to the worsening of the global financial crisis 
(and the negative effects that the crisis had produced on the Japanese rural areas), the 
increasing incongruence of the official foreign policy towards China, and the 
precedent that the 1927 expeditions and the London naval conference had set, it is 
only between February and March 1932—that is only after the inauguration of the 
Inukai cabinet, the passing of the new military budget, and the approval of the new 
Japanese foreign policy agenda—that the Kwantung Army reached Harbin in North 
Manchuria and set up the state of Manchuko. The advance acquired such 
unprecedented scope and qualities that one can reasonably doubt it would have been 
achieved had a Kenseikai cabinet been in power. In other words, it would be foolish to 
discount the importance of the cabinet’s “positive” economic and military policies on 
the successful takeover of Manchuria by Japanese troops. 
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 These developments and the close interdependence between, on the one hand, 
financial deflation and military retrenchment and, on the other hand, “positive” 
economic policies and military expansionism are well known. Beasley (1963:122) has 
possibly offered the best explanation as to why Japanese national security policies, 
between 1927 and 1932, moved from caution towards assertiveness. As he writes: 
“Participation in a Western-dominated system set up intolerable contradictions for 
Japan, and accounted for much of the violent oscillations in Japanese economic and 
monetary policy between 1929 and 1931. After futile attempts at conciliation, Japan 
accepted the contradictions as antagonist, launching an assault against the system.”  
What this section of the chapter brings to the debate on the reasons that informed 
Japan’s turn towards assertiveness and away from it in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
is that the global financial crisis that started in Japan in 1927, and the process of 
financial crisis response that followed thereafter, first in Japan only and then across 
the world, informed a move away from national security caution between 1927 and 
1929, and from September 1931 onwards—confirming the existence of fewer 
constraints to the exercise of assertiveness that I expected—as well as a move back to 
caution between 1929 and September 1931. For instance, in April 1927 Tanaka came 
to power (and the shift from cautious to assertive in Japanese foreign policy occurred) 
because of profound disagreement amongst members of the genro, the Privy Council, 
the House of Peers and the cabinet over the kind of “indulgent” financial crisis 
response that the Wakatsuki cabinet intended to carry out. Had the financial crisis not 
occurred, the Wataksuki cabinet and the national security policies of the Wataksuki 
cabinet would have continued their life, while the extremist measures which the armed 
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forces undertook in the fall of 1931, after years of financial and economic crisis, 
would have found fewer proselytes.202 
 Denying this argument, some scholars (Imai 1958; McCormack 1977) have 
argued that there was little fundamental difference between the Shidehara diplomacy 
and the Tanaka diplomacy. Both cabinets, these scholars note, tried to manipulate 
Japanese-Chinese relations via economic and security means. This section aligns itself 
with the supporters of the opposite positions (Connors 1987:113; Kirshner 2007:78-
83), who have noted that the swift and dramatic change in Japan’s foreign policy 
following the appointment of the Tanaka cabinet and the Inukai cabinet.  
 
 Financial crises and Japanese national security policies in nuts and bolts 
 
 With the exception of the last stage of crisis response to the financial crisis of 
1927-1933, this chapter suggests that the assumptions of the framework described in 
Chapter One are correct. In agreement with expectations derived from the framework, 
financial crises changed the direction of Japanese military spending, threat assessment, 
and war prospects between 1907 and 1909, between 1920 and 1922, between 1927 and 
32. Also, in agreement with expectations derived from the framework, the financial 
crises that occurred in 1889-91 and 1896-1901 did not change the direction of 
Japanese national security policies but powered their character, while also drawing 
deeper political fractures within the government.  
 Three factors help to explain why the Japanese national security policies 
moved from caution to assertiveness during the last stage of response to the financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 In 1927, for instance, the political supporters of an assertive foreign policy course in Japan were so 
few that Tanaka himself, who headed the most assertive faction of the Seiyukai, decided to put aside his 
determination to develop his assertive program and compromise. 
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crisis of 1927-31, that is from September 1931 until the end of the crisis: a) the 
particular ordering of the stages of crisis response that the Japanese government went 
through; b) the power and institutional prestige of Japanese armed forces; and c) the 
timing of the spread of the financial crisis across the globe. The transition from what 
was regarded as a corrupted government due to its questionable financial policies to a 
government far less committed to the orthodox medicine and national security caution 
that occurred during the first stage of crisis response (mid-1927-mid-1929) “failed” to 
herald a new financial-security agenda. The new members of the cabinet remained 
hesitant to embrace the ambitious dreams of new premier General Terauchi, and the 
Japanese military conceded. An uncomfortable precedent was created, however: to 
bring about a significant change in Japanese policies, awarding the premiership to a 
General would not suffice. With a cosmopolitan leader newly in power from July 1929 
onward, an orthodox medicine that continued to disappoint, and the weakening of 
domestic financial interests and high finance, the political and military opposition to 
financial orthodoxy and military restraint became both more popular and fierce.  In 
late 1931, the military incidents of organized by the Kwantung Army suggested that 
any element pointing at political moderation had become extremely unattractive.  
 On the whole, the examined shifts in Japanese national security policies 
illustrate how financial crises have marked the evolution of Japan’s relationship with 
the international financial system. In the pre-1900 period, this relationship is defined 
by exclusion, and the determination to place catch-up rearmament and catch-up 
industrialization before any financial variable (including financial crises). In the period 
between 1906 and 1927, Japan increasingly participates in the existing international 
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financial order, and financial factors are now recognized as a priority for Japanese 
security. Neglecting financial crises is now politically suicidal. Finally, 
disenchantment with the international financial and domestic order is what shapes, 
gradually, Japan’s response to financial chaos from 1927 onwards. 
 Some traits of the distinctive influence of financial crises on Japanese politics 
and national security policies shall be recognized. A first one is that, in the pre-1900 
period, this influence did not originate from or produce any change in premiership, 
cabinet, or ruling coalition—a development that does not find an equivalent in Italy or 
the United States. Both in Italy and in the United States, a change in the governing 
coalition or ruling presidential team followed the onset of any financial crisis between 
1880 and 1940.  
 A second and related trait of the influence of financial crises on Japanese 
security policies is that the channels through which this influence was exerted changed 
across time. The debt-repayment mechanism, for instance, which was a constant in the 
Italian context, was not always at play during Japanese financial crises. In 1889-91 
and 1896-1901, for instance, a rising national debt posed little pressure on the national 
security agenda of incumbent cabinets. But the pressure had exponentially increased 
by 1907. Similarly, foreign financial dependence was irrelevant to the process of 
financial crisis resolution in 1889-91 and 1896-1901, but it was paramount in the early 
1920s and late 1920s.  
 A third trait that sets the Japanese experience apart from Italian and American 
experiences, is that the influence of financial crises on Japanese national security 
policies was highly modulated by the incentives that the international financial system 
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and participation in the gold standard offered to Japanese financial officials. Another 
important variable is the gradually increasing political voice of domestic financial 
interests. These two variables were the main drivers of the studied changes.  As shown 
in the next two chapters, neither Italian nor American financial officials were as 
powerful as Japanese financial officials.  
 Evidence collected in the chapter further suggests that local and global 
financial crises did not exert a substantially different influence on Japanese national 
security policies. The permanence in power of a statist-nationalist government 
throughout the financial crises of 1889-1891 and 1896-1901, for instance, had little to 
do with the fact that both crises were local, and much more do with the disinterest of 
foreign investors in Japanese finances (and Japanese economy more generally), as 
well as with the absence of a democratic system of party politics in Japan. Foreign 
investors and foreign capital required, first of all, the local presence of a political 
opposition that could hold the crisis-stricken government accountable. Once that 
government accountability and a party system were assured, financial crises and 
Japanese financial officials’ response to them significantly contributed to the dawn 
(1907-09) and success (1929-1931) of the liberal internationalism. This “peaceful” 
effect lasted only as long as the orthodox medicine remained a trusted instrument of 
financial crisis resolution internationally, and as long as the domestic political forces 
bearing the main costs of the medicine could tolerate it.  
 Another interesting finding of the chapter is that implementing the orthodox 
medicine of financial crisis response, and shifting national security policies towards 
greater prudence might not have the peace-inducing effects internationally that one 
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might think it would have. Between 1929 and 1931, for instance, the undertaking of 
drastic military retrenchment measures by the Japanese cabinet in response to the 
financial crisis increased the prospects of a Japanese-Chinese war. Japanese military 
forces had, until then, respected political authorities’ decisions to a much greater 
extent that at any other time in the past. But drastic military cuts, at that point in time, 
after a decade of significant military restraint, were regarded as an irreparable setback 
to national security. Countermeasures were quickly taken. The finding that the pursuit 
of greater prudence in national security policies might not be peace-inducing is in line 
with the existing knowledge (Kirshner 2007) that powerful financial interests desire 
international peace not as an end in itself, but only as a means to an end, which is the 
set up and preservation of the necessary conditions for lucrative investment. Greater 
awareness to this simple rule by crisis-stricken cabinets promises to benefit their 
intended financial strategies as much as their desired national security goals. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RULES MADE ABROAD:  
CURBED FOREIGN LENDING AND REGULARLY FETTERED ITALIAN 
IMPERIALISM  
      
   
“Italy faces a difficult moment for the anguish of  
                               national finances […], but we’ll recover from it […]    
                                                                                                         We will lift up our credit […] 
We will demonstrate [to London, Paris, and Berlin]  
                                                                               that Italy has no aggressive intentions.”203  
 
    Antonio di Rudiní to the Chamber, 1891 
 
Italian military and economic involvement in Northern Africa between 1880 
and 1940 remains a puzzle. Although the dream of founding an Italian Empire never 
faded from the political horizons of Italian leadership, its realization was often 
tenaciously pursued only to be put on hold shortly afterwards, and then resumed. This 
dragging out of the Italian imperialist desire for a “place in the sun” is generally 
explained by a number of factors, including the frequent turnover of Italian 
governments, the fragility of Italian institutions, the lack of financial and economic 
resources, and geopolitical pressures of more powerful neighbors. The importance of 
all of these factors emerges from the works of scholars in pre-World War I, post-
World War I, and contemporary Italian politics, such as Lowe (1975) Putnam (1994), 
Fabbrini (2011), and Giacomello (2011). 
This chapter argues that there is one particular factor, financial crisis, that had 
(and has) the power to set in motion these variables (and a few others, too), and that 
yielded critical repercussions on Italian military spending, threat assessment, and war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Speech by Prime Minister Antonio di Rudiní to the Chamber delivered on February 14, 1891, after 
the denial of foreign credit to Italy from France, and the fall of the government of Francesco Crispi. 
AEM, Serie Politica P, busta 319, pos.54: Programma della Politica del Governo Italiano 1891-1900. 
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prospects—and ultimately the course of Italian imperialist ambitions. Relatedly, not 
only has the primary causal role of financial crises been neglected but also post-
financial-crises shifts of Italian national security policies away from or towards 
assertiveness have been misattributed. Financial crises altered the balance of power 
between Italian political leaders and domestic financial interests thanks to the leverage 
that foreign financial markets gained on the former.  To rescue their jeopardized credit 
rating, Italian leading authorities—generally the expression of a rearranged governing 
coalition after the outbreak of a financial crisis—either shifted Italian national security 
policies towards greater caution or desisted from inflating them. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next couple of pages situate the Italian 
case vis-à-vis the American and Japanese cases. Next, expectations about the national 
security influence of financial crises based on the framework explained in Chapter 
One are drawn from relevant Italian financial and military history. Then, the chapter is 
divided into three main sections dedicated to illustrating the expected national security 
influence of the financial crises that hit Italy in 1889-1890, 1893-94, 1907-08 and 
again from 1931-33.204 Statist-nationalist governments—governments having low 
affinity with high finance—were in power at the start of the first two financial crises. 
Conversely, cosmopolitan governments led the nation when the latter two crises 
began.   
The Italian security context differed from the Japanese and American ones in 
significant ways. As much as the Japanese military was impressive, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Financial crises also hit Italy in 1914, 1921-22, and 1935-36. For reasons of space, only four 
financial crises are treated in the chapter. The discussed crises have been selected with an eye to 
discussing each of the four branches of the analytical tree presented in chapter 1.  
	   137 
disorganization and institutional weakness of the Italian army were notorious. Since 
Italian colonial ambitions and geopolitical pressures continued between 1880 and 
1940, military inadequacies translated into recurrent and abysmal military fiascos.205 
Similarly, Italian alliance politics was amongst the most volatile and unreliable in 
Europe. The political stances of Japan and the United States were less ambiguously 
defined even when Tokyo and Washington did not belong to any international 
alliance.206  
The capriciousness of Italian alliance politics found an equivalent in the 
multifaceted character of Italian parliamentary politics and governing coalitions.207 
Both traits were also a function of whether British, French, German or American high 
finance could fund Italy’s economic, industrial, and military development. Although 
the largest Italian private banks had close political ties with Palazzo Chigi, and these 
ties prevented the financial decentralization characteristic of the American 
environment, the Italian government and Italian bankers were constantly in need of 
foreign funds. Italy did not have an effective tax collection system—like Japan had, 
and Italian private financiers were a shadow of Wall Street’s titans. As a result, 
financial dependence on foreign banking houses characterized Italian politics to a 
much greater extent than Japanese or American politics.208 High exposure to high 
finance soon after financial crisis outbreak was also very likely.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Rochat and Massobrio 1987:37,60,128,268; Lowe and Marzani 2002:6,7,22. 
206 Ibidem. 
207 On the coalitional nature of Italian governments see Mack Smith 1997, pp.97–103 and Verzichelli 
2007, pp.2,6,9,10. 
208 On the Italian financial system see Posner 1978, pp. 225,229,234,235; Serra 1987, pp.611–612; 
Goodman 1992, pp.142–143, and Fratianni and Spinelli 1997, p.88. 
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Financial crises changed the direction of Italian national security policies by 
altering the relative importance or desirability of obtaining the support of German, 
French, British, and American capital instead of investing in military preparedness and 
expansion. During financial crises, the Italian government lost a large chunk of its 
loan-repayment ability and financial credibility, and high finance could effectively use 
the threat of withdrawing its financial support to steer the Italian national security 
policies towards greater caution.209   Differently from the American case, change in 
partisanship and governing coalition was part of the historical equation through which 
financial crises exercised their influence on Italian military spending, threat 
assessment and war prospects. For the Italian case to a greater extent than the Japanese 
case, changes in partisanship and governing coalitions were expressions of 
parliamentary reshuffling and bargaining amongst different groups rather than the 
replacement of a party-led government with another. Italian parties were fluid 
aggregates in which political identities were reshuffled rather frequently. Rescuing the 
financial credibility of the Italian political leadership after financial crisis outbreak 
necessitated the formation of a new parliamentary majority committed to place 
national finances on a sounder track. The consensual nature of Italian politics and the 
organization of political consensus around one leading figure made coalitional 
adjustments with the replacement of prime ministers more common than Japanese-
style cabinet overhauls. Finally, national financial dependence from abroad increased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Italian financial dependence was significant between 1885 and 1900. It drastically decreased 
between 1900 and 1907 due to the favorable circumstances such as a booming economic growth and 
related easy access to financial capital and a temporarily favorable capital account in the national 
balance of payment. It swiftly climbed up during WWI and it was extreme between 1919 and 1934. 
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the power of the domestic financial sector—at least during a first phase of response to 
the financial crisis.  
 
EXPECTATIONS 
 
 The framework discussed in Chapter One is valid if, after financial-crisis 
outbreak, an Italian government having low affinity with high finance curbed its pre-
crisis (assertive) national security agenda under high exposure (LA-HE) and enhanced 
it under low exposure to high finance (LA-LE). Conversely, an Italian government 
having high affinity with high finance should, after the outbreak of financial crisis, 
push its national security policies towards extra-prudence under high exposure to high 
finance (HA-HE). This section formulates more specific expectations after discerning 
which of the three aforementioned scenarios was realized after the start of financial 
crises in 1889-91, 1893-94, 1907-08, and 1931-33.  
 Two financial crises rocked Italy between 1880 and 1900: the local-turned-
global financial crisis of 1889-91, and the local financial crisis of 1893-94.210  The 
first crisis started locally (in 1889) due to a credit-fueled overexpansion of the building 
industry. It was then compounded in late 1890 by the failure of the Baring Brothers 
(the world’s largest merchant bank), which brought to an end the international 
speculative excesses and investment mania that had developed throughout the 1880s 
across the major European markets. The inflow of capital from London and Paris to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Other countries in other continents also experienced a financial crisis in 1893—namely the United 
States, South Africa and Australia. However, there was no direct connection amongst the crisis episodes 
that Italy, the US and Australia experienced, although it can be said that the deflationary effects of the 
1889-91 crisis were still present in 1893 and were not irrelevant to the Italian, American and Australian 
financial crises of 1893, even if these crises had a local breadth. 
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Italy stopped, and the Italian economy suffered a deficit and debt crisis as a result 
(Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1. Financial Crisis Statistics 1880-1897 (in million lire) 211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 In 1889 the withdrawal of French capital cut gross national investments in 
half compared to 1888; the state deficit reached the never-seen-before peak of 488 
million lire; and the national debt climbed to the exorbitant level of 122% of GNP. 212 
After 1891, national finances struggled to sustain recovery, and between 1893 and 
1894 the nation was caught in another financial crisis.213  This time the crisis was 
triggered by the discovery in 1892 of widespread irregularities in the administration of 
key domestic financial institutions, and the eruption of scandals involving eminent 
governmental figures. Between 1893 and 1894, banking scandals and the collapse of 
leading national banks such as the Credito Mobiliare and Banca Generale brought the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211Data obtained or calculated from Ercolani, pp. 442-448; Serra, p.235, and Mitchell, pp.907-922. 
212 On the Baring crisis see Mitchener and Weidenmier (2007); Eichengreen (1999), pp.249-270; Fern 
(1992), pp.241-273; Ford (1956), pp.127-150; Ferguson (1998), pp.863-73; and della Paloera and 
Taylor (2001). On the crisis in Italy see Toniolo (1973), pp.17,18,87-88; Mitchell (1975), p.375; 
Kindleberger (1984), pp.142-43; Repaci (1962), p.29; Webster (1975), p.18; and Warglien (1987). 
213 The Banca Romana had over-issued and falsified its balance sheets to conceal bankruptcy for years. 
Overnight, the Bank’s practices became public knowledge. For an in-depth account of the Italian 
financial crisis of 1893-94 see Toniolo (1990), p.93; Fratianni and Spinelli (1990), p.91; De Rosa 
(1997), pp.252-253; Forsyth (1993), pp.9-10; and Warglien 1987, p. 403. 
             
Year 
                    
Deficit 
      
Debt/GNP             
    Gross 
Investment  
1886 -213 1.07 1915 
 1887 -219 1.164 1521 
1888 -386 1.22 1391 
1889 -488 1.22 558 
1890 -222 1.123 1203 
1891 -206 1.11 1552 
1892 -129 1.23 887 
1893 -48 1.20 1190 
1894 -175 1.27 724 
1895 -95 1.22 707 
1896 -98 1.24 909 
1897 -36 1.29 546 
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national banking system down, while the national debt exploded, reaching its worst 
value ever (at 127% of GNP). 
 Original documents I accessed at the Archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry 
display the anxiety that the withdrawal of foreign capital caused Italian state 
authorities, as financial intermediaries were regularly sent to London, Paris and Berlin 
to raise loans “in the best interest of Italian affairs,” and to reassure investors of the 
country’s “financial rectitude.”214  
A statist-nationalist government having low affinity with high finance was in 
power at the start of both crises. In 1889, the Historical Left—a conservative coalition 
that united the interests of the great industrial oligopolies of the Northwest with the 
landowners of the South—was led by Francesco Crispi and combined an audacious 
foreign policy of military conquest in Eastern Africa with a protectionist economic 
agenda.215 The heterodox character of the financial policies promoted by the Crispi 
government in the late 1880s was manifest in its determination to pursue a tariff war 
against France and condone bank-note circulation vastly exceeding any legal (and 
orthodox) credit limit to cover up repeated failures in the private banking sector.216 
The mounting levels of national deficit and debt that the security agenda of the Crispi 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, busta 448, fascicolo “Finanze Italiane: notizie, manovre ostili, missioni;” 
and ASMAE, Serie Politica P, busta 319, pos.54, “Programma  della Politica del Governo Italiano.” See 
also Toniolo (1898), p.287. 
215 Quite counter intuitively, the “Right” was much more progressive than the “Left” in 19th century 
Italy. The (conservative) Historical Left favored the expansion and strengthening of national defense 
industries, an assertive national security policy line, and commercial protectionism. By contrast, the 
(liberal) Historical Right encouraged social services, middle-sized national industry, and very moderate 
defense budgets. On the distinction between the two blocs and their different financial and security 
preferences see Manacorda (1968), pp.21,22,23,94,141-149; Barone (1972), pp.568-69; Kogan (1963), 
pp.29,30; 
216 On the Italian tariff war against France and the government’s lifting of legal restrictions on credit see 
Mack Smith (1997), pp.143-148. Crispi regularly intervened in the national financial market to 
persuade the larger domestic financial houses to cover the costs of failing banks.  
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government demanded during these years snubbed high finance and financial 
orthodoxy. The Historical Left was newly in power at the start of the 1893-94 
financial crisis. This time, the coalition had appointed ex-Treasury minister Giovanni 
Giolitti to the premiership, in the hope of convincing high finance of the financial 
trustworthiness of the Italian political leadership. Government affinity with high 
finance continued to be low, however. Premier Giolitti remained committed to the 
same economic policies he had backed as Treasury minister. As Crispi had done, he 
condoned heterodox free printing by Italian national banks, and illegal printing and 
fraudulent activities by a number of Italian commercial banks.217 
 After the onset of the financial crisis of 1889-91, the Crispi government found 
itself highly exposed to the pressures of high finance. The Left intended to preserve its 
access to foreign capital and keep domestic markets afloat by strengthening collusive 
relationships between the cabinet and Italian banks of issue and bailing out domestic 
financial institutions that began to suspend payment.218 The spread of the financial 
crisis across the major financial capitals—for reasons other than the Italian financial 
crisis—and the leaking out of irregularities within the Italian banking system thwarted 
these intentions. In the late 1880s, international liquidity had started to shrink, and, up 
until 1891, high finance was involved in international rescue efforts to save the Baring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 On this point see in particular Webster (1975), pp.20,21; Giolitti Memoirs, pp.76-77. More broadly, 
on the heterodoxy of the Left see Tattara (2003), pp.122-142. It is interesting to note that the financial 
heterodoxy of the Left did not impede it from receiving the political support of eminent domestic 
bankers. The Banco di Roma, for instance, was a  
218 The Italian banks of issue in the late 1880s and early 1890s were private companies with 
shareholders who sough profit. For an account of the collusive practices through which the Crispi 
government persuaded large Italian banks to keep the system afloat see Fratianni and Spinelli (1991), 
pp.90; Mack Smith (1997), pp.148-49; De Rosa (1963), pp.375; Barone (1972), p.584.  
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Brothers and the international financial system.219 Securing foreign credit by selling 
large quantities of state bonds became more and more difficult for the Italian 
leadership but still remained a priority. In the meantime, domestic banking difficulties 
increased, revelations of wrongdoings continued to surface, and Italian bankers 
defended themselves from accusations by implicating the Crispian leadership. Political 
opposition was galvanized, private commissions of inquiry were instituted, and, in 
February 1891, the government fell to the advantage of the more financially virtuous 
(or orthodox) Historical Right. Its frontrunner Antonio S. M. di Rudiní subscribed to 
drastic “economies” to stop the decline in popularity of Italian state bonds abroad.220 
Only then did fears dissipated, albeit only temporarily.  
 Government exposure to high finance was high even during the first phase of 
response to the financial crisis of 1893-94, even if a conservative government was 
newly in power, this time its affinity to high finance was high. The resolution of the 
1889-91 financial crisis had increased the domestic power of Italian financial and 
economic elites, and the ability of foreign state leaders to control Italian financial 
policies. After the start of the crisis in early 1893, the further loss of Italy’s 
international financial prestige became intertwined with a domestic ethical, financial 
and political crisis conducted on the battlefield of real or presumed scandals. The 
Giolitti government was powerless in the face of the crisis, and had to resort to foreign 
capital to resurrect the collapsing national banking structure. German financiers 
quickly came forward in early 1893. The localized nature of the financial crisis gave 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 The international intervention to bail out Baring Brothers is described in Kingleberger (1978), 
pp.184, 185, 210, 219; Frieden, p.36. 
220 Battaglia (1958), pp.339-45; Haywood (1999), p.161; and Toniolo (1990), p.90.  
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them an advantaged position and plenty of financial resources.221 In the following 
months the Italian banking system was entirely rebuilt using mostly German funds. 
The balance of power openly swung towards high finance.  
 This extent of foreign financial dependence was not an ideal outcome for any 
Italian government, let alone a coalition representing the Historical Left. Yet, the 
correspondence of Italian Treasury minister Sidney Sonnino indicates that the cabinet 
outmaneuvered as much as it could to reach this outcome and prevent a worse one.222 
As Giolitti wrote in his memoirs, “The conditions of our budget were such that […] 
we were obliged to have recourse to foreign credits [to maintain] a fixed exchange.”223 
In November 1893, Giolitti and what had become liberal attempts to overcome the 
crisis were replaced by Crispi’s return to leadership and a strategy of financial crisis 
response that brought back financial heterodoxy and strong state intervention in the 
national economy. The program of economies-alone had failed, and the nation had 
dangerously increased its dependence on foreign bankers without successfully 
reducing the national debt. Taxes and customs duties on imported agricultural 
products were raised. Gold reserves were immobilized (so-called “Corso Forzoso”), 
and the banks of issue were permitted to enlarge their circulation. In December 1893, 
a unified, state-regulated, central note-issuing bank, the Bank of Italy was born. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 In 1893-94, financial crisis remained limited to Italy, the United States and Australia, which were at 
the margines of the international financial system. Alberto Acquarone, “Italia Giolittiana 1896-1915. Le 
Premesse Politiche ed Economiche,” pp.39-41. 
222 ACS, DDI, Seconda Serie 1870-1896, vol.XXVI, Sonnino’s letter to Blanc, 25 December 1893. On 
the reconstruction of the Italian commercial banking system with the help of foreign capital see 
Acquarone, pp.39-41; Kindleberger 1993, p.143; Hertner, pp.69-101; and D’Alessandro (1968), p.459. 
223 Giolitti, Memoirs, p.62.  
	   145 
Giuseppe Marchiori, the chief of the old and less powerful Bank of Italy took the place 
of Giacomo Grillo, as desired by the Treasury Ministry.224 
 These developments allow for formulating the first set of expectations on the 
influence of financial crises on Italian national security policies. If the framework 
advanced in Chapter One is correct, this is what should have happened to Italian 
national security after the two financial crises just described. Since Crispi and his 
conservative government found themselves in scenario LA–HE after the start of the 
financial crisis of 1889-91, the agenda of foreign policy assertiveness that the 
Historical Left had pledged Italy to under Crispi should have been curbed.  Similarly, 
after the start of the financial crisis of 1893-94, and during most of financial crisis year 
1893, Italian military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects should have 
become extra—since the Giolitti government was in scenario HA–HE. However, the 
failure of the orthodox medicine to resolve the crisis, and the materialization of 
scenario HA–LE in late financial crisis year 1893 and in 1894, should have removed 
some of the existing constrains for shifting Italian national security policies towards 
greater assertiveness (HA–LE). In due course, this new phase of crisis response should 
have allowed the Crispi government to revert back to its original, ambitious security 
agenda.  
The Italian financial system was hit again by a financial crisis in 1907, when 
panic and crashes spread through world markets, impelling a halt to foreign lending. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 The government refused altogether to consider the right of emission of currency as a privilege given 
to a group of private capitalists. As Sonnino stated to Parliament in June 1893, “while respecting the 
interests of the private, the State needs to defend the interests of the State!” On this second phase of 
response to the 1893-94 financial crisis, see Manacorda (1986), pp.141-145; 174; Sonnino, Discorsi 
Parlamentari, Camera, June 29, 1893, p.37.   
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Like the main powers in Europe, before the crisis Italy had experienced unforeseen 
levels of economic prosperity, booming investment, and an abundance of liquidity 
(Table 3.2).225 Although the gross national product continued to grow, in 1907 and 
1908 a sudden and drastic reversal in credit lines brought many on-shore and offshore 
banks and investment projects to a standstill, causing price deflation, cut backs in 
employment, industrial overproduction, and a worsening of the budget. 226  
Between June and October 1907, major commercial banks like the Societa’ 
Bancaria Italiana (SBI) and the overextended Banco di Roma were temporarily 
paralyzed in their ability to repay their debts and function as financial lenders. 
Industrial sectors were brought down too, as a result.227  Witnessing the beginning, 
development, and end of the financial crisis in Italy was the second Giolitti 
government, in power between 1903 and 1905, and then again from June 1906 until 
December 1909. Between December 1909 and March 1911—after the end of the 
financial crisis on Italia soil—the premierships of, respectively, Sidney Sonnino and 
Luigi Luzzatti replaced the Giolitti leadership.  Both premierships had a liberal 
character and their majority in parliament remained essentially the one that Giolitti 
had shrewdly assembled.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 The national deficit had disappeared altogether by 1905. 
226 For an account of the 1907-08 financial crisis see Frieden (2006), pp.36-39; Kindleberger (1978) 
pp.132,133,171,185,186; and Sayers (1936), p.111. See also the description of the crisis offered in 
chapters two and three of this work. On the crisis in Italy during these years see Forsyth, (1993), p.7; 
Bonelli (1971); Bonelli (1982); Toniolio (1990); Ciocca e Toniolo (1999), pp.194-98. 
227 Entire national industrial sectors—the steel, cotton, and mechanic industries in particular—were 
paralyzed. On the industrial dimension of the crisis see especially De Rosa, Storia del Banco di Roma, 
pp.180-181. 
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Table 3.2. Financial Crisis Statistics 1904-11(in million lire)228 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Giolitti had broken ties with the Historical Left of the 19th century. Gathering 
forces from the left, the right and the center through a strategy later known as 
“transformismo,” he had assembled a coalition that, up until World War I—and quite 
singularly in the Italian context—faced no serious political competition.229 The 
coalition had an unwaveringly liberal character. Before the onset of the financial 
crisis, the Giolitti government had demonstrated its high affinity with high finance by 
favoring the free-trade interests of small and medium-sized industries, promoting 
social reforms, assuring the development of ordinary credit institutions and economic 
opportunities at home and abroad, and opposing high military spending and 
expansion.230  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Data obtained or calculated from Ercolani; Sommario di Statistiche Storiche Italiane, 
pp.163,164,447,448; Serra, Il Debito Pubblico Italiano, p.235; and Mitchell (1975), pp.907-922. 
229 In Giolitti’s governing coalition, socialist, republican, and radical forces would coexist with catholic 
forces of the Right. See, for instance, Webster (1975), pp. 24-26; Kogan (1963), pp.31-32; and 
Haywood (1999). The stunning economic and industrial development of this period clearly explains the 
anomalous and almost uninterrupted regnum that the coalition enjoyed. On the lack of a serious 
political alternative to the liberal front see Haywood (1999), pp.267-394; Rochat and Massobrio (1987), 
p.164; and Whittam (1977), p180. From December 1909 to March 1911, Giolitti’s premiership went to 
Treasury Minister Sidney Sonnino and then to Treasury Minister Luigi Luzzatti. Both governments 
were liberal, like their predecessor. Conservative forces gained power only in March 1914.  
230 De Rosa (1997), p.255; Haywood (1999), pp.267-394; Rochat and Massobrio (1987), p.164 
          
Year 
                 
Surplus/ 
Deficit 
      Gross      
Investment  
 Banknote                               
Circulation Real GNP  Inflation 
       
1880 
248 1153 10818  0.0229464
29 
 
904 
 
46 1839 445 13650 0.0109 
1905 63 1889 442 14421 0.0054 
1906 72 2130 438 15156 0.0161 
1907 92 3668 437 16460 0.0510 
1908 52 2942 436 16773 -0.0103 
1909 22 3754 433 18593 -0.0319 
1910 -10 2697 442 17351 0.0259 
1911 
 
-35 
 
3644 
 
485 
 
19215 
 
0.0252 
 
	   148 
 After the onset of the crisis, the government was highly exposed to high 
finance—by choice more than by necessity. Treasury minister Paolo Carcano had 
excellent relations with Governor of the Bank of Italy, Bonaldo Stringher, and left him 
in charge of saving the national financial system. In the spring of 1907, while resisting 
pressures for the indiscriminate financing of firms whose financial conduct had been 
irresponsible, the Bank of Italy began to grant several lines of credit to rescue the SBI. 
As fears of panic spread across the national system in the fall of 1907, the Bank of 
Italy organized a consortium to assist a number of troubled financial institutions, 
providing liquidity in all directions. The increase in circulation was exceptional 
compared to any increase recorded before that time.231  
 The government helped the success of this infusion of liquidity by limiting 
paper money printing and preserving its creditor position (Table 3.2). Distancing 
himself from the behavior of conservative leaderships on occasion of the financial 
crises of 1889-91 and 1893-94, Carcano recognized the existence of “a temporary 
state” of financial tension and reassured national markets of the “solid foundations” of 
Italian credit, the presence of a substantial cushion of reserve cushion, and the 
enduring “prestige” of state bonds.232 The Bank emerged from the crisis-response 
process as the effective lender of last resort, endowed with greater political strength 
and freedom of movement in the national money market.233 The stabilization of 
European financial markets through similar bailout efforts spearheaded by the Central 
Banks of Britain, France, Germany and Russia, and by the transnational cooperation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Bonelli (1971), pp.58,62,93,124; Toniolo (1990), pp.115,253; Forsyth (1993), p.43. 
232 Quoted from Carcano, Annual Financial Exposition to the Chamber, Biblioteca del Senato, AP, 
Legislatura XXII, Discussioni Camera, 7 December 1907. 
233 See in particular Bonelli (1971), p.63. 
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tycoons of high finance such as J.P. Morgan and Nathan Rothschild indirectly helped 
the resolution of the financial crisis within Italian borders.234 Much less successful was 
the response to the spread of the crisis to Italian offshore colonial possessions. 
Assistance to subsidiary financial and industrial firms located in Northern Africa was 
not forthcoming. 
 Since the Giolitti government had a high affinity with high finance before the 
start of the financial crisis of 1907-08, and a high exposure to high finance after the 
start of the crisis, Italian national security policies should have become extra-prudent 
according to the framework. This shift should have taken place as a result of the 
greater reliance on financial orthodoxy demanded by the process of financial crisis 
resolution.  
The last set of expectations is derived from the response by the first regime of 
Benito Mussolini to the global financial crisis of 1929-33, which hit Italy between late 
1931 and early 1932, peaking between mid-1932 and early 1933.235 Differently from 
what occurred in 1907-08, international financial cooperation and the orthodox 
medicine did not work this time, and a wave of bank failures spread through North 
America and central Europe. By the time the crisis reached Italy, gold convertibility 
had already been suspended in London (September 1931). Between 1931 and 1933, 
the condition of Italian finances changed radically. Following the cancellation of 
American loans and the suspension (and then cancellation) of German reparations, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 On the resolution of the global financial crisis of 1907-08 at the center of the financial system see De 
Cecco (1987), pp.103-26; Frieden (2006); pp.106-07; Kenney (1989), pp.202-49; Kindleberger (1978), 
pp.185-86; Withers (1911), pp.288-89. 
235 On the global financial crisis of the early 1930s see Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, op. cit., pp.268-91; 
Barry Eichengreen (2008) pp.72-92; Claven (1996); Strange (1988), p.101; Frieden, Global Capitalism, 
pp.182-194. 
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five large Italian banks that had long sustained excessive risk-taking activities failed. 
Next to the credit crunch and bank failures, the national economy faced the explosion 
of deficit and debt levels, a sharp contraction in industrial production and GNP 
growth, and a currency and exchange rate crisis (Table 3.3). 236 
Table 3.3. Italian financial statistics 1929-1937(in million lire)237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
As in 1907-08, a government having high affinity with high finance was in 
power before the onset of this crisis, too. Mussolini’s quota novanta policy, which 
implied a commitment to maintaining a fixed exchange between the lira and the US 
dollar (and the lira and the British pound), was one indication of the respect which 
financial orthodoxy enjoyed within the Italian government in the late 1920s.238 
Although reasons of prestige and strategic revenge undoubtedly informed Mussolini’s 
fascination with his quota novanta policy, in the late 1920s the regime exhibited its 
commitment to international financial cooperation by participating in debt-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 See, for instance, Battilossi (2009), pp.101-134; Ciocca and Toniolo (1976), p.22; Ciocca (1999), 
pp.277-288; Catalano (1969), pp.4,5; De Cecco (1993), p.625. On the cancellation of American loans to 
Europe refer to the chapter four.  
237 Data obtained or calculated from Ricerche per la Storia della Banca d’Italia, vol.I, p.358,359;  
Ercolani, pp.442-43; Sommario di Statistiche Storiche Italiane, pp.163,164;  
Serra, Il Debito Pubblico Italiano, p.235; and Mitchell (1975), pp.907-922. 
238 With the “quota novanta” policy, which was kicked off in December 1927, the exchange rate was 
pegged to lire 92.46 versus one British pound and lire 19 versus one dollar. See Toniolo (1990), pp.327-
350. 
          
Year  Real GNP      Debt/GNP 
Lira E.R. vs. 
   $/average 
Gross 
Investment Deficit 
 
1929 111543 0.693769 100/100 27705 1525 
1930 189453 0.770744 100/101 19527 1858 
1931 125415 0.896783784 99/105 16446 2532 
1932 109578 0.968009346 98/111 16355 5968 
1933 105706 1.091553986 125/119 14399 5615 
1934 105344 1.132054108 164/128 15335 8458 
1935 110564 1.049267857 158/121 23252 6040 
1936 110977 1.084823529 135/100 21738 15000 
1937 129606 1.005468085 100/84 30285 19000 
	   151 
restructuring agreements to save financially endangered European governments, and 
by continuing to negotiate financial loans with high finance on behalf of the Italian 
government. The same 1927 stabilization of the lira at the heart of the quota novanta 
policy was achieved through a loan granted by J.P. Morgan. Moreover, fascist forces 
shared their hold on power with Italian financial interests.239 
After the spread of the global financial crisis in central Europe and in Italy, 
Italian leaders trusted the power of liberalist crisis policies—the same policies that had 
saved Europe from financial collapse throughout the 1920s. Showing its high affinity 
with high finance, in June 1931, when the crisis had spread through Austria and not 
yet affected Italy, Italian minister of foreign affairs Dino Grandi offered the support of 
the Italian government to the international stabilization loan for saving the Viennese 
banking system; expressed hostility about the German project of economic custom 
union with Austria; and reiterated the necessity of condoning war debts and 
reparations during international financial conferences in Paris and London (in July 
1931).240	  Concurrently, Mussolini praised the “high moral meaning” of the Hoover 
initiative, and took on shareholdings weighting heavily on the Italian banking system, 
in an attempt to bring financial relief to domestic financial markets while auspicating 
the international success of the orthodox medicine.241 The cabinet even completed a 
domestic custom reform dominated by liberal principles. In 1932, Italian finance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 MAE, Ufficio Trattati, Anno 1929.  
240 Grandi (1985:I), pp. 393-4. 
241 ACS, DDI, VII Serie, 1922-1935, t.650; ACS, DDI, Settima Serie, 1922-35, volume X, pp.541-676. 
ACS, DDI, Settima Serie, Serie 1922-35, volume X, Appunto di Grandi, 19 June 1931, and ACS, PCM, 
Anno 1934-36, 1.1.7/4236. See also Ciocca (1999), pp. 276; ACS, SPD, CR, Busta 1 (De Stefani), 
March 24, 1931. To the extent that it pledged to a cancellation of war debts and reparation, the Italian 
position was even more “orthodox” than the American-British line. 
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ministers Antonio Mosconi and Guido Jung promoted deflationary policies and harsh 
budget cuts, with deleterious consequences on GNP growth (Table 3).242  	  
 State finances gave no visible sign of improvement, however. Italian large 
commercial banks struggled and failed. Between 1932 and 1934, the exposure of 
Italian state authorities to international financial cooperation and high finance was 
evident in the declining fortunes of domestic financial actors and in the increasing 
international resort to heterodox policies by other nations, Great Britain included. 
During the London Monetary Conference of June-July 1933, Italian representative 
Alberto Beneduce reported to the Italian delegation and the Italian government that 
President Roosevelt’s proposition to delink the Italian exchange from its gold parity 
value promised to heighten the financial crisis rather than solve it.243  
 In Rome, the Duce continued to be faithful to the deflationary “quota 
novanta” policy (and the international gold bloc), but he also produced the Italian 
version of the American New Deal by establishing two mercantilist institutions, the 
Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI) and the Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale 
(IRI), to reorganize and return to the market the national industrial enterprise—
particularly the mechanic and metallurgic sectors.244 In January 1934, the government 
turned towards financial heterodoxy with the decision to issue large quantities of 
treasury bonds to be absorbed by the “revitalized” domestic market. Italian deficit and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 ACS, PCM, Anno 1934-35, Mosconi’s communication, October 6, 1932. 
243 Beneduce’s message and other correspondence can be accessed at De Cecco (1999), pp.454-58. 
244 Until 1933 the Italian industry was dominated by the textile sector. The mechanic and metallurgic 
sectors expanded by leaps and bounds between 1933 and 1935. See Indici delle condizioni economiche 
e finanziarie dell’Italia dal 1922 al 1930, Roma (1940), Compendio Statistico Italiano, 1940, Vol.XIV, 
cap. XX, ISTAT. See also L’Economia Italiana nel Sessennio 1931-36, pare II, vol. II, a cura della 
Banca d’Italia, Rome 1938, pp.1268-69 and ASBI, Rapporti con l’estero, cart.108. Dattiloscritto: 
“Appunto anonimo sulla costituzione dell’oro.” 
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debt increased but not by much and not for long (Table 3.3).245 A few months later, the 
Italian ambassador in Washington, Rosso, notified American authorities that Italy 
would not pay its debt disbursement before everyone else had done so.246 By 1935, the 
state intervention in the Italian economy was reflected in GNP growth.   
Because of the high affinity with high finance of the Mussolini government at 
the time of the financial crisis, and because of the same government’s low exposure to 
high finance throughout the crisis, expectations on the influence of the crisis on the 
course of Italian national security policies cannot be extrapolated from the framework.  
 
FROM CURBED TO SUICIDAL MILITARY MOVES TO SALVAGE FINANCIAL 
CREDIT: Financial crises and Italian 19th century imperialism 
 
  Italian military strategy in Eastern Africa during the Victorian Age earned 
intense domestic criticism and significant international mockery for the “incredible 
incompetence,” to quote Giovanni Giolitti, in the “organization and direction” of the 
enterprise.247  How did the Italian political and military leadership achieve this 
miserable record? Existing literature answers this question by recognizing that the 
systemic and domestic pressures shaping Italian national security policies combined to 
create a recipe for abrupt changes and military disaster. Systemic pressures originated 
from Britain, France, Germany and Eastern Africa. For instance, Webster (1975:47), 
Whittam (1977:121), and Mack Smith (1997:113,120) have observed that Italian 
assertiveness originated from wake-ups calls such as French expansionism in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 ACS, AP, Camera dei Deputati, Legislatura XXIX, 1a sessione, Discussioni, May 18, 1935.  
246 ACS, DDI, VII Serie, 1922-35, vol.XV. On the role of international pressures in shaping Italian 
national security decisions see Webster (1975), p.47; Whittam (1977), p.121; Serra (1987), p.611; and 
Mack Smith (1997), pp.113, 120. 
247 Giolitti as quoted in Mack Smith (1997), p.168. 
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Morocco; British welcoming of an Italian presence in Africa as background support 
for the British campaign against Sudan; German fears that a shaken Italy might throw 
herself in the arms of France, Russia, or Britain; and the arming of Ethiopian forces by 
Emperor of Ethiopia Menelik. 248  Domestic pressures originated from money scarcity 
(or abundance), and the related necessity to pursue stringent financial policies (or 
privilege not to do so).249 Stressing the role of domestic constraints and diversionary 
motives in explaining changes in Italian national security policies, Mack Smith 
(1997:133, 167-68), Romano and Bosworth (1991:128) and Serra (1987:612) have 
also noted that factors such as production gluts and surfacing episodes of financial 
distress and corruption fueled the charm of an Italian African Empire and infused the 
false appearance of Italian military strength.250  
As a result of these pressures, Italian national security policies experienced two 
major and bizarre changes in the Victorian age: in 1891 the Italian leadership 
abandoned an ambitious, expansionist foreign policy and embraced cautionary 
military spending, threat assessment and war prospects; in 1893, the opposite 
occurred.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248  In the late 1880s and in the early 1890s interstate relations indicated a growing rapprochement 
between France and Russia, and a deterioration in British-German relationships. On British reasons for 
supporting Italian military expansion in Northeast Africa see Mack-Smith (1997), p.164. On German 
(and Austrian) reasons see Pribram (1920:II), p.54 and Serra (1987), p.611.  
249 See also Lowe and Marzani (1975:66). Arms trade in Western weapon had allowed Menelik to arm 
its forces and increase Ethiopia’s military power. Other sources of domestic pressure have been 
identified in nationalism and changes in national political leadership.  Structural- and domestic-level 
explanations of changes in Italian national security policies are not incompatible. Historians have often 
combined explanations at both levels to enlighten Italian national security decisions.  
250 Other domestic factors include nationalism, Italy’s questionable status as a great power, regional 
unrest, and political competition. See also Whittam (1977), p.124; Lowe and Marzani (1975:57); Seton-
Watson (1967:18); and Rochat and Massobrio (1978:109,115-16).  On the forward-jump in European 
economic growth of the first half of 1880s see Toniolo (1973), p.87; Mitchell (1975), p.375; 
Kindleberger (1984), pp.142-43. 
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This section updates existing interpretations of the causes of Italian petty 
colonial adventures in the late 19th century from the perspective of the overlooked role 
of financial crises and the process of financial crisis responses on Italian national 
security decisions. Existing accounts on the domestic economic foundations of the 
change in Italian national security policies that was realized in 1891 or 1893 leave 
some puzzling questions. To begin, why would financial stringency become an 
imperative specifically in 1891 and again in 1893? Second, why would Crispi refuse 
to provide the army with the means necessary to win the war against Ethiopian forces 
in 1893? Third, if it is true that in 1893 Crispi was “anxious” (as Mack Smith put it) 
about the status of the state’s finances, why did he not act to impede an assertive 
Italian African policy? This section responds to these questions by illustrating that the 
financial crises of 1889-91 and 1893-94—and related processes of financial crisis 
response—shifted Italian national security policies towards greater cautiousness. What 
accounted for the different character of the shift was the different scenarios (or 
different balance of power between government authorities and high finance) that 
came about in the context of each financial crisis.  
The section suggests that, in financial crisis years 1889-91 and 1893-94, 
money scarcity (or abundance), financial corruption and distress, and overproduction 
were intermediate variables taking different values or becoming consequential 
depending on the affinity-exposure scenario that Italian governments faced.  
Relatedly, the findings of the section challenge both the power of the diversionary 
theory of war and the overproduction thesis in explaining changes in Italian national 
security policies in the Victorian age. These results are in line with available findings. 
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Interestingly, while financial distress and corruption have been described as the trigger 
of expansionist turns in Italian foreign policy—along the lines of diversionary war 
theory and overproduction-fueled expansionism—economic factors have also been 
linked to the playing down of jingoism and the pursuit of cautionary military 
spending, threat assessment, and war prospects. Mack Smith (1997:133, 168), Rochat 
and Massobrio (1978:131) and Haywood (1999:161), for instance, have argued that, in 
1891, the shift towards caution in Italian national security policies matured or emerged 
out of the growing conviction that financial stringency was an urgent and imperative 
necessity.251 Mack Smith even went as far as to claim that financial stringency would 
explain why Crispi refused to fund the Italian army exactly when military operations 
against Ethiopia were resuming (in 1893) after that they had come to a halt in 1891.  
Before the outbreak of the financial crisis of 1889-91, the Crispi government 
unabatedly promoted military expansion in Northeast Africa while widely condoning 
financial heterodoxy via massive foreign borrowing, economic warfare, and the 
breaking of money printing rules. 252 Ministerial documents from the archives of 
Francesco Crispi and then Army General Secretary Luigi Pelloux show that, up until 
1889, the Italian dream of founding an Eritrean colony in Eastern Africa enjoyed 
widespread support within the cabinet and in parliament. In the pursuit of this dream, 
the governing Left joined the central powers in the Triple Alliance in 1882, thereby 
abandoning its pre-1882 military restraint, opposition to colonialism, and diplomatic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 The literature is in agreement that a major shift in Italian national security policies occurred in 1891.  
252 In 1881, much to the surprise of the Italian government, the French established a protectorate over 
Tunis. Soon afterwards the Italian government ditched military restrain. For an account of Italian 
colonial policy in East Africa in the 19th century see Crispi, Memoirs II, pp.390-91; Kogan (1963), p.4; 
Mori (1972), pp.152-53; Whittam (1977), p.121; Rochat and Massobrio, (1987), pp.109,114-116; Mack 
Smith (1997), pp.114-120,132-149; Barone, (1972), pp.595-596; Ferrari (1986), p.162; Sonnino, 
Discorsi Parlamentari, pp.474, 485; Lowe and Marzani (1975); and Monzali (2008), pp.369-416. 
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and economic cooperation with France. Between 1882 and 1889, under the command 
of War Minister Ettore Bertole’-Viale and Army General Oreste Baratieri, the Italian 
Army marched inward (and west) from the port of Massaua, occupying Asmara, 
Cheren, and Agordat (Map 3.1). The security dilemma was intense. Not advancing—it 
was believed—would have automatically translated into the failure of the Italian 
dream. 
Map 3.1. Italian expansion in East Africa  
 
Throughout these years, governmental debate over the financial and economic 
sustainability of Italian national security policies was entirely avoided. 253 
Parliamentary motions endorsing military restraint or military withdrawal from Africa 
were occasionally presented between 1885 and 1889, and were regularly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 ACS, Crispi DSPP, b.57, 58; and ACS, Archivio Pelloux, b.45 and b.143. 
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whitewashed.254 Not even Italy’s military defeat against the Abyssinian forces in 
Dogali (January 1887) stopped the government from supporting an Italian war of 
conquest. In July 1887, Italy’s imperial plans were favored by 332 votes against 40 in 
the Chamber and, from 1887 onwards, Prime Minister Crispi kept propagandizing the 
glamour of imperialism amongst larger and larger segments of state decision-makers. 
Military spending skyrocketed, as shown in Table 4. In December 1888, Crispi 
approved a bill that allocated 127 million lire of extraordinary military expenditures, 
causing an increase in real military spending, compared to 1887, of almost 15% (4% 
of real GNP) while real government spending increased only 5% and real GNP 
decreased about 4% (Tab.3.3).255 
Between 1889 and early 1890, Italian military boldness encountered its first 
challenges. As expected, after the onset of the liquidity crisis and debt and deficit 
crisis of 1889-91, Italian state leaders, despite their intention to renew their financial-
security agenda (and some initial, partial successes in defending these intentions), 
gradually found themselves in scenario LA-HE. Previously stifled criticisms of 
Crispi’s national security policies were brought to light in April 1889 as ministers 
from both the Chamber and the Senate expressed serious concern over the increasing 
difficulty of selling Italian public debt in London and Paris, and the uncomfortable 
financial dependence on foreign bankers or high finance. Since national treasury 
bonds sales and foreign financial dependence served primarily to fund Italy’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 These motions and their lack of success even between May 1888 and December 1888 as new 
investments in military plans were discussed—is well evident from ACS, Crispi DSPP, b.57, 58, and 
Biblioteca del Senato, AP, Legislatura XVI, sessione III, tornata del 17 Giugno 1889.  
255 This massive increase in military spending is described in Barone (1972), pp.595-596; Ferrari 
(1986), p.162; Rochat (1978), p.114; Mack Smith (1997), p.132. 
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expansionist foreign policy plans, the practice and philosophy of expansionism came 
under attack.  
Table 3.4. Italian real military spending (ME), GNP and government spending (CGE) in 
1886-1897* 
 
 
* Data obtained or calculated from Ercolani, pp. 445, 446 and Mitchell, pp. 907-911. 
 
Concurrently, the need to implement a “stringent policy of economies” took on 
a sense of unprecedented urgency. Crispi’s archival collection revealed that on April 
5, 1889, the prime minister suffered a major defeat over Italian foreign policy and 
military conduct in Eritrea: when the Chamber discussed potential ways to square the 
circle between Italian Eritrean policy and the anticipated national fiscal adjustments 
for the year 1888-1889, many members endorsed Finance Minister Federico Seismit-
Doda’s plea for redressing the deficit and adopting a more prudent financial conduct, 
in line with the preferences of high finance. 256	  A process of reassessment of the 
financial and military measures endorsed by the Crispi government had just started—
as Treasury Minister Giovanni Giolitti noted on the same day.257  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 ACS, Crispi DSPP, b.58.  
257 Besides ACS, Crispi DSPP, b.58, see Plebano (1902), pp.102-112.  
 
         Year Real ME Real CGE   Real GNP 
 
ME/GNP      ME/CGE 
       
1886 337 1433 11200 
 
0.0300 0.24 
1887 369 1478 10521 
 
0.0350 0.25 
1888 424 1547 10128 
 
0.0418 0.27 
1889 552 1707 10328 
 
0.0534 0.32 
1890 416 1586 11141 
 
0.0373 0.26 
1891 398 1617 12000 
 
0.0331 0.25 
1892 370 1588 10919 
 
0.0338 0.24 
1893 356 1605 11250 
 
0.0316 0.22 
1894 354 1617 10600 
 
0.0333 0.22 
1895 332 1618 11125 
 
0.0298 0.21 
1896 439 1699 11000 
 
0.0399 0.26 
1897 375 1624 10800 
 
0.0347 0.23 
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In agreement with the framework, the transition to another financial-security 
agenda was not immediate. Archival documents show that the Crispian leadership 
attempted to double-down on its military and financial measures by announcing the 
establishment of the Italian colony of Eritrea (January 1890), closely watching 
international markets’ reactions to Crispi’s statements, and sending emissaries to the 
continental financial capitals to assure the placement of Italian debt and keep the cash 
rolling in.258 The strategy functioned for awhile and on November 18, 1890, Crispi 
was reconfirmed to the premiership—even if the new mandate was not as broad as the 
former one. Between November 1890 and February 1891, however, as the news of the 
Baring Bank’s insolvency uncovered the global nature of the crisis, and as 
international competition for liquidity intensified, international and domestic political 
pressures on the Crispian leadership mounted. Bending only slightly to these 
uninviting circumstances, in December 1890 and January 1891 Crispi continued to 
send loan-raising Italian missions abroad while promising the introduction of 
economies at home—in all sectors except those serving national defense.259 The main 
international banking houses with headquarters in Britain, Germany, and France did 
not buy the promise and refused to take in new Italian treasury bonds.  Italy’s 
international doors to liquidity were being shut. Correspondence already gathered by 
Marcello De Cecco (1993:760-67) documents the many disappointing messages sent 
by high finance to Palazzo Chigi.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 ACS, Crispi DSPP, b.58. 
259 ACS, Crispi, DSPP, b.54; ACS, Giolitti, Archivio Cavour, b.1, fasc.3; and ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 
b.448.  
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At home, Crispi’s financial and military strategies started to meet the overt 
ostracism of several ministers. Documents from the Central State Archives and the 
Bank of Italy elucidate that, in late 1890 and early 1891, several members of 
parliament judged Crispi’s national security policies and foreign loan requests as 
excessively onerous for being comprised within his new electoral mandate.260 In early 
December 1890, Treasury minister Giovanni Giolitti resigned.261 Interestingly, 
opposition to the government’s financial and military policies arose even from the 
Director of the National Bank, Giacomo Grillo, who, in the 1880s, was one of Crispi’s 
firmest supporters and friends.262  This indicates that political perspectives were 
changing because financial developments were redesigning the lines of battle. The 
correspondence between Crispi and Grillo and between Grillo, and Treasury Ministers 
Giolitti and Luigi Luttazzi further illustrates the growing strength, within the Italian 
government, of a policy line centered on rigid fiscal measures and a prudent military 
stance. As Luzzatti pointed out, continuous efforts at selling Italian treasury bonds on 
international markets took economic opportunities away from private Italian citizens 
and industrialists—the same constituencies that had supported Italian economic 
growth for the previous ten years.263 By early February 1891, high finance and the 
orthodox medicine had gained enough proselytes across the peninsula to induce the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 ACS, Giolitti, Archivio Cavour, b.1, fasc.3; ASBI, Studi, cop.16. 
261 ACS, Giolitti-Cavour, s.1, fasc.3.  
262 As Grillo warned, a radical change in Italy’s fiscal and military policies was warranted because 
capital was being drawn away. 
263 ASBI, Studi, cop.16. 
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collapse of the Crispi government and coalitional rearrangement in favor of the 
Historical Right.264  
As expected, the new leadership adopted a cautionary approach to military 
spending, threat assessment, and war prospects, as archival documents from the 
ASMAE and the ACS reveal. Between 1891 and 1893, the Right played down 
jingoism and colonial expansion, and committed to placing Italian foreign policy 
“back in the middle road.” Italian authorities in Eritrea were warned that the governing 
Right was “adverse to any further attempt at colonial expansion.”265 In the spring of 
1891, the government of di Rudinì brought Italian military expansion in Eastern Africa 
to a halt by signing agreements with Paris and London that limited Italian military 
occupation to the triangle Massaua-Asmara-Cheren (Map 3.1). Italian financial 
situation, not Italian neighbors, was now the real threat. Not only was a military 
agreement with France was signed but the Right also resolved to put a decade of trade 
wars to an end, significantly improving diplomatic relations between Paris and Rome.  
It should not be a surprise that the most radical shift in national security 
policies concerned national military spending. 266  Overall, the Right’s ascent to power 
rested on the Italian foreign indebtedness and the related promise of implementing 
“all-ranging” budget reductions. Between February and March 1891, Minister of War 
Luigi Pelloux was ordered to reduce army expenditures in Africa “to the lowest 
possible sum,” and to introduce “economies” in many items or tasks of the military 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Diplomatic exchanges between di Rudinì and Italian embassies in London, France, Vienna and 
Berlin reveal the new government’s intent of “lifting up the status of Italian credit abroad” in order to 
obtain “greater independence from foreign bankers” and relieve “the anguish of finances.”  ASMAE, 
Serie Politica P, b.448.  
265 ACS, DDI, Seconda Serie, 1870-96, volume XXIV, p.22,64,65,112.  
266 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, b.319, pos.514; ACS, Pelloux, b.45. 
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budget.267 As the encircled data in Table 4 indicate, in 1891 and 1892 military 
spending cuts were far-reaching. Military appropriations were slashed both in their 
absolute value as well as in the proportion of budget spending.  Also, so quickly was 
the reduction in military spending happening that, in November 1892, the King 
ordered the government to reach annually a minimum military ceiling of 246 million 
lire.268 The ceiling was compatible with the policy of stable military quota advocated 
by high finance but also impeded the outflow of military funds.269  Although in May 
1892 the Left had returned to power under the lead of Giolitti, without the King’s 
intervention cuts would have most likely continued.270 The consolidated figure of lire 
246 million represented, as Giolitti declared in November 1892, what was strictly 
necessary to maintain the efficient functioning of the army and the state’s national 
security and independence.271 Giolitti had come a long way since 1889, and, by 1892, 
the state’s deficit had been significantly contained, as shown in Table 4.1. 
Existing explanations of the change in Italian national security policies that 
occurred in 1891 rightly link it to the perceived necessity of pursuing stringent fiscal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 ACS, Pelloux, b.45.  
268 Table 3.4 suggests that the actual military spending for 1892 significantly overcame the established 
ceiling. That there were substantial reductions in military spending throughout these years is an 
established finding. See, for instance, Whittam (1977), pp.126,127.  
269 For a description of this policy and the change in Italian national security policies between 1891 and 
1893 see also Sonnino (1892), p.596; Battaglia (1958), pp.339-45; Whittman (1977), pp.126,127; Mack 
Smith (1997), pp.166,67; Haywood (1999), p.161.  
270 ACS, Pelloux, b.45, Giolitti’s statement of November 3, 1892. It is not surprising that the new set of 
fiscal and military ideas legitimized by the financial crisis encountered the resistance of the King and 
the war ministry. Both of them were the guarantors of conservatism. Notice that the ceiling of “246” 
million lire would be incorrect according to Tab.4. There are two possible explanations to this 
discrepancy, both of them plausible. The first is that actual military spending for 1892 significantly 
overcame the established ceiling and Giolitti’s estimates. The second is that part of the military 
spending previous to 1892 was computed in the military spending of the following years (included 
1892). This practice was for instance extremely common during the Great War years. That there were 
substantial reductions in military spending throughout these years is certain nevertheless. See Whittam 
(1977), pp.126,127.  
271 Ibidem.  
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policies, a conduct which the Historical Right embraced much more readily than the 
Historical Left. Rochat and Massabrio (1978:124) even acknowledge that a debate 
over whether budget parity or defense was a priority was taking place at the time. Yet,	  
current explanations discount entirely the catalytic role of the financial crisis of 1889-
91. Implicitly, these explanations advance the alternative hypothesis that the 1891 
change governing coalition and Italian national security policies would have occurred 
even without the global financial crisis of 1889-91. Such an hypothesis, however, fails 
its hoop test.272 The Left bloc would have not been dethroned from power (and the 
Italian African campaign would have not been stopped) had the Crispi government not 
been paralyzed in its ability to sell the Italian debt by the 1889-91 financial crisis. 
Crucially, despite the defeat suffered by Crispi’s conservative coalition in early April 
1889, before April 1889 and during the remainder of that year, Crispi’s financial-
security agenda was still rather popular. Many renowned government members—
including future Treasury Minister Sidney Sonnino—were positively passionate about 
the Italian colonial mission in East Africa, and so was the Italian military. In early 
May 1889, Italian troops occupied the East African high plain. In the following 
months, they continued to march from Massaua to the conquest of Cheren, Asmara 
and Agordat, in perfect alignment with Crispi’s foreign policy objectives and 
flagrantly outstripping the allocated military budget. Further, in July and August 1889, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 On the use of hoop tests to exclude alternative hypotheses see Van Evera (1997), pp.31-32; and 
Bennett (2008), p.706.  
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even Grillo defended the purchase of Italian Treasury bonds on international financial 
markets. During those months, Grillo was still a “Crispian.”273  
Grillo’s stance radically changed in correspondence with the financial squeeze 
of 1890 and 1891 and, as earlier seen, his stance was not the only one to change. 
Sidney Sonnino was a strenuous supporter of Crispi before 1891. After 1891, he 
declared his full support for reducing the number of the armed corps (from 12 to 10), 
and implementing military cuts and reforms in the army. Like Sonnino, many within 
the government became convinced that a stringent policy of economies was an urgent 
necessity.274 The evidence so far provided not only rejects the alternative hypothesis 
advanced earlier but it also makes clear that had the crisis been “local” or “Italian,” the 
debate would have likely been tamed—as it indeed occurred between April and July 
1889—and Crispi’s policies would have continued.   
As expected, more cautionary national security policies—indeed extremely 
prudent military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects, as per HA–HE, were 
embraced by the Italian government during the first stage of response to the financial 
crisis of 1893-94. Before the onset of this crisis, and differently from the pre-1889 
period, the military ambitions of the Giolitti government (May 1892 – December 
1893) were kept at bay.275 Military activities in Northern Africa had been curbed as a 
result of the financial crisis of 1889-91 and the above described response, and had 
been on hold since. After the start of the crisis in early 1893, as financial operators 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 During the summer of 1889 Grillo, contacted international banking houses on Crispi’s behalf to 
allocate the Italian debt. The Italian Rendita was the main government security traded in international 
financial markets—These letters are found in Marcello De Cecco (1993), pp. 688-757. 
274 On Sonnino’s rethinking and on the growing governmental awareness between 1891 and 1894 that 
Italy could not afford its grandiose foreign policy see Whittam (1977), p.126; Plebano (1902), pp.102-
112; and Haywood (1999), p.163. 
275 The (first) Giolitti government was formed in May 1892.  
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across Europe fretted over the prospect of an Italian bankruptcy, British and German 
authorities demanded that the Giolitti government bend even further to the dictates of 
the orthodox medicine.276 British premier William Gladstone alerted Italian 
Ambassador in London Count Tornielli of the need for a more serious Italian 
commitment to balancing the budget.277 Along the same lines, German and Austrian 
state officials provided Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Blanc with instructions 
regarding how to reorganize the Italian army to allow for “additional,” and  
“necessary” reductions in the military budget. 278  
Both government and parliament took unambiguous and extreme national 
security measures to rescue the nation’s banking system and restore financial 
credibility. The Chamber and the Senate introduced more radical economies in the 
military budget to reach budget parity, redress any unbalance between the military and 
other items of the budget, and defend the country’s financial independence and credit 
status.279  As shown in Table 4, military spending moved from 24 percent of total 
government spending in 1892, to 22 percent of total government spending during 
financial crisis years 1893 and 1894. In an unprecedented reappraisal of the financial-
security agenda of the 1880s, military budgets were explicitly recognized as the crux 
of existing economic evils. In his speech to the nation in October 1893, Prime Minister 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 It was rumored that Italy could very likely end like Portugal and Greece (or many Latin American 
states) and be forced to declare its inability to continue to serve the payment of the interests on its 
foreign debt. ASBI, Studi, cop.66; ASMAE, Serie Politica P, b.319, pos.54 and b.448. See also Théry 
(1893).  
277 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, b. 319, pos.54. Correspondence of January 1894 between the Italian 
Embassy in London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome. 
278 ACS, DDI, Seconda Serie, 1870-96, v. XXVI; ASMAE, Serie Politica P, b.448. Blanc shared the 
German instructions on the reorganization of the Italian army with war minister Mocenni and treasury 
minister Sonnino in March 1894.  
279 See Biblioteca del Senato, AP, Discussioni Camera, Legislatura XVIII, 10-16 June, 1893 and May 
1894. See also ACS, Pelloux, b.45. 
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Giolitti stated that the ongoing national financial crisis, which threatened both Italian 
financial security and the Italian ability to provide for national and allied defense, 
rested entirely upon a previous financial policy of excessive military spending via 
foreign debt.280  
As the financial crisis continued and after that major banking scandals swept 
Giolitti out of power leading to the reinstatement of Crispi to the premiership in 
December 1893, the discrediting of assertive military policies (and financial 
heterodoxy) was moderated. From mid-December 1893 onwards Italian troops 
resumed the military activities that they had halted in 1891, and advanced east and 
south of the triangle Massawa-Asmara-Cheren (Eritrea), reviving the aggressive 
foreign policy stance and the ambitious military plans of General Oreste Baratieri—
governor of Eritrea and commander of Italian forces in Africa. The Army conquered 
Kassala, at the border with British Sudan, and occupied Aduwa and Macalle’ in 
northern Ethiopia (Map 3.1), fueling the resentment of Menelik, the Ethiopian Negus, 
and his military forces.281 Archival documents on the exchanges between Baratieri and 
Crispi in the second half of December 1893 illustrate the General’s expectation of 
receiving the desired, daring military instructions and completing the unfinished 
business of conquering Ethiopia.282 Crispi himself, as existing explanations have 
rightly pointed out, did not resolutely oppose military advance, perhaps still convinced 
that military conquest could have lifted its popularity at home. Yet—and this is where 
a crucial aspect that existing explanations fail to account for—while the Italian army 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, b.319, pos.54. 
281 Italian military expansion in the 1890s is described in Battaglia (1958), pp.716-720; Seton-Watson 
(1967), p.181; Whittman (1977), pp.134,135. 
282 ACS, Crispi, DSPP, b.143, fasc.1066. 
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was advancing and meeting a powerful Abyssinian resistance, the military budget for 
the Italian campaign was not increasing but rather decreasing. As confirmed by the 
official collection of the Laws and Decrees of the Italian Kingdom, and by existing 
military data (Table 4), between 1893 and 1895 Italian military spending shrank in 
both its absolute value and as a share of total government spending.283 The “minimum 
ceiling” of 246 million lire to be allocated to the army was lowered to 233 million in 
May 1894 and kept declining in the following year. Crispi himself avoided asking 
parliament for funds and denied Baratieri the military reinforcements he demanded.284   
Overall, headstrong military forces could do little to change a prevailing 
political atmosphere of ostracism towards the conservative dream of imperialist 
expansion in Northeast Africa. Between December 1893 and late 1895, the Italian 
government was split into two fronts, one represented by Finance Ministers Giuseppe 
Colombo (1893) and Sidney Sonnino (1894-1895), and the other heralded by War 
Ministers Luigi Pelloux (1893) and Stanislao Mocenni (1894-95). The Colombo-
Sonnino front drew the greater majority of deputy members, enjoyed the particular 
favor amongst the main European financial houses and their governments, and favored 
further reductions in the allegedly consolidated military budget of 246 million lire.  
Using words that illustrate the relevance of the financial crisis in shaping national 
security policies, Minister of Public Works Ascanio Branca justified the Treasury’s 
position in these terms: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Biblioteca del Senato, Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e Decreti del Regno d’Italia.  
284 So Branca expressed himself in May 1894. On the discrepancy between military spending and 
military activities see especially Rochat and Massobrio (1987), pp.135,136; Mack Smith (1997), 
pp.167,168. 
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 “If [Italy], at this very moment, had stable national finances and a florid 
economy, none in the Chamber would propose to make economies in the military 
budget […]. Military expenditures have left us 2 milliards of debt and, if there were 
two milliards less of public debt, the issue would be practically solved.”285  
 
 This situation according to the Colombo-Sonnino front had also decreased the 
value of the Triple Alliance because an ally who is “financially in ruins”  [like Italy] is 
also a “cumbersome military help.”286 Hence, military restraint was the sensible way 
ahead.  
War ministers Luigi Pelloux (1893) and Stanislao Mocenni (1894-95) led the 
other front. Pelloux and Mocenni, too, understood the impellent necessity of 
responding to most difficult financial circumstances, and the increased power of 
foreign bankers. Yet, further economies in their view would have weakened the army 
and created a precedent for inexorable reductions in the military budget. As a result, 
their plan was to maintain the army budget to 246 million while introducing further 
army reforms to improve military efficiency.  
Between 1893 and 1895, right when Italian military forces were renewing their 
efforts to conquer Ethiopia and achieve the dream of an Italian Eastern Africa Empire, 
the Colombo-Sonnino front was committed to ensure the success of the orthodox 
medicine of financial crisis response and this effort shaped the destiny of Italian 
military spending. Although Baratieri’s military plans were arguably not very distant 
from the premier’s aspirations, Crispi could not actively support them. In due course, 
this divergence between political circles and military forces culminated in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 See AP, Discussioni Camera, Legislatura XVIII, Tornata del 7 Maggio 1894.  
286 AP, Discussioni Camera, Legislatura XVIII. The observations by deputy member Giovanni Bovio on 
May 12, 1894 best capture the essence of the discussion. On Sonnino’s rethinking and on the growing 
governmental awareness between 1891 and 1894 that Italy could not afford its grandiose foreign policy 
see also Whittam (1977), p.126; Plebano (1902), pp.102-112; and Haywood (1999), p.163. 
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disastrous defeat of Aduwa (1896), where 6,000 Italians died in one battle against the 
Ethiopians. After Aduwa, Eritrea was placed under civilian rule, and Italian plans of 
military conquest in Easter Africa were shelved for the following fifteen years.287 
 Archival evidence confirms that, between 1893 and 1895, the resort to 
international financial cooperation by members of the Crispi government to stop the 
financial crisis obstructed the resumed military operations in Eastern Africa. As both 
Treasury Minister Sonnino and Foreign Minister Blanc knew, successful negotiation 
of the foreign loan from German bankers that would have rescued the country from 
the financial crisis required the restoration of parity in the national balance of 
payment. Budget parity would have been reached only by virtue of a more serious 
commitment to the security conditionality of the orthodox medicine, and therefore the 
abandonment of offensive military policies in Africa and the adoption of a strategy of 
passive defense.288  Accordingly, in late December 1893, Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Blanc and Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Antonelli ordered 
General Baratier to restrict Italian military operations in Africa to the triangle 
Massauwa-Asmara-Cheren. Similar instructions were repeated in a telegram from 
Blanc to Baratieri in early February 1894.289 The measures—available minutes on 
record reveal—were taken “in consideration of existing financial risks and the 
available financial means.”290  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 For an account of the change in Italian national security policies that stemmed from Aduwa see 
Bosworth (1979), p.12. 
288 DDI, Seconda Serie, 1870-1896, personal letter by Sonnino to Blanc of December 25, 1893; DDI, 
Seconda Serie, 1870-1896, telegram by Italian ambassador in Berlin, Lanza, to Blanc of July, 2, 1894. 
See also Biblioteca del Senato, AP, Discussioni Camera, Legislatura XVIII, 7 Maggio 1894. 
289 DDI, Seconda Serie, 1870-1896, vol.XVI, telegram 347 sent by Blanc on February 5, 1894. 
290 DDI, Seconda Serie, vol. XVI, ‘verbale’ from the meeting of the Consulta of December 23, 1893; 
ACS, Crispi, DSPP, b.143, Baratieri’s letter to Crispi of December, 26, 1893. 
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Archival evidence also confirms that, between 1893 and 1895, Prime Minister 
Crispi remained faithful to giving new impetus to Italian military operations in Africa 
and so did General Baratieri.291 Confident of Crispi’s support, Baratieri organized and 
launched the military conquest of Cassala after having communicated to Blanc, in 
early February 1894, that, “in spite of the stringency of [Italian] finances,” the Eritrean 
colony could be best preserved “by defending the outposts of Cassala and Agordat 
rather than by restricting [Italian] forces to the triangle Massauwa-Asmara-Cheren.”292 
In the spring and fall of 1894 Italian troops advanced in defense of the newly gained 
outposts.293 Ethiopian resistance increased in the meantime. 
In 1895 and 1896, the clash within the Italian government between the 
orthodoxy of international financial cooperation and Crispi’s pursuit of military 
expansionism resulted in the utter estrangement of political authorities from the course 
of events on the battlefield and an ensemble of disastrous national security policies. To 
General Baratieri’s requests for new troops, the Sonnino-Colombo front responded 
with retrenchment. Not only were military reinforcements to East Africa denied, but 
military disengagement was also ordered and massive military cutbacks performed. 
The Eritrean budget was lowered to less than lire 10 million lire—a sum that, as 
Baratieri explained in the spring of 1895, demanded the winding-up of several Italian 
battalions, encouraged Ethiopian aggression and paralyzed any Italian response.294 
Erasing any doubt over the primary reason that impelled this radical restrain, Blanc 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 ACS, Crispi, DSPP, b.143; Baratieri’s letter to Crispi of December, 26, 1893. 
292 Historical Office of the Armed Forces, Baratieri’s report to Blanc, r.154; and DDI, Seconda Serie, 
1870-1896, vol. XXVI, telegram sent by Blanc sends to Baratieri on February 5, 1894. 
293 ACS, Crispi, DSPP, b.143. 
294 DDI, Seconda Serie, 1870-1896, Vol.XXVII. Telegrams were sent to Baratieri on April, 10, 23 and 
25 and May 21 and 25, 1895. 
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informed Baratieri that the government in Rome was “mostly focusing on trying to 
limit any public spending to redress the balance of payment deficit and the enormous 
debt from the of abyss of which [the country had been] lightly saved.”295  
Sonnino kept stating and restating his opposition to raising the defense budget 
until mid-December 1895, when Italian troops were defeated in Amba Alagi. From 
then onwards, Italian national security policies moved resolutely towards greater 
assertive and scenario HA–LE. The Colombo-Sonnino front was now convinced that 
restoring budget parity had endangered the State’s defense and national integrity. 
Crispi passed a bill that added lire 20 million to the African budget and sent an urgent 
telegram to Baratieri that read: “We are sending you more than you have requested. If 
any damage occurs now due to lack of resources or improvidence it will not be our 
fault.”296 It was a couple of months later that Italian troops experienced the massive 
defeat of Aduwa.  
The conflicting character or confusing nature of Italian military conduct 
between 1893 and 1896—character which an explanation of the influence of financial 
on Italian national security policies significantly enlightens and that existing 
explanations ignore—could hardly have played little role in the “incompetent 
organization and direction” of the Italian African campaign during these years. At the 
root of this ambiguity was confusion over whether the financial crisis should have 
been addressed following the rules of international financial cooperation or following 
national military independence and autonomy. In an interesting update to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 DDI, Seconda Serie, 1870-1896, Vol. XXVII. Telegrams exchanged between Baratieri, Blanc, 
Mocenni, and Crispi on April 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,10 1895. 
296 Ibidem. Notably, the funds were awarded for the defense of Eritrea and not for pursuing a policy of 
foreign expansionism. 
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framework, when Italian military defeat by Menelik’s forces came about, its strongest 
domestic advocates abandoned subscription to the dictates of the orthodox medicine.  
On the whole, the gathered archival information offers a more nuanced 
explanation than the ones which financial stringency or “military ineptitude” would 
offer about why the Crispi government and why the Italian military failed so badly, 
between 1894 and 1896, to provide a decent African military strategy and campaign. 
Financial stringency, or “military ineptitude,” do not per se explain why Italian 
military activities in East Africa between 1893 and 1895 were first initiated, then 
stopped, then initiated again, or why the military budget was harshly cut first and then 
increased radically at the last minute. The explanation offered here does arguably a 
better job. Crucially, the riskiest and most ambitious Italian military advances in East 
Africa occurred while the greatest attempts at exercising financial stringency were 
being implemented at home. The Crispi government (1893-96) was paralyzed for two 
years since its installment by the transnational power of orthodox ideas and policies. 
Throughout this time, Menelik put together an impressive army. For the Italian army, 
reaching a comparable level of preparedness when financial retrenchment was the 
dominant crisis response strategy at home became extremely difficult—perhaps 
impossible. 
 
FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE PERIPHERY AND  
CHANGES IN FOREIGN POLICY AT THE CORE: 
The Origins of the Libyan War (1911-12) 
 
 The Italian decision to wage war to Libya in 1911-12 is more puzzling than 
existing explanations have credited it to be. A cosmopolitan government that had an 
established record of commitment to disarmament and to the preservation of 
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international peace decided, rather out of the blue, to wage a war against an 
international peer—Turkey and its Ottoman Empire—for reasons that involved Italian 
spheres of (colonial) influence in Northern Africa. Between 1896 and 1911, the 
rejection of colonial aggression and the defense of international peace were the staples 
of Italian foreign policy. Militarism and colonialism were replaced by the pursuit of 
financial and economic interdependence and the expansion of Italian business interests 
in North Africa and the Balkans. National military spending did not surpass the fixed 
ceiling of 20-22% of total government spending (Table 3.5).297 The low investment in 
military spending is apparent when it is considered that the GNP kept growing 
throughout most of the period. Similarly, between 1896 and 1911, the Giolitti 
government renewed the Triple Alliance and defended its policy of alliance with the 
central powers while simultaneously promoting friendly relationships with France 
based on the assumption that Franco-Italian cooperation would have helped the 
interests of European peace.298  
 These policies changed drastically in September 1911, when, overturning its 
previous policy of pacific financial and economic penetration in Northern Africa, the 
Giolitti government began military operations in Libya against the Ottoman Empire.299 
Italian military spending, too, underwent a massive increase between 1911 and 1912. 
Why did this happen? That is, why did Italian colonial possessions in Northern Africa 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 See Whittam (1977), pp.146,156; and Rochat and Massobrio (1987) p.153-54.  
298 These policies are described in Bosworth (1979), p.136; Lowe and Marzani (1975), pp.92,102; 
Whittam (1877), pp.146,156; Rochat and Massobrio (1987), pp.153-54. 
299 For an account of existing perspectives on the Italian war in Libya see Malgeri (1970); De Rosa 
(1984); Mori (1952), pp.102-118; Giolitti (1922), pp.249-260; Giolitti (1962), p.57; Whittam (1977), 
pp.156,157,167; Bosworth (1979), pp.143-44; Mack Smith (1997), p.245; Rashid Khalidi (1991), p.22; 
Herrmann (1989), pp.332-356; an d Haywood (1999), p.342-45. 
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become an issue of political contention with the Ottoman Empire? Some scholars have 
explained this drastic change in the foreign policy of liberal Italy with the more 
threatening international security context and war-like atmosphere that developed in 
Europe from the First Moroccan crisis (1906-07) onwards.   
Table 3.5. Italian (real) Military Spending (ME), GNP and Government Spending (CGE) 
between 1904 and 1911* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Data obtained or calculated from Ercolani, pp. 445, 446 and Mitchell, pp. 907-911. 
 
 Between 1904 and 1911, a number of systemic shocks were reshaping 
international relations in the region. These included, for instance, the Anglo-French 
entente, the Tangier incident, the Anglo-Russian entente, the intensification of Anglo-
German naval rivalry, Austria’s expansion in the Balkans, and the Agadir crisis. Along 
these lines, Haywood (1999) and Whittam (1977) have observed that calls for a more 
assertive Italian military policy intensified after the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1908. The most convincing structural explanation of the Italian policy 
towards Libya in 1911-12 is possibly the one advanced by Khalidi (1991) and 
Anderson (1993). Both scholars have noted the detrimental implications on Italian 
colonial possessions in Libya—and therefore the policy pressures for a military 
intervention—that the spread of the Young Turk revolution (1908) across the Ottoman 
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Empire was bringing about, and the related growing local opposition against foreign 
encroachment.300 This interpretation is very close to the one that the Giolitti 
government accredited. Prime Minister Giolitti, in fact, justified the decision of taking 
military action against Libya by noting that the Turks had provocatively resisted 
Italian economic penetration, denying franchising opportunities to Italian nationals 
and forestalling Italian economic supremacy in Libya.301   
 Giolitti’s defense of Italian military intervention in Libya is buttressed by 
Marxist explanations of the Italo-Turkish war. Identifying the roots of the Italian 
foreign policy towards Libya (and Turkey) in the capitalistic system of the domestic 
economy, Marxist accounts (Webster 1975:193-94; Mori 1978:672-73) hold that, in 
the year preceding the military intervention, Italian business firms at home and abroad 
encountered closing windows of opportunity, critical financial conditions, and a 
recession. Because of their strong connections with national leadership—Romolo 
Tittoni, Vice President of the Banco di Roma was the brother of Italian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Tommaso Tittoni—, Italian business interests dictated a shift towards 
greater national security assertiveness to deflect the costs of domestic economic 
adjustments.302 The economic imperialism thesis is supported by available evidence 
that the Banco di Roma, the primary vehicle of Italian economic penetration in Libya, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 The revolution replaced paninslamic sentiment with political turmoil, regional loyalties, and hostility 
against European encroachment. Since Italy had the largest number of business ventures in Libya, 
paninslamic hostility was essentially directed to the Italian rule.   
301 Giolitti (1922), pp.250-260, especially p.257; Giolitti states that “by means of concessions offered to 
other powers,” the Ottoman government “rendered the Italian military occupation inevitable.” See also 
Mack Smith (1997), p.245. 
302 On these developments Haywood (1999), pp.343-44,380; Webster (1975), pp.193-94; Mori (1978), 
pp.672-73; and Bosworth (1979), pp.13, 141. The Italian leadership, the Marxist argument goes, had 
systematically resorted to its connection with Italian business elites to advance its strategic interests in 
Northern Africa and the Balkans. 
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blackmailed the Italian government by threatening to sell its considerable assets in 
Libya to Austrian and German banks if the Italian government did not intervene to 
protect the interests of Italian business in Northern Africa.303 Ultimately, whether the 
economic imperialism thesis or the systemic, great power politics explanation is a 
more accurate understanding of the Italian war in Libya boils down to a matter of 
emphasis more than substance, namely whether it was mostly business interests or 
mostly strategic reasons (and the Giolittian leadership) that were responsible for the 
intervention.   
 This section reconciles these two sets of explanations on the Italian decision 
to move war to Turkey by reconstructing the role that the global financial crisis of 
1907-08 exerted on Italian political leadership and business elites. The crisis 
exacerbated international economic competition, and made a shift towards 
assertiveness in Italian foreign policy much more likely than would have been 
otherwise. Whichever their take, existing portrayals of Italian military intervention 
against Libya are incomplete without considering the pressures unleashed by the 
financial crisis of 1907-08. Their incompleteness, as the section will show, has kindled 
mistaken conclusions. Notably, while the linkage between the global financial crisis of 
1907-08 and the change in Italian national security policies remains ignored by the 
existing literature, some accounts have recognized the relevance of the social and 
economic distress in 1911 in inciting Italian nationalistic ambitions.304 In particular, 
historian Richard Bosworth (1979:143-44) has documented the existence of a “social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 The threat posed by the Banco di Roma is well documented by a letter sent by Italian foreign 
minister Antonio di San Giuliano to Giolitti on August 9. The letter is contained in Giolitti (1962), p.57. 
See also Mack Smith (1997), pp.238-39, 244. 
304 See Albertini, I, p.343; Malgeri (1970), pp.54-55; Bosworth (1979), pp.143-44.  
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and economic crisis” in Italy in 1911. Yet, this 1911 crisis is nothing like the global 
financial crisis of 1907-08 discussed here. Moreover, the role that Bosworth bestowed 
upon the 1911 crisis in explaining the origins of Italian intervention in Libya is rather 
marginal.  
 More importantly, the section unwraps interesting material for updating the 
framework as the expectation that the Italian government pursued extra-prudent 
conduct in national security policies after the onset of the 1907-08 global financial 
crisis is disproved by existing evidence. As previous paragraphs have made evident, 
Italian threat assessment and war prospects did not exude extra prudency after 1907. 
Military spending, too, as data in Table 3.5 demonstrate, did not decrease. If anything, 
it increased slightly. Rochat and Massobrio (1977:153-54) have found that Italian 
military spending increased from 22% to 27% of total defense spending in 1907—a 
finding that is not matched by the evidence here gathered (cf. Table 3.5). Rochat and 
Massobrio themselves have observed that this increase did not correspond to a 
calculated or intentional policy shift but was mostly a result of the decreased incidence 
of interest rates on state finances following the national debt conversion of 1906.305	  
Still, Rochat and Massobrio are not the only ones to have noted the presence of a few 
percentage points increase in Italian military budgets during or after the financial crisis 
of 1907. Consider, for instance, that historian Geoffrey Haywood describes the 1907 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 See Rochat and Massobrio (1977), pp.153-54. On Italy’s national debt conversion in 1904 see 
Giolitti (1922), p.194 and Lowe and Marzani (1975), p.96. The Italian Rendita was lowered from 5 to 
3%.  
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military spending increase as part of the context of the factors that heralded the shift in 
Italian national security policies that culminated in the Libyan war.306  
 As known, the Giolitti government remained firmly in power throughout the 
financial crisis, and the governments that followed in the years following the end of 
the crisis shared a liberal set of fiscal and military preferences not different from the 
previous, long Giolittian era. In the months and years leading up to 1907, the national 
security agenda of Giolitti’s ruling coalition recognized and defended the preferences 
of private financial interests and the principles of international financial cooperation. 
A popular opinion in Parliament was that increasing the military budget was equal to 
“subtracting the nation’s vital forces from productive employment.”307 As the circled 
data in Table 5 indicate, year after year before the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
national military spending as a percentage of gross national product kept decreasing 
year while GNP growth kept increasing several percentage points. The Italian standing 
army had already been reduced to 200,000 soldiers—half the size of the Swiss army—
, and the Italian Parliament had refused greater investment in national defense for 
“fear that it could compromise Italian financial future.” 308 Moreover, in March 1906, 
Italy signed an international agreement with Great Britain and France, which de facto 
paralyzed Italian military expansion in Eastern Africa.309  One year later, the Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed in Parliament and during various international 
disarmament meetings that Italy saw no threats to national security, rejected the use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Haywood (1999), p.342.Refer to the following paragraphs for a discussion of the factors leading to 
the increase of Italian military spending in 1907.  
307 ACS, AP, Discussioni, Camera, Legislatura XXI, 2a sessione, June 21-22, 1904. 
308 ACS, Atti Parlamentary, Discussioni Camera, Leg. XXI, Sessione June-July 1904; 
309 On this agreement see Monzali (1999), p.425.  
	   180 
military force, and pledged to peaceful international economic competition in its 
primary regions of interests—Northern Africa and the Balkans.310 
After the onset of the crisis, and even after the end of the crisis, the Giolitti 
government found itself in scenario HA-HE, but rather than courting an extra cautious 
military stance, it moved gradually towards assertiveness. For instance, between June 
and December 1907, and despite reiterated pressures by Treasury Minister Carcano 
and a majoritarian front in parliament to restrain national spending, specifically the 
military budget, attempts by government forces to stop steady decreases in national 
military investment appeared just as resolute. In July 1907, freshly concerned about 
the risk of condemning the national defense sector to “complete inaction,” Premier 
Giolitti attempted to pass a law, drafted by War Minister General Viganó, to freeze the 
extraordinary component of the war budgets for three years.311 Exposure to high 
finance was high, and republican and socialist forces blocked the measure. But 
opposition to the “progressive and disturbing impoverishment of the army,” as Viganó 
defined it, weakened in the following months. A commission was set up for verifying 
the necessity and effectiveness of Viganó’s plan; several pleas were made in 
Parliament for the introduction of extraordinary measures—for instance the 
disbursement of 200 million lire over 10 years to strengthen the Italian standing army; 
and, in late 1907, a war budget that did not entail additional military reductions was 
approved. 312 Since GNP decreased as a result of the financial crisis, the military share 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 MAE, Archivio Riservato, 1906-1911, fascicolo 63; Atti Parlamentari, Leg. XXII, 1a Sessione, 
Discussioni, Camera Deputati, June 1907. 
311 ACS, AP, Discussioni Camera, Legislatura XXII, discussion from June 1907 to June 1908. 
312 ACS, AP, Discussioni Camera, Legislatura XXII, discussions from June 1907 to June 1908 and on 
28 November 1907. 
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of the budget increased. By December 1907, even the fiscally prudent, ex Treasury 
Minister Sidney Sonnino bemoaned Italy’s chronic unpreparedness, while Giolitti 
nominated a civilian, Baron Severino Casana, to the War Ministry, in the hope that the 
latter could better persuade the Chamber to start military preparations.313   
The evidence just presented dismisses the expectation that the financial crisis 
paved the way for extra-cautious military spending.  If anything, a less cautionary 
approach ensued between the onset of the crisis and the end of year 1907.  Afterwards, 
the shift away from extra-cautiousness was even more evident. In 1908 and 1909, 
Italian national security policies moved gradually towards greater assertiveness. In 
March 1908, several voices in the Chamber recognized that it was necessary to pass 
more audacious military budgets, and “prepare the army for harder times.” Two 
months later (June 1908), Premier Giolitti expressed his determination to avoid 
arresting “the military machine” and creating “disaster in the administration of 
war.”314 Due to “ongoing financial difficulties,” it was established that the increase in 
the military budget would not be “immediate” but take place the following year.315 In 
June 1909 the Pollio-Spingardi program was approved: it promised substantial 
increases in the military budget and the reorganization and reinforcement of the army 
between 1909 and 1913.316  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Sidney Sonnino, Scritti, II, 21 December 1907 and 25 June 1908. See also, Haywood (1999), pp.344, 
45. 
314 ACS, AP, Leg. XXII, 1a sessione discussion, June 25, 1908. 
315 AP, Discussioni Camera, Legislatura XXII, 6 Marzo 1908. 
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Similar to military spending and contrary to what would be expected according 
to the framework, Italian threat assessment reflected greater assertiveness and not 
greater cautiousness after the financial crisis. The shift, however, was much more 
gradual. In 1907, 1908 and 1909, the Giolitti government remained faithful to the 
same foreign policy agenda that it had subscribed to before the start of the crisis. This 
agenda included the defense and expansion of Italian economic opportunities in 
Northern Africa and in the Balkans, and the preservation of international peace.317 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Tommaso Tittoni declared, in a speech to the Chamber in 
December 1908, that Italy was committed to “preserving [its] traditional alliances”—
the Triple Alliance and the informal alliance with Britain—and “respecting the 
interests of Ottoman and Russian Empires in the Balkans.”318 As a result, Italy had “no 
intention of dragging the country into a war,” as the Premier had stated even after the 
approval of the Pollio-Spingardi Program (June 1909).319 After the ministerial crisis 
that developed in December 1909 over the potential introduction of a progressive tax, 
the like-minded leaderships of Sonnino (1909-1910), Luttazzi (1910-1911), and 
Giolitti (1911-1914) showed greater awareness of the diplomatic and military dangers 
of cautionary conduct. In December 1909, Minister of Foreign Affairs Count F. 
Guicciardini informed Vienna that further Austrian expansion in the Balkans be 
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ASMAE, Archivio Riservato, 1906-11, b.63. 
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1908-1914, Vol. V-VI, memorandum by Di San Giuliano to Giolitti, July, 28, 1911. See also Malgeri 
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accepted only with adequate “compensation." 320 At the same time, the Foreign 
Ministry writ-large believed that only the acquisition of a stronger Italian position in 
Northern Africa and the Balkans would have improved Anglo-Italian relations and 
dissipated British doubts over Italian “incapacity as a colonial power.”321 Accordingly, 
and as revealed by Italian diplomatic correspondence throughout 1910, efforts by the 
Foreign Ministry to sustain Italian private enterprises in these regions intensified.322  
In the meantime, war prospects worsened compared to a few years earlier. As Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Di San Giuliano informed Premier Luzzatti in “most urgent and 
personal letters” in October 1910, Italian firms located in Libya risked to undertake 
actions that could foment violence and escalate out of control.323  
Crucially, as much as the decreed increase in military spending, these 
developments were very subtly related to the financial crisis that had developed in 
Italy and at the center of the international financial system in 1907-08, and which the 
National Banks and high finance had cooperatively and effectively addressed. These 
developments were more directly related to the financial and economic crisis that had 
spread at the periphery of the system during the same period, and which international 
financial cooperation between the Italian government and the Libyan authorities, the 
Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary and Germany had not resolved. 
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deteriorate. On this point see, for instance, Bosworth (1979), pp.130-131. 
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More exactly, the global financial crisis of 1907-08 buttressed speculative dynamics in 
the periphery, which, united with the developments above, and local factors such as 
the growth of panislamic sentiment and the decreasing Ottoman military might, 
increased the Italian leadership’s fears of incurring economic and strategic losses in 
Libya. This, in turn, fueled a perception of altered military stakes in the region, 
increased Italian leaders’ suspicion about their European peers’ intentions, and paved 
the way for the military intervention of 1911-12.  
Between 1905 and 1907, driven by the international economic boom, Italian 
private firms peacefully expanded throughout Northern Africa and the Balkans. In 
Libya—thanks to the strategic endorsement of the Italian government and helped by 
the favor of the locals—the Banco di Roma established commercial, industrial, and 
agricultural agencies.324 The diffusion of these agencies escalated between February 
and June 1907, and continued till 1911.325 Archival material shows that, during this 
period, because of the development of the financial crisis in the periphery, Arab 
populations no longer responded positively to the industrialization process.326 
Liquidity dried up, industrial production fell, and prices and wages collapsed.   
These events fomented local hatred and violence against Italian capital and 
institutions and, by implications, Italian strategic interests, impelling a change in the 
peaceful character of Italian penetration in Northern Africa.327 The situation is 
portrayed in a long and secret report that Italian Consul in Benghazi Bernabei sent to 	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Prime Minister Giolitti in September 1911, just a few days before the start of Italian 
military operations in Northern Africa.328  In the report, Bernabei explicitly ascribed 
the changed local context in Libya to the period of financial and industrial speculation 
that had developed in the wake of the 1907-08 financial crisis, escalated throughout it 
and then continued in its aftermath. Italian industrial enterprises had grown too swiftly 
and precipitously, Bernabei noted. They had incurred severe financial losses and 
industrial difficulties, had missed to live up to their promise of offering a better future 
to local people, and had inspired local hatred and violence against Italian capital and 
institutions, compromising the originally positive disposition of the locals.  
This evidence updates systemic and Marxist or imperialist explanations of the 
Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12. To begin, systemic factors like the 1908 Austrian 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the spread of pan-Islamic sentiment in Libya 
following the Young Turks Revolution in Turkey, and the French occupation of 
Morocco in July 1911, were not sufficient to cause a change in Italian national security 
policies. Had these factors been sufficient to envision a change, Italian leadership’s 
statements would have reflected it. While systemic factors stirred Italian nationalism 
and increased Arab resistance to foreign invaders, the unchecked pressures that the 
global financial crisis of 1907-08 unleashed in the periphery significantly compounded 
Italian nationalist fervor. A case in point: as Gaeta and Bosworth have shown, Italian 
nationalists and nationalist associations were highly concentrated in Libya, and they 
used the running clash between the local and Italian authorities to encourage their 
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growth within Italy.329 In short, the systemic factors of “global financial crisis and 
financial crisis response across the world” mattered.  
Moreover, the spread of the crisis in the periphery, and its impact on the 
fortunes of Italian firms in the region and on the Banco di Roma in particular, 
reorganize Marxist or imperialist interpretations of the origins of the War. Because of 
the successful resolution of the financial crisis at the core of the system, closing 
windows of opportunity at home were arguably not a paramount issue behind the 
Italian decision to wage the War. By contrast, the damage that the global financial 
crisis provoked at the periphery of the international system—damage that was not 
successfully addressed—was paramount. The Bank of Italy’s rescue efforts did not 
extend to the Libyan financial apparatus.  Left to handle this damage on its own, the 
Banco di Roma begged for the intervention of the Italian government. When the 
government hesitated (up until July 1911), the Banco resorted to blackmail and 
threatened to sell its agencies in Libya to foreign interests. The threats were credible 
given the greater extent of British, German, and Austrian economic (and military) 
involvement in the territories of the Ottoman Empire.330 As the authorities of the 
Banco di Roma had forecasted, the news greatly alarmed Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs di San Giuliano, who, in early August 1911, in a private letter to Prime 
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Minister Giolitti, solicited preparations for a military intervention because Italy “could 
not afford that Italian affairs in Libya went to foreign hands.”331   
Ultimately, when the role of the 1907-08 financial crisis and its response is 
considered, explaining the change in Italian military spending, threat assessment, and 
war prospects between 1909 and 1911 from a systemic or imperialist perspective 
becomes much easier. The final explanation cuts across systemic and domestic levels 
of analysis. 
Finally, the evidence in this section updates the framework presented in 
Chapter One by suggesting that high exposure to high finance (at home) does not 
preclude the possibility of more assertive national security policies when the crisis-
stricken country in question has vital strategic interests (i.e. colonies) in the periphery, 
and response to the crisis in such territories does not develop along the same lines as at 
home. This finding is compatible with other conclusions in other chapters of this 
manuscript that denote the greater complexity of global financial crisis compared to 
local financial crises. 
WAGING WAR TO SOLVE FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
Italy’s latest bet for colonial ambition and the limits of diversionary war theory 
 
 Compared to the influence of financial crises on Italian national security 
policies, so far described in the chapter, the economic roots of Italian imperialism in 
the 1930s are no secret. Between 1932 and 1936, Italy went from being a status-quo 
power that subscribed to the post-war order established at Versailles and renegotiated 	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throughout the following years, to a revisionist power committed to the conquest of 
Ethiopia and the utter dismissal of international treaties. Before 1932, the intrinsically 
subversive nature of the fascist regime and Prime Minister Benito Mussolini’s 
territorial ambitions had been restrained by the pact that the Prime Minister had to 
strike with financial and industrial forces—the regime’s support base.332 These forces 
favored the promotion of international peace and national and international financial 
stabilization. From 1932 onwards, in concomitance with the worsening of national and 
international economic conditions, Italian national security policies became more 
militant, and expansionism in Eastern Africa moved to center stage. The first thoughts 
of an invasion of Ethiopia were advanced between mid-1932 and early 1933. In 
December 1934, plans were crystallized in a secret memorandum that set forth the first 
stage of Italy’s new expansionist program. Then, while being intent on sending 
directives and actions plans to address the Italo-Abyssinian question in view of this 
newly changed context, Mussolini noted that the process of reinforcement of 
Ethiopian armed forces against Italian interests had been irresistible, that Italian 
foreign policy of pacific penetration in Abyssinia was failing, and that the use of force 
was therefore mandatory.333   
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 Several analysts (Baer 1967; Catalano 1969; Rochat 1972; and Lowe and 
Marzani 1975) have identified the roots of this aggressive shift in Italian national 
security policies in diversionary as well as non-diversionary pressures. For instance, 
scholars like Bauer (1969:43) and Rochat (1972:191) have argued that Mussolini 
embarked on rearmament and war in order to deflect public attention away from grave 
and urgent domestic economic difficulties, re-launch the regime, and ensure his 
political survival. Scholars like Catalano (1969:7), instead, have concluded that 
unleashing Italian national security ambitions served to revive the broken national 
economic engine through war-related industries and commissions.  
 These interpretations of the domestic economic roots of Italian foreign policy 
are clearly at odds: the former credits the predictions of diversionary war theory; the 
latter refutes them. 
The findings of this section support the non-diversionary hypothesis: the Italian 
government embarked on an assertive set of national security policies not to escape 
from internal difficulties but to solve them. This does not equal to stating that the non-
diversionary hypothesis is the only sensible explanation for the changed Italian 
national security policies of the 1930s. The relevance of systemic factors, such as the 
growing Ethiopian threat to Italian possessions in Abyssinia; British provocative 
policy and increasingly uncooperative attitudes vis-à-vis Italy; the failure of ongoing 
discussions on European disarmament; and the rise of Germany, is well recognized. 
So is the role of nationalism, reasons of décor or prestige, and Mussolini’s 
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unscrupulous behavior.334 In this spirit, Mori has explained the Italian conversion to 
the Ethiopian enterprise by uniting the imperialist aspirations that had haunted Italian 
politics since the defeat of Aduwa (1896) with the feeling of urgency that the 
Ethiopian violent expansion demanded, and the desire to prove that the fascist 
corporative system was not less worthy than Anglo-American liberalism.335  
 While being compatible with a multiple-cause approach to the study of Italian 
imperialist resurgence in the 1930s, the explanation offered here addresses an 
important question which scholarship has left unanswered, namely, why did the Italian 
transition towards overt imperialism and national security assertiveness take so long? 
Relatedly, why did Italian relations with the status-quo powers deteriorate radically in 
the mid-1930s and not before?  It is worth recalling that up until late 1935, the Italian 
leadership made specific efforts to defend international cooperation and the existing 
international order. Between late 1931 and 1932, Italy joined international efforts at 
armament reduction and proposed the formation of a Directorate between Britain, 
Italy, Germany and France to bring about “orderly treaty revision.”336 
 Throughout the following two years, the Italian government undertook serious 
diplomatic efforts to maintain the status quo in Europe and offset German ambitions. 
It signed the Four Power Pact with France (June 1933), the Little Entente with 
Yugoslavia, Czech Republic and Rumania (July 1933), and the Tripartite Agreement 
with Austria and Hungary (March 1934). On top of that, the Italian government 
exerted pressure on Engelbert Dollfuss for a resolution of Austro-German political 	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disputes that defended Austrian integrity.337 Finally, it opposed German revisionism 
by signing the Rome protocols with French foreign minister Laval (January 1935), and 
by participating in the Stresa conference (April-May 1935) with French and British 
delegations (April-May 1935).338  
 It was only between mid-1935 and late 1936 that Italian national security 
policies shifted from tamed revisionism to complete revisionism.339 In June 1935, 
Anglo-Italian discussion concerning a settlement over the Ethiopian question failed, 
and, thereafter Mussolini began to lay the groundwork for the establishment of the 
Rome-Berlin Axis, and a full-scale military intervention in Ethiopia.340 Both events 
shaped international politics dramatically, setting the context for World War II. 
 As the following paragraph will clarify, an analysis of the influence of the 
financial crisis of 1929-33 on Italian national security policies accounts for this 
delayed, two-stage Italian transition towards revisionism while also providing a 
validation of the scenarios and expectations derived from the framework.   
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  From the mid-to-late 1920s, the Mussolini government combined international 
financial cooperation and reliance on the loans of high finance, with diplomatic and 
military prudence. In the mid-1920s, key declarations by Mussolini reveal that the 
Italian government committed to cultivating diplomatic and military cooperation with 
all great powers—Great Britain in particular—, and considered Austrian independence 
a vital international interest.341 In defense of this cautionary line, in 1925 and 1927 
Italian leadership signed diplomatic agreements with Britain and France for both the 
preservation of peace in Europe and the division of spheres of influence in Eastern 
Africa and on the Red Sea.342 In Europe the Italian government aligned itself with the 
Kellogg-Briand pact of war renunciation (1928), and participated in the London 
conference on armament limitation (1930). In Eastern Africa, Mussolini and Ethiopian 
Negus, Ras Tafari, concluded a treaty of friendship and non-aggression (1928).343 
Admittedly, as much as the earlier discussed financial policies, Italian security policies 
were not completely detached from nationalistic aspirations. For instance, at the 
London conference, the Italian delegation refused to accept any agreement that would 
have stipulated Italian naval inferiority to France.344 Along with French obstinacy, this 
position stalled the possibility of reaching an international agreement on armament 
reduction. On the whole, however, a cautionary approach to military spending, threat 
assessment, and war prospects far surpassed any revisionist undercurrents. 
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 Naval parity between Italy and France had been one of the cardinal points of 
the post-Great War order, and, as shown in Table 6, between 1926 and 1930 Italy 
made no clear rearmament effort.345 Moreover, in the spring of 1929, Mussolini 
handed over the foreign ministry portfolio to Dino Grandi, and his “peace program” of 
cooperation with Great Britain, respect for the principles of the League of Nations, and 
disarmament.346 After the onset of the global financial crisis abroad—in 1929 and 
1930—, Grandi combined his defense of the orthodox medicine advanced by high 
finance, with a pledge to accept any reduction in Italian naval power—supposing that 
France and Italy preserved parity. Archival correspondence and the Grandi’s diaries 
reveal that, as a result of the onset of the financial crisis abroad, the cabinet expected 
an increase in American cooperation with Europe. Italy, it was believed, needed to be 
at the forefront of this cooperation. 347  
In early 1931, on the eve of spread of the financial crisis in Italy, the Italian 
government continued to commit to a peaceful policy of economic penetration in 
Ethiopia, and expressed satisfaction over the disarmament agreement reached by Great 
Britain, France, and Italy in March 1931.348 Diplomatic exchanges within the cabinet 
inform that the 1930-1931 increase in military spending as a percentage of total 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Italian military spending fluctuated between the Duce’s condemnation of France’s refusal to 
recognize naval parity with Italy with Grandi’s peace offensive.  
346 ACS, DDI Settima Serie, 1922-1935, volume X, March 4, 1931. Fascist forces in Italy described 
Grandi’s foreign policy as “renunciatory.” See in particular Burgwyn (1997), pp.57-59; Lowe and 
Marzani (1975), pp. 219-20. The naval agreement reached by France, Italy and Great Britain in March 
1931was a result of these efforts. Italian authorities were extremely satisfied at the time.  
347 ACS, SPD, Busta 1 (De Stefani), February 9, 12, 14, 1930; ACS, Carte Schanzer, busta 29 (Grandi), 
May 1930; Grandi (1985), pp.280,282. 
348 ACS, SPD, b.1. Exchanges between Italian minister of foreign affairs Grandi, Italian minister of 
colonies De Bono, and Italian minister in Addis Abeba Paternó. DDI, VII Serie 1922-35, vol.X. March 
4, 17, 1931. On March 4, 1931, in a telegram to British prime minister Mac Donald, the Duce expressed 
its deep satisfaction for the recently signed Italo-French naval agreement and praised the contribution of 
British intermediation. 
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government spending and of GNP had no revisionist purposes but rather served to 
quell a rebellion in Libya before it could become a more serious threat to the stability 
of Italian protectorate rule there.349	  In early 1931, on the eve of spread of the financial 
crisis in Italy, the Italian government continued to commit to a peaceful policy of 
economic penetration in Ethiopia, and expressed satisfaction over the disarmament 
agreement reached by Great Britain, France, and Italy in March 1931.350 Diplomatic 
exchanges within the cabinet inform that the 1930-1931 increase in military spending 
as a percentage of total government spending and of GNP had no revisionist purposes 
but rather served to quell a rebellion in Libya before it could become a more serious 
threat to the stability of Italian protectorate rule there.351	  	  
Table 3.6. Italian real ME, GNP and CGE between 1929 and 1937* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*ME and CGE data are from Paolo Ercolani 445, 446; data on GNP are from Mitchel, 907-911 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 ACS, SPD, CR, Busta (De Stefani), March 1930; DDI, Settima Serie, 1922-35, volume X, February 
18, 1930. Note that the Hoover moratorium made the increase in Italian military spending possible.  
350 ACS, SPD, b.1. Exchanges between Italian minister of foreign affairs Grandi, Italian minister of 
colonies De Bono, and Italian minister in Addis Abeba Paternó. DDI, VII Serie 1922-35, vol.X. March 
4, 17, 1931. On March 4, 1931, in a telegram to British prime minister Mac Donald, the Duce expressed 
its deep satisfaction for the recently signed Italo-French naval agreement and praised the contribution of 
British intermediation. 
351 ACS, SPD, CR, Busta (De Stefani), March 1930; DDI, Settima Serie, 1922-35, volume X, February 
18, 1930. Note that the Hoover moratorium made the increase in Italian military spending possible.  
           
Year       Real ME      Real CGE      Real GNP     ME/GNP ME/CGE 
 
1926          5163 19481 149677 0.035 0.265 
1927 6899 23202 153479 0.045 0.297 
1928 5849 21314 152444 0.038 0.274 
1929 4535 15765 111543 0.041 0.288 
1930 8668 29809 189453 0.046 0.290 
1931 7085 23604 125415 0.056 0.300 
1932 6267 23749 109578 0.057 0.264 
1933 6482 23217 105706 0.061 0.279 
1934 5771 25791 105344 0.055 0.224 
1935 5233 20579 110564 0.047 0.254 
1936 5733 30828 110977 0.052 0.186 
1937 6173 37624 129606 0.048 0.164 
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As expected, after the start of the financial crisis in Italy in late 1931, and 
during the first stage in the crisis response process (1931-32), the Italian government 
intensified its cautionary posture. Relying on both the (meager) financial cushion 
awarded by the Hoover moratorium and the (less meager) hope that ongoing 
international financial meetings would succeed, the Italian government sacrificed 
considerations of national defense to help keep the nation’s banking system afloat.352 
While a much greater percentage of national public spending (which increased in 
1931-32, as Tab. 3.6 shows) went to the founding of a credit-awarding institution and 
another institution for the reorganization of national industry (IRI and IMI)—see 
Table 3.6, figures in red, bold—funds awarded for military spending decreased in their 
absolute value and as a share of total spending. Italian Financial Ministers Guido Jung 
and Antonio Mosconi ordered the implementation of an austere financial policy that 
included budget cuts in the military sector.353 Military cutbacks meant a severe blow to 
Italian plans of economic penetration in Africa. Italian operations for resisting 
rebellions were suspended, and, since the existing colonial policy established that the 
majority of available resources be allocated to sustain peaceful plans of foreign 
economic policy, the military share of the budget of Italian African colonies decreased 
even more quickly than did the civil share.354  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Italian hope in the working of financial orthodoxy is well confirmed by Italian loans awarded, 
throughout financial crisis year 1932, to the rescue of various European states. ACS, DDI, Settima 
Serie, Vol. XI, March 7, 22, 23 and May 5, 31 1932; MAE, Ufficio Trattati, Anno 1932, pos. T. 26/2, 
June 15, 1932.  
353ACS, PCM, Anno 1934-35; Mosconi’s communication, October 6, 1932; ACS, Fondo Graziani, b.11: 
April 1, 1932; ACS, AP, Camera dei Deputati, leg.XXVIII, Discussioni, vol.III, May, 10, 1932; 
Ricerche per la Storia della Banca D’Italia, pp.196, 197. As an example, Libyan military spending 
moved from 230 million lire in 1928-29 to 131 million lire in 1932-33. 
354 ACS, Fondo Graziani, b.10: 27 July 1933.  
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Not surprisingly, correspondence throughout 1932 between Mussolini, Grandi, 
Minister of Colonies De Rubeis, and Governor of Libya General Emilio De Bono 
illustrates that the Ethiopian Negus was taking advantage of Italian military 
disengagement to reinforce the Kingdom and threaten Italian colonial possessions in 
Eastern Africa.355 Downplaying the security risks that the financial crisis and the 
orthodox medicine of response created for Italian colonies, between 1931 and 1932 the 
Mussolini government participated in international bailout agreements as much as it 
joined international disarmament meetings in Geneva. Showing an ever more prudent 
security stance (and more orthodox financial philosophy), Italian authorities proposed 
the formation of a Directorate among Britain, Italy, Germany and France, to bring 
about an “orderly treaty revision,” and cancel forever the economically suboptimal 
legacy of war debts and reparations.356 As foreign minister Grandi stated several times 
after the failure of the Creditanstalt (May 1931), Italy strongly sided with the United 
States in the resolution of the global financial crisis; offered its cooperation to solve 
German and Austrian financial difficulties; and praised the contribution of British 
intermediation in the Franco-Italian naval negotiations.357 In June 1932, the Hoover 
government repaid the regime by renegotiating the Italian-American debt agreement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 ACS, DDI, VII Serie, 1922-35, vol.X, January 14, 22, 1932. 
356 Lowe and Marzani (1975), pp.48, 223-24. 
357 ACS, DDI, Settima Serie, 1922-1935; Grandi’s notes and telegrams of June, 15 and 22, 1931. A few 
months later, Grandi reported to the Senate his “extremely friendly discussions” with Washington and 
was applauded within the cabinet for his speeches in favor of disarmament in occasion of the 
preparatory works to the Genève conference on disarmament that were held in late 1931. ASMAE, 
Carte Grandi, b.11; Carte Schanzer, b.29. 
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(June 1932), in view of the exchange rate crisis of the lira and Italian difficulties in 
meeting the payment.358 
 Confirming previously formulated expectations, Italian softened threat 
assessment, diplomatic patience, and military restraint changed between 1933 and 
1934, as the conditions of European and Italian finances continued to deteriorate—the 
collapse of Italian GNP was halted only in 1934 (Tab.6)—, and orthodox measures 
continued to fail to address the problem at its root.359 Although German reparations 
were canceled by an Anglo-American ad hoc understanding with Berlin (Lausanne, 
July 1932), nothing was done internationally to relieve Italy from debt repayment or 
ease its foreign borrowing. In December 1932, Mussolini was only able to provide the 
United States Federal Reserve with $1,245,437 (rather than the required $1,800,000), 
and in February 1933 an even smaller amount could be put together.360 The regime’s 
best orthodox prospect seemed to be one of signing debt agreements with the United 
States every six months to temporarily excuse Rome’s crippled ability to honor its 
external payments, or postpone the day of an Italian bankruptcy. Throughout 1933, 
however, this prospect worsened, as Italian GNP kept falling, and financial crisis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Italy had concluded a war debt agreement with the United States on November 14, 1925. According 
to the terms of the agreement, the Italian government owned the United States the amount of 
$14,706,125. The payment of this amount was to be realized in six-months disbursements until 1957. 
The agreement was renegotiated before the congregation of the Lausanne Conference in June-July 
1932. The major European powers convened at the conference to discuss, amongst other things, the 
future of the debt and reparation question after the outburst of the financial crisis and the issuing of the 
Hoover moratorium. According to the new financial agreement stipulated on June 3, 1932, the payment 
of the June 1932 disbursement was postponed to the fiscal year starting in July 1932 and set equal to 
approximately $1,800,000. ASMAE, Ufficio Trattati, Anno 1932, pos. T.26/2.  
359 Compounding Italian finances was the American decision to cancellation of public loans to Italy, 
preserve the repayment of international debts and cancel German reparations (Lausanne, July 1932). 
See, for instance, De Cecco (1993), p.625.  
360 ACS, DDI, VII Serie, 1922-35, vol.XII, Mussolini’s telegram to Italian business representative in 
Washington;  December 15, 1932. 
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continued both at home and abroad.361 Italian-American diplomatic relations 
deteriorated. In June 15, 1933, Finance Minister Guido Jung informed US President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt that Italy could not meet the expected disbursement 
($1,800,000) but would nevertheless offer $1,000,000 to demonstrate “(Italian) good 
will.”362 Fearing the formation of a debtor coalition against the United States, the new 
American leadership questioned the credibility of the Italian “excuse.” Exasperated, 
Mussolini replied that “the United States should better consider the conduct of the 
Italian government,” and that Italy no longer wanted “to speed up” but rather desired 
to “hold back as much as possible the beginning of bilateral negotiations.”  
With Italian GNP and the exchange rate in free fall, unemployment climbing, 
and debt and deficit levels skyrocketing, the Mussolini government could see fewer 
and fewer reasons for accepting the American privilege of deciding whether the Italian 
state was in default or not.363 This was especially true because by mid-1933, the power 
of domestic financial interests that were part of the governing coalition was far weaker 
than it was just a couple years earlier. Deprived of such political counterweight, and 
deprived of faith in the orthodox medicine, the fascist regime could now manifest its 
intrinsic revisionist character more easily, and it did not take too long to do so.  
The overhaul of existing Italian-American relations was only one expression of 
the diplomatic and military shift the new path of crisis response demanded. From mid-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 The installment of a new American government with a heterodox financial-security agenda did not 
ease the conclusion of an agreement between Washington and Rome. Refer to Chapter IV for more 
details on the change in American financial-security agenda during the Roosevelt’s presidency. 
362 See ACS, DDI, VII Serie, 1922-35, vol.XII; telegram to Mussolini, May, 7, 1933; ASMAE, Carte 
Grandi, b.67 and DDI, VII Serie, 1922-45, vol. XIII.  
363 DDI, VII Serie, 1922-35, vol. XIII, XIV, XV. Exchanges between Mussolini and Italian ambassador 
in Washington Rosso in 1933; exchange between Rosso and Mussolini on May 27, 1934 in ACS, DDI, 
VII Serie, 1922-35, vol. XV. On the worsening economic conditions in Italy see Guarnieri (1988), 
p.242. 
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1933 onwards, Mussolini abandoned his alliance with the Western front, adopted an 
assertive foreign policy towards Ethiopia, abandoned the League of Nations, and 
found an ally in Nazi Germany. Italy embarked on a war of conquest (1935-36), 
became a target for international sanctions, and was excluded from the Tripartite 
Agreement of 1936.364 
As outlined in a memorable speech delivered by Mussolini to the Chamber in 
the spring of 1934, the financial crisis and the ineffective process of crisis response 
had pushed the country to a point of no return. A new foreign policy was required to 
solve the unemployment and industrial stagnation that financial austerity, deflation, 
and international cooperation—the orthodox medicine—had been unable to solve. 
Thus, although a collapsing GNP could not offer sustained military increases (Table 
6), national military spending was left free to grow in 1933, and in 1934 the regime 
initiated military preparations for launching the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. 
Relatedly, saving Italy’s African Empire and saving the national economy from a 
never-ending crisis were portrayed as inextricable goals.365 Supporters of orthodoxy 
were summarily removed from power, and Italian workers and soldiers were sent to 
Africa.366 As Mussolini unambiguously stated in a communication to Italian State 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 ACS, DDI, VIII Serie, 1935-39, vol. IV; Rosso’s telegram to Ciano, June 19, 1936; ACS, DDI, VIII 
Serie, 1935-39, vol. V; telegram by Attolico to Ciano regarding Italian talks with German finance 
minister Schatch, October, 1, 1936. Excluded from the Tripartite agreement of July 1936, Italy was 
naturally drawn to the financial policy and concerns of German finance minister Schacht. 
365 Biblioteca del Senato, AP, Leg. XXIX, 26 May 1934. “No state—Mussolini argued on May, 26, 
1934—can live by continuously contracting debt” as “debt payment [..] subtracts money from the 
national economy” while impeding creating jobs for “the highest possible number of Italian workers,” 
and jeopardizing the maintenance of existing Italian possessions in Africa. The scenarios were two, 
“remaining on the bottom” or “starting to live again” by launching a “continental policy next to the 
continental policies of the United States and Japan.”  
366 The first to go was finance minister Guido Jung. ACS, SPD, CR, b.86. Mussolini’s letter to Guido 
Jung, January 24, 1935.  
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Secretaries for the War and the Navy in November 1935, “jumpstarting Italian labor 
market” was a major purpose of Italian military commissions.367 To a possibly greater 
extent than it was a military enterprise, the Ethiopian war of conquest was a 
“construction enterprise.” A disproportionate quantity of soldiers and civilians was 
employed and massive road and railway works were initiated.368 
These developments and declarations seem to negate the diversionary war 
hypothesis. The problem that Italian leaders faced in the mid-1930s was not as much 
“distracting the country from the ongoing economic crisis,” as diversionary theory 
postulates, but rather performing one last candid attempt at rescuing the nation from 
bankruptcy. Symptomatically, Mussolini’s speech occurred soon after the exchange of 
a series of telegrams between him and Italian ambassador in Washington Rosso on the 
subject of Italy’s war-debt payment capacity. Moreover, counter to the prediction of 
diversionary war theory, the Duce’s control over the cabinet increased between 1933 
and 1935, as the fortunes of the domestic financial sector dwindled.  
In sum, Catalano’s non-diversionary explanation about the roots of Italian 
foreign policy in the early 1930s seems the most accurate understanding of the origins 
of the Ethiopian war. Because of its focus on the global financial crisis of 1929-33 and 
the shifting power of high finance during and soon after it, the explanation proposed 
here has the advantage of capturing not only the domestic financial and political 
developments informing Italian African policy but also the systemic pressures that 
prompted the regime’s assertiveness. The failure of high finance and the orthodox 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Guarnieri (1988), pp. 508,9. 
368 ACS, SPD, CR, b.3 and b.67; ACS, Fondo Graziani, b.45; ACS, DDI, Settima Serie, 1935-1940, 
vol.II; SPD, CR b.4. 
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medicine to check the spread of the financial crisis in the United States and Great 
Britain compounded the Italian transition towards scenario HA-LE and the prospect of 
assertive Italian action. While the influence of the financial crisis of 1929-33 on 
American national security policies will be discussed in Chapter IV of this manuscript, 
and the influence of the same crisis on Italian national security policies has already 
been described, a few words should be said on the influence of the crisis on British 
national security policies, and particularly British African policy.  Evidence shows that 
the financial crisis and the British process of financial crisis response led to the 
liquidation of the Bank of Abyssinia and to Britain’s financial and political 
disengagement from central Africa. These events, in turn, wiped out the most 
promising attempts at institutional cooperation that the great powers had set up in 
Africa; crushed the Italian expectation that the British would have helped Italian 
economic expansion in the region; and paved the way for the strengthening of an 
autonomous Ethiopian force.369   
As Italian foreign minister Dino Grandi told the Italian ambassador in London 
in June 1931, the British withdrawal from Ethiopia was a recipe for causing a financial 
catastrophe there, and, inevitably, for producing a drastic change in Italian African 
policy.370 Financial catastrophe did not occur, but the Negus was able to exploit 
ongoing financial and commercial speculation in East Africa for achieving the military 
restocking of Ethiopia.”371 The trend continued throughout 1932, and in late August 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 ACS, DDI, Settima Serie 1922-35, vol. X, Director Guariglia to Italian minister of colonies De 
Bono, May, 9, 1931 and Grandi to Italian ambassador in London, June, 8, 1931. 
370  ACS, DDI, Settima Serie 1922-35, vol. X, June 8, 1931. This was Italian last attempt to convince 
the British government to organize a financial rescue of Ethiopia. 
371 ACS, VII Serie, 1922-35, vol.X. 
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1932, Italian director of political trade affairs Raffaele Guariglia reported to Mussolini 
that Ethiopia was “arming up and getting much more centralized, posing a much 
greater obstacle than it was five years [earlier]” and “endangering [Italian] bordering 
colonies.”372 It is difficult to believe that these events did not inform the shift in Italian 
national security policies towards Ethiopia, which took place between 1933 and 
1934.373 Arguably, these events also point to the more numerous channels of national 
security influence that a global financial crisis unleashes compared to a local financial 
crisis. When the crisis is local, this influence originates locally. But when the crisis is 
global, it originates both locally and globally, making the analytical efforts of tracking 
down all the channels of influence, and particularly the interaction between them, 
much more challenging.  
Finally, the Italian abandonment of the orthodox medicine did neither occur 
suddenly nor irreversibly. In the spring of 1934, Mussolini had clearly lost his patience 
with financial diplomacy and the regime embarked on a more assertive foreign policy 
vis-à-vis Ethiopia. Yet, throughout 1934, the regime refused to enter into an alliance 
agreement with Germany and in January 1935, Mussolini and French Prime Minister 
Pierre Laval even concluded a military agreement against the prospect of German 
mobilization for the Anschluss. Months later, at Stresa (May 1935), the Italian 
government renewed its support against a rearming Germany. Only in October 1935 
did Italy begin a war of conquest of Ethiopia and fully embrace revisionism. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 Quoted in Guariglia (1949), p.769. 
373 Italian rearmament and the first war plans against Ethiopia, for instance started in the fall of 1933, 
after international financial cooperation in Ethiopia had lost any hope. ACS, SPD, CR, b.86. See also 
De Bono (1937), pp.8,9; Catalano (1969), pp.4,5. 
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Financial crises and Italian national security policies in nuts and bolts 
 
With the exception of the 1930s, the influence of financial crises on Italian 
national security policies has been generally ignored. This disregard—the chapter has 
shown—has produced either inaccurate or incomplete explanations of paramount 
Italian diplomatic and military decisions that were made during or in the aftermath of 
the financial crises that swept through Italy between 1880 and 1940. Financial crises 
shaped the course of Italian military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects, 
both when governments having high affinity with high finance were in power (1907; 
1929), and when governments having low affinity with high finance led the country 
(1889; 1893). At times the national security influence of financial crises was realized 
in one stage of crisis response (1889-91; 1907-08); at other times two stages were 
necessary (1893-94; 1931-33). 
A consistent finding for the Italian case is that always, during a first stage of the 
crisis response process, the domestic balance of power shifted to the advantage of high 
finance, and therefore to the domestic financial sector, and to cautious (1907-08) or 
extra-cautious (1889-91; 1893-94; 1931-33) national security policies. As will be clear 
after reading the chapter on the American case, the pressures of high finance on the 
Italian government came from abroad and not from within. Similar to the American 
case, the heightening of these pressures resulted in a retreat from imperialist agendas 
(1889-91; 1893-95; 1931-33) or a rescheduling of military build-up (1907-08). Also, 
similar to the American case, and arguably to a greater extent than the American case, 
diplomatic and military retrenchment was revisited and overturned when it failed to 
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address the financial crisis and/or critically jeopardized Italian military position. For 
instance, the decision to perform further cuts in the military budget between 1893 and 
1895 was followed by the decision to increase military spending (1895-1896) to face 
Menelik’s incessant military advances. Similarly, the decision, during the financial 
crisis of 1907-08, to restrain military build-up and continue a foreign policy of pacific 
economic penetration in Libya, was followed by the start of military operations (1911) 
to avoid dangerous financial, industrial (and strategic) losses in Northern Africa. 
Finally, resort to the orthodox medicine and military restraint (1931-1933) was 
replaced, between 1933 and 1935, first by an ambiguous mix of military spending, 
threat assessment, and war prospects, and then by a full conversion to economic, 
diplomatic and military revisionism when national financial conditions failed to turn 
around.  
This “evolution-bounded” effect of financial crises on Italian national security 
policies points to the fact that the real national security implications of Italian 
financial crises were very often obscure to existing governments, and that a process of 
trial and error, including parliamentary debates, political defeats, new financial 
expedients, and exposure to the side-effects of no longer satisfactory financial and 
security ideas was often the rule in responding to financial crises.374  The same could 
be said with regards to the national security influence of financial crises on Japanese 
and American national security policies, although some channels of influence were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 Learning from previous financial crisis experience was rare but it has occurred at least once. In 
accepting British and French liquidity in 1914, Treasury minister Sidney Sonnino, a strong supporter of 
the Italian alliance with the central empire, was very much reminiscent of the cost of liquidity shortages 
for Italy between 1893 and 1896 and this consideration arguably contributed to the political shift 
towards the Allies. 
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much more typical than others. The Italian government mastered the “art” of 
coalitional reshuffling and repositioning around a new financial-security agenda 
flexibility to please foreign moneylenders. One could argue that geopolitical pressures 
made Italian politics less domestic and more international than were American or 
Japanese politics.  
Thus, when Crispi did not bend to the orthodox medicine in 1889-1890, but 
behaved as if he were in scenario LA-LE, his government and financial-security 
agenda fell under the pressures of high finance and a much stronger domestic 
opposition. This boomerang effect came into play again during the financial crisis of 
1920-22, which, for reasons of space, has not been treated in this chapter. On that 
occasion, fascist forces with their assertive security agenda were compelled to tie a 
pact with powerful domestic financial interests. The successful resolution of the 
financial crisis by high finance informed Mussolini’s thwarted national security 
agenda throughout the interwar period, as well his first response to the global financial 
crisis of 1929-33.  
Interestingly, archival material indicates that the Italian government struggled 
to resist the slippery slope of withdrawing from an expansionist agenda once a new 
parliamentary majority around a new financial-security agenda had been established 
after the outbreak of a financial crisis. In the spring of 1892, without the King’s 
intervention and the issuance of a decree imposing to preserve a minimum ceiling of 
investment in national defense, cuts to the military budget would have continued 
irrepressibly—a decision that from a strategic point of view (and possibly even a 
financial one), was entirely foolish.   
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Suggesting a potential problem with the analytical framework of this work, the 
findings of the chapter on the national security influence of the global financial crisis 
of 1907-08 seem to support scenario HA-LE rather than scenario HA-HE. However, 
the shift towards assertiveness in Italian national security policies following the 1907-
08 financial crisis appears to be a response not to the domestic manifestations of the 
crisis—on which the framework is based—but to the manifestation of the crisis in 
Italian colonial possessions in the periphery. It should also be noted that the Italian-
Libyan war was neither conceived as a war against the status quo nor was it against 
the interests of the main powers in the international (financial) system. If anything, the 
war helped preserve international peace at the core of the system.  
Also, evidence shows that Italian leadership did not “jump” into a war against 
Turkey, but abstained from doing so for several months and years, until it could no 
longer avoid it. Even then, the Giolitti government made sure to defend his pro-status 
quo stance with the great powers. The possibly discrepant resolution of financial crises 
that is offered at the center and at the periphery is surely an interesting avenue for 
further research. On the whole, the findings of the chapter indicate that changes in 
Italian national security policies during or soon after financial crisis might have been 
misattributed to factors or theories—like the diversionary war theory—that do not 
seem to explain historical events more powerfully than our financial crisis-based 
explanation. 
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          CHAPTER IV 	  
ABROAD IS AT HOME: 
WALL STREET CRIES, AMERICAN SECURITY SHIFTS 	  	  
February 4, 1895, The White House: 
 “If that $10-million draft is presented, you can’t meet it. It will be all 
over by 3 o’clock.”  
                    Pierpont Morgan to President Grover Cleveland 
 	  
October 31, 1936, The White House: 
“Never before in all our history have these forces been so united against one candidate as they 
stand today. They are unanimous in their hate for me — and I welcome their hatred.” 
Radio Address by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Nation1
375
 	  
What should we make of American imperial understretch in the 1880s and 
1890s? Why did a Japanese-American war not occur in 1907-08? And were the 
national security agendas of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt fundamentally 
similar in the early 1930s? This chapter answers these questions based on financial-
crisis outbreak and the interplay between American governments’ affinity with and 
exposure to high finance during the process of crisis response. In the United States, 
differently from Italy or Japan, government exposure to high finance pitted 
Washington elites against the financial titans of New York, or Wall Street. Between 
the 1880s and the early 1930s Wall Street titans were some of the world’s most 
prominent private financial houses, with no equivalent in Japan or Italy. 2
376 The 
chapter argues that financial crises altered the balance of power between American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Chernow (1990:75); FDR Presidential Library, 
http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/OD2NDST.HTML 
376 As seen in chapter II, Japanese financial elites remained significantly weak throughout most of 
the period under analysis. In the 1920s they achieved  short-lived  political prominence  
domestically.  As seen in Chapter III, the power of Italian financial  elites was usually inferior or 
subordinate to that of Italian authorities and wealthier international banking houses.   
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governments and Wall Street, causing the inflation or curbing of American pre-crisis 
financial-security agendas and changing the course of American military spending, 
threat assessment, and war prospects in the Gilded Age, in the late 1900s, and in the 
1930s. Discussion proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of the specific traits of 
this case compared to previous ones, expectations on the national security 
influence of financial crises are extrapolated based on the interplay between the 
financial-security agenda of American governments stricken by financial crisis, and 
the exposure of the same governments to high finance throughout the process of 
crisis response. Then, three major sections illustrate how the foundational hypothesis 
of this study is a potent device to understand the change in American military 
spending, threat assessment, and war prospects caused by financial crisis. Of the 
three sections, the first discusses the national security influence of the local gold 
crises of 1884 and 1893-96. The second and the third sections are dedicated to the 
global banking crisis of 1907 and the worldwide financial crisis of 1929-33.377 
Financial crisis hit the United States in 1884, in 1893-96, in 1907-08, and 
again in 1929-36.378  Statist-nationalist governments were in power when the 1884 
and 1907-08 crises started, whereas cosmopolitan governments experienced the 
outbreak of the crises of 1893-96 and 1929-36.  Ultimately, it was impossible for 
American cosmopolitan governments, and politically suicidal for their statist-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 On  these  crises  see  Barnes  (1931:230-31),   Sobel  (1968:207,222-24,250-66,297-321),  
Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1971:99-100,108,156-163,254-255,299-308,324-28),  Dewey  
(1968:415,444-447,481,536),  Kindleberger  (1978:132,173-74,189-195); Myers 
(1970:211,218,317-318,335), Chernow (1990:71-77,122-124), Brownlee (1979:270), and Rockoff 
(1990:742). 
378 This sample does not include the financial crisis of 1914, which is treated in Chapter V. 
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nationalist counterparts, to avoid relying on the political sway and recommendations 
of Wall Street in response to financial crisis. Interestingly, during or in the 
immediate aftermath of each financial-crisis episode, Wall Street interests were able 
to punish statist-nationalist governments who attempted a crisis response that 
penalized the orthodox medicine. Thus notwithstanding, only after 1884 and 1907 did 
the power advantage gain by Wall Street versus Washington outlast the end of the 
crisis. 
American national security policies differed from those of Italy and Japan in 
three major ways: they were less driven by the quest for vital spaces or colonies; 
they relied on a weaker state apparatus; and their creation and destiny rested on two 
solidly civilian institutions, the Presidency and the Congress. As the chapter will 
show, the United States was never disinterested in the projection of diplomatic and 
military power abroad, and American administrations expressed this drive well 
(May 1961; Kennedy 1987:202-203; Campbell 1976:40; Graebner 1985:314-315). 
Yet, to  provide  for  national  defense  in  a  dangerous  world, American 
leaderships needed much less vital space to conquer than did their Italian or Japanese 
counterparts. Geopolitical factors, American civil war experience, and a liberal 
political tradition also discouraged war enthusiasm and colonial dreams.379 It is also 
well known that the American offshore projection of diplomatic and military power 
relied on a feeble bureaucratic structure and a commonly thin financial apparatus.380 
While Japanese and Italian leaderships worked on reinforcing the national financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Note that until 1890, the American army ranked fourteenth in the world, after Bulgaria’s,  and 
the American navy was  
380 See Bensel (1880:106); and Zakaria (1998:40). 
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system between 1880 and the mid-1890s, American leaders remained without a solid 
system until 1913, when the Federal Reserve System was established.381 
This explains why, in times of financial crisis, Wall Street titans could 
often act as the United States’ central bank—as will be clear later in the 
chapter.3828   However, American governments were not defenseless against the 
power of high finance, nor were their institutions fragile. The steady control over 
American military forces that the Presidency and the Congress enjoyed, for instance, 
found no parallel in Italy or Japan. 
To augment its domestic power and kick-start shifts towards greater national 
security caution after financial-crisis outbreak, Wall Street could operate through two 
or three channels. Namely, it could provide the administration with the liquidity and 
creditworthiness necessary to impede a worsening of the financial crisis, and it could 
attempt to stir support for its cause during presidential races and congressional 
political majorities.  Backing an  “honest” defender of financial orthodoxy—a gold-
standard-friendly presidential candidate—promised to usher  in more  cautionary 
national security  policies. Similarly, Wall Street could affect  the administration’s  
agenda  by  compacting  a  solid  Congressional  majority  behind  a  stricter 
adherence to international financial cooperation. Presidential races and mid-term 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 Even then, the state’s financial apparatus was not wired to bail out, regulate, or enforce. The 
New York Federal Reserve never acted as the national lenders of last resort nor capitalized on the 
nation’s financial assets. American leadership steered away from reinforcing domestic financial 
institutions even when, in the 1920s, the US was financially the most powerful nation on earth.  
382 A “strong”  financial  apparatus  does not mean a “moral”  or a “just” one, as Japanese  and 
Italian experiences  well exemplify. Note that the defeat of the titans in the early 1930s allowed 
for a systematic  strengthening  of the practice of American  central banking. The levels of 
centralization of Japanese finance were never reached, however. 
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elections were also the channels through which American leadership, Congress, 
and,  as  a  result, national security policies could withstand the pressures of high 
finance. Notably, to a greater extent than their Japanese or Italian equivalents, 
American debates over finance and national defense cut transversely across  parties 
or  administrations.383 Consequently, neither partisanship nor, more obviously, 
regime type was ever part of the historical equation through which financial crises 
influenced American national security policies.384 
   
 
                        EXPECTATIONS 	  
The overarching expectation of this chapter is that the relationship, postulated 
in Chapter I, between the four scenarios of influence and American military 
spending, threat assessment, and war prospects is accurate. Particularly, the 
framework is correct if the following propositions hold. The national security policies 
of a government having low affinity with high finance tend to be curbed when 
exposure to high finance is high (LA–HE), and to be inflated when such exposure is 
low (LA–LE). The security policies of a government having high affinity with high 
finance are likely to become extra prudent when exposure to high finance is high  
(HA–HE). More specific expectations regarding the character of the change in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 For instance, from 1880 to 1896, a bimetallic financial system  and the build-up  of a strong  
navy were goals that Presidents Chester Arthur (R) and Grover Cleveland (D) shared. In a 
similar vein, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt (R) exposed a kaleidoscopic set of financial 
and security polices, while those of President F.D. Roosevelt (D) evolved drastically between 
1929 and 1936. On the relevance of institutional factors other than partisanship in the scrutiny of 
American politics or foreign policy, see Bensel (1984), Lake (1988), Trubowitz (1998), and 
Kirshner (2007:122-153). 
384 By contrast, shifts in national security policies in Japan are highly correlated to shifts in 
partisanship, regime type, or regime change. Although less markedly than in Japan, similar 
conclusions can be drawn for the Italian case. See Chapters II and III. 
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American national security policies during financial crises can be obtained by 
discerning the particular scenario or scenarios coexisting with each crisis. It is to this 
task that I now turn. 
In the Gilded Age, the United States experienced two financial crises: the 
local silver scares or gold crises of 1884 and 1893-96. 385 The latter crisis was 
significantly compounded by the global financial crisis of 1890-91, which the United 
States escaped but Europe did not.386  In 1884 as well as between 1893 and 1895, 
European and American investors threw back American securities upon the US 
market and recalled their credits in copious quantities, resulting in an 
intensification of current gold and capital outflows and the most significant GNP 
contractions between 1880 and 1900 (Table 4.1). Congressional documents and 
newspapers of the time reveal that both American state leaders and Wall Street 
financiers felt grave anxiety, between 1884 and 1895, over the “financial 
emergency” derived from the loss of ongoing projects to European markets and 
the risk of an American gold default.387 Gold crises meant not only a drastic fall in 
profits on Wall Street but also a curtailed capacity of the American government to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 The crisis of 1884 started after the introduction of the heterodox Tariff Act of 1883 and 
Treasury Secretary Hugh McCulloch’s decision to coin 200 millions silver dollars. The crisis of 
1893-96 started after McCulloch’s  successor, Charles Foster, had issued 
the ultra-heterodox  McKinley Tariff Act and Sherman Act of 1890. See “Is this a Mystery?” The 
Daily Register, March 23, 1891; Myers (1970:211); Dewey (1968:440); Chernow (1990:72); 
Sobel (1968:242); and Friedman and Schwartz (1971:106). 
386 Differently from Great Britain and most of Europe, the United States escaped the Baring crisis 
of 1890-91 via export increases to the old continent (Tab.1). By 1892, however, the Treasury gold 
supply was down to only $14 million over the reserve limit. 
387 Congressional Record,  53rd  Congress,  2nd  Session,  August  7-September  6, 1893;  “Getting  
All our Gold:  Treasury  Officials Anxious  to  Stop  the  Drain  Made  by  Europe,”  Washington  
Post,  December  19,  1892;  “On  the  Verge  of  Panic.  Wall  Street Alarmed by a Succession  of 
Failures,” New York Times, May 17, 1884; “Is this a Mystery?,”  The Daily Register, May 23, 
1891 in The Papers of Grover Cleveland, 1859-1908, Library of Congress (1931), Series 2, 
General Correspondence,  1846-1910, Reel 69; “Nothing  But Money,”  Chicago Daily Tribune,  
December  19, 1892;  and “American  Nation  in Jeopardy,”  Chicago Daily Tribune, December 
18, 1892. 
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harness necessary state funds and political support to push forward ongoing nation-
building ventures.388 
Table 4.1. American Financial statistics 1880-1898 (in million $) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the statist-nationalist government of Chester Arthur (1881-84), who 
fully subscribed to silver-friendly financial policies, national building ventures 
included naval rearmament and the pursuit of an ambitious national defense 
strategy. For the cosmopolitan government of Grover Cleveland (1893-1896), 
instead, the national financial-security agenda entailed establishing and maintaining 
naval plans and a security profile that were compatible with strengthening American 
commitment to the gold standard. 
Before the onset of financial crisis in 1884 and again in 1893, the Arthur and 
Cleveland governments had, respectively, low and high affinity with high finance. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 As the greatest borrower in international financial markets, the US needed foreign funds and 
depended on a good credit rating. See, for instance, Myers (1970:22). 
Year 
Real 
GNP 
 
Capital  
Account 
 
Gold 
Stock 
Increase 
(Exp – 
Imp) 
      Net 
Liabilities 
on GNP 
    
  
 
1881 11483  65884 99.2 235 0.13 
1882 12343  145544 84.7 264 0.13 
1883 12590  132879 2.1 77 0.13 
1884 12348  104394 41.3 127 0.15 
1885 11656  63464 10.3 92 0.16 
1886 12113  93957 37.2 157 0.17 
1887 12162  103471 26.9 83 0.18 
1888 12420  111341 64.1 15 0.20 
1889 13315  87761 ---- -41  
1890 13524  85040 -16.5 24 0.21 
1891 13742  26839 16.5 55 0.22 
1892 14081  9914 -16.5 122 0.22 
1893 14390  2342 -35.1 196 0.23 
1894 13937  -61170 16.5 76 0.24 
1895 14330  -31466 -41.3 251 0.23 
1896 14044  -14037 -26.9 81 0.24 
1897 15065  -18052 95.1 232 0.22 
1898 15869  -38047 51.7 333 0.19 
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The assertive national security program of the Arthur administration rested on a 
financial policy of sustained silver printing at home and encouragement of 
international bimetallism abroad. Cleveland repudiated this platform during the later 
stages of his 1892 presidential campaign, when he praised the financial benefits of 
participating in the gold standard and renouncing to an international bimetallist 
agreement.389 
As a result, in 1893 the affinity of the American government with high 
finance was low. After the onset of either financial crisis, the American 
administration found itself highly exposed to pressures of Wall Street titans and 
financial orthodoxy. Neither the Arthur nor the Cleveland government possessed 
the necessary resources to strengthen American international financial credibility 
and stop either crisis—these  resources  being  either  gold reserves or the ability to 
obtain, as US Treasury Secretary Foster acknowledged in 1892, the cooperation 
of the principal European countries to save American commitment to gold.390 By 
contrast, J.P. Morgan and his friends had plentiful gold assets and were the earnest 
receivers of international respect, as demonstrated by their key role in the 
transnational rescue of the Baring Brothers in 1891. Between 1884 and 1885, and 
again between 1892 and 1895, Wall Street financiers bailed out the Treasury and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Until the spring of 1892 American   administrations   remained   interested   in  establishing   
bimetallism   domestically   and internationally.  Cleveland  too tried incessantly  to bring Great 
Britain  and Germany  into an international  bimetallic  agreement with the United States. See 
“Parity is maintained:  Secretary  Foster Discusses  Relations  of Gold and Silver,” Washington  
Post, November 18, 1891; and “The Silver Conference,” New York Times, December 31, 1892. 
See also LaFeber (1963:108); Grenville and Young  (1966:41-45);   Sobel  (1968:242);  Dewey  
(1968:460);  Myers  (1970:207-208);   Rockoff  (1990:739-760);  Frieden (1997:367-395);  and, 
more recently, Wilson (2000). 
390  “Getting All our Gold: Treasury Officials Anxious to Stop the Drain Made by Europe,” 
Washington Post, December 19, 1892. 
	   215 
prevented an American gold default by cosmopolitan and nationalist statist 
administrations. 
Practically, in 1884 Morgan and his banker acolytes purchased stocks from 
alarmed American and European speculators and silver from the Treasury in 
exchange for gold. Scares about an impending silver standard and doubts about the 
nation’s commitment to gold disappeared. Identifying the causes of the crisis in the 
pro-silver financial policies pursued by the Arthur administration until 1884, Wall 
Street took advantage of the ongoing presidential campaign to give its full support, 
successfully, to the more explicitly pro-gold—although not exclusively pro-gold 
until late 1892—presidential candidate Grover Cleveland. Thus, an administration 
that had low affinity with high finance and scarce sympathy for the gold standard 
was relatively quickly replaced with one that promised greater virtue. Rescue 
efforts similar to those performed in 1884 were undertaken between 1893 and 1895, 
albeit unsuccessfully this time.  
By late January 1895, the US Treasury was $10 million away from gold 
default, and, in a tremendous display of the change in government exposure from 
low to high following the outbreak of financial crisis, Morgan was able to play a 
game of “chicken” against the administration. With a signature by the financial 
magnate on a $10 million draft that he reserved the right to present to US Treasury 
Secretary Carlisle, American participation in the gold standard would have ended 
(Chernow 1990:75). Backed against a wall, the President had no choice and, without 
Congressional approval, he gave Morgan the green light to bail out the 
	   216 
Treasury.391 Crisis resolution efforts failed, Congressional opposition exploded, anti-
Wall Street forces gained popularity, and the exposure of American administrations to 
high finance moved to low. This second stage of crisis response, which lasted at least 
until 1897392 under the succeeding Cleveland and McKinley administrations, saw the 
emergence of a financially stronger and more independent American Treasury, the 
defense of silver circulation as much as the gold standard, and a commitment to 
national financial reform—although the contours of that reform remained 
ambiguous.393 
A first set of expectations is thus formulated. After the start of the financial 
crisis in 1884, the Arthur administration should have found itself in LA–HE. 
Instead, the Cleveland administration should have been, from the start of the crisis 
in 1893 to the end of a first stage of crisis response in early 1895, in HA–HE and, 
after early 1895, in HA–LE. According to the framework, both the Arthur 
administration and, until 1895, the Cleveland administration should have faced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Morgan set up a private syndicate  between the Morgan and Rothschild  houses in New York 
and London and the dollar-gold peg was saved. On the financial rescue efforts during both crises, 
see Dewey (1968:447); Sobel (1968:250-52,266); and Chernow (1990:74, 75). 
392 Trade  reversal  was achieved  by 1896,  and quite  unexpectedly  so; American  financial  policy  
remained  confused  thereafter, while  bank failures  continued  and industrial  growth  stalled.  The 
resumption  of a steady  inflow  of gold from Europe  in 1898 significantly eased the recovery 
process. 
393 See US Treasury Secretary Carlisle, Annual Report for 1896; and McCulley (1992:40-55).  
Under the McKinley administration, a financial reform movement that knew no precedent started. 
Notice that the policy platform of William McKinley defended the interests of high finance only 
on the surface. The Republican Party was deeply divided over the optimal national financial 
policy, and the McKinley administration  developed an approach to monetary issues that avoided 
precise definitions and was in practice very consonant  to bimetallism.  In late 1896, Wall Street 
only fooled itself by thinking that a staunchly  orthodox  President  had been elected. The first 
proposals for establishing a national banking system started during these years, and lasted until 
1907. With high finance having failed to restore financial and economic stability and growth, the 
American government  was next in line to try out, challenging the limited financial role that the 
state and the Treasury had occupied since the Civil War.   
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pressures to endorse, and eventually endorsed, more cautious national security 
policies—that is, policies signaling greater American commitment to the dictates of 
the international gold standard. The outcome should have been, following 1884, the 
curbing of Arthur’s agenda of military and diplomatic assertiveness, and, after 1893, 
the inflation of Cleveland’s diplomatic and military prudence. The failure of orthodox 
medicine and the partially related mounting of Congressional opposition from early 
1895 onwards should have freed the Cleveland administration first, and the 
McKinley administration thereafter, from the former constraints of avoiding assertive 
national security policies to solve financial crisis. 
       Table 4.2. American Financial statistics 1900-1913 (in million dollars)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The global financial crisis that spread across Great Britain and Europe 
between late1906 and 1907 did not fully reach the United States until the late 
 
 
Year 
 
Real 
GNP 
Public 
Debt 
 
Total 
Bank Assets 
 
Gold 
Stock 
Increase 
     
 
1900 18694 1263417  4115 93 
1901 19991 1221572  4897 68.2 
1902 21180 1178031  5420 70.3 
1903 22099 1159406  5905 68.2 
1904 22828 1136259  6382 31 
1905 25043 1132357  7217 74.4 
1906 27171 1142523  7820 167.4 
1907 28443 1147178  8390 16.5 
1908 28765 1177690  7954 49.6 
1909 31647 1148315  8780 -16.5 
1910 31792 1146940  9432 70.3 
1911 33712 1153985  9941 88.9 
1912 35502 1193839  10638 80.6 
1913 37609 1193048  11024 39.3 
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summer/fall of 1907.394 Before then, as the growth in total bank assets between 1900 
and 1907 shows  (see Table 4.2), the fortunes of Wall Street titans had been 
swelling while the nation had transformed from a peripheral, highly dependent 
financial borrower into a financially creditworthy world frontrunner in manufacturing 
and trade.395 Wall Street’s soaring financial fortunes had not stalled Theodore 
Roosevelt’s statist-nationalist agenda, however. Denoting low affinity with high 
finance, the Roosevelt administration between 1901 and 1907 crafted a foreign policy 
of unprecedented ambition while remaining firmly committed to strengthening 
financial regulation and trust- busting policies, thereby stirring the anger of American 
financial elites who blamed primarily the American government for the spreading of 
the global financial crisis.396 Embittered Wall Street titans John Rockefeller and E.H. 
Harriman squealed and staged pro-business protests but were unable to change the 
course of Roosevelt’s financial policies for most of 1907. Early that year, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394  Global financial crisis started following the San Francisco earthquake of April 1906. It spread 
in Great Britain and the rest of the world following a massive gold outflow to the United States. 
British companies had underwritten  most of the fire insurance policies in San Francisco. It 
October 1907, the collapse of the copper shares of the Knickerbocker  Trust Company in New 
York brought the crisis to the United States. As shown in Table 4.3, official gold reserves 
decreased,  stock market and security prices fell, bank runs and a credit crunch seized the nation, 
and a sharp drop in output and employment occurred. On the crisis of 1907-08 and its causes,  
see in particular  Odell and Weidenmier  (2004);  Bruner  and Carr (2007);  H.D.S.  Greenway,  
“The Panic of 1907,” New York Times, 09/23/1908; and Chernow (1990:122-124). 
395   From the world  economic  boom  that took place  between  1899  and 1907,  the United  States  
benefited  more  than any other member of the international financial system. The financial gap 
between Uncle Sam and Great Britain shrank fast throughout this period. See Dewey (1968:469); 
Myers (1970:243); De Cecco (1974:26-29); Lake (1988:120); Bensel (1963:40-54). 
396 Theodore Roosevelt Papers  (1967),  Library  of Congress,  Series 1, Reel 78, 79 and Series 2, 
Reel 347, October,  November 1907;  George  B.  Cortelyou  Papers,  Manuscript  Division,  
Library  of  Congress,  DC,  Box  62,  “General  Correspondence,” November  1907;  The Papers 
of William  H. Taft,  Secretary  of War,  “Correspondence  with  Roosevelt,”  reel 321, March  
1907 through November  1908. These were also the years when the powers of the Executive  
were significantly  expanded,  greatly but not exclusively  by the hand of Teddy Roosevelt.  On 
these developments,  see Sundquist  (1973:155-164);  Schulzinger  (1984:24-25); Leuchtenburg 
(1952:483-504);  and Chessman (1969:143). 
 
	   219 
American government remained visibly absent from ongoing British and European 
attempts to save the international gold standard. Ultimately, joint rescue efforts 
between the Bank of England, the Bank of France, the German Reichsbank, and the 
Russian State Bank—efforts in which Wall Street titans and other major transnational 
financial houses participated—succeeded in bringing relief and restoring confidence 
at the core of the international financial system. By the spring of 1907 European 
states had overcome the crisis, leaving the United States to face its own, by then much 
accrued, financial troubles. 
Table 4.3. American financial statistics 1924-1937 (in million dollars) 
 
Mistrusted and attacked by high finance, Roosevelt had a difficult time 
creating national financial and economic recovery once the crisis hit full bloom in the 
United States in the summer and fall of 1907:  government exposure to high finance 
Year 
Real 
GNP 
Number 
of Banks  
Investments 
Income 
Receipts of  
US Assets  
Abroad 
 
Government 
Deficit/ 
Surplus 
 
 
 
Real 
Gov 
Spending 
Number of 
Unemployed 
(in 
Thousands) 
      
 
         
1924 87115 20908 762  963367 2908 2341 
1925 88315 20376 912  717043 2842 2115 
1926 96735 19770 953  865144 2916 1321 
1927 97187 18860 981  1155365 2899 1808 
1928 99113 18113 1080  939083 3005 2235 
1929 103900 17440 1139  734391 3127 1383 
1930 94359 16432 1040  737673 3405 4340 
1931 85562 14854 766  -461877 3970 7721 
1932 67011 12598 527  -2735290 5274 11468 
1933 59786 9310 437  -2601652 4849 10635 
1934 64291 9931 437  -3629632 6443 8366 
1935 71945 10063 521  -2791052 6342 7523 
1936 83000 9961 569  -4424549 8321 5286 
1937 89189 9801 577  -2777421 7472 4937 
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was high. 397 As archival evidence indicates, without the cooperation of high finance, 
national remedies such as the issuing of Panama bonds and the deposit of customs 
receipts in national banks were failing. Once again, the pressures of Wall Street on 
the Roosevelt administration tilted the domestic balance of power to the former’s 
advantage. Although the Treasury took on a more active role compared to the 
previous crises, the intervention of a Morgan-led clique of American bankers became 
crucial to legitimating the Treasury’s injection of liquidity into the system, 
organizing a private pool to collect extra funds, and ultimately restoring faith in the 
creditworthiness of the administration at home and abroad.398 
 The administration’s need to preserve a well-functioning capital market to 
push forward its agenda rendered it highly exposed to high finance shortly after the 
outbreak of the financial crisis at home. In the summer of 1907, as animated 
discussions between the President and Secretary of War William Taft illustrate, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Letters  sent to and received  from Emlen  Roosevelt  (October  29, November  22, 1907; 
January  13, 1908);  Douglas  Robison (November 16, 1907); American Ambassador to France 
Henry White (November 27, 1907); financial magnate Andrew Carnegie (February 15, 1908) 
Presidential Papers Microfilm, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1, reels 78, 79, 80,81; Series 2, 
Reel 347. Exchange between the President and US diplomat Cecil Arthur Spring Rice on 
December 21, 1907 in John M. Blum, Alfred D. Chandler,  Jr., and  Sylvia  Rice,  eds.,  The 
Letters of Theodore  Roosevelt,  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press  (1952),  vol.6, Madison  
Library, Library of Congress;  “Power of the Treasury,”  The Wall Street Journal,”  April 25, 
1907; “Rothschild  Scouts Panic,”  Washington  Post,  March  26,  1907;  “Causes  of  Declining  
Prices,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  March  30,  1907;  “Remedy Found,” Los Angeles Times, November 
19, 1907; “Power of the Treasury,” The Wall Street Journal,” April 25, 1907; “The Secretaryship 
of Mr. Shaw,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 1907. 
398 Within a few weeks from the spread of the crisis in New York in October 1907, J.P. Morgan 
rallied some of the titans of Wall Street, organized a pool of $35 million and came to the rescue 
of several trust companies,  stopping further stock price declines. Concurrently,  Cortelyou 
deposited an equal amount of currency with the reserve city banks of New York. Panic subsided. 
Letter of Cortelyou  to Teddy  Roosevelt,  November  16, 1907, in Theodore  Roosevelt  Papers,  
Series  1, reel 78; Roosevelt’s  reply to Cortelyou  of the same  day in Series  2, reel 347. “Issue  
of Panama  Bonds  Might  Bring  Out the Hoarded  Cash,”  Wall Street Journal, November 18, 
1907; “Ghost of ‘Panic’ Vanishes in Air,” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 19, 1907. On 
Shaw’s effort to bolster national bank circulation see Timberlake (1963:41). 
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Roosevelt’s trust-busting policies came under harsher scrutiny in the face of their 
seemingly unrelenting “harm to business.” President Roosevelt distanced himself 
from his “middle-of-the-road” policy by asserting, in late 1907 and again in 1908, 
that American “businessmen” had done an “invaluable service” to the country “in 
checking the panic” and bringing the nation into “excellent financial standing.” 399 
The Anti-trust Act was also bent on a few occasions between late 1907 and 
1908.400 This trend was further strengthened by (and arguably contributed to) the 
victory, in the presidential elections of 1908, of William Howard Taft, by then the 
paladin of high finance. 
In view of these observations, the Roosevelt administration should have 
confronted LA– HE.   As the financial crisis reached the United States between 
the summer and fall of 1907, pressures on the administration for endorsing greater  
caution  in  military  spending,  threat assessment, and war prospects should have 
escalated, while the Roosevelt government should eventually have settled on a 
more cautionary national security path. Pre-crisis, ambitious national security 
policies should have been curbed as a result. The pull back from diplomatic and 
military assertiveness should be even more evident after the election of the 
cosmopolitan administration of Howard Taft. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 TR to Cortelyou,  October  25, 1907,  Theodore  Roosevelt  Papers,  Series  2, reel 347; letter to 
Jacob  Schiff  from  TR in The Selected Letters of Theodore  Roosevelt  (2001:448);  Annual  
Message  of the President  to Congress,  Journal of the Senate,  68th Congress,  1st  session,  p.4. 
The anti-trust  laws  were  indeed  bent  on a few  occasions  during  the crisis,  most  notably  with  
the purchase of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company by Morgan’s United States Steel. See 
Chernow (1990:123-24). 
400 On August 16, 1907, for instance, TR was writing Taft “you are asking me to abandon the 
effort to enforce the laws  [..] and this because you think harm will come to ‘business’ if 
corruption is exposed.” The Papers of William Taft, “Correspondence  with Roosevelt,” reel 321.   
	   222 
Between 1929 and 1933, financial crisis spread around the world much 
more radically than it had between 1907 and 1908. This overlapped with crises 
of significant proportions in other sectors of the economy, ending a decade of 
financial boom and prosperity in the United States (Table 3) and an equally long 
period of financial instability and tentative economic recovery around the world.401 
By April 1933 the international financial system had officially disintegrated and, 
although widespread banking  crises  subsided  after  1933,  prices  did  not stabilize  
until  1936  (Eichengreen  1992:4;  Friedman  and  Schwartz  1963:300;  
Gourevitch 1986:24; Eichengreen 1957:4,48; Eichengreen and Temin 2000:183-
207; Clavin and Wessels 2004:765-795). From shortly before the onset of the Wall 
Street crash of October 1929 until the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
March 1933, the White House was led by the cosmopolitan administration of 
Herbert Hoover who clearly committed to international financial cooperation and a 
conciliatory foreign policy posture. Although the Hoover government continued 
America post-WWI pledge to fiscal protection of the American shipping industry, 
and fiscally conservative bilateral trade (Lake 1988:180-182), the administration’s 
affinity with high finance and financial orthodoxy was unquestionably high. Its 
exposure to high finance after the financial crisis outbreak was also high. Noting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Crisis in the United States took the form of several waves of banking panic, mostly 
concentrated  between 1931 and 1933. The crisis itself was initially given little importance by the 
Hoover administration  and high finance. Financial crises had been a staple abroad  throughout  the  
1920s  and  international  financial  cooperation  had  always  triumphed,  or so it seemed.  
National  alarm mounted after the spread of the crisis across Europe, the related failure of the 
Austrian Creditanstalt (May 1931), the closure of a number of German banks, and the freezing of 
British short-term assets in Germany (July 1931). Things kept worsening. Austria and Germany 
suspended the convertibility of their currencies (summer of 1931); Great Britain abandoned the gold 
standard in (September 1931); Japan devalued the yen (December 1931); and France defaulted on 
its war debt payments (December 1932). 
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the deterioration of national finances and a low- performing international financial 
system a year and half after the stock market collapse of October 1929, President 
Herbert Hoover committed to crisis-resolution efforts which, first and foremost, 
brought about “a condition of affairs favorable to the beneficial development of 
private enterprise” internationally as well as domestically.402 
The one-year moratorium on international payments (summer 1931); the 
encouragement of rescue-loans organized by eminent American bankers Jack 
Morgan and Thomas Lamont to save Austria, Germany, and Great Britain—or 
better the schilling, the deutschmark and the pound (May-September 1931); 
resistance to wide- ranging proposals for federal action on behalf of the 
unemployed (1930-32); and unrelenting commitment to multilateral economic 
negotiations are just some primary examples of Hoover’s pro-business  strategy  of  
financial  recovery. 403 This strategy failed resoundingly, financial scandals flared, 
and the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency began a harsh grilling of the 
American banking community in March 1932. 
The failure and increasing domestic resistance to Hoover’s orthodox strategy 
of crisis response resulted, in 1932, in the overwhelming political victory of 
Franklin D.  Roosevelt (1932), whose government was still cosmopolitan in kind—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 Hoover’s  words in Schlesinger  (1957:238).  See also The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The 
Cabinet and the Presidency 1920-33, New York: The Macmillan Company (1952), pp.11,179-
180;  and Schlesinger (1957:474).  
403 Significantly,  private debts were not excluded from the moratorium.  On Hoover’s response to 
the crisis, see also Schlesinger (1957:236) and Chernow (1990:319). Challenges to the workings 
of orthodox crisis measures were concrete, however, as Hoover himself  admitted  and  as some  
of his  policies  (like  the  infamous  Smooth  Hawley  tariff)  proved.  Letter  of President  Herbert 
Hoover to Secretary of State Henry Stimson, April 21, 1931, and letter by Stimson to Hoover, 
same day, in The Papers of Henry Stimson,  reel 81, Manuscript  Division,  Library  of Congress;  
The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency 1920-33, New York: The 
Macmillan Company (1952), pp.29-31. 
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an assertive government would have been unelectable—but with low exposure to 
high finance. Having run on a clearly anti-Wall Street agenda, funded by lawyers 
rather than bankers, Roosevelt’s crisis-response strategy entailed a retreat from 
financial internationalism and the “replacement,” as the President put it, of “old 
fetishes of so-called international bankers” with “efforts to plan national currencies” 
aimed	  	  at “giving those currencies a continuing purchasing power.”404 Examples of 
this new financial stance included the issuing of a national banking holiday 
(March 1933); the introduction of a Silver Purchase Act (June 1934) and major 
banking laws that strengthened the financial power of the Treasury versus the Federal 
Reserve (1933, 1935); the lifting of the gold-dollar par during the London financial 
conference  (July 1933); the  Johnson  Act, ending  any  possibility  of 
international debt revision (1934); the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934); and 
the Tripartite Monetary Agreement of 1936 (Dallek 1979:35-38,51; Rhodes 2001:98-
101; Eichengreen and Uzan 1990; Lake 1988:204-209). For a number of reasons that 
are well documented in the literature, a full transition to new financial and security 
principles throughout	  the crisis did not occur (Schlesinger 1958:18; Dallek 
1979:38,93,94).405 
Notably, since the American government found itself in scenario HA–LE 
after the start of the crisis, the framework does not allow formulating specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  404 Quoted in Freidel 1973:478-89; Dallek 1979:54; Rhodes 2001:101. 
405 For instance, after rather consensual Hundred Days Congressional political divisions and 
domestic unrest often paralyzed crisis response. As many within the administration noticed, the 
spirit of Roosevelt’s New Deal clashed with the democratic tradition of free trade and ingrained 
domestic abhorrence to public spending. Additionally, the Democratic Party had not been in 
power since the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson.  Even the Democratic majority  that  
overwhelmingly  elected  F.D.R.  in 1932  remained  a patchwork of disparate political forces and 
divergent philosophies thereafter. 
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expectations on the course of American national security policies in this instance. 
Following the logic of the framework, however, it can be expected that the low 
exposure of the American government throughout the crisis should have released 
existing constraints on the exercise of greater assertiveness in the sphere of national 
security. The removal of these constraints should have been more evident from 1933 
onwards, as a new phase in the process of financial crisis response started under the 
Roosevelt administration, and less pronounced under the Hoover administration.  
 
SAVING THE GOLD-DOLLAR PAR AND SHELVING EXPANSION: 
        Explaining American imperial understretch in the 1880s and the 1890s 	  
An examination of whether the local financial crises of 1884 and 1893-96 
paved the way for, respectively, LA–HE and HA–HE—both crises steering 
American security policies towards a major cautionary position—provides an 
excellent outlet for contributions to two debates in the literature of international 
relations and international political economy: one concerning the role of the world 
economic depression in triggering the process of American expansionism, and the 
other regarding the reasons behind the United States’ delayed rise to global influence. 
The first debate originates from the works of Walter LaFeber and William Williams, 
who attributed American military awakening to persistent price deflation, low 
consumption, and overproduction suffered by the United States between 1873 and 
1897. The phenomenon, the authors reckoned, stimulated American interest in the 
acquisition of foreign lands and markets to sell accumulated surplus.406 Since their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 LaFeber  identifies  three  macro-periods  within  the  interval  1873-1897  and  specifically  
1873-78,  1882-85  and  1893-97.  He argued  that there  were  moments  within  these  periods  
	   226 
appearance in the 1960s, important limits to these studies have been recognized. 
David Pletcher, Donald Mitchell, and Walter Herrick observed that while the 
deflationary periods identified by LaFeber and Williams had a persistent and 
enduring character, the movement towards a new, expansionist American strategic 
posture was sluggish.407  More pointedly, as Figure 1.1 shows, the process of naval 
revival stalled exactly during those intervals where, according LaFeber, it should 
have been most virulent. 
The second debate, which emerges from the writings of analysts such as 
Henry Kissinger and Fareed Zakaria, stems from the very same evidence that 
LaFeber and Williams overlooked, that is, the lack of translation of American 
manufacturing power into military expansion until 1898.408 Explaining this oddity, a 
clear challenge to the predictions of classical realism, Zakaria argued that the lack of 
a strong central government, which could harness the nation’s enormous wealth for 
the purposes of expansion, forced American statesmen to diplomatic and military 
inactivity. Zakaria observed that presidents and administrations attempted to set 
the United States on an expansionary path whenever they saw an increase in the 
nation’s relative economic power, yet a weak state and a small central government 
curbed their plans.409 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
during  which  the impetus  for foreign  market  search  and expansionism peaked due to the 
worsening depression. See LaFeber, (1963:20,217),  and Williams (1969). 
407  This is not the only problem that has been noted in relation with the glut theory thesis, but it is 
by far the most relevant for the purposes of this work. See David M. Pletcher (1984:125);  
Mitchell (1946); and Herrick (1966:3,160,230).  Also see William H. Becker (1973:466-481). 
408 Notice that in the mid-1880s  the United  States’  industrial  power  had surpassed  that of Great 
Britain’s,  then considered  the world’s industrial power, in manufacturing  output. See Kissinger 
(1994:37). 
409 Zakaria  considers  this  position  as  consistent  with  realist  theories  of  international  
relations.  Kissinger  offers  a  different institutionalist  explanation  for slow American conversion  
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Figure 4.1. Naval Share of the Federal Budget, 1880-1899, Historical  Statistics  of the 
US, Colonial  Times to 1970, 1975, p.1115, Series Y 457-465. Adapted from Trubowitz, 
Defining the National Interest, p.39. 	  
 	  
While recognizing the value of Zakaria’s emphasis on institutional variables, 
this section offers an alternative explanation to the delayed or better conflicted and 
inconstant American embrace of the expansionist path—one grounded in the national 
security influence of the local financial crises of 1884 and 1893-96.  In agreement 
with the formulated expectations, and contrary to the arguments of LaFeber and 
Williams, both of these crises overturned American attempts at rearmament and 
expansion, thus setting the nation on a radically cautious national security path. The 
withdrawals from expansion occurred, respectively, between 1884 and 1889, and 
between 1893 and 1898—that is, during, and in the aftermath, of the discussed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to expansion, one that focuses on the role of Congressional  pressures. The American Senate, 
Kissinger argues, remained focused on domestic priorities and thwarted all expansionist  projects, 
keeping the army small (25,000 men) and the navy weak. The explanation, however, is more an 
allusion than a statement backed by solid empirical evidence. 
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crises—and they were so radical as to infringe on American national security. The 
following paragraphs explain these claims. 
In the early 1880s, the national security policies of the Arthur administration 
(1881-1885) rested on four major security objectives, which the nation had pursued 
since the end of the Civil War and the administration of President Ulysses Grant.410  
In their most toned-down formulation, these objectives consisted in impeding the 
construction of a foreign-built isthmian canal in Central America; protecting the 
Caribbean Sea; and defending American influence in Hawaii. This national security 
trinity demanded, in turn, the construction of a strong American Navy, although 
debate continued over whether the acquisition of naval bases for the control of the 
Caribbean and Hawaii was preferable to the establishment of closer commercial 
relations with those lands.
411 
In line with these objectives, between 1881 and 1884 the Arthur 
administration embarked on a plan to modernize the navy and intensify national 
expansionist efforts. This policy was rooted in the preservation of heterodox 
financial policies, namely bimetallism and silver coinage. Without the printing—by 
Treasury Secretary Hugh McCulloch—of 200 million silver dollars to assist in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410  See, amongst many, Campbell (1964:50-84);   Leopold   (1962:3-143);   Stevens,   (1945:201-
202);   Grenville   and  Young, (1966:83); Pletcher (2001); Pratt (1936:257); Trubowitz, Goldman, 
and Edward Rhodes (1893); Schulzinger (1984:18,19).  
411 A strong navy was linked to the acquisition of naval bases as much as to the intensification  of 
commercial  relations between the United States and the Caribbean  and Pacific islands. See 
Kissinger  (1994:37);  Mitchell (1946:11-16);  Trubowitz  (1998:36-37); Trubowitz  et al. 
(1983:12).  Building up a strong navy was a commitment  of Democratic  and Republican  
administrations alike. See the electoral campaign platforms between 1869 and 1900 in Porter and 
Johnson (1961). 
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national industry, this expansionist ambition would have collapsed.412 Congressional 
documents show that, between December 1882 and April 1884, increases in 
appropriations for the naval service were satisfactorily adopted. In April 1884, 
before the financial crisis had reached momentum, Secretary of State Frederick 
Frelinghuysen lauded the bill which approved, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1885, the build-up of   “a new American navy, and, as an installment of that navy, 
[…] seven additional cruisers.”413 
The administration’s interest in propping up naval budgets dovetailed with the 
adoption of a militant security posture in Central and Latin America, a position 
which brought the United States in sharper conflict with Great Britain. Building on 
its assertiveness, Frelinghuysen successfully concluded a number of reciprocity 
treaties, including the Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty negotiated in late 1884. By 
virtue of this Treaty, Nicaragua granted the US permission to construct an 
interoceanic canal in exchange for a permanent American-Nicaraguan alliance.414 
The project, which violated the requirements of the Anglo-American 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty banning the construction of an American canal, was 
welcomed by President Arthur in December 1884 as an achievement whose “political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 “Is This a Mystery?” The Daily Register, 
March 23, 1891.  
413 Record of the US House of Representatives, Committee  on Appropriations,  Department  of the 
Navy, 47th  Congress,  Second Session,  HR48A-F3.11,   Box  no.15,  NARA;  Naval  
Appropriation   Bill,  Congressional   Record,  House,  vol.15,  part  3,  48th Congress, 1st session, 
April 14, 1884, pp.2920-2927.  In 1883 Congress had also authorized the construction  of the 
country’s first steel warship. On these efforts see also, more broadly, Mitchell (1971:10-16);  
Narizny (2007:88); Long (1903:chapter  1); Sprout and Sprout (1946:162-64);  and LaFeber 
(1963:104,105). 
414 Treaties were negotiated, for instance, with Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, Hawaii, and Nicaragua. 
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and commercial advantages could scarcely be overestimated.”415 By this time the 
financial crisis had practically reached its conclusion. 
These developments seem to refute the expectation that the Arthur 
administration was in LA–HE, facing strong pressures to endorse cautionary national 
security policies during the financial crisis (May through November 1884). Indeed, 
if the financial crisis was having an effect on national security policies, curbing the   
expansionist plans  of  the incumbent administration was  not  one  of  them.  This 
lack of influence on the Arthur  administration, however, has a simple explanation 
that strongly corroborates the framework and the rest of the earlier formulated 
expectations on the national security influence of the 1884 crisis. 
The Arthur administration doubled down on its pre-crisis, assertive security 
posture because it was convinced that it was operating under LA–LE. This 
assumption was clearly wrong, although it remains unclear whether President 
Arthur would have benefited politically from behaving as if he were under LA–
HE  (as he indeed was).  As the New York Stock Exchange collapsed in mid-1884, 
spreading alarm across the transnational business community and American 
financial elites, the presidential campaign was about to start.416 Rather than trying to 
fix the  policies  of  an  incumbent  administration,  which  transnational  financial  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 Message  of the President,  Journal of the Senate, 48th  Congress,  Second session, December  
1, 1884, NARA; “The Nicaragua Treaty,”  New York Times,  December  3, 1884.  See also 
Walton  (1953).  Concluding  a treaty  with  Nicaragua  had been  on the agenda since 1876, the 
year in which the Canal Commission unanimously recommended this route for an interoceanic 
canal. Frelinghuysen  had tried to pressure Great Britain to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty 
and recognize the Monroe Doctrine even in 1882, and then Britain’s refusal did not weaken the 
administration’s  efforts to overrule the treaty with Britain.          
 
416 “On the Verge of Panic: Wall Street Alarmed by a Succession of Failures,” New York Times, May 
15, 1884. 
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markets regarded as tainted by an unorthodox financial record, American financial 
elites worked towards assuring the election of the presidential candidate who would 
mo st successfully signal credibility to financial markets and stopped the gold 
drain.417Despite their growing concerns regarding the “impairment of the national 
credit,” candidates Chester Arthur and James Blaine, respectively incumbent 
president and incumbent secretary of state, faced extremely bleak re-election 
prospects.418 
As financial newspapers of the time indicate, between May 1884 and 
November 1884, American business magnates Daniel Manning, Samuel Jones 
Tilden, and Thomas Bayard sided with Grover Cleveland. Cleveland was a more 
credible opponent of free silver and inflation than Arthur or Blaine could ever be. 
Cleveland also abhorred imperialism, interventionism, and entangling alliances.419 
As a banker put it, American financial elites were looking for “a business man” who 
could defend “sound monetary principles” and “the honest, commercial law of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Arthur’s re-election prospects were already dim before the campaign started. He withdrew due to 
health reasons. 
418 Neither Arthur nor Blaine could calm the business fears of pursuing a policy at variance with 
sound monetary principles, even though both had pledged to greater respect of international 
financial cooperation during the campaign. They kept being associated with inflationary policies 
and panics.  Compared to Cleveland,  a member  of the Bourbon  Democrats,  they stood  basically  
no chance of re-election. Message of the President to Congress, December 1, 1884, 48th Congress, 
2nd session, NARA; “The Reason and Remedy,” Washington Post,  May  17,  1884;  “Mr.  Blaine  
of  Panics,”  Washington  Post,  June  10,  1884;  “Blaine  and  the Business Men,” New York Times, 
October 13, 1884; “Better Business Prospect,” Washington Post, January 2, 1885. 
419 Cleveland  had  also  the  advantage  of  having  no  connection  with  the  running  Republican 
candidates  whose  policies had allegedly  caused the financial  crisis and endangered  American  
commitment  to the gold standard.  Cleveland’s  letter to Senator Morrill, December  8, 1884, in 
The Papers of Grover Cleveland, 1859-1908,  Manuscript  Division,  LOC, DC, Series 2, General 
Correspondence, 1846-1910,  Reel 3; “Rallying to Cleveland:  The Great Demonstration  of the 
Business Men,” New York Times, October 10, 1884; “The Great Parade Today: The Monster  
Procession  of the Business  Men Who Favor Cleveland,”  New York Times, October 24, 1884; 
“The Administration  Outlook,” Washington Post, March 13, 1885. See also Grenville (1966:42-
45). 
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world,” as much as a statesman who was diffident “about making star route 
contracts.” 420 No presidential candidate fit this profile better than  Cleveland.  In 
March 1885, during the installment of the new administration, the business 
community would happily declare that “Mr. Cleveland [would] never place himself at 
variance with sound monetary principles” and that “the character of his foreign 
policy” promised to “keep [the US cabinet] religiously aloof from all entangling 
alliances and fully in line with the characteristic reluctance of American people to 
meddle with other people’s affairs.” 421  
The expectation that the financial crisis of 1884 created pressures for 
endorsing more cautious national security policies is therefore verified.  The electoral 
campaign was the terrain upon which these pressures played out, while the victory of 
Cleveland and his financial and security platform attested to their strength. As 
expected for a statist-nationalist government meeting financial crisis in LA–HE, the 
pre-1884 national security agenda was overhauled, and the withdrawal from 
expansionism involved the broad spectrum of national security policies, namely 
military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects.422 I will examine them in 
turn. 
The ambitious expansionist agenda of the Arthur administration started to 
crumble as early as December 1884, when the conclusion of the financial crisis  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 “Rallying to Cleveland,” New York Times, October 10, 1884. 
421 “The Administration Outlook,” Washington Post, March 13, 1885.  Notice also that Cleveland 
had held no federal or military office before becoming president in 1885.     
422 A number of scholars have already noted the prudent national security policies endorsed by the 
Cleveland administration after 1884,  although  no one has recognized  the fundamental  role of 
the financial  crisis  of 1884  in engineering  this foreign  policy calmness. Amongst these scholars 
are, for instance, Narizny (2007:39-92); Campbell (1964); and Trubowitz (1998:37-38). 
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the  presidential campaign left no doubt about the binding commitment of the 
newly elected administration to defend gold and financial orthodoxy, and, 
inevitably, the ostracizing of silver production and coinage.423 A letter sent to the 
House by the Secretary of the Navy Chandler reveals that by late December 1884, 
existing bills for appropriating additional cruisers had been dropped in the Senate.424 
By January 1885 the House, too, had approved a Navy bill that 
suspended naval construction for two and half years, in an attempt to impede 
“money squandering.”425 After its official installment in March 1885, the Cleveland 
administration pushed forward military retrenchment and rejected pleas for 
battleships from the navy department in order to place American finances “on a 
sound and sensible basis.”426 As Table 4 exhibits, between 1883 and 1886, the 
naval modernization program of the Arthur administration stalled. Military 
spending decreased 32 percent compared to a GNP decrease of 4 percent, and a 
decrease in total government spending of “only” 8 percent. In the summer of 1886, 
The New York Times denounced 16-month delays in contract assignments for vessel 
building, and the laying off of thousands of navy employees for “lack of funds.”427 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 In 1885, Daniel Manning took possession of the Treasury, replacing  “tainted with heterodoxy” 
Hugh McCulloch. 
424  Letter sent by Chandler to Chairman of the Committee of Appropriations of the House Samuel 
Randall on December 31, 1884 in Record of the US House of Representatives, 48thCongress, 
HR48A-F3.11, Box 14, NARA. 
425  Naval Appropriations  Bill, Congressional   Record, House vol.16, part 3, 48th Congress, 2nd 
session, February 23, 1885, pp.2041-43; and “Appropriations for the Navy,” Washington Post, 
January 13, 1885; Message of the President  of the United States to Congress delivered on 
December 8, 1885, Journal of the Senate, 49th Congress, 1st session, NARA. 
426 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-
1897, Washington, DC, (1899), vol. VIII, p.302. 
427 “The New Navy,” New York Times, June 26, 1885; and “The Navy Yard Deserted: Over 1,000 
employees laid off because of lack of funds,” New York Times, July 2, 1886. 
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Military retrenchment was accompanied by the endorsement of a more 
cautious foreign policy stance, and a milder threat assessment. With the 
exception of the treaty between the United States and Hawaii, which Cleveland 
firmly defended and renewed in 1886, all reciprocity treaties concluded by the 
Arthur administration were withdrawn under the premise that the United States, 
in Cleveland’s words, was committed to a policy of “peace, commerce, and honest 
friendship with all nations, and entangling alliances with none.”428 
Table 4.4 American real military spending (ME), GNP and government spending (CGE) between 1880 
and 1897 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supporting framework and expectations, Cleveland justified this withdrawal 
from expansionism and the related promotion of international peace with the 
necessity of pursuing financial policies that expressed greater commitment to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 Annual Message of the President, December 8, 1885, Richardson, A Compilation, VIII, pp. 327-
28; Cleveland  expressed  his conviction of the necessity to preserve the American-Hawaiian Treaty 
in a message to Congress of December 6, 1886; Journal of the Senate, 49th Congress, 2nd session. 
See also Richardson, A Compilation, VIII, pp.500-501. 
 
Year Real ME 
Real 
CGE 
Real 
GNP 
 
ME/GNP ME/CGE 
        
1881 56 261 11483  0.004 0.21 
1882 59 258 12343  0.005 0.23 
1883 65 270 12590  0.005 0.24 
1884 58 250 12348  0.005 0.23 
1885 60 265 11656  0.005 0.22 
1886 49 249 12113  0.004 0.19 
1887 54 266 12162  0.004 0.20 
1888 55 268 12420  0.004 0.21 
1889 68 308 13315  0.005 0.22 
1890 68 324 13524  0.005 0.21 
1891 75 366 13742  0.006 0.21 
1892 76 345 14081  0.005 0.22 
1893 81 387 14390  0.006 0.21 
1894 90 386 13937  0.006 0.23 
1895 83 363 14330  0.006 0.22 
1896 78 352 14044  0.006 0.22 
1897 85 369 15065  0.006 0.23 
1898 151 443 15869  0.010 0.34 
       
	   235 
gold standard. “Nothing,” he stated in a speech to Congress in December 1885, 
was “more important” than the “present condition of […] currency and coinage.”429 
The lack of adequate financial means and the necessity to strengthen national 
financial credibility was reiterated when the Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty was 
scrapped in early 1885, providing for the most remarkable “softening” of American 
threat assessment compared to the pre-financial crisis period. Previously established 
plans to construct an American canal were abandoned by the administration and 
Congress because of their excessive financial cost and the “embarrassing” alliance 
against Great Britain—the primary defender of the gold standard—that the US-
Nicaragua treaty entailed.430 
Ultimately, with the withdrawal of the Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty and the 
cancellation of the progress made towards the construction of an American canal, 
the United States moved from its pre-crisis position as Great Britain’s foremost 
challenger in Central America to Great Britain’s best ally, determined to preserve 
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and subordinate American national security decisions to 
the British will.431 Rearmament and the acquisition of an American canal were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429  Message of the President of the United States to Congress, Journal of the Senate, 49th Congress, 
1st  session, December 8, 1885. 
430 Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate (Washington  1901), XXIV, 453, pp.456, 
481; the treaty failed ratification in February 1885.  “The Nicaragua Canal Bad Bargain,” New 
York Times, January 9, 1885; “Cleveland on Expansion: His Views Clearly Defined in Connection 
with Nicaragua and Hawaii,” Washington Post, October 30, 1900; “The President’s Message,” 
December 9, 1885, New York Times. 
431 The Cleveland administration also withdrew American participation in the international 
convention concerning the Congo Free State, lest it entangle the US in diplomatic conflicts with 
England or Europe in Africa. The US had joined the Berlin Conference in November 1884, in 
view of the trade opportunities offered by the Congo. The American representative in Berlin 
signed the Berlin Act, but Cleveland declined to submit it to the Senate. His explanation was the 
same as the one offered for the ditching of the United States-Nicaraguan   Treaty.  President 
Cleveland, Message t o Congress, Journal of the Senate, 49th Congress, 2nd  session, December 6, 
1886. See also Kasson (1886:119-33). 
	   236 
pushed out of the agenda and there remained for many years. British-American war 
prospects collapsed as a result. Had the financial crisis of 1884 not occurred, and 
had American financial elites and the transnational power of financial orthodoxy not 
been strong, the US Treasury would have not complied to a strict program of 
adherence to the gold standard; silver coinage would have continued, enlarging the 
financial capacity of the Treasury; military and expansionist plans would have 
moved forward; the construction of a Nicaragua canal would have been at the very 
least initiated; and stronger alliances between the United States and countries in 
Central America would have been concluded. American national security policies 
between 1884 and 1887 would have been remarkably different from what we know 
about them today.432 
The Cleveland administration faced strong pressures to endorse—and 
eventually did endorse—greater national security restrain even during the financial 
crisis of 1893-96. More so than between 1884 and 1885,  and  by  HA–HE,  
diplomatic  and  military  wariness  reached alarming heights in the mid-1890s, 
providing further confirmation of the framework. This time, as emerges from press 
records and presidential papers, American financial elites had acted preventively 
before the outbreak of the crisis. When fears of a national gold default surfaced 
between 1891 and 1892, shortly after the global financial crisis of 1890-91, Wall 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Interestingly, the election of the Harrison administration in 1888—an administration  which was  
visibly  in  favor  of  an expansionist foreign policy—occurred  in the absence of a financial crisis 
and when American gold reserves were rising, as Tab.1 shows. Also, by 1888 Cleveland’s 
incentives for a strict observance of financial orthodoxy had receded as exports kept shrinking 
and financial conditions failed to match the enormous manufacturing power (Tab.1). Significantly,  
n 1888 President Cleveland was newly pressing for an international conference on bimetallism. In 
1889, before the installment of the Harrison administration, Cleveland had shown an increasingly 
belligerent attitude by sending American warships to deter Germany from taking control of the 
Samoan islands. See Hagan (1991:193-227);  Herrick (1966:11).  
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Street bankers took advantage of the electoral campaign of 1892 to support, once 
again (and once again successfully), Grover Cleveland.433 As Table 4.1 shows, gold 
outflows increased between 1891 and 1892, following the global financial crisis of 
1890-91. Although the American economy had escaped the crisis, alarm newly 
spread across American financial circles. As in 1884, pressures on presidential 
candidates mounted. 
In agreement with expectations, between 1893 and early 1895 the course of 
national security policies gave in to these pressures. In 1892, Cleveland clearly 
knew how to give business elites a run for their money. His position against the 
coinage of silver dollars, his anti- imperialist views, and his overall cautious 
presidential record made him extremely appealing to high finance.   
By contrast, as was true for James Blaine in 1884, the  financial  record  of 
incumbent president and runner-up Benjamin Harrison was tainted. Since Harrison’s 
ambitious national security policies stood little chance of being realized without 
enlarging the financial capacity of the US Treasury through silver coinage, between 
1889 and 1892, the administration had pursued heterodox, silver-friendly policies, as 
well as expansionist and inflationary military policies (Tab.1 and Tab.5).434 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 Letter of the State Treasurer of Missouri to Cleveland of November  5, 1891 in The Papers of 
Grover Cleveland,  1859-1908, Manuscript Division, LOC, DC, Series 2, General Correspondence,  
1846-1910, Reel 69; “Secretary Foster Discusses Relations of Gold and Silver,” Washington Post, 
November  11, 1891;“Gold  Supply and Bimetallism,”  and “Finances  of the Nation: Annual 
Report of Treasury and Results of Reciprocity,” Washington Post, December 7, 1892; “Alarm in 
Financial Circles,” and “Getting All our Gold: Treasury Officials Anxious to Stop the Drain made 
by Europe,” Washington Post, December 19, 1892;  “American Nation  in Jeopardy,”  and 
“Nothing  But Money:  This has been the Absorbing  Topic  on Wall Street”  Chicago Daily 
Tribune, December 19, 1892. 
434 Secretary of the Treasury John Foster was wholeheartedly committed to silver coinage and 
justified it based on the country’s remarkable economic growth. “Mr. Foster’s views,” New York 
Times, June 26, 1891. 
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particular, the latter set of policies included an offensive naval strategy and the 
related build-up of a world-class battle fleet; the creation of American commercial 
empire through sustained trade reciprocity; and a spirited defense of the Monroe 
Doctrine.435 A foremost pillar of these plans was the furthering of the American hold 
on Hawaii. Envisioning the forthcoming annexation of the Islands, the Hamilton 
administration aided in the overthrow of the native monarchy of Queen Liliuokalani 
in January 1893, hastily negotiating an annexation treaty with the provisional 
government.436 
Cleveland’s victory in November 1892 shattered this ambitious national 
security agenda. Confirming framework and expectations, immediately upon his 
March 1893 installment—and, just as the financial crisis was starting, Cleveland 
curbed his predecessor’s imperialist policy by withdrawing the Hawaiian annexation 
treaty from the Senate.437 The administration justified the maneuver with ethical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 On the expansionist program of the Harrison administration, see “The Grand Possibilities of 
Secretary Blaine’s  Reciprocity Policy,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 15, 1891; Charles 
Hedges, Speeches of Benjamin Harrison: A Complete Collection of His  Public  Addresses  from  
February  1888,  to February  1892,  New  York,  (1892),  pp.287,325,388,409,415,467-68,499-
500; Hagan  (1991:194-95);   Herrick  (1966:3); Trubowitz   et  al.(1983:32);   Grenville   and  
Young  (1966:93);   and  Richardson,   A Compilation,  pp.122-123.  Under Secretary of the Navy 
Benjamin Tracy, a series of ambitious naval acts was passed. Over the course of 1890, the 
Navy’s share of the federal budget more than doubled. Between late 1891 and early 1892, the 
United States had also come very close to a war with Chile. LaFeber (1963:130); Hagan 
(1991:199). 
436 After the Hawaiian revolution of mid-January 1893, which deposed the Queen and established  a 
provisional  government, American  Hawaiian  minister  John  Stevens  urged  the  administration  
to  annex  the  islands  before  Great  Britain  “plucked  the Hawaiian Pear.” Stevens to Foster, 
February 1, 1893, House Executive Documents, 53rd Congress, 2nd session, no.48, p.136; the text 
of Stevens’ announcement is in Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 2nd session, p.191.  
437  Secretary of State Water Q. Gresham to Blount, March 11, 1893, House Executive Documents, 
53rd Congress, 2nd session, n.47, p.2. The withdrawal of the Hawaiian annexation treaty in 1893 
echoed the withdrawal of the Frelinghuysen-Zavala canal treaty soon after the crisis of 1884. 
Cleveland accompanied the withdrawal of the Treaty with the setup of a commission to 
investigate the causes of the revolution and Hawaiian sentiment towards annexation.  James 
Blount was the commissioner appointed by the administration to investigate the Hawaiian 
revolution. 
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considerations on the circumstances surrounding the downfall of the Hawaiian 
government.438  
Yet the President’s inaugural speech made clear that the withdrawal did not 
respond primarily to considerations of morality, but to the need to abide by the 
principles of international financial cooperation. In March 1893, Cleveland stated: 
“Nothing is more vital to our supremacy as a nation […] than a sound and stable 
currency. […] In dealing with our present embarrassing situation [...] we will be 
wise if we temper our confidence and faith in our national strength and resources 
with the frank concession that even these will not permit us to defy with impunity 
the inexorable laws of finance and trade.”439 Further tempering confidence in 
American national strength was the concomitant decision, in March 1893, to scrap 
warship authorizations for that year. As displayed in Figure 4.2, however, no 
warship was authorized for two years, indicating that the financial crisis of 1893-96 
pushed cautionary national security policies forward and caused what Herrick has 
defined as a “hiatus” in American naval revolution.4406 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 The emphasis on moral factors to justify the righteousness of hijacking the annexation treaty 
emerges from a variety of the administration’s declarations  with regard  to Hawaii  in 1893 and 
1894.  The interference of the Harrison administration in the process leading up to the Hawaiian 
revolution also made ethical debates rather legitimate. Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1894,  Appendix  II,  pp.197-205;  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  House,  Record  of US 
House  of Representatives,  53Congress, First session, HR 53A-F11.1, box 139, NARA; 
Congressional  Record, 53 Congress, 2session, pp.5499-5500;  Lorrin A. Thurston, Memoirs of the 
Hawaiian Revolution,  Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Co. (1936), p.302; Blount to Gresham, 
July 17 and  31, 1893,  House Executive  Documents,  53rd Congress, 2nd session,  n.47,  
pp.144,164.  Ethical  debates  on the issue  of Hawaiian annexation occurred frequently in 
Congress in 1893 and 1894. 
439 Grover Cleveland, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1893. “President’s Address: Cleveland’s 
Inaugural Speech Smooth and Well,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 5, 1893. 
440 Herrick (1966:153,154).  
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Archival records confirm that, between 1893 and  1895,  the  House  and  the  
Senate strongly supported Cleveland’s policy of economy in the naval appropriations 
bills so that legislative energies could center, as one senator put it, on the supreme 
issue of “how to maintain the present standard of gold and not have to adopt 
monometallism.” Congressional pressures for economies in the naval 
appropriations bill began in early February 1893, before Cleveland entered 
office, and before the start of the 1893-96 crisis. 441   
Figure 4.2. Warships Authorized 1893-9 (Mitchell, History of the Modern American 
Navy, p.26) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441  Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House; Various Sessions; Record of the House, 53rd 
Congress, 1st session, HR 53A-F11.1, Boxes 100,139,  NARA;  Committee  on Banking  and 
Currency  of the House Record  of the US House of Representatives 53rd Congress, 1st session, HR 
53A-F4.1,  Rg 233, Boxes 39,41,44,  Statement  of Mr. W.T. Grant of Louisville,  Kentucky  on 
July 2, 1894 in Committee on Banking and Currency of the House Record of the US House of 
Representatives,  53rd Congress, 1st session HR 53A-F4.1, Rg 233, Box 41, NARA; “Economy in 
the Naval Appropriations  Bill,” Washington Post, February 8, 1893. 
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Yet, the historical record indicates that had the financial crisis not occurred, 
Cleveland’s national security decisions between 1893 and 1895 would have been 
remarkably different from the ones actually undertaken. To begin with, the 
President was not a dove. Cleveland was strongly persuaded of the vital importance 
of Hawaii to American security. From the conclusion of American-Hawaiian 
Reciprocity Treaty in 1875 until the financial crisis of 1893-96, no Republican or 
Democratic administration had refused to renew the Treaty or dared to question the 
strategic significance of Hawaii and American military presence in the Pacific—nor 
did Cleveland before 1893. Even when retrenchment plans were undertaken during 
and soon after the crisis of 1884, the Bourbon Democrat had saved and strengthened 
the American reciprocity treaty with Hawaii, considering it an unyielding bastion of 
US foreign policy and concluding—in 1886—that the “paramount influence” 
acquired in Hawaii and “the telegraphic communications between those Islands and 
the United States” needed to “be maintained.”442 
Moreover, despite his distaste for Harrison’s imperialism, Cleveland 
completely understood the necessity of strengthening the American navy for 
defending the nation’s seacoast, confronting the first-class vessels of other powers, 
and preventing an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine. By endorsing economies in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Message of Cleveland  to Congress,  December  6, 1886, Journal of the Senate, 49th  Congress,  
2nd  session, NARA. Notice that American  fears of British influence  in Hawaii had been the 
most impellent  reason behind the conclusion  of the treaty in 1875. Article IV of the US treaty 
with Hawaii  expressed  its essence.  It prohibited  Honolulu  from granting  “any special privilege  
or rights or use therein to any other power, state or government.” See Kirshner and Abdelal 
(1999:128).  
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Table 4.5. Total Investments of American  	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Year  
1900   
1901   
1902   
1903   
1904   
1905   
1906   
1907   
1908   
1909   
1910   
1880   
1881   
1882   
1883   
1884   
1885   
1886   
1887   
1888   
1889   
1890   	  
the naval appropriations bill in early 1893, Cleveland did not intend to scrap 
American naval rearmament. 
In March 1893 he even appointed Hilary A. Herbert, an ex-colonel 
commonly known for backing expansionist bills, as head of the Department of the 
Navy. In fact, Herbert was quite successful in mustering support for allocating 
resources to the navy (slowdown in battleship construction aside), which also 
explains why military spending did  not  drop substantially between 1893 and 1895, 
as Table 4.5 shows. 443 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The President placed no opposition on Herbert’s work indicating that, had the 
financial crisis not occurred, naval spending figures for the years 1893 and 1894 
would have been much higher. Further attesting that American national security 
decisions between 1893 and 1895 would have been markedly different had the 
financial crisis not occurred and had the administration not felt the utmost need to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 See sketch of Herbert in DAB, VII, 572-73, in Philadelphia Evening Telegram, February  23, 
1893; and in Troy Daily Press. See also Herrick (1966:154-155). 
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reassure financial markets of American creditworthiness, President Cleveland did not 
limit American retreat from expansionism to the withdrawal of the American- 
Hawaiian annexation treaty. He went further, and then some.  As the crisis 
deepened between July 1893 and January 1895, Cleveland felt an increasing 
obligation to defend the nation’s respect  of  the  inexorable  laws  of  international  
finance,  and  plunged  into  an  exceedingly restrained national security path. 
Between July and August 1895, as the depletion of gold from the vaults of the 
Treasury continued, Cleveland convened an extra session of Congress to alert the 
State to the immediate necessity of obtaining the seal of approval of international 
financial markets. As the President stated, “lack of confidence at home and abroad” 
over American pro-silver financial policies was “shunning the country out of the 
nations of the first class.”444  A few weeks after this statement, the administration 
instructed the American minister in Honolulu, Albert S. Willis, to tell the deposed 
Queen that the United States regretted American military presence in Hawaii and 
supported her reinstatement provided that she promised to assume the provisional 
government’s debt.445 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Message from President Cleveland, Journal of the Senate, 1st session, 53rd Congress, 1893, August 
7, 1893, NARA. Cleveland could not have used stronger words to convey the necessity, at this stage of 
the crisis, of a stricter adherence to orthodoxy. As he put it, “the present perilous condition is largely the 
result of a financial policy which the executive branch of the government finds embodied in unwise 
laws, which must be executed until repealed by Congress.” He was referring here to the Sherman Act. 
445  Albert S. Willis, new US Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary  in Honolulu after the ousting of 
Stevens carried the message to the dethroned  Queen and Hon. S.B. Dole, who was head of the 
provisional  government.  Gresham  to Willis, October 13, 1893, FRUS  1894,  Appendix  II, 
pp.1189-91;  Willis  to Gresham,  January  14,16,19  and  February  10, 1893,  Committee  on 
Foreign Affairs of the House, Various Sessions,  Record of the US House of Representatives, 53rd  
Congress, 1st session, HR 53A-F11.1, Box 100 NARA; Oliver T. Morton to Gresham,  November  
17, 1893, in Papers of Walter Quintin Gresham,  vol.41, August 23, 1893 to Jan 9, 1894, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. See also Alexander (1896). 
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Besides further exposing the weakness of American Hawaiian policy, the 
decision to reinstall the Queen would  have  been  unthinkable for  a  moralist  of  
the  caliber  of  Grover Cleveland had he not been increasingly entangled in his 
battle to defend American adherence to the  gold par,  and  therefore unable to  
take on  foreign debts.446 Indeed, how could someone concerned with American 
and international morality reinstall a government that, as the Blount report of July 
1893 made clear, was undesired by the Hawaiians to the point that they preferred 
American annexation to a return of the Queen? The picture of a Democratic 
president advocating monarchy was already strange enough. Unfortunately, in his 
assessment of the reasons “shunning the United States out of the nations of the first 
class,” Cleveland could not have been more mistaken. Taking advantage of 
American “disinterest” in the Pacific, Great Britain in October 1894 drafted an 
agreement with Honolulu to lay a submarine cable between the British colonies of 
Canada and Australasia.447 It is impossible to underestimate the significance of this 
plan for Great Britain: the domain of the British Empire would have been 
enlarged, while two British colonies would have served as counterweights to 
America’s rising power.  The only condition barring the Hawaiian government 
from concluding the agreement was its reciprocity treaty with the United States. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 The American Congress took the side of the Hawaiians, agreeing on one basic point (which 
Cleveland would not have disputed in  the  absence  of  a financial  crisis):  the  United  States  
should  not  attempt  to  undo  the  Hawaiian  revolution.  Cleveland  and Gresham accepted the 
recommendation  in the end. The Queen was not reinstated. On the Blount Report, see Senate 
Reports, 53rd Congress, 2nd session, n.227, pp.xxi,xxxiii-iv.  
447 Memorandum  of  the  Agreement  between  the  Hawaiian  government  and  representatives  of  
Great  Britain  and  the  British colonies,  Honolulu,  October  1894, Committee  on Foreign  Affairs  
of the House,  Various  Subjects;  Record of the US House of Representatives,  53rd Congress, 1st 
session, HR 53A-F16.1, Box no.100, NARA. 
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Providing extra support to the hyperbolic diplomatic and military carefulness 
foreseen by HA–HE, in January 1895 the administration brought its cautionary 
foreign policy stance to its most dangerous extreme, practically repudiating the US 
Reciprocity Treaty with Hawaii and American Hawaiian policy more broadly. While 
the treaty had been consistently renewed by American administrations from 1875 
onwards, Cleveland had fully endorsed and pledged to defend it.448 In December 
1895, however, engaged in what he later defined as “averting” the “imminent 
disaster” resulting from the “collapse of the entire system of credit,” Cleveland 
asked Congress to amend the existing reciprocity treaty with Hawaii so that 
telegraphic rights could be awarded to Great Britain, and British colonies Canada 
and Australia, instead of the United States.449 Concurrently, American naval forces 
were withdrawn from Hawaiian waters.450 In doing so, Cleveland was letting Great 
Britain “pluck the Hawaiian pear,” to use an expression that was popular at the 
time—and not the only pear to pluck, as revealed by British statements and actions 
towards Nicaragua in May 1895 and towards Venezuela shortly thereafter. 
Between 1894 and 1895, Great Britain assumed an increasingly interventionist 
posture in Central America. In May 1895, British marines occupied the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448  Message  of the President  relative  to proposed  submarine  cable in Hawaii,  Congressional  
Record,  Vol.27,  part 1, January 9, 1895, p.768; and Message of Secretary of State Gresham, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, Various Subjects; Record of the US House of 
Representatives,  53rd  Congress,  1st  session,  HR 53A-F16.1,  Box no.100,  NARA;  “Hawaiian  
Cable  Looks Certain  Now,”  Chicago  Tribune,  February  1,  1895;  “Cleveland  is keeping  up  a 
policy  of  infamy,”  Chicago  Daily  Tribune, January 15, 1895; “Hawaiian  Cable: The Question  
Comes Before Both Houses,”  Los Angeles Times, February  19, 1895; “Will Not Aid the Hawaiian 
Cable,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 22, 1895. 
449 Annual Message of the President, December 2, 1895, Journal of the Senate, 54th Congress, 
NARA. 
450 On the withdrawal of naval forces from Hawaii between late 1894 and January 1895, see 
Leopold (1945:136). 
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Nicaraguan port of Corinto for a few days, expelled the British consul  there,  
and  demanded  an  indemnity  after  the  government  incorporated  the Mosquito 
islands. The Cleveland administration closed one eye. The United States’ 
prudent threat assessment lured Great Britain, and a couple months later London 
intensified its demands towards Venezuela over the boundary line of the British 
Guyana. 
The administration’s exposure to high finance was making a mockery of the 
Monroe doctrine and trumping American national security. Things were about to 
change, however. Pressures for pursuing greater national security caution eased off 
starting in late February 1895 when, in agreement with framework and expectations, 
Cleveland’s cosmopolitan government found itself in HA–LE. In the following 
months, a move away from an exceedingly cautionary security stance occurred but, 
as expected, the American government did  not  unwaveringly embark on a more 
assertive national security course, instead showing substantial ambiguity— 
arguably the same ambiguity that characterized its post-February 1895 financial 
policies of crisis response. Soon after the failure of the Morgan-Cleveland 
agreement, Congress voted out the proposed amendment to the American 
Hawaiian treaty and a bolder program of battleship construction was authorized 
(Fig. 4.2 and Tab. 4.5).451 Between spring and summer of 1895, President Cleveland 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 President  Cleveland  and Secretary  of State  Walter  Gresham  resisted  the rising  tide of 
American  bellicosity  until  February 1895. On the rising bellicosity and the resumption of 
military build-up starting in February 1895 see Congressional  Record, 53rd Congress, 3rd session, 
p.3113; Richardson, Messages and Papers, pp.540-41; “New Battleships and Torpedo-boats 
Authorized to be constructed,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 1895; Navy Department, Annual 
Report, 1894-95. See also Mitchell (1946:22-26); LaFeber  (1963:175-8); Herrick  (1966:175-85); 
Grenville  and  Young  (1966:120-123);  Leopold  (1962:138);  and  Ferrell (1987:18). 
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and newly installed Secretary of State Richard Olney adopted a much less dovish 
foreign policy stance towards Great Britain. In July 1895, Olney notified the British 
cabinet that its Venezuelan demands infringed upon the Monroe Doctrine, and that 
the United States would act as a Venezuelan ally if needed.452  Strategically and 
diplomatically, this increase in national security readiness was far from being a 
secure foray into international assertiveness. The American government was just 
defending principles of regional security that it had established back in 1823. 
Moreover, Cleveland waited months before responding to British provocations; he 
continued to advocate for an international arbitration of the Venezuelan dispute; 
and had he really wanted to flex American diplomatic and military muscles, he 
could easily have begun by liberating Cuba from the Spanish oppressor—an action 
that was explicitly opposed by both Cleveland and Olney even when domestic 
pressures to intervene mounted throughout 1895.453 
However, when the British refused to take Olney’s message seriously, 
Cleveland pledged to “resist by every means in its power” ongoing British efforts to 
exercise jurisdiction over Venezuelan territory, a promise that the government 
would not have made in 1893, 1894, or early February 1895.454 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 In April 1895 British marines  landed  in Nicaragua  for a few days after Nicaragua  had 
expelled  the British  consul from the Mosquito  islands.  On the Venezuelan border dispute  
between  Great Britain  and the United  States, Cleveland’s  stance, and its resolution, see 
Campbell (1976:chapter 11).  
453 On the Cleveland   administration’s position versus  an  American-Spanish   conflict,  see  
Grenville   and  Young (1966:181,182,184); Trask (1981:11-22);  Offner  (1992:2,25);  and 
Kirshner  (2007:32-33).  See also “No Action Toward  Cuba: The President Will Not Recognize 
the Insurgents,” New York Times, June 12, 1896. 
454 See Cleveland’s Presidential Address to the Royal Historical Society in Humphreys (1967), 
pp.131-164. 
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In this context of ambiguity regarding threat assessment, war prospects, and, 
obliquely, military spending too, one thing was clear: Cleveland was no longer linked 
to or could no longer rely on a pro-finance friendly, pro-British, and anti-Treasury 
American foreign policy to kick- start national financial and economic recovery. 
Preserving national honor after a phase of conciliatory diplomacy “gone bad” was 
surely a reason for this development.455 Another reason, which validates HA–LE, 
was an increased uncertainty in the administration’s crisis response strategy. After 
February 1895, this strategy no longer required the demands or suggestions of 
high finance.456 Throughout that year, Morgan and his acolytes continued to stand 
ready to assist the Treasury with individual and collective offers of syndicates and 
gold deposits to save the nation from bankruptcy but Cleveland and Carlisle 
regarded a new private loan as “politically inexpedient” and opted for a public loan 
in January 1896 (Carosso 1987:340-343).457 In sum, American financial policies 
and security policies in 1895, during the second stage of response to the financial 
crisis of 1893-96 reproduced a political fracture between the Cleveland 
administration and high finance that helped polarize domestic politics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455 As Cleveland stated in November 1895,  “I  am  nevertheless  firm  in  my  conviction  that,  
while  it  is  a  grievous  thing  to contemplate  the two great English-speaking  peoples  of the 
world  as being  otherwise  than friendly  competitors  in the onward march of civilization  […], 
there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals [..] the loss of national self-
respect and honor”; Cleveland’s words in Whittle (1920:216). 
456 Many eminent Wall Street firms (including J.P. Morgan) were very close to exhausting their 
available gold too at this point.      
457 Facing  a much more undecided  American  government,  and convinced  that the American  
public was the culprit for a failed financial  recovery,  Wall  Street  titans  embarked  on  a 
reform  movement  against  Free  Silver  in the  attempt  at converting  the American public to 
gold monometallism.  On Wall Street’s attempts to convert the masses, see Livingston 
(1986:88,89).  
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Under McKinley, the ambiguity in national financial policy increased as 
the president continued along the path laid by his predecessor by strengthening 
the taxing and spending powers of the Treasury in reaction to the financial 
crisis,458 and by reaching an international bimetallist agreement to preserve 
American participation in the gold standard  (McCulley 1992:54). This investment in 
the independence of the American Treasury, a strategy that insulated the government 
politically from the pressures of “gold  monometallists” and “silverites,” is a 
fundamental variable to help explain how an cosmopolitan administration like that of 
McKinley’s, which in stable financial conditions would have committed to 
international peace, was slowly dragged into a war that it did not want to fight 
between 1897 and 1898. The transition to assertiveness would have been much more 
difficult had the administration not prioritized national legislation favoring a stronger 
Treasury—a policy heritage of the financial crisis—and had the financial crisis not 
contributed, as previously illustrated, to alienating Wall Street from the rest of the 
American public, the administration from Wall Street, and ultimately the 
administration from financially splintered interests. All of these elements are 
compatible with the expectation that the American administration after February 
1895 found itself in HA– LE—guarded national security policies being gradually 
abandoned. 
Ultimately, the financial crisis of 1893-96 profoundly shaped American threat 
assessment and war prospects. Without it, American financial elites would not have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 In his acceptance speech to the G.O.P. Notification Committee, McKinley stressed the 
government’s need of raising sufficient revenues and avoiding  paying  excessive  interest  rates  to  
private  finance  because  of  the  negative  financial  and  economic repercussions of this policy 
domestically. See the Cleveland Gazette, August 8, 1896. 
 
	   250 
placed such intense pressures on the Cleveland administration as they did during the 
first stage of the  crisis; Cleveland would not have miscalculated the British threat 
and staged an American military withdrawal from the Pacific or accepted a more 
timid interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine; heterodox financial policies would 
not have gained the popular support that they did between 1894 and 1895; 
polarization in Congress between gold-standard defenders and silverities would not 
have been as strong; the cosmopolitan government of Cleveland and McKinley 
would not have leaned towards a more assertive national financial policy and, as a 
result, a less cautionary national security policy; and a Spanish-American war would 
have appeared much less inevitable in Washington.	   
It is difficult to determine which factor mattered most in bringing about the 
national security shift from greater caution to greater assertiveness after February 
1895—Cleveland’s “collusion” with high finance until February 1895 and following 
populist backlash, or the very timid national security course that Cleveland agreed to 
pursue and that stunned the president himself in due course. Regardless of the 
answer, which might entail a combination of the two factors, it is worth noting that 
neither would have occurred without the financial crisis of 1893-96. 459 
This  assessment  and  the  evidence  backing  it  suggests  that  LaFeber  
might  have overestimated the causal role of heterodox financial policies and 
underestimated the cautionary influence of the financial crises of 1884 and 1893-96 
on American expansionist plans. On the other hand, Zakaria’s explanation does not 
account for the timing and variation of American retreat from expansionism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 On the relevance of both factors see Humphreys (1967:131-164). 
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between 1880 and 1900. In addition, the independent variable ‘weak state and a 
small central government’ does not do a good job of explaining the yo-yo effect of 
American leaders’ expansionist attempts. Why would state weakness matter 
more at certain times and less at others? Zakaria does not fully explain this 
phenomenon, although he argues that jumps forward in relative economic wealth 
changed American leaders’ attitude towards expansionism.	  	  	  	  
That said, Zakaria’s explanation is not incompatible with the one proposed 
here. A weak state and a small central government or, more exactly, a poor 
Treasury, are here described as epiphenomenal products of the relative power of 
American financial elites vis-à-vis national authorities and particularly the change in 
the domestic balance of power following financial-crisis outbreak  and  its  influence  
on  national  security  policies.  Overall, evidence suggests that the financial crises 
placed significant limitations on the translation of American wealth into power. 
 
 
SOLVING A SECURITY DILEMMA WITH  
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION: 
How Japanese-American war scares disappeared and dollar diplomacy thrived 
At the start of the global financial crisis of 1907-08, international arms races 
were in full swing, and diplomatic and military tensions had been mounting in 
some corners of the world, like the Pacific, for quite a while.46088 Throughout 1907, 
as the financial crisis spread around the world, escalating military measures by 
Washington and Tokyo and long-standing diplomatic tension between the United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 The failure  of the Hague  conventions  of 1899 and 1907, respectively,  diminished  the 
prospect  of an international  court for compulsory arbitration and of an international agreement 
over arms limitations. 
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States and Japan brought the two countries to the verge of war. Interestingly, 
between the summer of 1907 and early 1909, war scares subsided. With the 
possible exception of Schweller (2010:26), who has recently acknowledged that 
the United States and Japan were facing a security dilemma in 1907 over the 
defense of the Philippines, international relations literature has shown substantial 
disinterest in the peaking and subsequent resolution of this diplomatic and military 
crisis.  
Explanations as to how—or why—a worsening of the Japanese-American 
security dilemma was avoided in 1907 can be derived from structural realism’s 
balance of power theory as well as from one of its analytical rivals, Schweller’s 
theory of underbalancing. The former would predict that conflict escalation in the 
Pacific in 1907 and 1908 was avoided through successful balancing, namely by 
strengthening military deterrence and establishing new alliances. The latter would 
emphasize the role of elite consensus, social cohesion, and strong state structures in 
explaining successful balancing by either side. This section demonstrates that both 
explanations fail to reveal the evolution of American national security policies in this 
period and that the global financial crisis of 1907-08, and its resolution according to 
LA–HE, mattered greatly in the non-escalation of the 1907 Japanese-American 
security dilemma and war scare. These conclusions are attuned to and shed further 
light on the observation—advanced by many studies in American foreign policy—
that between 1907 and 1909, a paramount  departure  from  Roosevelt’s  global  
strategy  of  “balanced  antagonism” occurred as the White House became more eager 
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to accept Japanese influence in Manchuria and the Far East and resort to dollar-
diplomacy in the conduct of American foreign affairs.461 
Dangers of a Japanese-American war materialized over the issue of Japanese 
immigration to California. Following the October 1906 decision by the San Francisco 
Board of Education to exclude Japanese children from regular schools, along with 
mounting anti-Japanese riots in California and anti-American riots in Japan, the 
ministry of Prince Kimmachi Saionji raised sharp diplomatic protests in December 
1906. A long path of diplomatic negotiations between Tokyo and Washington 
began while anti-Japanese rioting continued, peaking in the spring, summer and fall 
of 1907. Between the fall of 1906 and the spring of 1908, The Washington Post, New 
York Herald, Chicago Daily Tribune, Los Angeles Times, and much of the world 
press predicted a Japanese attack on the Philippines within five years at most.462 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461  American  dollar diplomacy  was initiated  under Roosevelt  as the administration  decided  to 
supervise  the finances  of Central and Latin American  states to prevent British or German 
incursions  into American  waters. Between 1907 and 1909, there was a jump in quality in its 
exercise. Taft and Knox elevated international business to the position where they, rather than 
diplomats, represented the  best  interests  of  the  United  States  overseas. See, amongst  many,  
Beale  (1956:157,326-28;332-334);  Esthus (1959:46-51);   Esthus  (1966:  chapters  8  and  11);  
Griswold  (1938:87-132);   Neu  (1966:433-449);   Kennedy  (1987:247-248); Schulzinger  
(1984:39);  Leopold (1962:chapter  18 and 19); Becker and Wells, Economics and World Power, 
chapter 4; John P. Campbell, “Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911,” Journal of 
American History 53:2 (1966), pp.279-298. 
462  “Note  from  the  Japanese  Embassy,”  October  25,  1906,  Record  Group  59,  General  
Records  of the  Department  of State, 1797/16, NARA; “Japan is warlike” and “Paris Thinks War 
with United States Inevitable,” Washington Post, December 1, 1906; “Expect  Japan  war  within  
five  years,”  Chicago  Daily  Tribune,  December  8,  1906;  “Must  Fight  Japan,”  New  York  
Herald December 11, 1906; “Europe expects a war,” Washington Post, December 16, 1906; 
“Predicts war with Japan: Eminent Japanese urges  his  countrymen  to  prepare,”  Los Angeles  
Times,  December  21,  1906;  “Hawaii,  the  Philippines  and  American  Pacific Commerce  all at 
the Mercy  of Japan’s  Many  Effective  Warships,”  The Washington  Post,  January  20, 1907;  
“Japan  has War Plans: Believed destroyers  could work havoc with battleships  on the Pacific,” 
The Washington Post, July 6, 1907; “Japan Must Secure the Philippines Islands: Manila Bay 
Believed Inevitable Destination of the Mikado’s fleet, Los Angeles Times, September 8, 1907; 
“Russians Want Us to War with Japan,” New York Times, December 1, 1907. See also Roosevelt 
to Charles Fairbanks, February 21, 1908, Morison (ed.), Letters of Theodore Roosevelt VI, 
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War scares were buttressed by escalating military orders or agendas on both sides of 
the Pacific, which made an incident possible. For instance, in April 1907 the Imperial 
Defense Policy approved by the Japanese Emperor gave its navy the freedom to 
designate the United States as its most likely opponent, authorizing the 
construction of a modern fleet inclusive of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers 
(Evans and Peattie 1997:148-151; LaCroix and Wells 1997:1-4; White 
1995:217).463 The Japanese government also signed an agreement with France in 
June 1907, and another with Russia in July 1907.  Adding to the existing Anglo-
Japanese alliance these understandings formed, potentially,  a  quadruple  front  
against  the  United  States  and  Germany  (White 1995: 256).464 
American leadership was not standing militarily idle, either. In October 
1906, Roosevelt started to fear “a bitterly humiliating and disastrous [defeat] which 
would turn not only the Philippines but [also] Hawaii to Japan.”465 Almost a year 
later, the Philippines still remained, in Roosevelt’s view, the United States’ “heel of 
Achilles,” and “all” that made the American “situation with Japan dangerous.”466 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pp.950-52. On the war scare, see Esthus (1966), chapters 8 and 11; and Bailey (1934:54-55). See 
also Chessman (1969:106,121-122); Leopold (1964:273-75);  Sprout (1946):259-264). 
463 The fleet consisted of a squadron of eight battleship and eight cruisers. It was to be supported 
by second-class armored cruisers and ocean-going  destroyers.  Japanese  rearmament  plans  were 
stimulated  by American  rearmament  plans,  which,  in turn, had originated from the Anglo-
German  naval race. 
464 A quadruple alliance in the formal sense did not materialize, but attempts to bring 
it out in practice were made. 
465  Roosevelt to Senator Eugene Hale, October 27, 1906; Roosevelt’s  letter to Cecil Spring Rice, 
December 21, 1907, pp.462-64; H.C. Barns, The Secret Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, New 
York: First Copper  Square Press (2001), pp. 436-438;  Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC. 
466 Roosevelt  to Taft,  August  21, 1907,  The Papers  of William  H. Taft,  reel  321,  
Correspondence  with  Roosevelt,  Library  of Congress, Manuscript Division, DC. Note that the 
fleet was kept in Atlantic and Caribbean waters to demonstrate American determination to uphold 
the Monroe Doctrine. 
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stationing of American ships in the Atlantic, the lack of a Panama Canal ready to 
use, and the absence of an American logistical base in the Pacific increased 
Roosevelt’s fear that a Japanese attack would find the United States unprepared 
or helpless.  As a result, between December 1906 and March 1908, Roosevelt 
embarked on three tasks that would keep him occupied until March 1908:  
“pushing  forward”  battleship construction, guaranteeing a “formidable defense” of 
American naval bases in California and the Philippines, and completing canal works 
in Panama.467  Not surprisingly, as displayed in Table 6, between 1907 and 1909 
American military budgets reached the American pre World War I record level of 
43-45 percent of total government spending, and, as revealed by much of Roosevelt’s 
internal and external correspondence, Japan was the primary target of American 
rearmament efforts.468 
Additionally, in early 1907 the American Presidency and the Navy and War 
departments began to work on contingency war plans in preparation for a possible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Taft to Roosevelt,  March 9; Roosevelt  to Taft August 21, 1907;Taft  to Roosevelt,  August 31; 
Taft to Roosevelt,  January 13, 1908; Roosevelt  to Taft, January  15, 17; Roosevelt  to Charles 
W. Fairbanks,  February  29, 1908; Roosevelt  to Victor Metcalf, March  9, 1908; Roosevelt  to 
Henry  Cabot Lodge,  April 22, 1908; The Papers of William H. Taft, Secretary of War, reel 
321, Correspondence  with Roosevelt; Theodore Roosevelt Papers, series 1, reel 81; series 2, reel 
347; Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,  DC; The Letters of Theodore  Roosevelt,  John 
M. Blum,  Alfred  D. Chandler,  Jr., and Sylvia  Rice,  editors,  Harvard University  Press, 
Cambridge  Massachusetts,  1952, v. 6; Message of the President of December,  3, 1907; 
Roosevelt to Harrison G. Otis, a veteran  of the Civil War and the Spanish-American  war, 
January  8, 1907 and Roosevelt  to Stone, July 26, 1907 in Elting  E.  Morison, The  Letters  of 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press  (1951),  vol. V,  pp.547, 
728;        Roosevelt  to Henry Cabot Lodge,  April 22, 1908 in selections  from Selection from the 
correspondence  of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge 1884-1918, Vol.II, Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1925, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
468 Roosevelt  to Secretary  of State Elihu Root, July 13, 1907; Roosevelt  to British ambassador  
James Bryce, June 10 1907; The Secret Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, pp.452-54; in July 1907, 
Roosevelt confessed to being “more concerned” over the situation with Japan “than almost any 
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Japanese attack in the Pacific. Before 1906, neither service had seriously considered 
an invasion of the Philippines, but in January 1907, at the president’s suggestion, 
the American Army and Navy undertook joint studies on the conduct of a possible 
war with Japan.469 
Between March and the summer of 1907, Roosevelt’s alarm grew and his 
military orders intensified. In March the War Department was ordered to complete 
permanent fortifications in the Philippines and in California “as promptly and 
expeditiously as possible.”470 In June and July, Roosevelt directed the Navy 
Department to mount  the  advanced  defense  of  Subwig  Bay, resolving to send the 
American fleet on a practice voyage around the world as a precautionary war 
measure.471 With the American blue-water navy heading to the Japanese coast, the 
Japanese- American security crisis reached its most intense stage. British Ambassador 
to the US (and Roosevelt’s friend) Cecil Spring Rice expected that a Japanese-
American war was about to begin at that point.472 Hawaiian governor G.W. Carter 
claimed that Hawaii would be taken hands- down, while Senator Latimer of South 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469   Admiral Dewey to Victor H. Metcalf, March 5, 1908, General Board Letterpress V, pp.196-201 
in Braisted (1954:37). 
470 Admiral  Dewey to Victor H. Metcalf,  March 4, 1907, R.G. 80, File No.11406-159.  NARA, 
DC. See also Morton (1949:95-104) and Braisted (1954:32,33). 
471  The fleet needed to be sent, as Roosevelt put it, to “show that it can be done,” and avoid 
running the risk of “experimenting  in a matter of vital importance in time of war.” TR to Henry 
Cabot Lodge, July 10, 1907, and to Elihu Root, July 13, 1907, in Barnes, Secret Letters,  pp.451-
454;  On this point,  see also Beale  (1956:328-29)  and Esthus  (1966:  chapter  11); Roosevelt  to 
Charles 
Fairbanks, February 21, 1908; TR to Cortelyou,  April 19, 1908 in The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt,  John Blum et al., p.1013. Fearing not only a war with Japan but a military defeat to 
Japan, the President  even confided  to Taft that he would award the Philippines  independence  
rather  than  seeing  United  States  lose  them  “under  duress.”  Roosevelt  to  Taft,  August  21,  
1907. Morrison (ed.), Letters of Theodore Roosevelt V, pp.761-62. 
472 Taft to Roosevelt, July 26, 1907; Roosevelt to Admiral William Brownson, July 26, 1907; 
Roosevelt to Taft, August 21, 1907; Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, December 21, 1907. See also 
Krauss and Nyblade (2004:122-24). 
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Carolina was ready to give the Philippines to Japan to put an end to the war scare.473  
In the spring of 1908, American rearmament stopped and the fleet returned home. 
The described American military preparations show that, in 1906 and the 
first half of 1907—when the global financial crisis had not fully reached the United 
States—President Roosevelt could behave as if he were in LA–LE, pushing forward 
its financial and national security agenda. Showing low exposure to the demands 
of high finance, the President firmly stood his ground vis-à-vis notable financiers, 
like Andrew Carnegie, who demanded a reduction in national military spending.474 
Like President Harrison had done during the global financial crisis of 1890-91, 
Roosevelt’s first response to this crisis was to ignore the demands of high finance 
and strengthen American defense. By doing so, however, he fueled the war scare 
and hastened the outbreak of financial crisis in the United States. Indeed, it was not 
a coincidence that worsening financial conditions in the United States and the 
Japanese-American war scare peaked exactly in the second half of 1907, as the two 
events fueled each other. The Washington Post made this clear in June 1907, when it 
reported that London brokers had sold an estimated total of 15,000 shares on the New 
York Market chiefly owing to the Japanese-American situation (“War Scare in Wall 
Street: Liquidation starting from London depresses stocks”).475 In other words, the 
war scare was causing losses to Wall Street, and Wall Street, in turn, could find 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473  “Hawaii at Japan’s mercy,” the Washington Post, June 30, 1907; “Give Philippines to Japan: 
Senator Latimer suggests that it would settle the war scare,” New York Times, July 14, 1907. 
474  Roosevelt to Andrew Carnegie, March 28, 1906, and August 6, 1906 in Brands, The 
Secret Letters, pp.410-11;423-424. 
 
475 Newspapers  of the  times  could  not  describe  this  phenomenon  any  better.  See,  for  instance,  
“War  Scare  in Wall  Street,” Washington Post, June 2, 1907; and “War Scare Affects American 
Stocks,” New York Times, October 6, 1908. 
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further reason to believe that a war was imminent, fueling further war rumors 
and further liquidations. As expected, after the spread of the financial crisis in 
the United States in the second half of 1907, government exposure to high 
finance was high, and the administration found itself in LA–HE. Assertive military 
measures could no longer withstand the wrath of high finance as easily as they had 
previously. In various exchanges with Secretary of War William Taft in the fall of 
1907, a frustrated President complained of the “senseless folly” of American “high 
financiers” who resolutely attacked the administration and “objected” to the 
American fleet going to the Pacific.476 
The pressures of high finance on Roosevelt’s policies continued through 
November 1907 as Wall Street, once again, warned the president not to “demand 
an increase in the navy” or “alarm” would “spread through the country and through 
the world” at the worst “juncture.” Andrew Carnegie kept reminding Roosevelt that 
the United States should have followed the example of Great Britain, which had 
apparently reduced its shipbuilding program for 1907 and, “in all probability,” would 
have done the same in 1908.477 
The president defended American military efforts to balance Japan against 
the demands of high finance as strongly as he could. He briskly replied to Carnegie 
that naval rearmament had to be pushed forward and evocatively wrote that he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476  Roosevelt to Taft, September 5 and September 19, 1907, The Papers of 
William Taft, reel 495. 
477   Andrew Carnegie to Roosevelt, November 18, 1907; Theodore Roosevelt Papers, series 1, reel 
79; Roosevelt to Mr. Schroers, November  11,  1907;  George  Cortelyou  Papers,  “General  
Correspondence,   Box  62;  Roosevelt  letter  to  Douglas  Robinson, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, 
series 2, reel 347; Emlen Roosevelt to Roosevelt, December 23, 1907 and T.E. Watson to 
Roosevelt, December, 16, 1907 in Theodore Roosevelt Papers, series 1, reel 80. 
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would not “‘surrender’ to the bankers,” or any “‘secret midnight conference’ with 
any big financier, or anyone else.” In February 1908, the president gave orders to 
fortify Pearl Harbor and informed congressional authorities of his determination not 
to let “considerations as to the needs of the economy” offset “the greater need of 
guaranteeing the preservation of peace, honor and national interests.”478 This 
resolve on the part of Roosevelt signals that the President attempted to behave as if 
LA–LE could occur, and the administration could overcome the crisis by relying on 
the national advantages of pursuing greater assertiveness in military spending, threat 
assessment, and war prospects, and having business activities resume as normally as 
possible. History proved him wrong. 
In the end, the administration’s necessity to side with financial elites to 
solve the crisis, differently from what had occurred after February 1895, 
counteracted ongoing attempts at balancing Japan.479 Roosevelt eventually promised 
to do “everything in [its] power” to revive financial confidence: this statement, and 
the policy decisions that accompanied it, dampened war prospects and softened 
diplomatic and military tensions between Washington and Tokyo.480 The propaganda 
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479 As the international gold standard triumphed abroad, and  the  United  States  risked  being  
excluded  from  it,  the  costs  of behaving as between 1895 and 1898 became increasingly  clear 
to the American  public and the administration.  Further scrutiny into the preferences of the 
American public and how the influenced the administration might be needed. 
480 Roosevelt became increasingly concerned about the national financial situation  as his 
reassurance  speeches  regarding  the nation’s  sound  economic  position  failed  to  instill  
business  confidence  throughout 1907.  In December 1907, the  President confessed to being 
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campaign that the State Department started in late April 1907, just as the financial 
crisis gained momentum in the United States proves this point. Between April and 
December 1907, Secretary of State Elihu Root  issued  statements  on  the  
“groundless”  nature  of  the Japanese-American war scare, and on the continuing 
“friendship,” “absence of friction,” “harmonious path,” “enduring peace,” and 
“unthinkable war” between Washington and Tokyo. American papers started 
publishing “calm statements of reason” by the Department of State over the 
“absurdity” of a Japanese-American conflict in view of the “respect and love” 
Americans felt for Japanese state officials. This discourse served to reassure 
financial markets that there was nothing to fear; that international financial 
cooperation would continue; and that Japan stood in “good faith.” The Washington 
Post, Wall Street Journal, and Chicago Daily Tribune concluded that financial 
interdependence between  Washington  and  Tokyo  could  only  draw  the  two 
countries together and that “the mere thought of war” would have been, in the words 
of Japanese vice-finance minister Reiziro Wakatsuki and Japanese ambassador to 
the US Aoki, “a grave injury to civilization.”481 
Secretary of War Taft, too, committed to publicly downplaying the 
prospects of a war with Japan to help relieve national financial conditions and 
respond to Wall Street’s outcry. While visiting Japan in early October 1907, Taft 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“under great strain with financial matters” and to “have more difficulty with the currency than 
anything else.” Roosevelt to Emlen Roosevelt, December 13, 1907; Roosevelt to T.E. Watson, 
December 16, 1907; Theodore Roosevelt Papers, series 1, reel 80; Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice 
and T.E. Watson, December 21, 1907, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Blum et al. 
481 “Japanese War Scare Groundless  Root Says,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 20, 1907; 
“Japan’s Future and the United States Along  Harmonious  Path,” Wall Street Journal,  June 9, 
1907; “Why War is Unlikely:  Notwithstanding  our Misunderstandings with Japan,”  Washington  
Post, June 30, 1907; “US War with Japan?  No, Says Envoy  Aoki,”  Chicago Daily Tribune,  
July 4, 1907; “Why Japan wants no war: Lack of money, if nothing else, would prevent it at 
this time,” Washington Post, August 18, 1907; “War with Japan Out of Question: Tokyo in Good 
Faith,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 5, 1907. 
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delivered a sensational speech in which he condemned American jingoes as 
“infamous” and “criminal.”482 It is unlikely that these public declarations would 
have been made had they not been necessary, and perceived as necessary, in 
refueling the confidence of American financial interests and increasing the appeal of 
presidential candidate Taft amongst Wall Street financiers and a large majority of 
the American public— who, after 1900, had come to depend on the international 
gold standard as never before.483 As Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Count 
Hayashi noted in December 1907, disavowing assertive national designs created the 
unfortunate impression that some critical military situation was being covered up. 
Covering up and making his platform as appealing to Wall Street was exactly 
what Taft was doing when he delivered his speech in Tokyo. The American fleet had 
started its journey to reach the Japanese coast. Albeit unsound from a military 
point of view, Taft’s allusion to war as a criminal act gained points within financial 
circles, painting him as the “honest” man high finance needed. 
By the same token, this propaganda campaign to stir business confidence 
worked entirely against the rallying of Congressional support around Roosevelt’s 
military agenda. In March and April 1908, the rearmament plans that the 
administration had since then successfully advocated were halted in both the House 
and the Senate. The requested increases in naval appropriations to match “four 
battleships in the Japanese fleet” that were “superior to any four [American]” were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 Taft’s  visit to Japan  had been decided  by Roosevelt  in late September  1907 while Secretary  
of War Taft was visiting  the Philippines to  make  sure  that  military  plans  proceeded  
expeditiously.  The  visit  had  two  major  goals:  calming  transnational business and investigating  
Japan’s military preparedness.  Taft to McIntyre  and to TR, October 4, 1907; The Papers of 
William Taft,  reel  495;  “War  is  a Crime,  Taft  tells  Japs,”  Cable  to the Chicago  Tribune,  
October  1,  1907;  “Taft  Removes  Cloud,” Washington Post, October 1, 1907;  “Tokyo Cheers 
Taft’s Message of Peace,” Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1907. 
483 In the US, a gold standard had been the only legitimate national financial system since 1900.  
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blocked in Congress due to “harmonious relations between the United States and 
Japan” and the obstacles that further rearmament attempts would pose to the “gospel 
of peace throughout Asia.” Strengthening the cause of high finance and paving the 
way for the triumph of international financial cooperation over a worsening security 
dilemma, Congress had concluded that there was “nothing to provoke the 
multiplication of American battleships.”484 By late 1907, the President, too, was 
aware that the realization of his military agenda was being hindered by the 
political alliance between the administration and high finance established to solve 
the financial crisis. Early in 1907 he would carelessly voice his concern in 
Congress about the Japanese threat and the necessity of keeping the navy at the 
highest point of readiness as he had done in early 1907. By later  that  year,  
however,  he  knew  that  using  Japanese-American  tension  to  influence Congress 
would have meant trouble: thus, when high financiers objected to the fleet going to 
the Pacific in October 1907, Roosevelt ordered that all military measures, including 
those related to the voyage of the fleet, be conducted “as quietly as possible.”485 Had 
preparations not proceeded quietly, domestic outcry would have compounded 
financial and economic recovery. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 Roosevelt  to  Metcalf,  March  9,  10,  28,  29,  1908,  and  Roosevelt  to  Cabot,  April  22,  
1908,  in  The  Letters  of  Theodore Roosevelt, Blum; Roosevelt to Taft, April 16, 1908 The 
Papers of William Taft, reel 321; “Hale Attacks Taft: Clash Over Army Plan,” Washington  Post, 
April 8, 1908: “Two Are Enough,”  April 10, 1908, Chicago Daily Tribune;  “Big Navy Needed,  
Says Taft,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 11, 1908; “Naval Plan Causes Clash: Congressman  
Hobson Fears Nation is in Grave Peril,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 12, 1908. The Naval 
Appropriation Bill originally foresaw the creation of eight battleships to curbJapanese ambition. 
Only two were approved in 1908. 
485 Taft  to  Roosevelt  August  31,  1907,  The  Papers  of William  H. Taft,  reel  321;Taft  to  
Roosevelt,  October  18,  1907,  RG 59:1797/383, NARA. See also Neu, “Roosevelt and the Far 
East,” p.441. 
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Table 4.6. American military spending (ME), GNP, and government spending (CGE), 1880–1897 (in 
million $) 
 
Gradually, and as expected, the administration had to pull back  ambitious  
security policies. As Table 4.6 shows, starting in the spring of 1908, American 
military spending stopped growing. Similarly to what occurred in Italy after the 
financial crisis of 1893-94, American military appropriations from 1909 onwards 
were consistently, or “orthodoxly,” firm at the ceiling of 41 percent of total 
government spending. This was not coincidental, as evidence shows that American 
business elites throughout 1907 and 1908 openly supported the adoption of 
stable military budget “quotas.”486 More importantly, in May 1908, military 
withdrawal from the Pacific began: the war vessels placed in defense of the 
Philippines and Hawaii—those vessels that were supposed to resist a Japanese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486Andrew Carnegie to TR, November 1907; Theodore Roosevelt Papers, series 1, reel 79; “Forced to 
Secure Peace,” 
Washington Post, April 16, 1907; “Finance: The Government’s Fiscal Year and the Outlook,” Harper’s 
Weekly, July 18, 1908 in 
George Cortelyou Papers, box 19.  
      
 
         
         
Year 
Real  
ME 
  Real               
CGE 
Real 
GNP 
 
      ME/ 
      GNP   
     ME/ 
      CGE 
        
CGE/
GNP	  
      
 
 1900 189 516 18694  0.01       0.37 0.028 
1901 204 520 19991  0.01       0.39 0.026 
1902 178 480 21180  0.008       0.37 0.022 
1903 196 503 22099  0.009       0.39 0.022 
1904 266 578 22828  0.012       0.46 0.025 
1905 246 573 25043  0.010       0.43 0.023 
1906 243 560 27171  0.009       0.43 0.020 
1907 237 556 28442  0.008       0.43 0.019 
1908 299 671 28765  0.011       0.45 0.024 
1909 314 707 31647  0.010       0.44 0.023 
1910 272 664 31793  0.008       0.41 0.020 
1911 283 691 33712  0.008       0.41 0.021 
1912 277 672 35502  0.008       0.41 0.018 
1913 288 703 37610  0.008       0.41 0.018 
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attack as the American fleet mobilized—returned home. During the same month 
the Indianapolis News, under “Why Wall Street Switched to Taft,” reported: 
“Something happened which convinced Wall Street that Taft is the man for it.”487 
A few months later, the battle-fleet also made its way to American shores, while 
Roosevelt was called to deny that he had ever contemplated a war against Japan. The 
portrayal of a relationship of mutual “gratitude” and “friendship” between 
Washington and Tokyo replaced previous allusions to an impending war. Japan 
“shuddered” at the idea of war, it was said, and fully committed to deflationary 
orthodoxy and cuts to the military budget.488 By 1909, the United States and 
Japan were no longer on the brink of war. Diplomatically, and militarily, they were 
moving away from power balancing. 
The shift away from power balancing occurred in three stages. It started with 
Taft’s visit to Japan and the Asian mainland in late 1907, and the anti-war, pro-
business speeches that he delivered throughout the journey.489 It then gained 
momentum throughout 1908, as American financial elites reached the pinnacle of 
their power vis-à-vis the administration because, as discussed earlier, the 
administration needed their complicity to quell the financial crisis and restore 
business confidence. Lastly, the shift became a reality with Taft’s electoral victory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Indianapolis News, May 19, 1908, in The Papers of William Taft, reel 321. 
488 “War scare has Subsided: Secretary Metcalf Says the Navy Beats Diplomacy,”  Los Angeles 
Times, May 18, 1908; “Roosevelt Denies Remark Touching War with Japan: Hobson must be 
misquoted,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 10, 1908. “Japan Shudders At War:  Mikado’s 
Representative Says  His Country  is Grateful  to United  States,”  New York Times,  July  11, 
1908;  “Japan’s Economies  Severe:  They Involve  Heavy  Sacrifices  in Navy  and Army  
Expenditures,”  New York Times,  September  15, 1908; “Our Fleet in Japan,” New York Times, 
October 20, 1908; “Friendship with Japan,” Washington Post, February 4, 1909. 
489 See in particular “Taft’s Significant Shanghai Speech,” New York Times, November 24, 1907; 
and “Taft Ridicules Japan WarTalk: War Chief Tells Easterners There’s No Possibility of 
Conflict,” Washington Post, February 20, 1907. 
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in 1908, thereby confirming once again the relevance of this variable for studying the 
national security influence of financial crises in the American context.490 In 1908, 
Taft was Wall Street’s honest man as much as Cleveland had been in 1884 and 
1892.491 As explained in The Washington Post of October 18, 1908, one major 
issue set Taft on a different level from his competitors to the Presidency: his 
support of a foreign policy of market enlargement and financial penetration on the 
Asian mainland. As The Post wrote, Taft had the advantage of “realizing that 
the amazing industrial growth of the US” made the creation of new markets 
abroad “an imperious necessity.”492 
With the installment of the Taft-Knox administration in 1909, US leadership 
openly legitimized national security policies that were tailored to the desires and 
protection of financial elites.  American leaders embarked on the very  same  plan  
that  Roosevelt  had  consistently opposed during his two terms as president—the 
overly ambitious agenda of “civilizing” regions of the world through the promotion 
of international financial competition. 
The contrast between this American foreign policy and pre-1907 American 
national security objectives was explicitly and enthusiastically acknowledged  by  the  
new administration.493 A  “crusade for peace” only on paper, the new  foreign  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 Roosevelt had decided not to run for President in 1908, a decision that he later regretted; he 
supported his Secretary of War, who would have disappointed him later. Roosevelt letter to 
Kermit Roosevelt, January 27, 1908, The Secret Letters, pp.74-5. 
491 “William Taft is Wall Street’s man,” Indianapolis News, May 19, 1908.      
492  “Taft Foreign Policy:  One Important Point in which He and Bryan Differ,” Washington  Post, 
October  18, 1908; “Talks  of Money  and Taft,”  Los Angeles Times March 19, 1908.  The Post 
also wrote,  “Mr. Bryan evidently has no conception  of that greater  America  which  Mr. Taft 
sees  so clearly  and would  work  to build  up. Mr. Bryan’s political outlook does not extend 
beyond our Atlantic and Pacific seaboards. Mr. Taft’s view sweeps over a wider area”. 
493 Many members of business and/or political figures like William Straight and Francis M. 
Huntington, who staunchly opposed Roosevelt’s pro-Japanese and investment-shy  Asian stance, 
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policy  transferred international competition from the military to the economic 
sphere and made it universal and perpetual—as opposed to localized and 
intermittent, as it had been in the pre-1907 context and as Roosevelt understood it.494 
Knox’s 1909 neutralization proposal and, during the same year, the linked 
establishment of an international investment consortium in China killed the spirit of 
the Open Door and sowed the seeds of the forthcoming Chinese Revolution of 1911 
and 1912. Thus, in creating the conditions for transferring competition from the 
military sphere to the economic sphere, the financial crisis of 1907-08 still increased 
the probability of conflict, though the results were not fully visible until a few years 
after the crisis. Moreover, international financial competition in Manchuria did not 
improve American relations with Japan or Germany, or among Japan, Russia, and 
China. Rather, it involved all nations in complex political entanglements that, along 
with the ambitious goals of the new foreign policy course, pointed towards a far less 
cautious American foreign policy stance. Notably, unleashing international financial 
competition in China was an option that the Roosevelt administration had 
deliberately shunned, as this promised to disregard Japanese and Russian security 
interests and negatively affect Chinese territorial integrity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
were now promoted to high-ranking  positions. William W. Rockhill was removed from the scene 
and sent from Peking to St. Petersburg in May 1909. Inaugural Address of William H. Taft, 
March 4, 1909;  “Diplomatic  Changes:  Taft’s  Appointments  to Foreign  Policy  Posts  Meet  
With  Strong  Approval,  Washington  Post, December 22, 1909; “Carnegie Aids Peace Crusade: 
America’s Aim Stated,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 30, 1909; “President Taft Delighted,”  New 
York Times, July 16, 1909; “Germany is Warned of Our New Policy: Chinese Loan First Step,” 
New York Times, July 18, 1909. On Taft and Knox’s “dollar diplomacy,”  see Ferrell (1957: 
chapters 9 and 10); Esthus (1966: chapter 14); Schulzinger (1984:39); Beale (1956:333). 
494  Archival evidence shows that between Taft’s electoral victory and the installment  of the new 
administration,  Roosevelt tried to resist the national security change. In a few letters to future 
Secretary of State Philander Knox and future President Taft, TR stressed  the necessity  of 
maintaining  good  relations  between  United  States  and Japan  and preserving  the existing  
spheres  of influence  in China, as Japan needed to “feel safe” and be prevented  from “attacking  
the United States” down the road. TR to Knox, February 8, 1909; and TR to William H. Taft, 
March 3, 1909, The Secret Letters, pp.510-515. 
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Thanks to the financial crisis, war scares and mutual suspicions between the 
American and Japanese leaderships were quelled, and military competition in the 
Pacific was replaced with financial and economic antagonism. Being in LA–HE 
caused this redefinition or change of direction of American national security policies. 
As historians like Howard Beale and Raymond Esthus have observed, in late 1906 
and early 1907 the Open Door policy and the strategy of international balancing that 
underpinned it were more established in Asia than ever before. The policy enjoyed 
the full backing of prominent Japanese, French, and Russian statesmen as well as a 
large majority of American diplomats, including Secretary of State Root and the 
American minister to Peking William Rockhill.495 Ito Sajonji, prominent Japanese 
statesmen like Foreign Minister Tadasu Hayashi, and important Japanese newspapers 
similarly favored a strict observance of the Open Door. 496  More remarkably, 
respect for China’s sovereignty,  a foundational principle of the Open Door and 
power balancing, was also very successfully upheld by Roosevelt when he used the 
threat of force to defend American trading rights against Chinese boycott and 
staunchly stood against further Japanese incursions into Manchuria in 1905-06.497 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 Beale (1956:121;333)  and Esthus (1966:34). 
496 The Nichi Nichi Shimbun, the paper of Foreign Minister Takaaki Kato, stated that nothing 
would be more detrimental to Japan than violating  the principle of the Open Door. The leading 
newspaper  Jiji Shimpo agreed. Jiji Shimpo, March 28 and April 25, 1906, and Nichi Nich 
Shimbun, April, 11, 1906, in Beale (1956:121;333)  and Esthus (1966:34). 
497 Roosevelt dispatched battleships to Asia and threatened the Chinese government with military 
intervention to end the Chinese boycott of American exports (1905-06). Five destroyers were sent 
to Canto, two cruisers went to Shanghai, a battleship squadron arrived in Hong Kong, and a 
warship was transferred from Chefang. On this point, see Beale (1956:213) and Riccards 
(2000:55). The Open Door doctrine  or policy,  coined  by Secretary  of State John Hay in 1900, 
justified  and defended  Chinese  territorial integrity and international spheres of influence in China 
for trade and commercial purposes. Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, June 13, 1904; Roosevelt to 
Baron Kentaro Kaneko, May 31, 1905; TR to Elihu Root of July 13, 1907; TR to Cecil Spring 
Rice, June16, 1905, in Brands, The Secret Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, pp.361-362 and pp. 381-
385. Esthus (1959:435-454). 
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Roosevelt intended to keep balancing Japan in 1907 and 1908, but his crisis 
resolution strategy— that is the strategy that he needed to endorse to solve the 
crisis—prevented this, forcing him to opt for greater international financial 
cooperation and greater national security caution. American Asian policy was 
therefore transformed. In 1907, given the strengthening of relationships among Japan, 
Russia and France, balancing Japan would have required the United States to form 
an American-German-Chinese entente. Although this relationship was actively 
pursued by Germany and China, the United States did not consider it.  Instead, in 
July 1908 Washington signed the Root-Takahira agreement, which reinforced 
Japan’s position in Eastern Asia by isolating China diplomatically and drawing the 
United States much further into the treaty network by granting special privileges to 
foreigners in the Chinese Empire.498 Successful balancing would also have required 
an increase in military build-up between 1907 and 1910, but, as explained earlier, 
was stopped when the war scare intensified. 
Ultimately, the argument that the Japanese–American security crisis was 
solved through balancing diplomacy—an argument derived from existing IR theory 
on power balancing—is unconvincing.499 In actuality, its resolution lay  in  the  
defense of  sound  financial and  trade relations between Washington and Tokyo to 
relieve the confidence of high finance and escape financial crisis. It also seems likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 Reid (1935:34); and Bailey (1940:229). 
499 Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, June 13, 1904; Roosevelt to Baron Kentaro Kaneko, May 31, 
1905; TR to Elihu Root of July 13, 1907; TR to Cecil Spring Rice, June 16, 1905, in Brands, The 
Secret Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, pp.361-362 and pp. 381-385. See also Dennett (1924:15-
21), and Reid (1940:66-70).  
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that, in the absence of the financial crisis, American business elites would not have 
persuaded Roosevelt’s administration to backtrack from the 	  
assertive foreign policy towards Japan; the Roosevelt administration would not have 
felt pressured to abandon its military plans in the Pacific to resolve the crisis and 
restore business confidence; the American rearmament program would have 
continued; the public defense of an alleged “enduring friendship” between Tokyo and 
Washington would have been much less necessary; the American Japanese conflict 
would have escalated much more easily; American– Asian policy would have 
focused more on the Pacific than on the Asian mainland; and President Taft and his 
administration would have adopted a less pro-business set of national security 
policies. US diplomatic and military policies would have manifested significant 
differences. 
 
MILITARY CAPITULATION VERSUS GREATER NATIONAL 
DEFENSE: Hoover, Roosevelt, and their different approaches to crisis 
resolution and American security 	  
In contrast to the financial crises discussed so far, the national security 
influence of the financial crisis of 1929-33, more commonly known as the Great 
Depression, has been long acknowledged. Robert Ferrell concluded as early as 1957 
that, “more than any other single factor,” the Great Depression “palsied” American 
statesmen’s hands, resulting in a timid diplomatic and military response to the 
disruption of peace in the Far East and the rise of a threatening new order in 
Europe.500 Since then, works at the intersection of international political economy 
and security studies (Trubowitz 1998:159,160,163; Narizny 2007:107,146) as well as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Ferrell (1957:5, 278, and chapter 2). 
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a number of historical studies (Divine 1961; DeConde 1989; Doenecke and Stoler 
2005; Schmitz 2007) have acknowledged  that  the  Depression  constrained  the  
American  national  security agenda, curbing the military budget and reinforcing the 
isolationist, defensive, and anti-military tendencies in American foreign policy. 
From this perspective, which the American State Department shares, the collapse in 
state revenues and the related need to rescue the regions or sectors of the country 
most affected by the Great Depression created strong incentives within the 
administration and Congress to economize on armaments, compounding the 
development of a timid foreign policy and American disinterest in war.501 
This analysis emphasizes a distinct but equally important aspect of the 
influence of the crisis of 1929-33 on American national security policies. 
Specifically, the similarly low exposure to high finance but diverse affinity with 
high finance characterizing the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations channeled 
American military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects towards extreme 
prudence if not military surrender under Hoover, and towards new assertive avenues 
under Roosevelt. In other words, although American national security policies 
remained much closer to internationalism than assertiveness for most of the 
decade and throughout both administrations for reasons that have been amply shown 
in the literature, Roosevelt’s diplomatic and military intentions were much less 
timid than commonly recognized by existing accounts on the national security 
influence of the Great Depression. This lessened timidity was largely due to the 
inability of high finance to solve the crisis and, relatedly, the strong public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501 http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/GreatDepression 
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components at the core of the New Deal and of the second stage of financial crisis 
response.  
Notably, throughout most of the 1930s, as was true throughout most of the 
1920s, American national security policies had an inherent, unprecedented bias 
towards caution or internationalism in security affairs (Trubowitz 1998:96-168; 
Narizny 2007:147). In 1923, for instance, the share of total government spending 
going to defense was lowered by 20 percentage points compared to the prewar 
years, and remained there for several years.502   This cautionary bias was primarily a 
reaction to the Great War,  its  deleterious  military  and  financial consequences, 
and the resulting American shift towards isolationism. Second, national security 
prudence was intrinsic to the post-World War I, Anglo-American architecture of 
world economic reconstruction—an architecture that depended upon the promotion 
of international peace and disarmament efforts, was initiated by the Washington 
Treaty of 1921-22,  and  was  carried forward at the Geneva Disarmament Conference 
of 1927, the London Naval Conference of 1930, and the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference of 1932-34.503 
Linked to the presence of weighty reasons for pursuing a cautionary set 
of national security policies, the impact of a number of other variables and related 
snowballing effects that influenced national security policies in  this  period  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 Historical Statistics of  the  United  States,  Washington,   DC:  Bureau  of  Census,  U.S.  
Department of Commerce (1975), Millennial Edition Online, Cambridge University Press. See also 
Hoff (1971:48-50); Offner (1975:80); and Eloranta (2003). 
503 As Herbert Hoover stated when he was Secretary of Commerce in October 1922, a message 
earnestly repeated thereafter by President Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge,  “reductions in 
armaments” were “contributing  to the balancing  of budgets and the cessation of inflation” and, 
ultimately, world economic recovery and growth. Hoover’s address at Toledo, Ohio, October 16, 
1922 in Records of the House, 67th Congress (1921-23), Committee on Foreign Affairs, Box 392, 
HR 67A-F17.7, NARA. DC. 
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complicates an  analysis  of  the  national security influence of the financial crisis 
of 1929-36, and renders problems of multi-causality, multicollinearity, and over-
determination particularly daunting to solve. In the 1920s, and even more so in the 
1930s, for instance, American national security policies were also affected by the 
workings of a flawed international financial system; the greater political relevance of 
previously marginalized domestic groups; and the concomitance of financial crisis 
with crises in the agricultural, farm, and real estate sectors. Determining the relative 
weight of these factors versus that of the financial crisis is a complicated enterprise 
and one into which this work does not venture. Despite these analytical constraints, 
the following pages suggest that the framework’s scenarios, particularly scenarios 
HA–HE and HA–LE, are as analytically useful to discern the national security 
influence of this crisis-period as they have been for the examined crisis periods. 
Validating the formulated expectations, between 1930 and 1932 the 
financial crisis led the Hoover administration to escalate its pre-crisis national 
security caution. To begin, significant reductions in military spending were deemed 
necessary to solve the crisis and implemented at least twice between 1930 and 
1932. As Table 7 displays, American defense spending was on the rise when the 
stock market crashed in October 1929. The ascent had begun in 1927, after the 
failure of the international disarmament talks in Geneva and growing fears of arms 
races (Dewey 1968:536;  Carlton  1968:573-598;  Offner  1975:78;  Rhodes  
2001:69).504 In  an  attempt  to strengthen American diplomatic leverage and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 At the Geneva Conference of 1927, cooperation failed due to incompatible goals between the 
Americans and the British over whether large or small cruisers needed to be protected. Fearing 
British armed merchantmen, the Coolidge administration insisted on the right to build large rather 
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reignite international cooperation on naval disarmament, the Coolidge 
administration had amended the cautious set of national security policies pursued 
since 1923 with a slightly more assertive program of military spending.505 
President Hoover initially carried forward his predecessor’s “tougher”—or, more 
appropriately, “less dovish”—military stance and passed legislation that increased 
military spending for four years, from July 1929 to July 1933, just a few months 
before joining Britain, France, Japan, and Italy in London for the London Naval 
Conference held January-June 1930.506 
By late 1931, this greater military vigor had come under criticism and the 
American cruiser program begun under Coolidge had been abandoned, allowing the 
US Navy to fall, numerically at least, far behind Great Britain and Japan (Rhodes 
2001:79). Archival evidence shows that the administration’s efforts to stop the 
spread of the crisis demanded military retrenchment. As Hoover explained at the 
opening meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce in May 1931,  “arms  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
than small cruisers and arming any small cruisers with eight-inch  guns. The British refused to 
abandon their naval supremacy in cruisers. France and Italy had declined to attend the conference. 
505 A diluted Naval Construction Act for the buildup of fifteen cruisers was therefore authorized in 
February 1929 while dialogue with Britain and Japan over the upcoming naval conference in 
London continued in the spirits of the Kellogg-Briand  pact of war renunciation approved by 
Congress. The Act, which President Calvin Coolidge had strenuously backed in view of the waning 
bargaining leverage  against Britain at disarmament  meetings  in 1927, was diluted by a clause 
providing  for its suspension  if a naval limitation agreement became a reality. On these 
developments, see Hagan (1991:276-279). 
506 President  Hoover’s  Press Conference  Statement  of July 23, 1929 in William  S. Myers,  The 
State Papers  and Other Public Writings of Herbert  Hoover,  vol.1,  New  York:  Doubleday,  
Doran  and  Company  (1934),  p.76;  Message  of  the  President  to Congress,  December  3, 1929, 
Senate Journal,  71th Congress,  2nd  session  and special  session  1929-1930;  Memoirs of 
Herbert Hoover:  The Cabinet  and the Presidency,  1920-33,  New  York:  MacMillan  (1951),  
p.330;  James  T. Shotwell,  “The  Londo Conference: Parity for Defense and the Impossibility  of 
a Purely Mathematical  Adjustment,”  New York Times, March 12, 1930; James T. Shotwell, 
“Navies and Policy: Necessity of Deciding Whether Naval Armaments  is to be Determined  by 
the Needs of Defense,”  The  New  York  Times,  March  14,  1930;  “Outlines  Naval  Treaty  
Success,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  May  13,  1930; “Prosperity Glimpsed by Occasionally in 1930,” 
Los Angeles Times, December 28, 1930. 
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cuts”  and  “world  disarmament”  were  primary  factors  in “encouraging the revival 
of world business.” Along similar lines, in the following days and months “sharp 
economies in national defense budgets” and “particularly the naval budget” were 
described by the administration as  “necessary” for  promoting  a  “vast  plan  of  
capital expenditures” and promoting the “rehabilitation of the country.”507 In the 
words of Treasury Secretary Odgen Mill, “drastic reductions in arms expenditures 
across the world and at home” were “essential” for their “profound,” 
“psychological” promise of stirring business out of the “present lethargy.”508 
The intensification of Japanese military incursions in the Far East between 
late 1931 and early 1932 stirred fears in California over United States’ naval 
weakness, raising voices in Congress to stop ongoing cuts to national armaments.509 
But the world disarmament conference of 1932 was about to begin in Geneva, and 
the Hoover administration was committed to going full speed ahead with its 
disarmament plans. Hoover further solidified America’s extra cautious military 
stance by offering, during Geneva’s inconclusive disarmament talks, a radical plan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 “Hoover Urges Arms Cut to Revive Trade in Opening World Chamber of Commerce, Special 
cable to the New York Times, May 4, 1931; “Plea for Reduction of Armament as Essential to Peace 
and Prosperity,” Hoover’s Opening Address at the Opening Meeting at the Sixth General 
Congress of the International Chamber  of Commerce,  Washington  DC, May 4, 1931; Stimson to 
Hoover,  several  messages,  May  27, 1931;  in Stimson’s  Papers,  reel 81. “Cabinet Inquiry Into  
the Financial  Situation  of the Government:  Hope for Relief in Expenditures,”  July 18, 1931;   
“Drastic  Economies  in Public Expenditures  are proposed  with special reference to Naval 
Budget,” October 16, 1931; Announcement  of Reductions  in Departmental  Budgets,” Hoover’s 
Press Statement, November 6, 1931; in Myers, The State Papers, vol.1, pp.358, 558, and vol.2, 
pp.11, 27. 
508 Mill to Young  12/16/1932;  Mill’s preliminary  draft Jan. 1932; and “Undermining  
Confidence,”  New York Herald Tribune, 10/05/1933, in The Papers of Odgen Mills, Box 11, 
General Correspondence, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, DC.  
509 “A Feeble Navy, Washington Post, August 10, 1931; “Uncle Sam’s Navy Weakness:  Our 
Perilous Inferiority  at Sea Both to Japan and England,”  Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1932. 
Congressional  Record, 72nd  Congress,  1st  session, January 2, 1932, pp. 2948-49;  “Hoover  and 
Cabinet  Act,” New York Times, February  1, 1932 “Crisis in East Stirs Congress  Activity,”  The 
New York Times, February 2, 1932. 
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for scrapping one-third of all arms. This proposal marked the capitulation of the 
American Navy. On January 1, 1932, the United States had in commission only 148 
fighting vessels of all classes, compared to 187 for Great Britain and 219 for 
Japan. By December 31, 1932, the American Navy was down to a mere 101 
compared to 140 for Great Britain and 184 for Japan.510 Hoover’s maneuver is 
especially striking if one considers that it was proposed after Hugh Gibson, the 
American delegate to the Geneva disarmament conference, had alerted the State 
Department that further American initiative on the disarmament front needed to stop, 
the American fleet being already far below the limits of the London Treaty.511 
Table 4.7. American military spending (ME), GNP and government spending (CGE), 1926–1937 (in 
million $) 
 
 
Not surprisingly, national military spending for the year 1932 exhibited a 
10 percent decrease compared to its 1931 levels (Table 4.7). Had the financial crisis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510 See in particular Mitchell (1946:278,292);  and Rhodes (2001:69).   
511 Hugh Gibson to Stimson, June 4, 1932, Stimson’s Papers, reel 83; “New Role at Home Seen 
for Stimson,” New York Times, May 15, 1932; “Hoover Urges World Cut in Armies, Navies,” 
Chicago Daily Tribune, June 23, 1932.      
 
         
Year 
Real  
ME 
  Real           
CGE 
  Real 
GNP 
 
      ME/ 
      GNP   
     ME/ 
      CGE 
   CGE 
/GNP	  
      
 
 1926 583 2916 96736  0.006 0.200 0.030 
1927 586 2899 97187  0.006 0.202 0.030 
1928 665 3005 99113  0.007 0.221 0.031 
1929 696 3127 103900  0.007 0.222 0.030 
1930 753 3405 94359  0.008 0.221 0.037 
1931 813 3970 85562  0.009 0.205 0.051 
1932 795 5274 67011  0.012 0.151 0.089 
1933 683 4849 59786  0.011 0.141 0.085 
1934 524 6443 64291  0.008 0.081 0.097 
1935 694 6342 71945  0.009 0.109 0.0861 
1936 903 8321 83000  0.012 0.108 0.099 
1937 905 7472  76404  0.010 0.121 0.081 
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not occurred, there would have been no reason for these cuts to be as swift and 
radical as they were. The commitment of the Hoover administration to attempt to 
respond to the financial crisis in central Europe and Britain starting in May 1931 
provides exactly that reason. 
Although the influence of the financial crisis on American threat assessment 
and war prospects is possibly less striking than the examined influence of the crisis 
on military spending, evidence indicates that the crisis tilted the Hoover 
administration towards a softer assessment of the Japanese threat than would have 
otherwise occurred. Indeed, the administration’s primary commitment to rescue the 
international gold standard from collapse and win the confidence of high finance 
impelled the adoption of a strategy of “watchful waiting” towards Japan. The Far 
Eastern Crisis—the staging of the Mukden incident by Japan’s Kwantung Army—
started on September 18, 1931, just three days before the collapse of the pound and 
British abandonment of the gold standard on September 21, 1931. After the failure of 
international financial cooperation, financial troubles mounted at home, too, with a 
second wave of banking crises in October 1931. Hoover’s absorption in promoting 
international financial cooperation and buttressing the confidence of high finance 
internationally and domestically took priority over the Manchurian crisis. 
More importantly, investing in national financial credibility and restoring 
confidence amongst financial elites to save the international gold standard demanded 
a response to rising military threats with greater military sacrifices and commitment 
to world disarmament. This is symptomatically illustrated by Stimson’s non-
recognition  doctrine,  the  toothless  American policy articulated in January 1932 
	   277 
after the Japanese occupation of the Chinchow port.512 As Stimson specified in late 
February 1932, American authorities refused to accept Japanese territorial changes 
based on  American  “willingness  to  surrender  its  commanding  lead  in battleship 
construction” and “leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without further 
fortification.” The administration’s maneuver would appear nonsensical to military 
strategists, if not to most people who ignored the mental frames sustaining a properly 
functioning international financial order.513 In Japan, where those frames held 
together a small minority and alienated the masses, Stimson’s doctrine could only 
appear, as has been acknowledged (Rhodes 2001:83), a “bluff.”514 To the Hoover 
administration, however, bluffing meant negating the value of those frames at a 
time when resolving the global financial crisis made them most necessary. The costs 
of this strategy became clear a year and half after the October 1929 crash. 
In alignment with the expectations and the analytical framework, 
Roosevelt’s strategy of crisis response replaced some of the constraints pushing 
American national security policies towards caution with incentives to pursue 
greater assertiveness. Like Hoover’s before him, the Roosevelt’s administration had 
to coexist with a number of forces within the nation buttressing a foreign policy of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512 Stimson stated  in his non-recognition  note  that  the United  States  would  not recognize  any  
treaty,  agreement,  or de facto situation that impaired the rights of American citizens or the 
territorial and administrative  integrity of China, or that violated the Kellogg-Briand  Pact of war 
renunciation. 
513 Stimson to The Secretary of State to the Chairman  of the Committee  on Foreign  Relations  
(Borah),  United  States  Senate, February  23, 1932 in U.S., Department  of State, Publication  
1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941: U.S., Government  Printing  
Office,  Washington  DC (1943:167-173).  See also “Secretary Stimson’s  Speech  at Philadelphia  
on Hoover’s Foreign Policy,” New York Times, October 2, 1932; and Rhodes (2001:84).  
514 The Act authorized the construction of three new battleships  armed with 16-inch guns, two 
additional  aircraft carriers, nine new cruisers, 23 new destroyers and nine additional submarines 
(Rhodes 2001:152).   
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isolationism and virtual pacifism. Yet, Roosevelt’s low exposure to high finance 
during the second stage of crisis response pushed American military spending, threat 
assessment, and war prospects away from Hoover’s conciliatory stance even if 
passing the various reforms and legislative acts of the New Deal required defending 
military and diplomatic caution. The result was an ambiguous security posture in 
which caution and assertiveness coexisted. Policy paralysis was often reached and a 
cautious approach triumphed in that sense, but elements for the curbing of appeasing 
military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects appeared too. 
Evidence shows that, from his first days in office, President Roosevelt backed 
naval military buildup as a means to create jobs, contribute to national economic 
recovery, and defend the country against the rising Japanese threat. In June 1933, 
as part of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Roosevelt allocated $238 million in 
public works funds for the modernization of 32 cruisers, destroyers, and 
submarines—the largest naval building program since 1916. Under the new 
administration, crisis resolution and naval rearmament were no longer, or not always, 
at odds. Naval rearmament was pushed further at the beginning of 1934 when 
Roosevelt gave   support to the Vinson-Trammel bill, which provided for the 
construction and replacement of ships up to the limits allowed by the Washington 
and London naval treaties of 1922 and 1930 (Borg and Okamoto 1973:207-208; 
Dallek 1979:75; Rhodes 2001:127,130; Doenecke and Stoler 2005:30). Had the 
American leadership not desired investment in naval rearmament from 1933 
onwards, the capitulation of the American Navy that had begun with Hoover would 
have gone forward. Notably, despite Roosevelt’s determination to keep the Navy on 
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course, it was only in 1938 that Congress approved a comprehensive rearmament 
program, the second Vinson Act.515 One must wonder what would have happened 
had response to the financial crisis continued along Hoover’s lines after 1933. 
Because his naval program created accusations of ultra-nationalism and 
widespread criticism across the country, Roosevelt went to great lengths to persuade 
critics that the White House stood by further international reductions in 
armaments—especially naval—and that the newly authorized naval building 
program would not draw the nation into a crisis with Japan.516 Pursuing 
disarmament and military restraint, sanctioning a Far Eastern policy of non-
provocation and lecturing the Japanese about the principles of good behavior—a task 
in which Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Chief of the Far Eastern Division 
Stanley Hornbeck were particularly invested—became key American foreign  
policy  guidelines  for  allowing  national  economic reform and rearmament. 
Crucially, although both Hoover and Roosevelt were fighting for disarmament and 
attempting to prevent the collapse of the Treaties, their purposes were different. For 
Hoover, world disarmament and sharp cuts to the American Navy were the 
means for bringing relief and confidence to high finance and solving the 
financial crisis at home and	  abroad. For Roosevelt, the pursuit of world 
disarmament and respect for the Treaties were necessary means to overcome 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515 The Act authorized the construction  of three new battleships  armed with 16-inch guns, two 
additional  aircraft carriers, nine new cruisers, 23 new destroyers and nine additional submarines 
(Rhodes 2001:152).   
516 As a result, the policy towards disarmament and the Far Eastern policy that the Hoover 
administration  had pursued were not abandoned  but  kept  as  a  bargaining  chip  for  passing  
economic  reforms.  The  same  was  true  for  Hoover’s  policy  of  non- intervention in Latin 
America. 
 
	   280 
Congressional opposition to arms construction, build up the American Navy to treaty 
limits, and neutralize hostility to New Deal legislation to solve the financial crisis at 
home.517 
Roosevelt’s strategy for crisis response also conveyed, in agreement with 
expectations, greater alarm vis-à-vis the Japanese threat, and a greater 
determination not to respond to war prospects with military unpreparedness. On 
assuming the powers of the Presidency in March 1933, Roosevelt sent a request for 
a partial arms embargo to Congress. The target was obviously Japan, with the 
implicit message that the United States would not refrain from punishing aggressors. 
The act was blocked in the Senate, but Roosevelt resisted the ensuing Congressional 
pressures to sign a neutrality law and an impartial arms embargo until late 1935, 
when the Italo-Ethiopian crisis made the passage of any embargo preferable to no 
action. It is hard to believe that Hoover would have been willing to present 
Congress with an impartial arms embargo request or send a similar message. 
American financial interests, upon which Hoover’s national security policies 
depended after the financial-crisis outbreak, equated “economic sanctions” against 
Japan with “cowardly war,” and the mere thought of conflict escalation between 
Japan and the United States was regarded as an “absurdity” in view of Japanese-
American investment opportunities and Japan’s faithful service to its obligations.518 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 On the aura of domestic legitimacy that the Treaties carried domestically,  see Dallek 
(1979:31,53;  Rhodes 2001:127). In May 1934, Roosevelt moved unsuccessfully  to prevent the 
collapse of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament  (1932-34). In 1935-36 the  administration   
participated  in  the  Second  London  Naval  Conference  (December  1935-March  1935)  to  
renegotiate  the Washington and London Treaties. The Treaties would have expired in 1936.   
518  “Foreign Entanglements,”  Washington Post, February 1, 1932; “Japan’s New Policy,” 
Washington Post, September 21, 1933; “Is Japan Our Enemy? Expert Brands War Fears as 
Fantasy,” Washington Post, August 19, 1934; “Clash of America’s Foreign Policy with Japan’s 
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Hoover himself, in August 1932, forced Stimson to redact any allusion to a 
discriminatory arms embargo from a speech he was about to deliver to the Council 
on Foreign Relations.519 Against both the preferences of high finance and Hoover’s 
foreign policy stance, Roosevelt in the summer of 1933 justified naval build-up based 
on the fact that “the whole scheme of things in Tokyo” did not “make for an 
assurance of non-aggression in the future” (Dallek 1979:75).520 Although FDR had 
no intention of risking war in the Far East when he assumed power, his very 
admission of the possibility of being attacked by Japan in the future imbued his 
national security policies with a tone of gravity that Hoover could not afford. In the 
array of national security responses to the financial crisis that Hoover considered, 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation of war could not be questioned. For 
Roosevelt, however, the Pact itself was a nuisance. 
That Roosevelt’s strategy of crisis response unleashed a less cautionary threat 
assessment than was possible under Hoover’s strategy of crisis response is also 
evident from Roosevelt’s use of the post-World War I treaty structure. Like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Causes Concern,” Washington  Post, October  28, 1934. The American  business  community  thus 
expressed itself with regard to the prospect of economic sanctions towards Japan (February  
1932): “The suggestion  that the United States should set up an economic  boycott against Japan 
is so silly as to be worthy of the theorists  who bungle international  relations through the League 
of Nations. An economic boycott is merely cowardly war.” 
519 Richard  N. Current,  Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft,  New Brunswick  (1954), 
pp.99,100,108.  The summer  of 1932 witnessed the start of the Chaco War between Bolivia and 
Paraguay. Hostilities continued between Japan and China. 
American pre-1933 policy stance on war 
prospects seems unlikely. 
520 It is true that by then  Japan  had officially  withdrawn  from  the League  of Nations  and 
disclosed  its intention  to abandon existing  naval  limitation  agreements.  Had  Hoover  been  in  
power  rather  than  Roosevelt  at  the  time,  a  similar  overhaul  of American pre-1933 policy 
stance on war prospects seems unlikely. 
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Hoover, Roosevelt was committed to playing within this architecture.521 Unlike 
Hoover, however, FDR envisioned a more flexible use of this structure to serve the 
United States’ national defense needs. Following the failure of the Geneva 
disarmament conference, in 1934, when the arms races in Japan and central Europe 
were in full swing and the Italo-Ethiopian conflict was brewing, American 
isolationist pressures had gained momentum, forcing Roosevelt to accept the 
passing of the Neutrality Act in August 1935.522 
Knowing that the Act would expire in early 1936, and well aware of the 
strident opposition by domestic pacifists and isolationists to armament expenditures, 
Roosevelt used the upcoming Naval Conference in December 1935-March 1936 in 
London to further the rearmament program. There, he insisted on an extremely 
unappealing cut of 20 percent on overall naval tonnage, which Japan refused and 
Britain regarded with skepticism. Concurrently, he pressed for the introduction of an 
escalatory clause permitting the signatories, and, practically, the United States and 
Britain, to ignore the agreement if Japan refused to go along with it and embark 
on rearmament—an outcome that was virtually certain (Rhodes 2001:132).523 
Roosevelt’s use of the treaties to make Japan appear the aggressor—Japan exited 
the conference in January 1936—and Great Britain uncooperative—the British 
stepped up rearmament in February 1936—paved the way for Congressional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521 This measure also embargoed munitions and war materials and barred loans to belligerents, but 
it denied the President any say over when and how these things would be accomplished  (Dallek 
119). Roosevelt needed the support of isolationist forces in the Senate to pass New Deal reforms 
at home. In 1935, the New Deal had come under assault from conservative critics.   
522 This measure also embargoed munitions and war materials and barred loans to belligerents, but 
it denied the President any say over when and how these things would be accomplished  (Dallek 
119). Roosevelt needed the support of isolationist forces in the Senate to pass New Deal reforms 
at home. In 1935, the New Deal had come under assault from conservative critics.   
523 Japan had denounced the Washington agreements in 1934. 
See Rhodes (2001:136,137). 
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approval, in March 1936, of the largest peacetime naval appropriation ever 
requested by an American president (Pelz 1974:202; Dallek 1979:90).524 
This analysis suggests that the financial crisis of 1929-33 steered 
American national security policies  initially  towards  greater  caution,  as  per  
HA–HE,  and  then  towards  an unspecified security posture with dashes of 
assertiveness, as per HA–LE. The complexity of the international context in the 
1930s—with increased militarism, the advent of revisionist regimes, spiraling arms 
races, financial crises spreading within nations and across the world, the collapse of 
international finance and trade, and states’ response to these developments over 
several years—makes it difficult to assess the relative importance of the national 
security influence of the financial crisis versus that of other variables.  To discount 
the  role  of  financial-crisis, however, seems misguided. Had the financial crisis not 
occurred, the Hoover administration would have had little reason to opt for military 
capitulation or to exalt American abidance by the international treaty structure in the 
hope of eliciting a similar response on the other side.  By the same token, the United 
States’ slow path towards military activism and the strengthening of the Navy would 
have been even slower in the absence of a strategy of financial-crisis response like 
that of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Ultimately, it is also difficult to believe that the 
described shifts from the normal course of American national security policies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 Facing the outcry of pacifist forces, Roosevelt could respond that the appropriations were 
strictly for defense reasons and that his attempts to rescue the Treaties demonstrated  his 
commitment  to peace. The appropriation included funds for only two newbattleships, and most of 
that money would provide replacements for outmoded destroyers and submarines.  
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brought about by the financial crisis of 1929-33 had no effect on other states’ 
policies or produced a safer international security environment.525 	  
Financial crises and American national security policies in nuts and bolts 	  
The American case confirms that financial crises changed the direction and 
character of American national security policies. This occurred when the ruling 
administration subscribed to an ambitious security agenda (1884; 1907) and when 
the American government acted as a dove in international affairs (1893-95; 1929-
33); when the national contribution to arms races and war prospects was significant 
(1907) and when it was not (1893; 1929); when government authorities opposed 
high finance (1884, 1907-08; 1933-36) and when ruling administrations were 
closely allied with it (1893-94; 1929-32); and when the United States was a financial 
hegemon (1929) as well as when its membership in the international financial 
system was controversial at home and abroad (1884-85; 1893-96). In every instance, 
and at least temporarily, the crisis reshaped the existing balance of power between  
the  American  government  and  financial  elites  to  the advantage of the latter, 
and this development produced a shift in existing national security policies 
towards major prudence. Accordingly, the administrations of Chester Arthur and 
Teddy Roosevelt were reminded that they were not, respectively, in LA–LE but 
rather in LA–HE, while the administrations of Grover Cleveland and Herbert 
Hoover, both of them highly exposed to high finance after crisis outbreak, were 
enthused to take conciliatory military spending, threat assessment, and war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 By “normal” here I mean “financial-crisis free.” 
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prospects to further extremes in an attempt to solve the financial crisis. Interestingly, 
as a result of every single financial-crisis episode, the enhancement of the pre- 
crisis national security agenda by the crisis-stricken government did not outlast the 
financial crisis—a clear difference with the Japanese case. 
Confirming the framework, assertive national security policies were curbed 
when high finance played a foremost role in the process of financial crisis 
resolution (1884-85; 1907-08). In these instances crisis-stricken governments 
reacted by redoubling on, or attempting to redouble on their assertive national 
security agendas but, in agreement with the framework, they failed in their endeavor. 
Also in agreement with the framework, after the start of the financial crisis, 
American crisis-stricken government attempted to redouble on their intended 
national security agenda even when they were pursuing cautionary national security 
policies before the outbreak of the financial crisis (1893; 1929). Finally, since 
scenario HA-LE materialized in two out of the four financial crises that hit the 
United States in the examined period, the framework is useful for extrapolating 
expectations on the course of national security policies only half of the time. Still, 
even with regards to the financial crisis instances falling in the “obscure” scenario 
HA–LE, the logic of the framework can still be appreciated in terms of decreasing 
constraints for the exercise of assertiveness after financial crisis outbreak.  
As expected, presidential races and congressional majorities stand out as 
the two main channels through which high finance exerted or failed to exert 
cautionary pressures in American in national security policies—and the two 
channels thought which American governments, after financial crisis outbreak, 
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resisted or conceded to high finance in the formulation of national financial and 
security policies. The findings of the chapter also show that American governments’ 
incentive, from LA– HE or HA–HE, to embrace greater national security caution 
in order to solve financial crisis decreased when high finance and international 
financial cooperation failed to improve national economic conditions and 
encountered profound domestic and Congressional opposition. The scarce power of 
high finance to solve the financial crisis became a fact between 1895 and 1896, and 
1931 and 1933, setting the stage for a scenario-HA–LE kind of influence of the 
crisis on national security policies.	  
The inflation or curbing of pre-crisis national security policies following 
financial crisis outbreak (or the release of constraints to pursue greater 
assertiveness) did not always affect the whole spectrum of national security policies 
to the same extent. In the 1930s, for instance, structural factors other than the 
financial crisis kept war prospects close to zero. As a result, the influence of the 
financial crisis of 1929-1936 remained limited to military spending and threat 
assessment.  Similarly, as the Cleveland administration embarked on  a  more  
cautionary assessment  of  the  British  threat  between  1893  and  1895,  military  
spending,  for  instance, remained shielded from cuts in 1893-95. A “protected” 
defense spending policy, however, did not cushion the administration’s decision to 
undertake most radical measures of military withdrawal from the Pacific. 
More notably, the chapter suggests that pushing cautiousness to new  
conciliatory extremes (HA–HE) to signal the respect of international financial 
cooperation, quell business anxieties, and abide by the prescriptions of high finance 
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in the attempt to resolve the crisis might not be the most “prudent” or farsighted 
measure. Also, when more cautious national security policies were undertaken, it 
was difficult to stop them, placing national security policies on an uncomfortable 
slippery slope.  American leaders’ financial-crisis responses  that  “glorified” 
national security caution were often overturned because of the repercussions on 
national interests and national honor. Moreover, financial crisis responses that 
promoted an overly dovish security stance were often only fictitiously prudent, 
paving the way for increased international financial competition to the detriment and 
security of other states. This occurred during the financial crisis of 1893-1895 and 
Cleveland’s exceedingly cautionary assessment of the British threat in the Caribbean 
and the Pacific. Hawaii and Venezuela were the victims. It also ensued soon after 
the financial crisis of 1907-08, and its influence on American Asian policy. This 
time it was China who suffered the consequences. Finally, it occurred in 1931-32, 
with the “honest” scarification of American military power to save the power of 
high finance and the international gold standard. Ambitious national security 
policies were then domestically intolerable, but Franklin Roosevelt’s heterodox 
response to the financial crisis and the collapse of the international financial system 
opened a new chapter for American national security agenda. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
WHEN SAVING MARKETS BECOMES TOO COSTLY: 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WAR IN THE SUMMER OF 1914 
 
 
“Preparation for war had reached the breaking point.  
It could not go on, and it could not stop.  
Peace had become a luxury too expensive to be borne.  
Bankruptcy or war was inevitable.”526 
 
The extraordinary financial calamity that spread across the main state capitals 
in the summer of 1914 has been customarily portrayed as the inevitable outcome, or 
simply the fear, of the outbreak of a war having unprecedented magnitude (World War 
I).527 This thesis has some validity. The financial crisis of 1914 blew through the 
Bourses of central Europe (July 4 –18) when political leaders and investors anticipated 
an Austrian military demonstration against Serbia and, as a consequence, a potential 
general war (Table 5.1).528 The crisis also reached the London Stock Exchange (July 
25), and led to the closure of all Western Stock Exchanges (July 27 – 31), only after 
that the harsh tones of the Austrian note to Serbia had become public (July 23).529  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 W.C. Van Antwerp, Governor of the New York Stock Exchange, in “The War and Wall Street,” 
Address Delivered in Rochester, NY, November 14, 1914, emphasis mine. 
527 On this interpretation see, for instance, Keynes (1914); Noyes (1916), p.24; Horn (2002), p.28; 
Feldman (1993), p.29; The Economist, August 1, 1914; and Seaborne (1986). A number of studies have 
admittedly looked at the causes and manifestations of the 1914 financial crisis separately from the 
analysis of the Great War (Keynes), and some economic historians (one above all, De Cecco) have even 
concluded that the global financial crisis widely predated the outbreak of the war. Yet, any analysis that 
has looked at these coexisting developments has tended to see the financial crisis as a result of the War.  
528 Members of the financial sectors and governments across the continent started to hoard gold for fear 
or in preparation to military hostilities.  
529 On July 27, the Vienna Exchange closed. On July 28, the day of the Austrian war declaration on 
Serbia, the rush to acquire funds in London intensified, as the discount houses were forced to knock on 
the doors of the Bank of England. The St. Petersburg Stock Exchange closed on the 29. The Bourses of 
Berlin and Paris were shuttered on July 30. Those of London and New York closed on the 31. No 
previous financial crisis had ever required the closure of one single Stock Exchange market. Chaos 
followed. The Times, July 14,18,19,21,22,28; Brown (1988), pp.1-34; Whithers (1916), p.2; De Cecco 
(1984), pp.141,142; Hawtrey (1938), p.1230; Lloyd George (1935), p.90.  
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Without denying the validity of this thesis, this chapter shows that the financial 
crisis of 1914 shaped the national security policies that led to the Great War as much 
as it resulted from them. More purposefully, the chapter applies the framework 
introduced in Chapter One and derived from the Japanese, Italian, and American 
experience discussed in Chapter Two, Three, and Four, to the novel financial crisis 
settings and national security policies of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Great Britain 
in the summer of 1914.530 Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1914 antecedes 
the outbreak of the Great War, this time period offers a reasonable and interesting 
ground for study.  Moreover, the focus of this chapter on the experiences of three 
countries at roughly the same time-period offers the opportunity—opportunity which 
was missing in the previous chapters—to examine the “horizontal” or across-the-
international-financial-system influence of financial crises, and therefore to observe 
related changes in national security as much as international security.  
Table 5.1. Changes in market prices in the summer of 1914: Three Countries531 
 
 June July 
2
27 
2
29 
3
30 
4
4 
1
11 
1
18 
2
22 
2
23 
2
25 
2
27 
2
28 
2
29 
Vienna 
4% crown 
 rente 
8
81.6 
-
-- 
8
81.6 
8
81.4 
 
81.1 
8
80.9 
7
79.8 
7
79.2 
7 
79.0 
-
-- 
-
-- 
-
-- 
Berlin  
3% Ger.  
loan 
7
76.9 
7
76.8 
7
76.8 
7
76.9 
7
76.3 
7
76.2 
7
75.8 
7
75.5 
7
74.3 
7
73.9 
7
73.7 
 
73.5 
London  
2% 
consols 
7
74.8 
7
75 
7
74.8 
7
75.5 
7
75.3 
 
75.8 
7
75.5 
7
75 
7
73.2 
7 
72.3 
7
71.8 
 
71.0 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
530 “National security policies” throughout this work is a family concept comprising the following three 
variables: military spending, threat assessment and war prospects.  
531 Data from The Times and The Frankfurter Zeitung in Brown (1988), p.8. 
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Like in the previous three chapters, four claims are under analysis in this 
chapter—the claim that a correspondence exists between the orthodox (or heterodox) 
financial policies that a government follows and the national security policies that it is 
willing to pursue (claim 1); the claim that financial crises and the process of financial-
crisis response cause a significant shift in national security policies (claim 2); the 
claim that the national security policies of a crisis-stricken government having low 
affinity with high finance are likely to be curbed when exposure to high finance is 
high, and to be inflated when such exposure is low (claim 3); and the claim that the 
national security policies of a crisis-stricken government having high affinity with 
high finance are likely to become extra prudent when exposure to high finance is high 
(claim 4).532  
Various reasons justify a primary focus on Austria-Hungary, Germany and 
Britain. To begin, the financial crisis of 1914 began in the Vienna Stock Exchange, 
progressed to Berlin, and culminated in London. Analyzing the process of financial 
crisis response in Vienna, Berlin and London is meaningful exactly because of this 
time frame. Also, since in Austria-Hungary and Germany the process of financial 
crisis response in 1914 was closely related to previous financial crisis, a focus on these 
two states makes for a more comprehensive picture of the national security influence 
of the 1914 financial crisis.  
Second, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Britain have been assigned important 
responsibilities for the start of the War. For instance, the Dual Monarchy is often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 Refer to Figure 1.1, which included at the end of the chapter, before the references, for a clarification 
on the terms “affinity with” and “exposure to” high finance, and a sketch of the argument that is 
explained in detail in Chapter One. 
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described as having a firm desire to punish Serbia in 1914. Similarly, Germany is 
often depicted as the instigator of Vienna’s assertive intentions, while Great Britain is 
described as guilty for its passivity, failing to adequately signal British determination 
to fight to Germany.533  Given the interlocking nature of Austro-Hungarian, German 
and British national security decisions in 1914, it seems especially promising to 
examine the national security influence of financial crises in this trio rather than 
another.  
Third, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Britain present three different theaters 
in which the battle between governments and high finance took place following the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis of 1914, as well as some of the previous 
financial crises. The variation between the institutional contexts and the financial and 
security policies of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Great Britain is desirable for 
similar reasons to the ones that have informed the selection of Japan, Italy and the 
United States, namely findings commonalities in financial and diplomatic or military 
developments across space. 
Examining the national security influence of financial crises in the months and 
years preceding the summer of 1914 makes sense also in view of the documented 
financial constraints that the Great Powers faced at the time, and the pressures that 
such constraints were posing on national security decisions. The preservation of 
national security required successful deterrence, and spending less on defense was an 
option that no great power could afford. In Great Britain and the major states in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 On the intentions and responsibilities of Vienna, Berlin and London see, amongst many, Albertini 
(1943:II), p.514; Fischer (1969); Van Evera (1984), p.100; and Lebow (1984:152). 
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Europe, total defense spending of increased by more than 50% between 1908 and 
1913. In 1913, the ratio of defense spending to net national product registered the 
greatest forward leap in Austro-Hungary, Germany and Russia (Table 5.2).534 In 
central Europe as well as in Britain, the security dilemma had important economic and 
financial components.535 The international and national financial systems were under 
evident strain.536 While the wealth and power of high finance continued to increase, 
the total supply of money—which included the funds devoted to armaments and 
industrialization—had grown far beyond the gold reserves of Central Banks and 
governments’ abilities to extract more financial resources from their population.537 
These financial constraints placed state authorities in front of a dilemma: steps made 
to buttress national security through military or economic investment risked to 
undermine the confidence of high finance in national financial stability, thereby 
creating the conditions for financial crisis and bankruptcy. This explains why in the 
critical years between 1911 and 1914, financial crises and military crises were not 
only frequent (and, luckily, circumscribed), but also tended to overlap.538 Obviously, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534 In turn, investment in deterrence fostered arms races and insecurity Some members of high finance 
in continental Europe were aware of this vicious circle and had, at least partially, accepted the principle 
that international peace required keeping up the great powers’ deterrence potential while also 
acknowledging that such an effort was economically intolerable in the medium term. See, for instance, 
Cecil (1967), pp.160,161. 
535 In these years, for instance, Germany surpassed Great Britain in manufacturing and Great Britain lost 
much of its reserves. See De Cecco (1984); Kennedy (1987); Ferguson (1994); Horn (2002). 
536 See, for instance, Feldman, p.30, note 11; De Cecco, p.133 
537 All great powers faced important constraints on their ability to finance naval and military expansion. 
Austria-Hungary did more than any other.  
538 In September 1911, during the Second Moroccan military crisis, fears of a war between France and 
Germany had created a panic in the Berlin Bourse.  French assets were recalled from Vienna and 
Budapest too. Similarly, during the First Balkan (1912) and the Second Balkan War, Slav military 
advances had an adverse influence upon the Bourses of Vienna, Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, as 
French and British investors pulled funds out from central Europe fearful that war would break out 
between Russia and Austria, and that Germany would support the latter. See “Crisis in Germany,” The 
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because of the loss of resources, policy independence, and prestige that it entails, 
national bankruptcy was an extremely undesirable outcome.  
By applying the framework to the pre-World War One political contexts in 
three crucial states, the chapter shows how the outbreak of the crisis and the process of 
financial crisis response in each state intensified the security dilemma first in Austria-
Hungary, then in Germany, and eventually in Great Britain. One by one, these three 
countries provided a different financial-security solution to the battle between 
government and high finance during the process of financial crisis response. 
Altogether, these solutions were permissive conditions for the Great War. This does 
not meant that in the absence of the processes of financial crisis response described in 
the chapter the Great War would not have occurred.  In other words, the chapter is not 
offering an explanation of the origins the Great War. Rather, the argument that the 
chapter advances is that an application of the framework to the pre-World War One 
context helps to understand some of the constraints that were pushing states towards 
militant strategies and away from diplomacy. At the start of the financial crisis, the 
power of high finance was low in Austria-Hungary, ambiguous in Germany, and high 
in Great Britain.539 Throughout the financial crisis, Austro-Hungarian, German and 
British leaderships gradually found the limits of the orthodox medicine and 
international diplomatic cooperation to solve their financial problems. By the same 
token, high finance struggled to craft effective crisis response plans and to trust the 
national and international financial system, implicitly legitimizing heterodox solutions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Washington Post, September 10, 1911; “Russian Financial Crisis: Misery Caused by the War,” The New 
York Times, October 23, 1912; Brown (1988), p.2. 
539 High finance did not have a home base in Austria-Hungary as it instead did in Great Britain and 
Germany. See Table 5.2 later in the chapter.     
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and governments’ low exposure to high finance. As cooperation between governments 
and high finance broke down in a state after the other, the higher the prospect of a 
general European war became. Finally, an application of the framework to the pre-
World War One context offers a way to reconcile explanations that have emphasized 
the unintentional or inadvertent nature of the war (Levy 1990-91:87; Albertini 
1943:252,253: Kissinger 1976:99), and explanations that have, oppositely, underlined 
leaders’ premeditated or conscious effort at waging military hostilities (Fischer 1969; 
Hamilton and Herwig 2003).540 
Table 5.2. Real Defense Burden (Defense Expenditure/Net National Product), 1912-13541 
 
 Britain       France Russia Germany Austria 
1912 3.3 4.0 4.5 3.8 2.6 
1913 3.4 4.3 5.1 4.9 3.5 
 
Using the format adopted in previous chapters, this chapter opens with three 
short sections that extrapolate expectations on the national security policies of, 
respectively, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Great Britain on the eve of the Great 
War based on Figure 1.1. The three sections that follow apply the chapter’s 
expectations and describe the influence of the financial crises of 1914 (and the 
financial crisis of 1911-12) on Austrian, German, and British military spending, threat 
assessment and war prospects. Particular attention is placed on the British financial-
crisis experience given its role in the transformation of hostilities from localized to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540 Note that, for Fischer, it was Germany, more than any other state, to resort to premeditation and 
assertiveness. For Hamilton and Herwig, all great powers consciously undertook steps towards war. The 
most famous statement on the inadvertent war thesis is possibly that on David Lloyd George, who in a 
speech of December 23, 1920 claimed “no one at the head of political affairs quite meant war…it was 
something into which (they) glided or rather staggered and stumbled.” 
541 Source: Stevenson (1996), p.7. 
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general in late July/early August 1914. Ending the chapter are a few observations on 
the utility and limits of the framework in contexts different from the ones it was 
derived from.  
 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S FINANCIAL FATALISM 
 
The financial crisis of the summer of 1914 started in the Vienna Bourse. In 
1914 Vienna was the “lead market.” From it, investors took their cues, convinced that 
financial dealers there had greater knowledge and a better grasp of events in 
southeastern Europe than did markets in Berlin, Paris or London.542 Exactly because 
of its proximity to the Balkans—the core of international investment as well as 
international political and military tension—Austria-Hungary had been no stranger to 
financial difficulties in the months and years preceding 1914, so much so that 
identifying the start of the 1914 financial crisis in the summer of that year might even 
be problematic.543 The Times of India had already painted a protracted, disastrous 
financial outlook for the Austro-Hungarian Empire in early 1912.544 A few months 
later, Hofrat von Pranger, the secretary general of the Joint State Bank, the Austro-
Hungarian Central Bank, had raised a warning about ongoing symptoms of acute 
financial stringency affecting domestic markets.545 After the onset of the first Balkan 
War (autumn 1912), the outflow of foreign capital assumed such proportions that the 
Bank had to sell large quantities of gold abroad to uphold the currency and avoid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542 For a similar interpretation see Brown (1988), pp. 4-9. 
543 The Creditanstalt, one of the largest Austrian banks, noted in a report for year 1912 that a state of 
constant tightness on the money market and a disproportion between capital formation and public and 
private capital requirements had begun in 1911. See März (1981), p.28. 
544 “Finances of Austria,” The Times of India, January 20, 1912. 
545 In “Money Stringency Distresses Austria,” Wireless Telegraph to the New York Times, March 18, 
1912.  
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bankruptcy.546 By December 1912, von Pranger reported that “big withdrawals from 
financial institutions had spread like a contagious disease to all parts of the economy,” 
and that, “for the first time in decades,” a “loss of confidence in the currency” gripped 
Austrian investors.547 Austrian gold coverage had severely shrunk, a large share of 
French capital had departed, and domestic investors had begun to place their capital 
overseas. 
These financial events did not catch Austro-Hungarian statesmen off-guard. 
Eminent officials of the Dual Monarchy had known since 1908 that credit could not be 
used “in the normal way,” and that the Austro-Hungarian Empire Bank would have to 
be most likely abrogated.548 Governor of the Joint Stock Bank Alexander Popovics 
was a strenuous advocate of the primary interests of the State and the State-Joint Bank 
liaison over those of financial markets. Similarly, the large majority of the Hapsburg 
governing authorities including Emperor Franz Joseph, Common minister of foreign 
affairs Count Berchtold, Austrian Prime Minister Karl Stürgkh, Common Finance 
Minister Ritten Leon Bilinski, Common War Minister Alexander von Krobatin and 
General Conrad von Hötzendorf had all come to value financial policies that had a low 
affinity with high finance.  The Austrian financial sector had admittedly attempted to 
rescue the power of domestic markets, or at least forestall its decline. In this effort, 
Austrian bankers had achieved only moderate success, aware as they were that a 
mercantilist involution had started. Like it was true for Italy and Italian statesmen, 
high finance in Austria and for Austrian statement had foreign, private roots. In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546  See März (1981), p.100; Strachan (2004), p.33.  
547 Pressburger (1966), p.277. See also Strachan (2004), p.33. 
548 Popovics (1925), pp.34, 38-48; and Pressburger (1966), p.277. 
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lead up to the summer of 1914, however, high finance seemed entirely absent from 
Austria-Hungarian financial and economic policies. In conversations with Emperor 
Franz Joseph, financier Alexander Spitzmüller emphasized the great political and 
military advantages of maintaining an internationally recognized central bank.549 
Along with the governor of the Boden-Creditanstalt, Rudolf Sieghart, Spitzmüller also 
endeavored to improve the status of Austrian finances, and a number of financial 
agreements with foreign consortia were successfully concluded.550  
In a similar fashion, during the financial crisis of 1912, the German financial 
community offered loans to the Austrian government. And in 1913 and early 1914, 
English, German, Belgian and Dutch banks under the leadership of the Rothschilds 
and the Schröders raised new loans for the Monarchy, thereby providing the means to 
rescue the country from the financial crisis.551 The Austrian leadership accepted them, 
but doubted their long-lasting effects or a long lasting ability to raise new loans by 
German high finance, indicating that government exposure to high finance in this 
financial crisis period was already transitioning from high to low. The Monarchy 
probably appreciated the opportunity of earning some liquidity while endeavoring to 
find adequate heterodox solutions to respond to increasing monetary tightness. As for 
the possibility that this cooperation might instill new faith in the working of financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549 Spitzmüller, Und hat auch Ursach, p.69, in März (1981), pp.99, 106. März argues that the very fact 
that Spitzmüller stressed the military potential of the Central Bank is “astonishing.” However, the 
banker’s behavior is not very astonishing in view of the changed security context of the 1900s.  
550 See, for instance, März (1981), pp.103. A good picture of the increasing gravity of the Austrian 
financial situation is painted in “Where the Gold Went,” The Washington Post, January 3, 1914. A 
comparison between the holdings of gold of the central banks of the main industrialized nations showed 
that the Austro-Hungarian Bank’s reserves were, by far, inferior to those of any other central bank, 
including the Italian and Spanish central banks.  
551 “The Austrian Loan,” Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1914; “Austrian Finance,” The Times of India, 
April 9, 1914; Stevenson (1996), p.254. 
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markets, the appointment of someone like Popovics to the Joint Stock Bank was a 
strong indication that the Dual Monarchy had no confidence in the benefits of 
international financial openness. Throughout 1913 and early 1914, the financial 
situation improved slightly but in the spring of 1913, Popovics was already thinking 
about undertaking steps to “dismantle the legal structure of the monetary system, [..] 
fortify national cash balances, and [..] severely prohibit the participation of domestic 
capital in foreign loan operations”—a heterodox (or mercantilist) stance that no other 
central bank governor of a key European state entertained with similar commitment.552  
 
Table 5.3. Liabilities on acceptances at the end of the year, 1912-1914553 
                                         
 Barings 
 
 
Kleinwort 
Sons 
 
Schröders 
 
 
 Hambros 
 
 
N.M. 
Rothschild 
 
Gibbs 
 
 
Brandts 
 
 
Total 
of 
“big 
seven 
(Home 
base: 
Britain) 
(Home 
base: 
Britain) 
(Home 
base: 
Germany) 
(Home 
base: 
Germany) 
(Home 
base: 
Britain)  
(Home 
base:  
US) 
(Home 
base: 
Germany) 
 
1912 6.58 
 
13.36 11.95 3.45 3.49 1.38 3.19 43.40 
1913 6.64 
 
14.21 11.66 4.57 3.19 2.04 3.33 45.64 
1914 3.72 8.54 5.82 1.34 1.31 1.17 0.72 22.62 
 
In the spring of 1914, the situation deteriorated again, however, and the 
withdrawal of foreign assets from Austria-Hungary resumed. Austrian leaders 
observed financial developments without much surprise, knowing that a response to 
the increasing monetary tightness needed to be found, that the financial system was 
unreliable, and that international sources of liquidity could no longer be trusted. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
552 Popovics (1925), p.40; März (1981), p.101. In May 1913 the Austrian Empire had also reached its 
peacetime borrowing capacity. See Stevenson, p.270. 
553 Kleinwort Sons and Schröders were the most exposed. Ferguson (1999b), vol.II, p.436.  
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June and July 1914, Popovics started to hoard cash regardless of the pledge to buy 
Austro-Hungarian securities that Austrian bankers had negotiated with French 
authorities.554  Both the affinity with and exposure to high finance of Austrian officials 
were low this time. Table 5.3 captures the shift in the power of high finance between 
1913 and 1914, showing a significant decline in returns on private investments. 
In July 1914, withdrawals of foreign assets from Vienna accelerated, triggered 
by runs on banks by Austrian investors. The process first peaked on July 23, and on 
July 25 the demand for domestic funds and foreign exchange reached gigantic 
proportions.555 The government responded with a mix of heterodox financial 
expedients: it expanded banknote circulation; raised the discount rate; and demanded 
short-term loans from consortia of Viennese banks. Senior bank officials were 
requested to continue their business “as usual” and domestic hoarding of gold and 
foreign exchange was initially tolerated as a measure to contain the panic.556 As the 
crisis progressed, new heterodox measures were introduced. On July 27, the Vienna 
Exchange was closed and on July 31 the Austrian government stopped the 
disbursement of foreign exchange and foreign notes and coins. A moratorium on 
payments followed.557 On August 4, the Bank Act was suspended.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 On the persistently chronic financial status of the Monarchy in early July 1914 see the Serbian Blue 
Book, exchange between Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 3/16,1914. On the reconciliation between the Monarchy and the 
French capital see Hamilton and Herwig, p.485; and “Brief Wall Street Gossip,” The Washington Post, 
July 4, 1914. On cash hoarding by Popovics see Strachan (2004), p.35.  
555 März (1981), pp.129,130. 
556 Popovics (1925), p.43; Fischer, p.11.  
557 See Popovics (1925), p.45 and Pressburger (1966), p.282 on these developments.  
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Table 5.4. Summary of Expectations for the Financial Crisis of 1914 
 
  
AUSTRIA-
HUNGARY 
 
GERMANY 
 
GREAT BRITAIN 
 
PRE-FINANCIAL CRISIS 
AFFINITY WITH HIGH 
FINANCE 
 
 
LOW 
 
AMBIGUOUS 
 
HIGH 
 
 
EXPOSURE TO  
HIGH FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
LOW 
 
Early June— 
 
HIGH 
 
July 10—29 
 
 
HIGH 
 
July 25/27— 29/30 
 
 
LOW 
 
July 29— 
 
LOW 
 
July 29/30– 
 
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
POLICIES BEFORE THE 
OUTBREAK OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
 
 
      ASSERTIVE 
 
AMBIGUOUS: 
ELMENTS OF 
PRUDENCE AND 
ASSERTIVENESS 
 
 
 
CAUTIOUS 
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
POLICIES AFTER THE 
OUTBREAK OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
 
 
 
Early June— 
MORE 
ASSERTIVE 
 
July 11—29 
MORE CAUTIOUS 
 
July 29— 
INDETERMINATE  
 
July 25/27— 29/30 
EXTRA 
PRUDENT 
 
July 29/30— 
INDETERMINATE 
 
 
A first set of expectation is thus formulated. The low affinity with high finance 
of Austrian authorities in the months and years before the financial crisis of 1914 
should have resulted in a willingness to pursue assertive national security policies. 
Austrian officials’ high exposure to high finance during the financial crisis of 1911-12 
should have acted as a brake on this assertiveness. By contrast, the Austrian 
leadership’s low exposure to high finance during the financial crisis of 1914—
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specifically in the months of June, July, and August—should have paved the way for a 
turn towards more assertive national security policies (Table 5.4). 
 
GERMANY’S FINANCIAL HOPE 
 
Although less dramatically so than its Austro-Hungarian ally, the German 
financial system was also under strain in the months and years preceding the summer 
of 1914. Capital outflow had pushed the Reichsbank close to falling below the 
statutory minimum of its gold backing in late 1911, during the Agadir crisis. Not much 
differently from their Austro-Hungarian colleagues, German authorities confronted the 
potential humiliation of being driven off the gold standard much earlier than during 
the financial crisis of 1914.558 In response to this potential threat, the Reichsbank 
withdrew gold from circulation, and increased its reserve holding from $200 million 
(777 million marks) at the time of the Agadir crisis to $500 million (1.17 billion 
marks) in 1914.559 Concurrently, the Treasury had encouraged non-cash transactions, 
and the Reichsbank’s note issuing, eliminating the 300 million-mark ceiling on the 
emission of small notes. The Reichsbank’s official discount rate was also raised—
quite cautiously—from 5 to 6 percent, to attract investments, but banks were warned 
to build up their gold reserves and curb the amount of money taken on deposit from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 The trigger had been the financial panic resulting from the Agadir crisis. Fearful that war would 
break out respectively between France and Germany and between Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
Russia, French and British investors pulled funds out of Germany and Austria-Hungary while German 
investors sold investments on Wall Street and moved their activities to Russia. On these developments 
see Brown (1988), pp.2-3 and Ahamed (2009), p.43. 
559 On these developments see Whale (1930):185-186; Cecil (1967), pp.160,161; Horn (2002), p.7; 
Feldman (1997), pp.25-35; Ferguson (2002), p.117; and Strachan (2004), pp.28,29; Ahamed (2009), 
p.43-44. The Reichsbank’s gold reserve never reached the size of the Russian or French gold reserves. 
Yet, gold circulated widely in Germany, overshadowing both paper and silver. See, for instance, De 
Cecco (1984), p.109. The Bank of England, by comparison, held only the equivalent to 200 million 
dollar. 
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foreigners.560 Finally, the Treasury revived a plan conceived by Frederick the Great 
for a war chest of $75 million in gold and silver.561  
These measures reflected a mixture of financial heterodoxy and financial 
orthodoxy. The German Treasury’s means of increasing note circulation, for instance, 
was an expression of financial heterodoxy. The Reichstag’s respect of low interest 
rates and the 1/3 gold rule—the requirement that at least one-third of its issued notes 
were covered by gold or silver or Reich Treasury Office notes—was an expression of 
financial orthodoxy. Differently from the Austrian case, there was no doubt amongst 
German statesmen that the extraordinary growth and prosperity of the national 
economy rested widely on the credit contributions of great universal banks such as the 
Deutsche Bank, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, and the Dresdener Bank. Differently from 
their Austro-Hungarian counterparts, German financiers were respectable members of 
high finance, and the government valued them and, as a result, the international 
financial system, to a greater extent than did the authorities in Vienna. German leaders 
had nonetheless begun to take measures to protect national finances.  
Because of these undertakings, the German government had an ambiguous 
affinity with high finance on the eve of the 1914 financial crisis. This is a possibility 
that is not specified in Figure 1.1, and which is, as already explained in Chapter One, 
difficult to explain theoretically. Finding this situation empirically, however, suggests 
that the “only high” or “only low” government affinity with high finance that the 
framework postulates does not account for the entirety of state relations with high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
560 Maneuvering the discount rate was common practice and central banks employed a good deal of 
discretion and varied their gold reserve ratios.  
561 “Plans Great War Funds: German Government Asks Banks to Keep 10 Per Cent of Assets,” Special 
Cable to the New York Times, July 11, 1914.  
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finance that can occur in stable financial times. On June 18, noting signs of stringency 
in the domestic market, Reichsbank governor Rudolph Havenstein tried to convince 
the main German banks to voluntarily increase their reserve ratios up to 10 percent 
over the course of three years, in collaboration with the Reichsbank. German bankers 
were uncooperative. Arthur Salomonsohn of the Disconto-Gesellschaft suggested that 
Havenstein was acting out of “too much pessimism” and that banks could manage the 
problem on their own.  Henry Nathan of the Dresdener Bank proposed that foreign 
assets be included in the calculation of banks’ liquidity, which would have easily 
concealed the problem. Other financiers blamed the provincial and savings banks for 
the liquidity problem and complained that Havenstein was attempting to increase the 
Bank’s powers while reducing its role as lender of last resort.562 The meeting ended 
with a general promise by the bankers that they would offer counter-proposals in later 
months.563  
Financial crisis hit Germany in 1914 on July 10, and then on July 14, 18, and 
21. Heavy selling began in the Berlin Stock Market after the spread of rumors from 
Vienna and Belgrade on the character of the imminent Austrian note to Serbia.564  Up 
until July 23 that is during a first phase of the financial crisis government exposure to 
high finance was high. German authorities expected a successful response to the 
financial crisis by the German banks, and, to this scope, they were ready to resurrect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 On these developments see Feldman (1997), p.31; Zilch (1980), pp.228-56; Habedank (1981), p.22. 
563 Gerald Feldman has explained bankers’ reluctance to cooperate with the Reichsbank by pointing at 
the difficulty of acting as if one were in an emergency after decades of prosperity and economic growth. 
See Feldman (1997), p.31. I argue that economic prosperity had come with an augmentation of the 
powers of the financial sector to the point that the latter strongly refused financial compromises with 
political authorities and judged them incapable of controlling the risk of war. This point is developed 
later in the chapter. Both Feldman’s explanations and my explanation can be right.  
564 See Schmitt (1930), pp.376-377; “War Scare in Berlin,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1914. 
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Havenstein’s prior plan of increasing banks’ reserve ratios to 10 percent, as they urged 
on July 20.  A more compelling threat, the possibility of enacting new and heterodox 
legislative measures, was only vaguely hinted at.565 On July 23, the situation 
deteriorated. The large German banks panicked and refused to give back deposits on 
demand, and by July 27, small savers and panic-stricken investors had stormed the 
large banks.566 The collapse in prices was described in The Chicago Daily Tribune as 
the most far reaching in Germany since 1870.567 More powerful than the Austrian 
banks, the large German banks intervened by buying the securities they were most 
interested in, but the maneuver had only a slight effect. The day after (July 28), 
spearheaded by German shipping magnate Albert Ballin, German banks formed a 
syndicate to continue their purchasing attempts. The strategy failed.568 In the 
meantime the Reichsbank had lost 163 million marks’ worth of its gold and silver 
reserves, and the government another 32 million in Reich Treasury Office notes. 
Thousands of people had lined up to exchange their paper money for gold and silver. 
By July 29, Bourse authorities had to intervene in the interests of security owners and 
suspend all dealings. Between July 29 and July 31, government exposure to high 
finance changed from high to low. On July 31, 1914, to prevent further losses, the 
Reichsbank suspended the gold convertibility of the mark, an action indemnified by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565 “Plans Great War Funds: German Government Asks Banks to Keep 10 Per Cent of Assets,” Special 
Cable to the New York Times, July 11, 1914. 
566 “Uploading in Berlin: Banks Buy Securities Dumped by Panic-Stricken Investors,” Special Cable to 
the New York Times, 07/27/1914. 
567 “London Stocks Least Hit: Bear Austro-Serbian Strain Best in Europe,” Cable to the Chicago Daily 
Tribune, July 27, 1914.  
568 The Norddeutsche Handelsbank, one of the largest banks in Hanover had to close its doors. “Berlin 
very nervous: Big Banks Will Support Stocks, Keeping Gold in Vaults,” Special Cable to the New York 
Times, July 29, 1914.  On the failure of high finance to resolve the German financial crisis see Mulligan 
(2010), p.205 
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the Reichstag and legalized four days later.569 Legislation enacted on August 4 
transformed the system radically by relieving the Reichsbank and other money-issuing 
institutions from the obligation of redeeming paper money for gold on demand. 
Channels for unlimited monetary growth were also created, and the Bundesrat was 
permitted to decree economic and financial measures without consulting the 
Reichstag.570 
Although the framework omits to consider the possibility that government 
affinity with high finance takes on an ambiguous character (like the affinity with high 
finance of the German government before the summer of 1914), expectations about 
the influence of the financial crisis of 1914 on German national security policies can 
be formulated using the same logic that informs the framework. Given the ambiguous 
affinity with high finance of the Hollweg government before July 10, 1914 (that is 
before the start of the financial crisis of 1914 in Germany), German national security 
policies should show, in this phase, both elements of caution and assertiveness. 
Between July 10 and July 29, German national security policies should have shifted 
towards greater caution given the German government’s high exposure to high finance 
during this first phase of financial crisis response. Vice versa, from July 29 
onwardsGerman national security policies should have moved towards greater 
assertiveness given the low government exposure to high finance that ensued from 
then on.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
569 On this point see Ferguson (2002), p.117. 
570 The transition to the new system was easier than in Britain as the Reichsbank had experimented with 
preparations for the establishment of state loan banks empowered to issue special notes in the event of a 
short and decisive war as early as 1912.  
	   306 
GREAT BRITAIN’S FINANCIAL DISBELIEF 
 
As much as Vienna was the “lead market,” London was the “lag market” in the 
summer of 1914. Differently from Austria-Hungary and Germany, Great Britain 
experienced no financial crisis in the months and years before 1914. During this 
period, the financial policies of the (liberal) Asquith cabinet expressed high affinity 
with high finance and full compliance with financial orthodoxy. Despite its awareness 
that the delicate mechanism of credit was somehow under strain at home, the British 
cabinet trusted the operation of both the Bank of England and the joint-stock banks. 
Enmeshing itself in the banks’ affairs was unconceivable. By the same token, the 
likelihood that waves of foreign financial sales and the cut-off of gold remittances 
could paralyze the London money market (as a result of a European war or its mere 
anticipation) was widely underestimated.571 
War nerves hit the London markets on July 25, 1914, and a financial crisis 
developed there between July 25 and 27, as all foreign banks and particularly the 
Germans ones took a very large amount of money out of the (British) Stock Exchange. 
Up until July 30, British authorities found themselves highly exposed to high finance. 
When it came to financial rules and regulations, the Bank of England was much closer 
to London’s foremost bankers than British state authorities. Governor Walter Cunliffe 
was no Havenstein, let alone Popovics; he defended the independence of the Bank of 
England as strenuously as he could. Between July 25 and July 30, the Bank advanced 
14 million pounds to the discount market and a similar amount to the London 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
571 Keynes (1914), pp.460-61,467; Ahamed (2009), pp.23-25. 
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banks.572 On July 28—the day in which the financial crisis escalated in London—
Governor Cunliffe reassured British authorities that the Bank of England was in a very 
strong position. Although it had worked in the past, Cunliffe’s reliance on the private 
financial market to solve the crisis struggled to take off this time. Rather than 
providing gold to an endangered Treasury, as had occurred in 1890, or contributing to 
a pool of reserves with the Bank of London, as had occurred in 1907, now high 
finance representatives held onto what gold they had, and expected to be supplied with 
a steady flow of gold reserve that they could impulsively hoard. As Chairman of the 
Union of London and Smith Banks, Sir Felix Schuster concluded, “the only possible 
effective remedy [...] is a gold reserve systematically and scientifically collected and 
distributed among the great banking institutions which collect it.”573 
Because of the Bank’s hostility to state financial interference, the British 
government hesitated to step in: only on August 29—after a black day of runs on 
banks in the city (the 28th), and several days after the start of the financial crisis in 
Continental Europe—Lloyd George organized a visit to the Treasury to the Bank of 
England.574 From then on, the government’s exposure to high finance moved from 
high to low as the cabinet increasingly transferred pieces of authority over financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 Ferguson (1999, II), p.433, Rot. 
573  Both Lloyd George and Keynes judged this behavior of the joint-stock banks as illogical and idiotic. 
A more Machiavellian interpretation is proposed by De Cecco (1984:132,140), who describes the joint 
banks as eminently interested, during the crisis of 1914, in stealing lucrative businesses from British 
authorities and the Bank of England. This debate is only tangential to a discussion, like the present here, 
which is mostly concerned with determining the effective power of high finance versus that of 
government in the process of financial crisis resolution. The Times, July 23, 1914 and De Cecco, p.140, 
emphasis mine. Already in early 1914 bankers in the Gold Reserve Committee agreed that they were 
“unable to devise any protective or retaliatory measure” to meet a financial collapse of the City of 
London in the case of a war involving European powers (Horn 2002:26).   
574 See De Cecco 1984, pp.142; Keynes (1914); The Times, July 28, 29, 1914. Between July 23 and July 
30 the Bank of England lost 12 million pounds.  
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matter away from the private sector to the advantage of the Treasury, while the Bank 
of England increasingly lost its political independence.575 For instance, on July 30, the 
Treasury severely reprimanded the banks for their “mischievous” and “dangerous” 
practice of hoarding coin and creating distrust. On July 31, as the banks refused to pay 
out gold to investors from Berlin and Paris who sought to turn their securities into 
money at any price, the Stock Exchange closed its doors. Between July 31 and August 
6, the British government’s crisis response measures, which reflected a mutable blend 
of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, were improvised. On August 2, Lloyd George accepted 
the banks’ proposal of depositing sterling in the Bank of England but declared it as 
“una tantum remedy,” in no way prejudicing future courses of actions.576 Soon 
afterwards, as gold hoarding continued, the government thought of new ways of 
injecting liquidity into the system. Since the Bank of England was unable to arrange 
for the expeditious printing of notes, the British Government extended an existing 
bank holiday (August 2) to buy time before deciding what to do. In the meantime, a 
thirty-day postponement on payments of bills of exchange (moratorium) was 
introduced (August 3)—something that the banks regarded as “a threat to their 
existence.”  
Then, on August 6, British authorities suspended the Bank Act, which 
governed the amount of notes that the Bank of England was legally entitled to issue, 
and issued special Treasury notes—notes distinct from the usual Bank of England 
notes—in denominations of one pound and ten schillings (the “Bradburys”). 
Concurrently, to staunch any flow of gold away from the Bank of England and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 On this point see Horn (2002:34,35). 
576 De Cecco (1984:146-148); Keynes (1914), p.461. 
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dissuade borrowers from seeking to remove gold, the Bank rate was manipulated at 
will, first raised and from 3 to 10 % between July 30 and August 1 (as prewar 
orthodoxy suggested), then lowered to dissuade borrowers from seeking to remove 
gold from the Bank of England. Once it became evident that the normal mechanisms 
of international finance remained frozen, more far-reaching measures to restore 
confidence and, by then, to run a war economy, were introduced.577  
Perhaps nothing demonstrates the overturn of political fortunes between 
government and high finance in the process of financial crisis response better than the 
battle over the suspension of gold convertibility. During the bank holiday, the bankers 
insisted on the importance of going off gold for fear of losing their deposits. They also 
refused to declare themselves ready to satisfy the cash requirements of their clients at 
the end of the bank holiday, with Lord Rothschild stepping in to alert the Government 
that it was handicapping the banks and “profiting from the country’s needs.”  All 
attempts were in vain.  Lloyd George, under the expert advice of Blackett, Keynes and 
Cunliffe, argued strongly that abandoning gold convertibility would have negative 
consequences for “British position and prestige,” and irreparably damage London’s 
position as the center of world finance. Lord Rothschild shut up and the banks were 
demanded not to obstruct the revival of the economy.578  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 On the strongly interventionist character of British rescue efforts see in particular Horn (2002), 
pp.30,31; Peter2 (1993), p.127. 
578 On these developments see De Cecco (1984), pp.150-170. See also See Horn (2002), pp.36. De 
Cecco acutely captured the victory of the British government in this critical crisis days with the 
following statement (1984:166): “Certainly banks were defeated […]: they wanted suspension of 
convertibility and they did not get it; they wanted a favorable interest rate on Treasury notes and they 
did not get that either. Moreover, they formally agreed with the government to carry on transactions in a 
climate of normality and to call off the tough squeeze to which they had subjected the economy until 
then.”  
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The last set of expectations of the chapter is therefore formulated. Because of 
the Asquith’s government high affinity with high finance, British national security 
policies should have had a cautionary nature before the start of the financial crisis of 
1914. After the start of the financial crisis (July 25-27), and due to the government’s 
high exposure to high finance during a first phase of the crisis (until July 29-30), 
British national security policies should have moved towards greater caution. During a 
second phase, that is from July 29-30 onwards, because of the government’s low 
exposure to high finance in the process of financial crisis response, British national 
security policies faced lesser constraints to stir away from assertiveness, but their 
change remains indeterminate in view of the framework. Table 4 synthesizes the 
expectations so far formulated.  
 
 
FAITH IN HIGH FINANCE IS LOST:  
Financial crises, Austria-Hungary, and (limited) war as the only option 
 
Austrian leaders had witnessed the challenges that financial crises posed on 
national security policies well before 1914. Concurrently, national security policies 
had been moving towards increasing assertiveness.579 As much of the literature has 
already shown, some of the reasons for this turn towards national security 
assertiveness are to be found in the internal and external military threats that the 
Hapsburg Empire faced, positioned next door to the most conflict-ridden region of the 
world, the Balkans. Yet, important financial reasons explain the Austrian bet on an 
assertive national security stance. Between 1911 and 1914, Austria-Hungary 
confronted constant monetary strain just for being geographically close to the theater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 See Stevenson (1996), pp.253. [..] 
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of military hostilities. Financial crises exacerbated this uncomfortable financial 
condition to the point of jeopardizing national military readiness and threatening 
financial bankruptcy. The liquidity crisis that developed in Austria-Hungary in late 
1912, after the onset of the first Balkan war, led the two ministers of finance to 
conclude that, “from the point of view of preparedness for war,” the prevailing 
situation was “extremely difficult.”  
As expected, on that occasion (December 1912), the Austrian high exposure to 
high finance acted as a restraint on the exercise of assertive national security policies. 
In late 1912, as markets faced financial crisis in Vienna, Berchtold accepted German 
loans to Vienna and reassured the Berlin financial community that Austria-Hungary 
was not seeking mobilization credits (Stevenson, 1996:254). This behavior might 
seem to contradict my expectation that the Dual Monarchy was set on an assertive 
foreign policy course. It is more probable, however, that the Berchtold government 
was just trying to avoid or contain the blow-up of a financial crisis beyond national 
borders. Indeed, always in late 1912 the chancellor secretly approved a medium-term 
program of military expenditures in light of a “very probably” war with Russia in the 
forthcoming years. 580 Somewhat similarly, in the spring of 1913 Austrian authorities 
only partially mobilized (again), and desisted from their military plans of achieving a 
fait accompli with Serbia due to “fears” that “the money markets would panic.”581 In 
other words, financial crisis fears in 1913 produced the same effects than the financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580 See for instance Stevenson (1996:255). 
581 Zaleski to Bilinski, May 4, 1913 in Stevenson (1996), p.270. The prospect of a war between Austria-
Hungary and Russia had materialized already in the winter months of 1912 and again in autumn 1913. 
Tensions arose after Austria-Hungary’s declaration that it would not tolerate Serbia gaining access to 
the Adriatic.  When Serbia occupied Durazzo, the Albanian port on the Adriatic, international tensions 
reached a point where both Austria and Russia partially mobilized. On this point see Brown (1988:2). 
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crisis in 1912. The result, in terms of Austrian national security policies, was the 
adoption by the Monarchy of some sort of “militant diplomacy” characterized by 
military mobilization and the preservation of neutrality.582  
Confronting financial crisis (and financial crisis fears), Austro-Hungarian 
officials realized that restrained military was convenient, at least for the time being, 
because in case of a general mobilization, the withdrawal of deposits from saving 
banks and financial institutions would have assumed “catastrophic dimensions,” 
complicating Austrian politics and foreign policy.583  Nor was it possible to raise a 
financial loan abroad to finance Austrian mobilization because the latter per se would 
have caused “immediate uneasiness in the Western markets.” This situation explains 
why, in April 1913, Austro-Hungarian financial authorities decided that “before 
issuing (full) mobilization orders”—and at the latest “before firing a shot”—steps 
needed to be undertaken to “dismantle the legal structure of the monetary system.”584 
Before any other great power did, the Dual Monarchy had concluded that war 
readiness and the preservation of the gold standard had become incompatible goals. In 
other words, it was simply very clear in Vienna that the gold standard was no longer 
delivering its promise, like it had done, for instance, for Great Britain in occasion of 
the Boer Wars (1899-1902), or for Italy in occasion of the Libyan War (1911-12).585 
Austrian war readiness, as the experience of the Balkan wars demonstrated, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 See, for instance, Afflerbach and Stevenson, (2007), p. 62. 
583 Popovics (1925), pp. 35, 100-11. Austria-Hungary, differently from any other great power decided to 
mobilize during the Balkan wars.   
584 Ibidem, p101.  
585 Wars could be waged under the terms of the gold standard. Under such terms, the warring nation’s 
adherence to the system would be suspended for the duration of the war while market participants 
would assume that the duration of the war would have been short and that deflationary policies would 
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undermined national finances and Austrian international financial credibility. By the 
same token, however, defending Austrian commitment to the gold standard demanded 
war readiness: in an environment of continuing international military crises and 
armament races, the preservation of international peace rested on a credible deterrent 
threat.586  
Table 5.5. Defense spending as a percentage of net national product: Austria-Hungary’s 
relative military unpreparedness. 587 
 
 Britain       France Russia Germany Austria Italy 
1913 3.2 4.8 5.1 3.9 3.2 5.1 
 
 
Table 5.6. Defense spending of the great powers in million dollars  
 
 Britain       France Russia Germany Austria Italy 
1913 72.5 72.0 101.7 93.4 25.0 39.6 
 
Hence, it is not surprising that after the start of the Balkan Wars, many in the 
Austro-Hungarian administration agreed with the assessment by common finance 
minister of the Empire, Leon Bilinski, that finance had become the servant of war 
even when peace still prevailed (Strachan 2004:33).588 Financial markets in Austria 
were gripped by war fears, and nothing seemed to calm them. Having ascertained that, 
between 1912 and 1913 the Austrian leadership spent increasingly more in military 
appropriations.589  By mid-1914, even foreign minister Count Leopold Berchtold, who 
in 1908 accepted the view that Austro-Hungary was “satiated” and wanted no more 
Balkan gains, moved closer to more militant solutions.590  
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587 In Hobson (1993), pp.464f. 
588 Williamson, Austrian Hungary, 157,9; März 27-32; 99-100; Popovics 27-29, 39. 
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590 Ibidem. 
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By late spring of 1914, having already taken mobilization measures and 
confronted the prospect of war several times, Austrian governing authorities were 
ready to act decisively to protect the Monarchy’s great power status.591 Acting 
decisively was not intended as staunchly pursuing an expansionist foreign policy. 
Although avowed “hawks” like Bilinski, War Minister Krobatin, and General Conrad 
desired it, a preventive war of conquest against Serbia was not in the cards. If nothing 
else, the levels of Austrian military spending made this plan unfeasible (Table 5.5 and 
Table 5.6).592 Rather, Berchtold and the rest of the cabinet recognized the need for an 
assertive policy of self-preservation—a policy in which a war with Serbia was a strong 
possibility (Afflerbach and Stevenson 2007:62,66; Stevenson, 1996:255). Thus, as 
expected, before the onset of the financial crisis in June of 1914, the low affinity with 
high finance of the Hapsburg leadership dovetailed with an assertive national security 
posture.  
Also in alignment with expectations, as financial crisis resumed in June and 
July 1914, the Hapsburg foreign policy moved towards greater assertiveness. The shift 
occurred in two ways. First, a war with Serbia moved from a strong probability to an 
absolute certainty. As Emperor Franz Joseph expressed in a letter to the Austrian 
ambassador to Constantinople, Marquis von Pallavicini, a war was “the only way out 
of the existing situation.”593  The existing situation was one in which national finances 
kept deteriorating; Austrian international financial credibility was untenable; and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591 Before 1914 the prospect of an Austrian war against Serbia appeared twice, in December 1912 and 
October 1913; in the opening months of 1913 Vienna confronted the danger of a war with Russia and in 
May 1913 the prospect of a war with Montenegro arose. See Afflerbach and Stevenson (2007), p.61. 
592 On Austrian comparative military unpreparedness see also Hamilton had Herwig (2003), pp.31, 126-
27; 234; 237. 
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repeated mobilizations without the use of force—a common practice during the 
Balkan Wars—had become a far too costly option.594 Fathomable from this 
perspective are Francis Joseph’s resigned words: “If the Monarchy is doomed to 
perish, let it at least perish decorously.”595 Francis Joseph’s desperation is 
conventionally attributed to the threat that Serbia’s increasing restlessness or 
nationalistic forces posed to the Empire (see for instance, Albertini, 1956, II:129). But 
the wording of the Emperor’s cry suggests that the origins of the concern were located 
inside rather than outside the Monarchy.  
A second way in which the Austrian shift towards greater assertiveness 
occurred in July 1914 is that Austrian leaders took actual steps for waging a war 
against Serbia. The Austrian alliance apparatus was strengthened. Vienna was now 
committed to learning if Rumania were part of the Triple Alliance and, failing that, 
aimed to enlist Bulgaria (Afflerbach and Stevenson 2007:62). A number of other 
policy choices confirmed a more militant commitment, from the celebrated mission in 
Berlin of Austro-Hungarian hawk, Count Alexander Hoyos, to Berchtold’s desire for 
an immediate action against Serbia at the Ministerial Council of July 7, and, most 
evidently, to the character of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.596 By mid-July, even 
Hungarian foreign minister Baron Tisza, who had strenuously resisted a militant line, 
had concluded that military confrontation against Serbia had become a necessity.597  
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The interpretation that an initial shift in Austrian national security policies 
towards greater assertiveness occurred before June 28, and that successive shifts 
towards greater assertiveness took place as the financial crisis continued through July 
1914 challenges the hypothesis, advanced elsewhere (Lebow 2007; Afflerbach and 
Stevenson 2007:66-78), that the assassination was a catalytic event responsible for the 
Austrian departure from a foreign policy of peace and restraint. It is hard to believe 
that such an extreme take on existing threats to the Monarchy’s prestige and the 
country’s national security matured as a result of the assassination of the Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand, as Austria-Hungary had endured greater national security challenges 
during the Balkan Wars years. The argument here is that the Austro-Hungarian belief 
in such policy disappeared much earlier, although the departure was gradual because 
of the Austrian elites’ high exposure to high finance during financial crisis year 1912 
and in 1913.  
When the financial crisis resumed in June and July 1914, the low exposure to 
high finance left the administration’s assertiveness unchecked, thus killing the path of 
restrained militancy adopted in 1912 and 1913. The Serbian minister in Vienna, Sir M. 
Yovanovitch wrote on July 1, 1914 that a general financial and economic crisis 
prevailed in Austria-Hungary, and that a “settlement with Serbia” was declared to be 
the only way out.598 He added that Austrian financial circles had been informed.  
Although Austrian financial interests were informed, high finance became 
aware of the new security risks very gradually. The resurgence of the financial crisis in 
Austria-Hungary made little news after the chain of financial crises experienced by the 	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country since 1908. Moreover, the kind of “settlement with Serbia” that Austrian 
leaders were seeking was still very generally formulated and, to the extent that it 
promised to curb Slavic terrorism—a goal that European capitals all but supported—
the settlement could only please high finance.599 Finally, high finance (as shown 
earlier in the chapter) was excluded from the process of financial crisis resolution. 
Thus, only on July 6, Nathan Rothschild started to wonder: “Will the Austrian 
monarchy and people remain quiet? Or might a war be precipitated?”600 The type of 
question asked was clear indication that the financial magnate was powerless, at this 
stage, in the context of Austro-Hungarian security decision-making, which is in 
agreement with the conclusion reached by existing literature on the origins of World 
War I in Austria-Hungary. As Michel found, and the recent works reaffirmed, it was 
the Austria of the diplomats and the generals, not the Austria of bankers, who, at the 
end of July 1914, pulled Europe into war.601 What the literature has failed to note, 
however, is that the absence of high finance in the decision-making process that 
plunged Austria into a war is in itself a noteworthy development to be explained—
development that hinged on the inability of high finance to solve the financial crises of 
1914 compared to previous financial crises, and that was ultimately paramount in 
making the difference between peace and war. Youssef Cassis’ thesis (1994:308-309) 
that high finance did not matter in the process leading to the outbreak of war seems 
unsustainable from this perspective. 
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That the financial crisis of 1914 and the lack of a solution exerted a role in 
increasing the assertiveness of Austrian authorities and driving the Monarchy into war 
is illustrated by the fact that the Berthold cabinet agonized over the ability of Austro-
Hungarian finances to sustain a war against a fighting Serbian army and another likely 
war against Russia, and yet it felt it had no other choice than to make a military move 
against Belgrade.602 This agony hinged on a security dilemma which, as Berchtold 
defined during the Council of Ministers of July 7, was destined to become “more 
precarious as time [went] on,” having the Monarchy already “lost […] 
opportunities.”603  The too-costly-to-sustain binomial financial crises and military-
mobilization- short-of-a-fait-accompli was surely computed in the Austrian 
leadership’s perception of precariousness and loss. What was not computed (or better, 
what was underestimated) was that the news of a forthcoming Austrian war against 
Serbia would have terrified financial markets, spreading the financial crisis across and 
beyond Europe, paralyzing any rescue effort by high finance, and removing some 
critical elements that would inhibit a general war and a general financial crisis. In 
underestimating this risk, Vienna was not alone. State authorities in Berlin repeated 
the same mistake. More significantly, underestimating this risk was a rational course 
of action. Localized financial crises and contained international military crises had 
been so frequent that the probability of an overblown manifestation of either event 
seemed very low. 
An interesting question is why it took so long for Austrian leaders to make a 
démarche in Belgrade given the heterodox nature of their response to the financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 On this point see, in particular Stevenson (2007), p.397. 
603 Quoted in Geiss (1967), pp.81,84.  
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crisis, and, relatedly, the assertive character of their national security policy were 
unequivocal already in June. As the literature has observed, however, a number of 
considerations unrelated to the financial crisis prompted Austrian-Hungarian state 
authorities to delay the immediate display of their intentions.  Among these 
considerations figure the necessity to secure German military assistance (which was 
done on July 5); the precautionary decision to wait (until July 23) for the return to 
France of French President Rarymond Poincaré and his Prime Minister René Viviani 
from their visit to St. Petersburg; and the desire to act shrewdly to place the world 
before a fait accompli.604 The delay had the perverse effect of momentarily reassuring 
high finance and Austrian financial circles that the Monarchy’s intentions were not 
belligerent. Although some members of high finance like Nathan Rothschild were 
uncertain about Austrian national security policies, the absence of Hapsburg military 
measures reinforced the belief that international peace could be maintained.  
By the same token, the increasing realization that an Austrian military move 
was unavoidable from July 11 onwards—the date of the famous “no going back” 
declaration by Emperor Franz Joseph—sent bourses across Europe into a frenzy. 
Austrian political elites consistently refused to abandon the invasion of Serbia, no 
matter the Russian threats, British mediation efforts, and German vacillations.605 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604 The visit in St. Petersburg by Poincare’ and Viviani took place July 20-23. To reduce the risk of 
wider repercussions, Austrian leaders took the decision of sending the ultimatum to Serbia exactly on 
July 23. See Goch, (1938, II) pp.436-37; Hamilton and Herwig (2003), pp.138; Lauren et al. (2007), 
p.229; and Geiss (1967), pp.200-201. 
605 From July 27 onwards German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg tried to hold Austria back by 
intercession of the German ambassador in Vienna. It was suggested that Austria made a fuller 
explanation to St. Petersburg that the occupation of portions of Serbian territory would be purely 
temporary. Germany was desperately attempting to avoid a European war by then. Similarly, the British 
ambassador met with Berchtold to suggest him that Serbia’s reply should be a basis for negotiation. 
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disproportionate (compared to any previous experience) blowout of the financial crisis 
at the end of July surprised even the Monarchy’s highest authorities. As later 
paragraphs will show, the spread of the crisis to Berlin and London critically 
contributed to transforming the war from “localized” to “general,” with repercussions 
on the national security policies of the great powers and, obviously, on the crafting of 
the Hapsburg military strategy. Vienna (and Berlin) had to shift from what was earlier 
thought as a war against Serbia only to a continental war, and possibly a war including 
Great Britain. When Berchtold on July 30 hinted at the potential problems that 
Austrian plans to wage a limited war were encountering, it was too late to stop 
them.606  
 
GERMANY’S OTHER TWO-FRONT WAR: 
Rescuing the nation’s financial status through military gambling  
 
Literature has long recognized that preventive war played a critical role in 
pushing the German Reich over the brink of war in 1914.607 Feeling that a window of 
opportunity was fading, and that chances to preserve Germany’s hegemony on the 
Continent were “slipping away,” German civilian and military leaders resolved that 
they could not win the arms race against their continental neighbors and chose war to 
forestall their decline.  Historians like Paul Kenney (1987), V.R. Berghahn (1973), and 
Niall Ferguson (1994) have shown the economic and financial dimensions of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See, for instance, Gooch (1938, II), p. 278, and Brown (1988), pp.23.24; Geiss (1967), pp.276, 301-302; 
318-19 (protocol 11203). 
606 See, for instance, Stevenson (1996), p.397.  
607 See, amongst many, Kaiser (1983), Van Evera (1984), Ferguson (1994), Copeland (2000), and 
McDonald (2011).  
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process.608 This section buttresses the conclusions of these studies but draws attention 
to the role of financial events and processes that have remained unaccounted. 
Specifically, the financial crisis of 1911-12 and its resolution and, to a greater extent, 
the financial crisis of 1914 and its resolution were fundamental components of the 
German plunge into war.  
Like Austria-Hungary, Germany faced an intense financial-security dilemma 
on the eve of World War I. The Schlieffen Plan itself—the risky military strategy 
designed to overcome Germany’s chronic problem of a two-front war—had a well 
prepared financial counterpart. More meaningfully, the Second Moroccan crisis or 
Agadir crisis (1911-1912) had encouraged new insights about the relationship between 
German finances and German national security policies. Agadir had shown that 
financial crises could have tremendous consequences on national security. In July 
1911, German statesmen had responded to the French military invasion of Morocco by 
sending the German gunboat Panther to the port of Agadir. As a Franco-German 
military crisis developed throughout the following months, a severe capital outflow 
pushed the Reichsbank to the verge of defaulting on its gold obligations.609 To avoid 
this outcome, the Kaiser had backed down but the French had ended up taking over 
most of Morocco. The lesson was clear: financial crises and financial-crisis responses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 Ferguson has arguably provided the most “financial” explanation of German participation in World 
War One. He finds that the fiscal structure of the German Reich—particularly its federalist and 
democratic underpinnings of this structure—prevented a greater investment on national defense and 
exacerbate the security dilemma at the heart of the German was effort (Ferguson 1994). 
609 The trigger had been the financial panic resulting from the Agadir crisis. Fearful that war would 
break out respectively between France and Germany and between Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
Russia, French and British investors pulled funds out of Germany and Austria-Hungary while German 
investors anxiously pulled in credits to Russia and sold investments on Wall Street. On these 
developments see Brown (1988), pp.2-3 and Ahamed (2009), p.43. 
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influenced the crafting of national security policies and set the stage for momentous 
political and military decisions.  
The earlier described heterodox financial measures that the Hollweg 
government introduced in its otherwise orthodox financial agenda in the months and 
years following the 1911-12 financial crisis were exactly an attempt to increase the 
compatibility of Germany’s status within the international financial system with the 
country’s position as a major military power able to provide for its own national 
security.610 In this vein, a few months after the Agadir crisis, Kaiser William 
summoned Governor Havenstein and the main representatives of the large German 
banks and demanded to know whether the latter were capable of financing a European 
war. At their hesitation, he allegedly told them, “The next time I ask that question I 
expect a different answer from you gentlemen.”611 Havenstein, too, was concerned 
that German banks were undermining Germany’s ability to harness sufficient financial 
resources to provide for national security. Not for nothing, in June 1914, he had 
attempted to convince the banks to increase their reserve rations. As it had emerged at 
the end of May of 1914, the Deutsche Bank was on the verge of a collapse, which 
threatened incalculable consequences for the German position in the East (Berghahn 
1973:164,165; Feldman 1997:31).612 The prospect of having to save national banks at 
the same time that the German government asked for reserves to supply to its defense 
needs was both very likely and terrifying. To make it likely were the military crises 
and wars that spread through the Continent in 1911, 1912, and 1913. Making it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
610 On this point see in particular Feldman (1993), pp.28-29; and Ferguson (1994). 
611 Ahamed (2009), p.43.  
612 The Deutsche Bank floated the loans for the construction of the Baghdad Railway, the primary 
vehicle of German influence in the East.  
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terrifying was the fear of another financial crisis like that of 1911-12. German national 
security and the German ability to preserve international peace through financial 
strength would have been endangered, and, in such a circumstance, the Kaiser could 
have not repeated Germany’s 1911 bow to French imperialism without damaging the 
national honor and the preservation of international peace through credible (financial 
and military) deterrence. Significantly, Havenstein’s drive to increase the liquidity of 
the banks was not the expression of as conservative a credit policy as the one 
implemented by Austrian finance minister Bilinski. On the contrary, as Feldman noted 
(1997:31-32), “It was precisely the liberality of the Reichsbank’s intentions in the 
event of a war” that drove Germany “in the direction of trying to control the banking 
system [a little more],” while easing the Reich’s mobilization for the preservation of 
international peace.   
As expected, and in agreement with these considerations, before the outbreak 
of the financial crisis of 1914, this “ortho-heterodox” financial Weltanschauung 
dovetailed with a matching blend of cautious as well as assertive national security 
policies. On the one hand, Germany’s remarkable economic growth and stunning 
industrialization rate, which a strong domestic financial sector eminently contributed 
to, fueled cautiousness and a commitment to international cooperation and peace.613 
Thus, after the Second Moroccan crisis, German political elites stepped away from the 
naval race, distressed by the toll on German-British relations that a policy of greater 
assertiveness in the Mediterranean had provoked.614 In doing so, German decision-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 On the mesmerizing growth rate of the German GNP see Mitchell (1985); and Bairoch (1976), 
pp.281;303. 
614 On the German naval détente see Lynn Jones (1986); Herwig (1987), pp.91,78. 
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makers were very much in synchrony with the preferences of high finance. Albert 
Ballin’s belief that German naval rearmament needed to be slowed down because 
Germany “could not afford a race in dreadnoughts against Britain,” amply resonated 
with the decision, by Bethmann-Hollweg and Kurt Riezler, to prioritize cooperation 
with Great Britain because English naval superiority was undeniable.615 A German-
British understanding was further consolidated during and after the Balkan Wars, 
under the initiative of high finance representatives like Ballin, Paul von Schwabach, 
Alfred de Rothschild, Max Waburg and Ernest Cassel.616 
On the other hand, the fear of losing the arms race due to inability to harness 
the necessary financial resources to maintain it fueled financial heterodoxy and 
assertiveness in the crafting of military spending and foreign policy.617 After the 
financial scare of 1911-12, German leaders operated in the constant awareness of a 
liquidity problem that had the potential to derail national rearmament and the 
provision of national defense.618 The threat of being financially unable to provide for 
the country’s defense was significant even without the outbreak of another financial 
crisis.619 Accordingly, in December 1912, soon after the Agadir’s military-crisis cum 
financial crisis experience, Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615 Ibidem, p.134. See also Cecil (1967), p.161. 
616 Anglo-German cooperation in the form of the London conference of 1912-13 allegedly ended the 
Balkan crisis. On this point see, for example, Cashman (2007), p.71; Cecil (1967), p.199. 
617 In terms of defense spending as a percentage of GNP Germany consistently lagged behind the 
allocations of France and Russia. See Ferguson (1994), pp.149, 154; and (1999a), p.136. 
618 Refer to Going (1996), p.519 and German financial statistics by Holfrerich (1986:52,53) for an 
illustration of the liquidity problem—mostly due to the spontaneous hoarding of coins by investors, 
accrued by ongoing European military tension. 
619 Exacerbating this fear that was Russian seemingly indomitable financial capacity that granted 
Moscow a lingering lead in the continental balance of power. Russia enjoyed privileged access to 
French capital and a prominent ability to extract financial resources from the Russian public. By 1913 
Germany, Great Britain and France all acknowledged Russian dramatic financial powers and military 
potential. See in particular McDonald (2011), pp.1105.  
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commented: “Our enemies are arming more vigorously than us, because we are 
strapped for cash.”620 In 1913 he restated that Germany was losing the armament race 
because German  “money” was “so tight.”621 Similarly, Havenstein noted that the 
power of international financial markets had “reduced the Reichsbank’s ability to cope 
with a military emergency” and “undermined” Germany’s ability to “extend the 
nation’s economic and political influence, and maintain peace through financial 
strength.”622 The cabinet’s struggle to find money to preserve German military power 
and honorable international peace helps to explain the Cabinet’s acceptance of 
heterodox measures like the June 1913 extraordinary tax, the Wehrbeitrag. This tax 
accompanied two Army bills that increased the German defense budget, closing—
temporarily—the gap in defense spending as percentage of GNP between the central 
empires and the triple entente.623 The less-costly Army came to be seen as a better 
instrument for arresting the erosion of Germany’s international position.  
Before the outbreak of the financial crisis in Berlin, Germany took the military 
gamble (July 5) of extending to Austria-Hungary the famous “blank check.”  The 
check fully reflected this German amalgam of cautious and assertive policies and 
intentions. It is true that by endorsing Vienna’s boldest potential move, that is a war 
against Serbia, Chancellor Theodore von Bethmann Hollweg knowingly pursued a 
foreign policy that carried the risk of a general European war.624  But a number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620 Moltke’s words as quoted in Ferguson (1999a), p.137. 
621 Moltke’s words as quoted in Ferguson (1999a), p.136.  
622 Feldman (1993), p.30. On German leaders’ concerns over the country’s financial capacity see 
Ferguson (1994) and (1999a), pp.136-140, and Coetzee (1990), pp.35-41. 
623 On the army tax see Bendix (1915), p.727 and Going (1916), p.525. On the increase in the German 
defense budget compared to the defense budgets of the Triple Entente see Fergusson (1994), pp.154-66; 
Berghahn (1973), p.126-29; Kennedy (1987), p.212. 
624 For an overview of this argument see Hamilton and Herwig (2003), pp.150-187. 
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considerations made this risk, which had existed at least since 1911 (and possibly 
1908), much lower than the benefits of safeguarding the financial and military position 
of the central empires—and with them international peace—that the full support of 
Germany’s most necessary military ally promised. In this sense, Germany’s foreign 
policy before the spread of the financial crisis of 1914 in Berlin was significantly pro-
finance. Specifically, taking action in support of the Dual Monarchy after the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand, thereby endorsing a “final and fundamental” 
reckoning between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, sent a clear message in favor of the 
preservation of stability in Europe—the same stability that financial markets 
necessitated.625  
Moreover, given Austria-Hungary’s financial and military weakness, which 
economic and military statistics confirmed, a German endorsement of Austrian 
military determination against Serbia had to be bold to be credible enough to serve as 
a deterrent force. Members of high finance such as Karl Hellferich and Max Waburg 
concurred that international peace was maintained through deterrence, and the latter 
required well-thought-out financial preparations for war.626  Finally, diplomatic 
correspondence reveals that, while Vienna never thought of anything beyond a 
military “reckoning” limited to Serbia in early July 1914, Berlin similarly expected a 
localized, fait accompli by the Monarchy against Serbia on the style of the French 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 By early 1914, high finance, for instance German financiers Karl Hellferich and Max Waburg, 
subscribed to effective financial and military deterrence for the preservation of peace (Mulligan 
2010:205).  
626 On this point see Mulligan (2010), p.205. Note that although it endorsed deterrence, high finance 
abhorred arms races. This obviously is different from saying that, through its activities, high finance 
was indirectly (and inevitably) encouraging deterrence.  
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intervention in Morocco (1911-12) or the Italian-Turkish War (1911-12).627 The 
conviction that France and Russia were not ready to fight, and that Great Britain, 
whose involvement in a continental war was extremely unlikely, would have very 
likely acted to impede an involvement of Paris or Moscow in the conflict further 
strengthened the German desire and belief that the dispute would have remained 
localized.628 The start of the financial crisis in Berlin from July 10 onwards 
exacerbated the existing security dilemma. Once again, national elites’ fears of being 
driven to bankruptcy while attempting to provide for their security, the security of 
Austria-Hungary, and the relief of panicked investors at home heightened.629 Like the 
financial crisis of 1911-12, the financial crisis of 1914 critically jeopardized 
Germany’s ability to sustain rearmament and mobilization, thereby annihilating 
Germany’s ability to preserve the existing status quo and international peace. As 
expected, the government’s high exposure to high finance during the first phase of 
response to the financial crisis (July 10 to July 29) resulted in a shift towards greater 
caution. In their daily diplomatic correspondences of July 16, 18, 21, 25 and 27, 
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow and 
Ambassador to London Karl Max von Lichnowsky unfailingly stressed that “the 
situation was not free from dangers,” and that it was of the “utmost importance” to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 This desire for localization explains the emphasis by Hollweg and the German foreign office on the 
need for speed as delay threatened to bring about premature intervention of other powers (Berghahm 
196). On German’s understanding of the blank check as a localized expedient to preserve the existing 
European balance of forces amongst the great powers see Trachtenberg (1991), Jaraush (1969:55), and 
Albertini (1943), pp. 252-53. 
628 On French and Russian unpreparedness see, for instance, Geiss July 1914, pp.65-8, Ferguson (1994), 
p.145, and Berghahn, p.203.  
629 See, for instance, Ferguson (1999a), p.136. International peace did not coincide with the absence of 
war (localized political crises and wars had happened on a regular basis between 1907 and 1914 and in 
Europe), but rather with the absence of war amongst the great powers, achieved through effective 
deterrence, and the horror that the prospect of a general war amongst them conveyed. 
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“localize the [Austro-Serbian] difference,” curb “[Austrian] enthusiasm,” “keep 
France quiet,” “having St. Petersburg admonished to keep the peace,” and “mediate 
between Austria and Russia.”630  
On July 19, the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgeime Zeitung even published a 
plea personally drafted by Jagow that appealed to the “European solidarity” and to the 
“united interests of Europe” to preserve, “as on previous occasions,” the peace in the 
Balkans.631 In a confidential telegram to Grey dated July 22, 1914, the German 
leadership was described as “very anxious to keep Austria in check,” and convinced 
that “there [was] no real danger of war.”632 Also, on July 24, Jagow ordered the 
German ambassador to London, Sir Edward Goshen, to call attention to the “enormous 
financial burden” borne by Austria-Hungary in the previous months and years, while 
Kaiser William expressed the intention to “not join Austrian efforts against Serbia 
unless Austria expressly [asked]—an event which was deemed to be “not likely.” 
Finally, between July 25 and July 27, the German cabinet reportedly “endeavored” to 
“preserve the peace of Europe” through mediation efforts in London, Vienna and St. 
Petersburg at the same time that Ballin was having conversations with Churchill to 
limit the Austro-Serbia conflict.633 On July 27 the German chancellor sent a telegram 
to Vienna stressing the necessity of “urgently and impressively” exercising restraint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 See, amongst many, Hollweg to Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine Roedern, July 16, 1914 in 
Geiss (1967), p.118; Jagow to Lichnowsky, July 18, 1914, ibidem, pp.122-124; Hollweg to 
Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Paris and London, July 21, ibidem, pp.149-150; Lichnowsky to Jagow, 
July 25, 1914, ibidem, pp.205-206; Lichnowsky to Jagow, July 27, 1914, ibidem, pp.238. 
631 On the note in the paper see Berghahn (1973), p.200. 
632 Rumbold to Grey, telegram 88, July 22, 1914, in Geiss (1976), pp.158-159. 
633 Montgelas et al. (1924), pp.173,74,183-84; Churchill, World Crisis, Vol.I, p.207; Cecil (1967), 
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and accepting mediation in the conflict with Serbia.634 On July 28, after the Austrian 
declaration of war with Serbia and the news of partial mobilization, Hollweg allowed, 
in a conversation with war minister Eric von Falkheneim, that the Chancellor no 
longer wanted war. Along with Moltke’s endorsement, Hollweg refused to mobilize, 
and on July 29 the Kaiser wrote to the Tzar that a “direct understanding” between 
Moscow and Vienna was “possible and desirable” and that the German government 
was continuing its efforts to promote it.635  
More to the point, sometime between July 26 and July 28, Bethmann Hollweg 
proposed to Grey through Goshen the exact arrangement that Ballin had proposed to 
Churchill on July 25.636 On July 25, during a dinner meeting with Churchill, Ballin 
proposed: “Suppose we had to go to war with Russia and France, and suppose we 
defeated France and yet took nothing from her in Europe, not an inch of her territory, 
only some colonies to indemnify us. Would that make a difference to England’s 
attitude? Suppose we gave a guarantee beforehand.” After Ballin’s return to Berlin, 
Hollweg officially telegraphed to the British government such an arrangement: “The 
Imperial government was ready to give every assurance to the British government that, 
provided Great Britain remained neutral, Germany aimed at no territorial acquisitions 
at the expenses of France.”637 Ballin’s assessment of Britain’s intentions fostered the 
Chancellor’s calculation that he could still contain the financial and political crisis.638 
As much as the cabinet was trusting high finance to resolve the financial crisis, so it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 Hamilton and Herwig (2003), p.32. 
635 Trachtenberg (1991), p.84; Snyder, pp.76-77.  
636 See Churchill (1930:I), pp.195-96; 207; and Cecil (1967), pp.208-210. 
637 Churchill (1930:I), p.196.  
638 On Hollweg’s beliefs that he could still limit the crisis on July 27 see Hamilton and Herwig (2003), 
p.179. 
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was relying on the diplomatic power of market forces to promote the resolution of the 
international political crisis abroad. The liaison between international markets and the 
German government had tremendous repercussions in international politics. On July 
28, despite the Austrian declaration of war, the Kaiser continued to reach an Austro-
Russian diplomatic settlement. He even agreed with Grey on the Stop-in-Belgrade 
proposal, which offered a solution like the one that had ended the Franco-Prussian war 
in 1871.639 
Oblivious to the financial threat that the Empire faced, however, the large 
German banks offered no cooperation. As late as July 28, German bankers continued 
to insist with the government that it was not justifiable to speak of a “financial crisis” 
in Germany.640 Concurrently, and as previously described, they continued to shun any 
cooperation with Havenstein. The Reichsbank’s losses spiked. With Austria-Hungary 
ready to attack Serbia, Russian mobilization well underway, and the German Central 
Bank risking financial bankruptcy, German authorities now looked at the behavior of 
German bankers as “criminal” and “abusive.”641 The turn to financial heterodoxy was 
amplified and from July 29 onwards, the chancellor welcomed the assertive foreign 
policy that military plans promised. Between July 29 and July 31, telegrams sent from 
Berlin to London and to Moscow in the interests of peace left the place to the belief 
that German participation in the war was inevitable.642 Moltke justified war as a 
“deliverance from the great armaments (and) from the financial burdens” they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 Austria-Hungary refused the proposal. See, for instance, Meyer (2006), p.53; Bethmann Hollweg to 
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640 “Berlin Very Nervous: Big Banks Will Support Stocks—Keeping Gold in Vaults,” Special Cable to 
the New York Times, July 29, 1914.  
641 See, for instance, Going (1916), p.518. 
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Snyder, Official documents, pp.80-81.  
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entailed. His Schliefflen plan, whose details had long been decided upon, promised to 
rescue Germany’s potential military inferiority as much as it tried to save Germany’s 
national credit and finances by employing instruments which had proven so potent in 
Germany’s rise to economic power.643   
More specifically, the Schlieffen Plan hinged on a credit system of such 
elasticity that it could quiet the panic and cope with a suddenly increased call for 
credit that would mark the beginning of a war. War, thus, for Germany, was a means 
for rescuing national financial pride. All options to achieve that goal except the 
military one were being closed. Havenstein’s words pronounced about two months 
after the beginning of military hostilities substantiate these statements further. As the 
governor declared:  
The enemy, especially the English expected Germany to collapse economically 
and it was thus essential that Germany falsify such expectations by showing 
that the sources of her peacetime success would be even more serviceable in 
war. He further added: In no nation in the world is credit so well-developed as 
in Germany; in no land is the progress of economic life so dependent upon 
credit and its maintenance as is ours [...]. All our preparations for the 
financial mobilization were based upon this, and they have proven themselves 
superbly, and we can be truly proud that we, as the most productive of all 
lands on earth, lone among all the combatants, have come through without a 
moratorium.644  
 
On July 29 the turn away from cautiousness seemed to point more towards 
confusion than assertiveness. “Germany does not want to bring about this frightful 
war,” Moltke stated in a letter to Hollweg,” but if the collision between Austria and 
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Russia becomes inevitable, he continued, Germany will also have to mobilize.645 In 
the meantime, however, state authorities had to intervene at the Berlin Bourse to save 
security holders and national finances. German bankers continued to exert pressure on 
the British press and Parliament—they would have continued till July 30—but their 
efforts no longer found a counterpart in Berlin. By July 30, the cabinet had shifted 
more clearly towards an assertive foreign policy. The Kaiser issued a status of 
impending war and ordered mobilization (July 30, 31).646 These decisions were taken 
exactly when the government, at the height of a domestic financial crisis and under the 
threat of bankruptcy, dismissed the behavior of German banks and trusted the nation’s 
financial and military resilience. High finance was left playing the peace game on its 
own. On August 1, Nathaniel Rothschild made a personal appeal for peace to the 
Kaiser. Communications were interrupted before a reply could be sent.647  Two days 
later Germany declared war on France.   
 
 
DELAYING FIRM MILITARY DECISIONS TO PREVENT FINANCIAL COLLAPSE: 
Financial crisis and political checkmate in Great Britain  
 
The cautious foreign policy of the liberal government of Herbert Henry 
Asquith between 1911 and 1914 can hardly be questioned. Shocked by the war 
prospects that the Agadir crisis had raised, the British cabinet steadfastly acted as a 
broker to improve Anglo-German relationships. During the Balkan wars, foreign 	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646 Exchange between Cambon and Viviani, July 30, 1914 in Smith, p.287. 
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secretary Sir Edward Grey worked closely with high finance and the German cabinet 
to prevent a clash between Austria-Hungary and Russia that risked spiraling into a 
European war.648 Undoubtedly concerned about this prospect, in the months and years 
before the summer of 1914 British state authorities were very keen on adopting a 
prudent, “businesslike,” and “City-minded” approach to resolving international 
political differences.649  
As a result of this attitude, the Anglo-German naval race had practically 
disappeared by 1914, and, in June of the same year, Britain had even arrived at a fairly 
wide-ranging agreement with Germany concerning British interests in 
Mesopotamia.650 In the crafting of each achievement, the Asquith cabinet and high-
finance representatives like Ernest Cassel had operated in symbiosis, so much so that 
the latter felt at ease in promising to his German colleagues that “Great Britain was 
prepared to go ‘very far’ by way of ‘compromise’ or neutrality.”651 Chancellor of 
Exchequer Lloyd George had reinforced this stance in 1911-12, when, during the 
Agadir crisis, he had stated that he “would make great sacrifices to preserve peace,” 
because “nothing would justify a disturbance of international good will except 
questions of the greatest national moment.” Considering that British collaborative 
financial and security policies applied not only to Anglo-German relations but also to 
Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian affairs, one can safely conclude that there was no 
great power more cautionary than Britain on the eve of the Great War.   	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On a more practical level, during the first six months of 1914, the Bank of 
England—differently from the Austrian Central Bank and the German Central Bank—
undertook no financial preparation for facing a potential war exactly because of the 
risk of a financial crisis that such measures would have engineered. As concluded in 
the spring of 1914 by the Desart Committee—the commission appointed by the 
Treasury with the task of deciding whether the gold that the banks had piled up should 
be deposited in the Bank of England—no protective or retaliatory measures in 
preparation of a war effort could be devised in Great Britain because they would have 
resulted in “the ruin of most people engaged in business,” that is, a major financial 
crisis (Horn 2002:26). Although the report of Committee was only a memorandum, it 
made the British Treasury aware that fears of a financial and military crisis were 
powerful and diffused, and that British military deterrence and war readiness 
necessitated either the lessening of those fears or domestic financial reform.  
As expected, before the financial crisis had reached a peak in Europe and 
began to upset London (respectively in July 23 and July 25-27, 1914), the British 
government trusted it could reduce war- and financial-crisis fears through the 
preservation of a prudent foreign policy (and orthodox financial policies). Throughout 
most of July 1914, the cabinet considered the Austrian government’s response to the 
assassination “neither alarmist nor extreme.” In the weeks preceding the issuing of the 
Austrian ultimatum, the British Foreign Office saw no “complication” or “threat to 
general peace “deriving from the “Serbian imbroglio” and trusted that the Austrian 
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demands would be “kept within reasonable limits.”652 Close to July 23, the 
apprehension of the British cabinet grew but did so more slowly than the Foreign 
Office’s feeling or hope that the crisis would be contained.653  
The news on July 23 that Vienna had delivered a message to Belgrade, and the 
reaction of continental markets to the missive produced intense alarm in London. Grey 
started to consider the potential “awful consequences of the situation.” Crucially, the 
apprehension of the British government did not regard solely the prospect of a 
European war but the related collapse of the international system of credit, too. 
Judging from Grey’s words to the British legations in Central Europe soon after the 
delivery of the ultimatum, this potential financial downfall had primary importance.  
As Grey told the Austrian ambassador in London, Count Mensdorff, and his German 
equivalent, Count Lichnowsky, on July 23: 
 
If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and 
Germany—were engaged in a war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure 
of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade that a war would be 
accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In 
these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that 
of 1848, and, irrespective of who were the victors in the war, many things might be 
completely swept away.654  
 
Hence, British state authorities feared the occurrence of a massive financial 
crisis even before July 25, the date at which the financial crisis started to visibly upset 
markets in London, and even before the content of the Vienna ultimatum was known 
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in London.655 Not only did British state authorities start to fear a financial crisis by 
July 23, but they also took steps to prevent it, which obviously meant taking active 
steps to preserve international peace, too, by adopting an extra-cautious national 
security stance. For instance, on July 23 the British delegation in Vienna was 
instructed to cooperate with the Russian, French, and German ambassadors in 
“giv[ing] friendly counsels of moderation” to the Austrian authorities.656 Since 
Germany had a pivotal role in this task, later that day Grey and Lord Morley had 
dinner with Ballin and other notable German bankers to cautiously reassure them and 
the German government on the absence of an Anglo-Russian naval convention (Cecil 
1967:207). Throughout the day after (July 24), the British foreign office endeavored to 
convince the Austrians to soften the ultimatum by introducing a longer time limit. 
Simultaneously, Foreign Secretary Grey exerted pressure on the Serbians to “give a 
favorable reply to as many points [of the ultimatum] as possible within the limit of 
time.”657   
The finding that the British shift towards greater prudence occurred starting on 
July 23 rather than, as expected, on July 25 is not entirely surprising. Although the 
financial crisis physically reached markets in London only on the 25th, the crisis 
peaked on continental markets exactly on July 23, partly as a consequence of the 
delivery of the Austrian note. Given the stakes of the British government in the 
preservation of the existing international financial system; the connection between the 
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British and European financial systems (Keynes 1914); and the government’s high 
affinity with high finance, it is not astonishing that British authorities had already 
changed their national security policies in response to the start of the financial crisis in 
Europe. The financial crisis of 1890 exerted a similar effect on the national security 
policies of the American government.  
In partial amendment to the earlier formulated expectations, then, one could 
argue that between July 23 and July 29-30, which is during the phase of orthodox 
response to the financial crisis, the British foreign policy shifted towards extra 
prudence. After July 24,658 this shift was especially clear by British efforts to promote 
mediation and compromise amongst France, Russia, Germany and Austria-
Hungary.659 Once the disclosure of the Austrian ultimatum had unveiled that Vienna 
was seeking some form of humiliation for Serbia (July 24), Grey tried to rein in 
foreign assertiveness by warning the German ambassador that Russia would stand by 
Serbia, while concurrently avoiding giving Russia and France any reassurance of 
British support in case the conflict escalated. In the words of the Foreign Secretary and 
the British Monarch, King George V, Britain “wished to prevent any question that 
arose from throwing the groups into opposition,” since “it had “no quarrel with 
anyone” and hoped to “remain neutral.”660 Even after hearing that Austria-Hungary 
had declared war on Serbia, and that Russia was planning a partial mobilization, the 	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British cabinet hastened to push forwards new mediation efforts among the German, 
French, Italian and British governments with the object of inducing Austria-Hungary 
and Russia to suspend military operations (July 28).661   
More pointedly, the financial crisis loomed large in this shift towards extra 
prudent national security policies. In alignment with what expected, between July 25 
and July 28—during the first phase of response to the financial crisis—the Cabinet 
converged around the “orthodox” crisis response desired by the Bank of England and 
Governor Cunliffe, who falsely declared that the Bank and the joint-stock banks had 
the situation in hand and that the situation did not justify any emergency action.662 
This was not what Edward Grey and Asquith desired, and even less what Winston 
Churchill wished.663 But the less cautionary decision to “initiate the precautionary 
stage in the preparations for war,” which part of the Cabinet desired and proposed, 
was overruled as a result of a “great debate” at the Privy Council—debate that placed 
the orthodox cause and new international mediation efforts at the forefront.664  
As expected, on July 29 and 30, when the exposure to high finance of British 
officials started to transition from high to low, British foreign policy lost features of 
extra cautiousness and acquired ambiguous traits.  On July 29, Grey told the German 
ambassador in London, Lichnowsky, who demanded a British declaration of 	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neutrality, that, “If war became general, […] the issue might be so great that it would 
involve all European interests” and it would  “not be practicable for England to stand 
aside.”665 The admission that London would have intervened in a possible general war 
suggested a step away from the highly cautious approach of the preceding days. Yet, 
the weak wording of Grey’s message to Lichnowsky revealed the absence of firm 
assertive intentions. The same was also revealed by Grey’s shocking disclosure, on the 
same day (July 29), to French ambassador M. Cambon, that Britain still “had not 
decided what to do in a contingency [like that of a European war],” which Britain 
authorities still hoped “might not arise.”666   
Evidence confirms that the convoluted and ambiguous nature of the British 
national security stance depended widely on the ongoing financial crisis, and Britain’s 
ongoing attempts to stop it. As Grey explained to Cambon on July 30: 
 
We [have] come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet today, that we [can] 
not give any pledge at the present time. The commercial and financial 
situation [is] exceedingly serious; there [is] the danger of a complete 
collapse that would involve us and everyone else in ruin….It [is] 
possible that our standing aside might be the only means of preventing 
a complete collapse of European credit, in which we should be 
involved. This might be a paramount consideration in deciding our 
attitude.667  
 
Grey further declared:  
 
Though we [shall] have to put our policy before Parliament, we [can] 
not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we [do] 	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not feel, and public opinion [does] not feel, that any treaties or 
obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might 
alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take 
the view that intervention [is] justified. The preservation of the 
neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an 
important factor, in determining our attitude. 
 
Several considerations can be made. The first and most obvious is that the financial 
crisis and the prospect of a collapse of the international financial system were a 
foremost concern for British authorities and, as a consequence, the crafting of British 
national security policies in the last days of July 1914. Since offering a firm promise 
of military support to the French, and more generally a promise of military 
intervention, might have hastened financial collapse, such a promise could not be 
made, and indeed was not made in these critical days. The British Cabinet knew that 
although high finance was not capable of active initiatives to solve the financial crisis, 
joint-stock banks were clearly very capable of bringing the international and national 
system to complete financial breakdown. This lingering ability affected the policies 
undertaken not only in response to the financial crisis but also (and simply) during the 
financial crisis. By midnight of July 30, for instance, Grey was aware that the hopes of 
preserving peace had almost vanished, and yet in the House of Commons he continued 
to state that “Britain was still working for the one great object of preserving European 
peace.”668 
If anything could help the faith of international financial operators at a time in 
which different expedients were tried to stop the crisis and restore confidence, surely 
that something was the prospect of successful mediation, not the prospect of British 
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intervention in an allegedly forthcoming war.669 Significantly, evidence shows that 
Grey’s statements to French ambassador Cambon and the House reflected the desires 
of financial magnate Nathan Rothschild, other exponents of high finance, and 
Chancellor of Exchequer Lloyd George.  Between July 29 and August 1, Nathan 
Rothschild attempted to silence the Times for its leading articles that, he reasoned, 
were “hounding the country into war,” and were doing so right when maintaining 
neutrality was “the only way” to avert “a [financial] catastrophe such as the world had 
never seen.”670  The resemblance of these words with Grey’s message to Cambon is 
undeniable. Similarly, George had consulted with other financiers in the City, the 
Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, and had arrived at the 
conclusion that financial interests were “aghast at the idea of [Britain] plunging into 
the European conflict”; how it would “break down the whole system of credit with 
London at its center”; how it “would cut up commerce and manufacture”; how it 
“would hit labour and wages and prices, and […] inevitably produce violence and 
tumult.”671  
An additional and related consideration to draw is that Grey’s words to 
Cambon of July 30 neatly captured the relation between the financial crisis and British 
national security stance. Grey’s admission that Great Britain was determined to pursue 
the “only means” in the security realm that could “prevent a financial collapse,” 
indicates that the financial crisis and the process of response influenced British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
669 An interesting hypothesis for another research project is that this perception might have also 
informed/fueled the mis(perception) that the war would have been short. 
670 During these days, the Times published editorials on the British “elementary duty of self-
preservation” and the government’s responsibility to “back [its] friends.” On Rothschild’s 
considerations see Steed (1925), pp.8,9, and Ferguson (1999b, II), p.432. 
671 Lloyd George’s words in Schmitt (1930) pp.281,287; Tuchman (1962), p.113. 
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national security policies independently of other factors—for instance, the Austrian 
declaration of war on Serbia (July 28) and the related likelihood of a European war. 672  
As for the nature of this influence, Grey’s uncertainty with regards to which means 
would prevent financial collapse—uncertainty which is understandable in view of the 
orthodox and heterodox financial measures that were tried at the time and that have 
been previously described—seems to indicate, in line with what has been already 
found, ambiguity. Ambiguity fostered delay or postponement of crucial military 
decisions. As late as August 1, The Economist—the foremost British financial 
magazine even at the time—claimed “every British interest points to the maintenance 
of strict neutrality.”673 
A final consideration is that the preservation of Belgian neutrality was a 
“further development” (in determining the British military stance), which the 
“exceedingly serious financial situation” still made vague and undefined.  In other 
words, the weight of Belgian neutrality in British war and peace calculations were 
destined to remain unknown until the risk of a complete financial collapse had been 
avoided. This was arguably the reason why Grey labeled the preservation of Belgian 
neutrality an “important” but “not [..] decisive” factor  deciding British participation 
or exclusion from a potential conflict involving Germany and France. By contrast, 
preventing a collapse of credit was “paramount.”  
As British officials gradually appreciated the national security dangers of a 
now certain European war, assertiveness became an increasingly more evident 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
672 The role of systemic military pressures has been already shown extensively by existing literature. 
See, for instance,  
673 The Economist, August 1, 1914, p.219.  
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ingredient. On July 31, as they resorted to orthodox and heterodox financial measures, 
cabinet ministers were still very alarmed at the chaos in the City. Grey was still 
grappling with the consequences of his statements to the Germans and the French, and 
whether British “uncertainty” was an “encouraging element in Berlin.”674 By August 
1, as Germany declared war upon Russia, it was clear even in London that saving the 
interests of high finance jeopardized the government’s responsibility for safeguarding 
the public good and national security. Cooperating with high finance had become too 
costly:  deciding to remain neutral because of fears of the economy—which was 
essentially what high finance desired and asked the British government—was 
tantamount to admitting that Britain could no longer afford to be a great power. It was 
also equal to saying that the business of high finance had undisputed importance even 
when it no longer safeguarded the public good.675 As the government veered towards 
heterodoxy to save the economy from ruin, it also moved closer to more 
interventionist approaches to the protection of British national security. By August 3, 
the day when the Germans issued their ultimatum to Belgium, the cabinet’s decision to 
intervene was much less difficult to make than it would have been three or four days 
earlier.676  
Interestingly, by having an influence on British national security policies, the 
financial crisis also had an influence on the national security policies of the main great 
powers and, ultimately, the Great War. Available evidence indicates that British 
ambiguous national security policies and ambiguous economic strategy of financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
674 Grey to Bertie, July 31, 1914, British Documents on the Origins of War (1926), xi, no.367. 
675 On this point, see in particular French (1981), p.94.  
676 Sir Edward Grey’s Speech before the House of Commons, Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. LVC, 1914, pp.1821 ff.; Snyder, pp.95-98. 
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crisis response did, in turn, influence the national security policies of France, Russia, 
and Germany. The fatidic days of British military indecisiveness (July 29-August 1) 
were the most critical days in which the destinies of Europe and great power politics 
were decided. The French government on July 30 was desperately seeking a strong 
commitment from the British government to avoid the military mobilization that the 
Russian government was demanding from Paris.677 Although it had called individual 
reservists and summoned reserve officers to duty, on July 30 France had not yet 
mobilized. Russia had only partially mobilized, and the Tzar was in constant 
communication with the German Kaiser.678 And on July 30, the German Kaiser 
Wilhelm and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg were still keeping the mediation door 
open.679 What they needed was a sharp warning word at Paris and St. Petersburg, 
which, at the time, because of the danger of financial collapse, Great Britain could not 
give.  
Therefore, on August 1, French authorities concluded that the British 
government was “not favorable to a landing of British troops on the Continent,” and 
Germany declared war on Russia.680 Had Great Britain given Cambon the pledge that 
France, as Grey later recalled, “had pressed [for] more and more urgently” on the 30th, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677 Viviani to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and London, telegrams 453, 373, 374, 
confidential in Geiss (1967), pp.312-3. 
678 Russia had partially mobilized on July 29. The Nicky-Willy telegrams began to go wrong exactly on 
July 30 as the Tzar told the Germans that they had started to mobilize five days earlier for defensive 
purposes.  
679 Hollweg stated: “My hope that mediation may still be possible on the basis of Grey’s proposal is 
most seriously imperiled by the Russian mobilization against Austria. Hollweg to Lichnowsky, 
telegram 191, July 30 in in Montgelas (1924), pp.352,355. To that comunication Kaiser Wilhelm II 
wrote marginal annotations of the kind: “the only possible way to ensure or enforce peace is that 
England must tell Paris and Petersburg, its Allies, to remain quiet. Then Germany can remain quiet 
too.” Ibidem. 
680 P. Cambon to Viviani, telegram, August 1, Poincaré, IV, p.487. 
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French mobilization might have been, at the very least, postponed; Russian 
mobilization might have been halted; and Germany might have not mobilized at all.681 
No one could trust the British lukewarm assurances of neutrality, and—at the same 
time—it was hard to know how to interpret them as they only created the suspicion 
that London was bluffing. As the Kaiser wrote on July 29, “[Grey knows that] if he 
were to say one single, serious, sharp and warning word at Paris and Petersburg [..]  
both would become quiet at once. But he takes care not to speak the word and 
threatens us instead! England alone bears the responsibility for peace and war, not we 
any longer. That must also be made clear to the world.”682 
Finally, the presented evidence enriches existing explanations of British 
(ambiguous) foreign policy on the eve of the war. The literature has emphasized the 
role of Cabinet partisanship and particularly the division between the supporters of 
unconditional neutrality, the advocates of simple neutrality, those who were for peace 
but would open the door to intervention, and those who stood solidly for 
intervention.683 Grey himself admitted that offering a British military pledge to France 
would have resulted in the “resignation of one group or the other” and the “consequent 
break-up of the Cabinet altogether.”684 Further paralyzing the cabinet, as shown in this 
last section of the chapter, was the fact that the financial crisis filtered through intra-
cabinet divisions but no group political seemed to have a convincing strategy of 
financial crisis response.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681 France and Russia also urged Britain—with “undeniable force” according to Grey—that if Britain 
could not promise anything to Paris and Moscow, it should at least not give Germany the impression 
that London would certainly stand aside. See Grey (1925, I), p.340, American Edition p.330. 
682 Wilhelm’s notes on July 29, in Montgelas et al (1924), pp.321-33. 
683 On these divisions see Beaverbrook (1928), pp.22-30; Schmitt (1930), pp.282. 
684 Grey (1925, I), pp.334-5. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The financial, diplomatic and military experience of Austria-Hungary, 
Germany, and Great Britain during the financial crisis of 1914 and in the months and 
years preceding it supports the logic of the framework. Specifically, Austrian, German 
and British policymaking in the economic and security realms shows that there is 
correspondence between the orthodox (and heterodox) financial policies that a 
government follows and the national security policies that it is willing to pursue (claim 
1); and that financial crises and the process of financial-crisis response cause a 
significant shift in national security policies (claim 2). Moreover, the Austrian 
experience validates claim 3: the nationalist government of Theobald von Bethmann 
Hollweg curbed its assertiveness after the start of the financial crisis of 1911-12, when 
government exposure to high finance was high, and inflated its threat assessment after 
the start of the financial crisis of 1914, when government exposure to high finance was 
low. The British experience instead sheds more light on the changes in national 
security policies occurring in the scenario that the framework cannot pin down (HA–
LE). After the start of the financial crisis of 1914, the government of Herbert Henry 
Asquith pursued first an ultra cautionary foreign policy and then gradually stepped 
away from it, although the disillusionment with the workings of international 
diplomacy in Great Britain never reached the radical character that it did in Japan or 
Italy.   
The evidence presented in the chapter also highlights some of the limits of the 
framework. First, the German experience indicates that a government can have an 
ambiguous affinity with high finance, and, relatedly, pursue a set of ambiguous 
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national security policies, with elements of cautiousness and assertiveness. The 
framework drawn in Chapter One omits to consider this possibility. Ultimately, 
however, since it is government exposure to high finance that decides whether a shift 
towards assertiveness or cautiousness will prevail, finding that a government can have 
ambiguous affinity with high finance does not undermine the framework.  Second, and 
in agreement with findings in previous chapters, evidence collected in this chapter 
suggests that the influence of a financial crisis on the national security policies of the 
crisis-stricken states might inspire changes in the national security policies of other 
states, too.685 More theoretical and empirical work on the subject would be an 
interesting research avenue to pursue. Third, and related to the former finding, national 
leadership seem to respond to financial crises and adjust their national security 
policies accordingly even if the crisis has not yet hit their states but is affecting other 
states. Once again, it is inopportune to make any inference without conducting further 
research into the subject matter. 
It is also imperative to note one last time that, because of its focus on the 
national security influence of financial crises, this chapter has missed to treat many 
underlying and proximate causes of the war in depth.686  I defend this decision by 
noting that the objective of the chapter was not to provide an alternative explanation 
on the causes of World War One, but only to demonstrate the general soundness of the 
framework, and the utility of examining variation in states’ military and diplomatic 
strategies based on their responses to financial crises.  In the process of trying to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 One can imagine adding more branches at the end of the analytical tree of this work. See Chapter 1,  
Figure 1.1. 
686 A fairly recent and comprehensive account is the one provided by Hamilton and Herwig (2003). 
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account for the multifaceted pressures and incentives that, combined, produced a 
catastrophe that we are still endeavoring to explain, observing the interdependence 
between financial and military pressures that financial crises and a prevailing status of 
financial fear helped to propel across and beyond Europe between 1911 and 1914 has 
the benefit of enlightening variables and phenomena that have remained unjustly 
overlooked.  
In this respect, the findings of the chapter offer a way to conciliate those 
explanations of World War I that emphasize the inadvertent or unintentional nature of 
the war (and the array of miscalculations and misperceptions that caused it), and those 
explanations that have stressed premeditation and deliberately assertive national 
security policies. 687 The political necessity of easing financial fears and solving 
financial crises—not only the global financial crisis of 1914 but also the European 
financial crisis of 1911-1912, and the inability of high finance to provide an effective 
response to financial crises and financial fears, gradually moved state actors towards 
taking greater charge of economic matters, and, as a result, security matters. The 
financial crisis of 1912 prompted the Austrian decision that the moment to settle 
accounts with Serbia had arrived, and the German decision to preserve international 
peace (and act as a brake on Austrian assertiveness). When the financial of 1914 hit, 
both Austrian and German leaders knew that the preservation of peace required a fait 
accompli between Vienna and Belgrade, as the risks of being driven to bankruptcy 
during the next military crisis while suffering national security losses now appeared as 
likely as forbidding. Austrian-Hungarian and German authorities took that decision, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
687 Refer to the introduction of this chapter for literary references.  
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assuming that the financial crisis would have remained localized—as much as the 
Austro-Serbian dispute.  
As the Austro-Serbian settlement was delayed, and the financial crisis spread 
across the continent, the risk of a European war increased. During a first phase of 
response to the financial crisis, German statesmen relied on Anglo-British cooperation 
to contain the theater of military hostilities. As the financial crisis reached London, 
British authorities faced pressure to postpone and hide their escape from neutrality to 
save the credit system, and later impede a financial collapse. This ambiguity let 
Russian and French statesmen believe that they were on their own, which exacerbated 
their security dilemma and hastened mobilization on their part. The same ambiguity 
led Germany to trust that military hostilities would have very likely been contained 
since Great Britain would have very likely maintained its neutrality, and, possibly, 
exerted pressure on France and Russia. In the end, British authorities, too, (like 
Austrian and German authorities) arrived at the conclusion that only a strong state-led 
response to the crisis would have impeded financial collapse and preserved Great 
Britain’s national security and great power status. Now awkwardly privileged, Great 
Britain had the last word on which was the most suitable financial response to 
embrace and the kind of war to be waged. This unforgettable decision did not sanction 
the abdication of political authorities to the military or the “cult of the offensive.”688 It 
gave the blessing to a fundamental revivification of great-power strength. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688 On the “cult of the offensive” see Snyder (1984) and Van Evera (1984). On the limits of the “cult of 
the offensive” thesis see Trachtenberg (1991) and Kier (1999). 
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CHAPTER VI: 
 
FINAL REFLECTIONS 
 
This work originated from the simple intuition that financial crises yield 
changes in national security policies by triggering collapses in the objective and inter-
subjective resources around which governments and government leaders build their 
power. Because of these collapses, fixing national financial and economic problems 
and policies becomes paramount for governments and government leaders after the 
outbreak of financial crises. National security policies are adjusted to meet these new, 
impellent needs.  
Based on this intuition the manuscript has offered a framework on the national 
security influence of financial crisis that evidence across governments, states and 
financial crisis periods has largely confirmed. The chapters of this dissertation have 
shown that crisis-stricken governments change their states’ military spending, threat 
assessment and war prospects because they endorse a positive or a negative set of 
economic policies of financial crisis response which dominant financial ideas and the 
power or weakness of domestic financial actors legitimate. Ultimately, when a crisis-
stricken government embarks on positive economic policies of crisis resolution, the 
national security policies of the same government are liable to either shift towards 
greater assertiveness or encounter lesser constraints to shift towards greater 
assertiveness. Vice versa, when a government follows negative economic policies and 
international financial cooperation in its crisis response strategy, the national security 
policies of the crisis-stricken state are prone to shift towards greater caution. 
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Whether the shift towards greater assertiveness (or greater caution) results in 
the intensification or the overhaul of pre-crisis national security policies tends to 
depend on the correspondence or lack of correspondence between the affinity with 
high finance and the exposure to high finance of the crisis-hit government. As a 
general rule of thumb, when there is correspondence, that is when the economic 
policies that the crisis-stricken government wants to implement solve the financial 
crisis, pre-crisis conciliatory or assertive national security policies are strengthened or 
exaggerate. When there is no correspondence, instead, pre-crisis conciliatory or 
assertive national security policies are either overhauled or more likely to be 
overhauled than before the crisis.  
 
Fourteen instances: Encouraging Outcomes and Exceptions 
The empirical chapters composing this dissertation have each been thought of 
and drafted as one component of a heterogeneous mix of case studies leading to 
similar conclusions on the national security influence of financial crises. In this 
respect, Japan, Italy and the United States between 1880 and 1940, and Great Britain, 
Austria-Hungary and Germany in the summer of 1914 have shown both remarkable 
similarities in their post-financial-crisis security policies and remarkable differences in 
the channels of influence filtering the relation between financial crises and national 
security policies. Each state has offered a distinct empirical version of the relationship 
between government authorities and high finance specified in Chapter I, and a distinct 
example of the relevance of domestic drivers, international drivers, and domestic and 
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international drivers in the translation of the influence of financial crises on national 
security policies.  
Altogether, the examined case studies provide a comparative analysis of shifts 
in national security policies across a total of fourteen instances of financial crises in 
the temporal interval between 1880 and 1940. The striking consistencies across these 
instances are illustrated in Table 6.1. During the financial crisis that began in Italy in 
1889, the one that began in the United States in 1907-09, and the ones that rocked 
Japan in 1907-09 and in 1920-22, crisis-stricken governments exhibited analogous 
affinity with high finance (low) and analogous exposure to high finance (high), and 
they analogously curbed pre-crisis assertive national security policies. In each 
instance, the shift towards greater military caution (scenario LA–HE) also occurred for 
practically the same reason, namely the materialization of a domestic political context 
hostile to tolerating private financial and economic losses and a novel understanding 
by government authorities of the need of endorsing greater international financial 
cooperation and limiting military ambitions (Table 6.1). 
Similarly, the Japanese government and the Austrian government both 
exhibited low affinity with high finance and low exposure to high finance, and both 
inflated their pre-crisis assertive military spending, threat assessment and war 
prospects during, respectively, the financial crises of 1889-90 and 1896-1901 and the 
financial crisis of 1914 (Table 6.1). Finally, after the outbreak of the financial crises of 
1893-94 and 1893-96 both the Italian government and the American government 
registered high affinity with high finance and high exposure to high finance and, in 
both cases, national security policies shifted towards extra caution.  
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Similarities exist even across those financial crisis instances that fall in 
scenario HA–LE and therefore those post-financial crisis national security policies that 
the framework cannot figure out, like for example the course of the Japanese, Italian 
and American national security policies after the outbreak of the Great Depression, 
and the course of the British and the German national security policies after the 
outbreak of the financial crisis of 1914.  In these five instances, indicated in white in 
Table 6.1, different governments similarly stricken by financial crisis and similarly 
pursuing cautionary national security policies before the start of the crisis, all faced 
lesser constraints to the exercise of assertiveness and all hesitated to embrace greater 
assertiveness, although notable differences remains with regards to the character of 
their full slide away from cautiousness. For instance, in the early to mid-1930s, 
following the outbreak of financial crisis in Japan, the military spending, threat 
assessment and war prospects of the Japanese leaderships exuded greater assertiveness 
than the national security agenda of the Italian government, let alone that of the 
American government. Despite the Italian-Ethiopian war, Italian military spending 
kept decreasing in absolute value throughout most of the 1930s while American 
military forces were not engaged in battle until 1941. On the whole, much more than 
in the other three scenarios leading, respectively, to inflated, curbed or extra-prudent 
national security policies, in scenario HA–LE the influence of financial crises on 
national security policies seems especially subject to variables like regime type, 
personality type, and military tradition and culture. Yes, as the third sections of 
Chapters Two, Three and Four, and most of Chapter Four have demonstrated, the 
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influence of financial crises on national security policies can be appreciated even in 
this scenario. 
Across all fourteen financial crisis episodes, the most memorable changes in 
national security policies have occurred in the presence of a mismatch or disparity 
between government affinity with high finance and government exposure to high 
finance. The mismatch took place under either scenario LA–HE or scenario HA–LE, 
and, for the reasons described above, overhauls in national security policies were 
constant under scenario LA–HE, less so under scenario HA–LE. Although the 
framework does not say anything about the specific magnitude of the shifts, the 
magnitude of the complete overturn of, say, American or Japanese national security 
policies between 1907-09 or Italian national security policies between 1889 and 1891, 
both of them under scenario LA–HE, is hard to question. The changes in national 
security policies that have occurred under scenario LA–LE and scenario HA–HE have 
been less striking, and one could argue that the magnitude of these shifts, particularly 
the ones under scenario LA–LE, was inferior to the shifts which took place under the 
other two scenarios. Significantly, however, in many financial crisis instances, leading 
government officials did not grasp immediately which scenario they were in or 
accepted its workings thereby behaving as if they were in scenario LA–LE or HA–HE 
until the real scenarios LA–HE or HA–LE kicked in. This was true, for instance, with 
regards to the financial crisis of 1907-09 in the United States and Japan, the financial 
crisis of 1914 in Great Britain, and the financial crisis of late 1920s and early 1930s in 
Japan, Italy and the United States.   
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Table 6.1. Summary of Expectations and Outcomes 
 
JAPAN 
 
1. 1889-90   
(local then 
global) 
 
2. 1896-1901  
(local then 
global) 
 
3 & 4.  
1907-09 &  
1920-22 
(global) 
 
5. 1927-31 
(local then 
global) 
 
AFFINITY WITH 
HIGH FINANCE 
 
 
LOW 
 
LOW  
 
LOW 
 
HIGH 
 
EXPOSURE TO  
HIGH FINANCE 
 
 
LOW 
 
 
LOW 
 
 
 
HIGH 
 
 
 
 
LOW 
 
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NSP BEFORE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
OUTBREAK 
 
 
 
 
      ASSERTIVE 
 
 
 
ASSERTIVE 
 
 
 
ASSERTIVE 
 
 
 
      CAUTIOUS 
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NSP AFTER 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
OUTBREAK 
 
 
 
INFLATED 
 
 
 
INFLATED 
 
 
 
 
 
CURBED 
 
 
 
 
 
____ 
 
 
VERIFIED? 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
 
____ 
 
ITALY 
 
6. 1889-91 
 (loc then gl)  
 
7. 1893-94  
(local) 
 
8.1907-1908 
(global) 
 
9. 1931-33 
(global) 
 
AFFINITY WITH 
HIGH FINANCE 
 
 
LOW 
 
HIGH 
 
HIGH 
 
HIGH 
 
EXPOSURE TO  
HIGH FINANCE 
 
 
 
HIGH 
 
 
HIGH 
 
 
HIGH  
 
 
LOW 
 
 
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NSP BEFORE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
OUTBREAK 
 
 
 
 
       ASSERTIVE 
 
 
 
CAUTIOUS 
 
 
 
CAUTIOUS 
 
 
 
CAUTIOUS 
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NSP AFTER 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
OUTBREAK 
 
 
 
CURBED 
 
 
 
EXTRA 
PRUDENT 
  
 
 
 
   
EXTRAPRUDEN
T 
 
 
 
____ 
 
 
VERIFIED? 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES  
 
 
NO 
 
 
____ 
	   356 
 
 
14. FINANCIAL CRISIS 
OF 1914 
 
AUSTRIA-
HUNGARY 
 
GERMANY 
 
GREAT BRITAIN 
 
AFFINITY WITH HIGH 
FINANCE 
 
 
LOW 
 
AMBIGUOUS/CAN’T CODE 
 
HIGH 
 
 
EXPOSURE TO HIGH 
FINANCE 
 
 
 
LOW  
 
 
 
LOW 
 
 
 
LOW  
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NSP BEFORE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS OUTBREAK 
 
 
 
 
ASSERTIVE 
 
 
 
AMBIGUOUS/CAN’T CODE 
 
 
 
 
CAUTIOUS 
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NSP AFTER FINANCIAL 
CRISIS OUTBREAK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFLATED 
 
 
 
CAN’T APPLY THE 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
____ 
 
 
VERIFIED? 
 
 
 
       YES 
 
 
CAN’T APPLY THE 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
____ 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
10. 1884 
 (local) 
 
11.1893-96  
(local) 
 
12.1907-1908 
(global) 
 
13.1929-33 
(global) 
 
AFFINITY WITH HIGH 
FINANCE 
 
 
LOW 
 
HIGH 
 
LOW 
 
HIGH 
 
 
EXPOSURE TO  
HIGH FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
HIGH 
 
 
 
 
 
HIGH 
 
 
 
 
HIGH  
 
 
 
LOW 
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NSP BEFORE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
OUTBREAK 
 
 
 
 
      ASSERTIVE 
 
 
 
CAUTIOUS 
 
 
 
ASSERTIVE 
 
 
 
      CAUTIOUS 
 
EXPECTATIONS: 
 
NSP AFTER 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
OUTBREAK 
 
 
 
CURBED 
 
 
 
EXTRA PRUDENT 
 
 
 
 
CURBED 
 
 
 
____ 
 
VERIFIED? 
 
 
NO 
 
 
YES  
 
 
YES 
 
 
____ 
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This equals to observing that, in many of the observed financial crisis 
instances—namely the ones characterized by scenario LA–HE or HA–LE, the shift in 
national security policies took a while to mature as leaders of crisis-stricken 
governments strenuously attempted to push forward their desired crisis response 
strategy, and crisis-stricken governments, as a result, experienced more than one stage 
of crisis response. In these instances, shifts in national security policies also took a 
while to mature.  
In one of the fourteen, examined financial crisis experiences, namely the 
German response to the financial crisis of 1914—Table 6.1, green boxes—applying 
the framework as presented in Figure 1.1 has not been possible due to the difficulty of 
coding the German government’s pre-crisis financial, economic and security policies 
as expression of high or low government affinity with high finance. Since the 
exposure to high finance of the same government was low, however, expectations on 
the (more assertive) character of the national security shift (or the lesser constrains for 
exercise of assertiveness) could still be formulated, like it was formulated with regards 
to the British government in the same time period. The collected evidence confirmed 
them. The German national security policies ushered in by the first stage of the 
financial crisis of 1914 were neither curbed, nor inflated, nor did they become extra-
prudent. Yet, they were “rationalized,” as the cautious elements composing them were 
strengthened and the assertive ones disappeared. 
Much more glaring are two instances—Table 6.1, orange boxes—which 
disconfirm the expectations of the shift in national security policies formulated on the 
basis of the framework. Specifically, the framework is at a loss in explaining Italian 
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national security policies, and the behavior of the Italian governing authorities and that 
of high finance after the start of the financial crisis 1907-09 in Italy. It also cannot 
make sense of the behavior of the Arthur administration and of American national 
security policies after start of the financial crisis of 1884. As the following paragraphs 
clarify, however, more than invalidating the framework both instances suggest new 
avenues for further research.  
      
Two Exceptions and Their Meaning  
A few years after the start of the financial crisis of 1907-1909 in Italy, the 
cosmopolitan government of Giovanni Giolitti, who responded to the financial crisis 
by entrusting financial markets with the process of crisis recovery (high government 
exposure to high finance), waged a long, politically undesirable war against Turkey 
shortly after the end of the crisis. For the war efforts, Italian authorities even sought 
and obtained the endorsement of financial circles in London, and, throughout the war 
and in its aftermath, foreign high finance had only words of praise for the excellent 
status of Italian finances throughout and after the conflict.  
Similarly, after the outbreak of the financial crisis of 1884, and from a position 
of high exposure to high finance, the American administration of Chester Arthur 
doubled-down on its pre-crisis assertiveness and Arthur’s objective of securing an 
American expansionist agenda.  High finance had no words of praise for the 
administration this time. Since these instances of unexpected government behavior 
during financial crisis are only two out of a larger number it seems opportune to speak 
of outliers but a question remains: what should we make of them?  
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The Italian experience suggests that, in some circumstances, one of the 
cardinal assumptions of the framework, that is the predilection of high finance for 
international diplomatic and military appeasement after the start of a financial crisis 
(and, relatedly, the effort by high finance to bring appeasing international diplomatic 
and military policies about after the start of a financial crisis) is no longer true. This 
might occur for a series of reasons, which the Italian financial, diplomatic and military 
experience between 1907 and 1911 helps elucidating. A first reason is that, after 1907, 
the trust of domestic financial actors in the workings of international financial 
cooperation and high finance broke down. Fearing widespread economic losses and 
the foreign encroachment of their business in Northern Africa, eminent Italian bankers 
pressured the Italian government to intervene militarily in defense of their interests. As 
a result, foreign high finance lost an important ally to exert a restraining effect on the 
national security policies of the Italian government.   
More tellingly, the tense social and economic situation, which many of the 
outlying territories of the Ottoman Empire, like Libya, were confronting, did arguably 
create challenges for high finance too as the orthodox medicine did not seem to work 
there. In turn, high finance might have welcomed the Italian resort to less 
compromising means to impede an escalation of the crisis and, concurrently, defend 
the success of the orthodox medicine and the security conditionality accompanying it 
at the center of the international financial system.689 Before settling on a conclusion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
689 The financial crisis of 1907-09 was resolved at the center of the international financial system thanks 
to European governments' cooperation with high finance. The orthodox medicine, however, was unable 
to solve the financial crisis at the fringes of the international financial system like, for instance, 
Northern Africa.  	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this kind, however, more research into the favoring of an Italian-Turkish war by the 
major German and British financial houses is warranted.  
The increasing conversion to assertiveness by the Arthur administration during 
the financial crisis of 1884 paints a somewhat less concerning outlier.  True, the 
administration ignored the orthodox medicine and continued to prop up American 
military investment and military presence in Central and Latin American throughout 
financial crisis year 1884 while relying on the help of high finance to bring the crisis to 
an end. But high finance suffered a relatively minor political defeat, as it quickly 
endeavored to assure the election of dovish presidential candidate Grover Cleveland 
later on that year. Although the argument here advanced would benefit from further 
research into the relation between Arthur and high finance throughout the first half of 
the 1880s, President Arthur and his acolytes were arguably aware in 1884 that their 
national security strategy was alienating the sympathies of the wealthiest Americans. 
They also knew that they could not compete with Cleveland for re-election. On the one 
hand, facing very forthcoming elections and dim reelection prospects, the Arthur 
Presidency could stretch his national security plans forward relatively undisturbed by 
high finance, albeit for a limited time. On the other hand, the local character of the 
financial crisis, and the still marginal role of the United States within the international 
(financial) system at this time did not create the same pressures to stop the Presidency 
that high finance felt, for instance, during the financial crisis of 1907-09. In this 
respect, Theodore Roosevelt was not as “lucky” as Arthur.  
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Interesting and Unexpected Findings 
A prominent finding of this work is that the turn towards greater diplomatic 
and military caution that occurs under scenarios LA–HE and HA–HE is not 
necessarily peace inducing or a most prudent policy decision to adopt. In financial 
crisis years 1908 and 1909, the Roosevelt and Taft administrations moved away from 
the militancy that had characterized American foreign policy in previous years, but 
reorienting that policy towards international economic competition did not diffuse 
peace across the world. International financial agreements accelerated the Chinese 
civil war and fuelled resentment and misunderstandings amongst the great powers, 
Japan included. Similarly, the withdrawal from assertiveness and the pursuit of a super 
restrained foreign policy that Japanese cabinets attempted between 1929 and 1931 
increased the chances of a Sino-Japanese war by encouraging the nationalist forces of 
Chinese warlord Chang Kai-shek and creating a profound fracture between the 
Japanese cabinet and the Japanese Army. 
Next to yielding this undesired outcome, national leaderships did not always 
get their scenario(s) correctly or adequately assessed the domestic political 
consequences of the strategy of financial crisis response they are keen on 
implementing. During some financial crises, the power of state leaderships was so 
superior to that of high finance that the crisis response strategy desired and selected by 
such leadership worked. In those instances, pre-crisis national security policies could 
continue uninterrupted.  This was true for the Japanese leadership during the financial 
crises of 1889-90 and 1896-1901. However, during other financial crises—the 
majority of the ones here examined—crisis-stricken governments either missed to 
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recognize that domestic financial actors and dominant financial ideas favored the 
triumph of the orthodox medicine or failed to realize that the latter would not have 
solved the existing crisis.  Responsible for the first mistake were the Crispi 
government after the start of the financial crisis in 1889, and the Saionji and Roosevelt 
governments after the start of the financial crisis of 1907-09. In all these instances, 
heterodox financial policies and ambitious national security policies were replaced, 
during the financial crisis, with a newly discovered faith in the virtues of private 
market forces and international diplomacy. The Japanese, Italian and Japanese 
leaderships between 1929 and 1931 made the second mistake—wrongly trusting high 
finance and the orthodox medicine, and strengthening the security conditionality 
attached to them. Nowhere was the failure to notice or surrender to the growing 
leverage of heterodox crisis response policies and the lessening power of high finance 
more costly than in Japan. Members of the Hamaguchi government paid for the 
mistake with their life, and a pre-crisis agenda of diplomatic and military caution was 
butchered with particular violence. 
Other findings stand out. One of them is that whatever strategy of financial 
crisis response crisis-stricken governments commit to—regardless of whether it works 
or not to solve the crisis—governments have a tendency to over apply their medicine 
of financial crisis response, and in doing so they create increasingly polarized 
domestic settings, vigorous opposition, and significant policy backlashes.  In 1895, so 
strenuously did the Crispi government continue a post-crisis strategy of withdrawal 
from colonial adventurism (to signal the authenticity of Italy’s conversion to the 
orthodox medicine), that Italian diplomatic and military advantages in Northern 
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African quickly dissipated, producing outrage amongst pro-military supporters and the 
armed forces, and ultimately contributing to one of the most inexplicable and 
regrettable episodes of military capitulation in history, when a small national military 
contingent was practically sent to die on battlefield. Analogously, in the early 1930s 
Wakatsuki, Inoue and Shidehara continued to slash Japanese military spending and 
trust the orthodox medicine until the unpopularity of this agenda thwarted any 
understanding between Japanese civilian authorities and the Kwantung Army.  
This evidence illustrates not only the serious policy blunders of national 
leaders during financial crises, but also these leaders’ lack of foresight and inattention 
to the larger policy context or medium-medium term implications of their actions. 
Interestingly, when the crisis, stricken government responds to financial crisis by 
prioritizing international financial cooperation, it is the larger national security context 
to the forgotten. Differently, when the crisis-stricken government responds to financial 
crisis by prioritizing national security needs, it is national financial and economic 
stability and growth that are set aside.  
A second interesting finding is that there does not seem to be any substantial 
difference between global and local (or local turned global) financial crises in terms of 
the influence that they produce on the security policies of the stricken governments.  
Independently of whether financial crises are global or local, governments seem to 
respond to financial crises only after that he latter have started within domestic 
borders.690 Having said that, global financial crises are possibly different from local 
financial crises in that they influence the national security policies of a higher number 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
690  Note that when financial crises are global, high finance generally starts to respond to them much 
earlier than governments do   
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of states or across the globe, and therefore tend to have a greater impact on 
international security than local financial crises are likely to have. Although the 
objective of this work has been to examine variation in national security policies after 
financial-crisis outbreak   and not variation in international security after financial 
crisis outbreak, the implications of the former on the latter during global financial 
crises have often been striking. Notable in this respect were the American response to 
the global financial crisis of 1907, the Japanese response to the global financial crisis 
of 1927-33, and the Austro-Hungarian, German, and British response to the global 
financial crisis of 1914.  
A third interesting finding—and a finding that shows that local financial crises 
can contribute to international security even if perhaps more modestly than global 
financial crises—is that states that are not stricken by financial crisis face strong 
incentives to change their security policies because other states confront local 
financial crisis. Between the mid-1880s and mid-1890s, for instance, Great Britain 
capitalized on the absence of a strong American defense policy, which local financial 
crises, as shown in Chapter Four, contributed to bring about. Likewise, following the 
start of the local financial crisis of 1893-94 in Italy, Ethiopian Negus Menelik 
exploited Italian military withdrawal from Northeastern Africa to regain the lost 
ground and prepare to launch, a few months later, the deadliest Ethiopian attack 
against Italian troops. Since both the British and Ethiopian retaliations against took 
place during local financial crises, the relevance of the latter on international security 
or at least the military and diplomatic interaction between two states cannot be 
ignored.  
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Theoretical Contributions 
Chapter Three, Chapter Four, and parts of Chapter Five have illustrated the 
limits that explanations of national security policies in the financial crisis years that I 
examine encounter when the national security influence of financial crises is excluded 
from consideration. In illustrating these limits, this work has not attempted to deny or 
downplay the importance that non-financial variables located at various levels of 
analysis have in contributing to shifts in national security policies, as well as to the 
decision-making process, perceptions, and capabilities informing those policies. 
Equally, this work has not attempted to dismiss the relevance of realist, neorealist or 
structural pressures; of domestic and international institutions and social processes; 
and of individual leadership and charisma during financial crises. It would be difficult 
to deny the importance of these independent variables given the constant resort to 
them, in each chapter, to reconstruct the national economic and security policies of 
crisis-stricken states before the start of financial crises.  It would also be foolish to 
deny the importance of these traditional variables in view of the gathered economic, 
diplomatic and military evidence after the start of the examined financial crises. For 
instance, it would be foolish to argue that systemic military and economic pressures 
and socially constructed concerns about international status and rank played a minor 
role in contributing to the positivist economic and national security agenda that 
Japanese leaderships were prone to resort to during financial crises. By the same 
token, it would be difficult to deny that the temperament of Theodore Roosevelt or 
Francesco Crispi shaped American and Italian decision-making in the security sphere 
throughout the financial crises that hit the United States and Italy in, respectively, the 
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late 19th century and the mid-to-late 1900s. And it would be difficult to deny that the 
particular configuration of Italian politics and the triumph of transformism prevented 
any radical change in Italian foreign policy during financial crisis years 1907 and 
1908.  
Rather than assessing the relative power of financial crises versus that of other 
variables in informing changes in military spending, threat assessment, and war 
prospects after financial-crisis outbreak, this work has drawn attention to whether the 
changes in national security policies which occurred in the financial-crisis instances 
here examined would have also occurred in the absence of the examined financial 
crises.  In synthesis, the crucial question that has informed the treatment of the 
fourteen instances of financial-crisis response analyzed in the dissertation, while 
pitching the explanation offered by the framework against alternative explanations 
based on, say, neorealist pressures or domestic institutional variables only, has been 
the following: “Was the financial crisis, other things being equal, a necessary 
condition for the greater caution (or assertiveness) in military spending, threat 
assessment, and war that followed the crisis outbreak?”691 When the answer was 
“yes,” I concluded that the financial crisis at hand exerted an overlooked influence on 
national security policies, stirring them towards greater aggressiveness or greater 
caution and determining the character of the realized national security outcome.692 
This counterfactual approach helped me limit as much as possible endogeneity 
problems deriving from the simultaneity and interdependence of national economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 On the relationship between necessary conditions and counterfactual analysis see Goertz and Levy 
(2007:9–45). 
692 On necessary causes see, for instance, Mahoney et al (2009:218).  
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and security decisions, and shed light on the inappropriateness of allowing national 
and international security considerations trump the relevance of financial crises when 
evidence suggests differently.693  Like military-security crises, two of the main 
variables of this work, government affinity with high finance and government 
exposure to high finance, shape national security decision-making of crisis-stricken 
governments in their own right. The argument here is not that the influence of these 
variables is weaker or inexistent without financial crises, but rather that financial 
crises transform these factors and their interplay, and, as a result, they transform 
national security policies too. These long ignored transformations exemplify the 
influence or independent causality of financial crises on national and international 
security. Accordingly, this work confutes two null or alternative hypotheses. The first 
is that no change in national security policies occurs after a financial crisis outbreak. 
The second is that, after a financial crisis outbreak, changes in military spending, 
threat assessment, and war prospects are impelled by developments that have little to 
do with the financial crisis.  
Both hypotheses are implicit in neorealist theories of world politics, and their 
understanding of “state capability” as the ensemble of population, industrial and 
military power, raw material endowment and little else.694 Collectively, these theories 
postulate that the causes of alliances, foreign policy, and war prospects—or, more 
broadly, states’ answers to the security dilemma—are to be identified in states’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 On the utility of counterfactuals to solve endogeneity problems, see King, Keohane and Verba 
(1994:21). 
694 See in particular Jervis (1978); Waltz (1979); Walt (1987); Van Evera (1999); Mearsheimer (2001). 
Neorealist theories such as the balance of power theory, offense-defense theory, balance-of-threat 
theory, and “window theory” all assume a more limited understanding of state capability or “capacity” 
than the one that this work accepts.  
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responses to shifts in the distribution of state capabilities; shifts in the offensive power 
of state capabilities; shifts in perceptions regarding state capabilities; and threats based 
on each of the aforementioned shifts. By omitting financial stability from their 
understanding of state capabilities, these theories implicitly negate that financial crises 
exert an independent causal influence on national security policies.695 This work 
denies the validity of this assumption. By posing a threat to important national security 
values; by unveiling an uncertain financial and economic future that necessitates an 
effective crisis-response; and by affecting government exposure to the pressures of 
high finance, financial crises produce shifts in perceptions regarding state capabilities, 
shifts in threat assessment, and ultimately shifts in national security in the same way as 
with military-security crises.  
In contributing to some of the existing literature, particularly the existing 
scholarship on financial crises, existing theories on the political economy of national 
security and existing literature on the causes of war and foreign policy, the framework 
is indebted to three scholarly traditions or literatures more than any other. A first 
tradition is concerned with the role of financial ideas in the processes of power 
redistribution that characterize domestic, international, and transnational policymaking 
(Grabel 1996; Haggard and Maxfield 1996; Kirshner 2003). A second tradition deals 
with the change in domestic and international politics, ideas, and policies that financial 
or economic shocks create (Katzenstein 1978; Gourevitch 1986; Seabrooke 2006; 
Pepinsky 2009). A third tradition revolves around the assumption that security 
dilemmas and real or perceived shifts in relative gains (or losses) inevitably 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695 State capabilities are commonly understood as referring to a state’s total population, industrial and 
military resources, and endowment of raw material. 
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characterize interstate relationships (Jervis 1978; Schweller 2007; Cesa 2011). While 
indebted to these traditions, I have not been impartial in using some of their analyses 
and findings. For instance, Peter Gourevitch (1986:19-22) explains how, in times of 
economic crises, new coalitions emerge and new policy packages are formed, as 
politics, the system of relationships, and policy become more fluid. Trusting this 
finding but having a primary interest in whether specific coalitions and specific 
packages win or lose, in this work I have stressed the importance, after the outbreak of 
financial crisis, of power shifts benefiting or harming high finance and the orthodox 
medicine. The formation of a coalition is in the picture but it’s whether it has an 
orthodox character or not that matters the most. 
Similarly, the framework recalls the argument by Leonard Seabrooke (2006) 
that state leaders can broaden or narrow their financial power by intervening for or 
against the interest of private economic elites. Specifically, in Seabrooke’s view, state 
leaders will increase their state’s international influence by allying against the interests 
of private economic elites, and decrease their state’s international influence by allying 
with the interests of private economic elites (and against the interests of low-income 
groups). If one understood “increasing a state’s international influence” in the same 
terms of “increasing a state’s assertiveness,” and private economic elites as high 
finance, then my argument and Seabrooke’s would not be very different. However, 
there are some substantial differences, the first being that Seabrooke’s (2006:11) 
argument is meant to apply to times of financial and economic stability (or to 
“everyday economic struggles” as he calls them). Other points of distinction are, as 
already hinted, that Seabrooke is not concerned with national security policies, and 
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that the complete conflict of interests between low-income groups and private 
economic elites that he envisions is not a good representation of the relationship 
between high finance and public forces that appears in this work.  
The reasons that link this work to arguments advanced by Gourevitch and 
Seabrooke also explain why, although this work borrows from structural realism the 
principle that security dilemmas and real or perceived shifts in relative gains (or 
losses) are foundational to interstate relations, I understand state capabilities in 
broader terms than structural realism would. Financial power and financial relations, 
let alone financial crises would not figure in any faithful neorealist account.  In this 
respect, this study is theoretically close to scholars like Snyder (1991), Solingen 
(1998), Trubowitz (1998), Lobell (2003), and Narizny (2007), who have recognized 
the advantages of a broader understanding of state capabilities in the explanation of 
national security policies and changes in national security policies.696 In these works, 
however, financial stability and financial crisis have remained very marginal variables. 
Also, the most distinctive aspect of financial crises, specifically the threat/opportunity 
that they pose to national and international financial systems, and, as a result, to 
national financial-security agendas and perceptions of the security dilemma, is entirely 
overlooked. By contrast, as hinted in Chapter One, the few, recent scholarly works on 
the geopolitical implications of the AFC and the GFM (Dibb, Hale and Prince 1998:5; 
Devlen 2008; Friedberg 2010:32,35) have recognized that financial crises can trigger 
changes in international security and balance-of-power, but their focus has remained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696 These works have acknowledged the weight of domestic variables such as coalition, partisan 
conflict, state structures and institutions as well as international and transnational factors like economic 
liberalization or international commercial orientation in the crafting of national security policies. Some 
of these variables figure prominently also in this work. 
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on the changes that are potential and that derive from relative gains and losses 
amongst states, not within states or governments.  
 Finally, the project also makes a theoretical contribution to the existing debate 
on scapegoat-war or diversionary-war theories (Levy 1993). These theories assume 
that, during economic instability, the domestic elite will display a more assertive 
foreign policy stance, choosing war to divert attention from domestic troubles and 
shore up their political position. The analytical framework here advanced offers a 
more nuanced explanation of escalating war prospects in times of economic 
turbulence. To begin, it suggests that during a financial crisis, a special form of 
economic instability, war prospects increase when a government’s affinity with high 
finance is low and remains low throughout the process of crisis response. Secondly, it 
indicates that war prospects increase not as an attempt to divert attention from pressing 
economic challenges but, to the contrary, in an effort to solve them via increased 
military spending and linked magnification of existing threats. Diverting attention 
from the crisis—or obscuring its presence—might be part of the strategy of crisis 
response, but the diversion will mostly be targeted to foreign governments rather than 
domestic constituencies, and to high finance above other interest groups. Thirdly, the 
dynamic analytical framework offered here addresses fundamental questions of 
causality linking financial crises to shifts in national security policies, which 
diversionary theory leaves unanswered.697  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
697 On this point, see Stoessinger (1982). 
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  The Framework in Contemporary World Politics 
Next to its theoretical contributions, explaining the contemporary variation in 
national economic and security polices around the world in response to the greatest 
market failure since the Great Depression is possibly what the framework is most 
useful for. Shifts towards or away from greater diplomatic and military caution 
resulting from high government exposure to high finance have affected states across 
different regions of the world. United States, Japan, and Italy are, once again, good 
examples. Since the start of the global financial meltdown in late 2007, American 
national security policies have been profoundly transformed. The military ambitions 
and grand geopolitical visions of the Bush administration have been lowered sharply. 
American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been wound down to the point where 
even the appetite for keeping a significant military presence in loco has waned.698 
Between 2009 and 2010 the Obama administration undertook concrete steps to 
promote natural and international reductions to costly nuclear arsenals. It ratified a 
new strategic arms reductions treaty with Russia (“New START”) and passed a 
“Nuclear Posture Review” that narrowed the declared role of nuclear weapons in 
American strategy. In the Middle East the United States has exhibited a noteworthy 
reluctance to engage. When it has engaged (Libya), it has done so by participating to 
multilateral, limited interventions for the preservation of peace, not very differently 
(so far, at least) from the international intervention against the Boxers in 1900-1901. 
Moreover, the Pacific pivot strategy launched in early 1912 and now described as the 
“Pacific Dream” of creating a “stable security environment rooted in economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 The ‘zero option’ is already a reality with regards to Iraq—thanks to some help from the Iraqi 
government too. See, for instance, “So long, buddy,” The Economist, January 12, 2013.  
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openness” recalls the American pivot to continental Asia realized during the global 
financial crisis of 1907-09 and discussed in Chapter Four. Although American marines 
have been relocated to northern Australia and Singapore, the primary economic and 
diplomatic rationale of the pivot is promoting international financial and economic 
cooperation as evident from major American initiatives like the Transpacific 
Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).699  
At the core of these developments have been acute budgetary pressures and a 
crisis response strategy heralding the high exposure to high finance of the Bush and 
Obama administrations. After the start of the financial crisis, no change in the in 
national security was initially contemplated. The Bush administration resorted to 
quantitative easing and to the TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program), to award 
money, credit and the ultimate task of solving the financial crisis to the rocks of the 
international financial system, Wall Street’s behemots like Bear Stearns, AIG, and 
Ctitigroup.700 When the deficit hit a peacetime record of 10.1% of GNP in 2009, the 
necessity of drastic cuts to the American defense budget and a transformation of the 
national security agenda emerged clearly as policy priorities if the United States 
wanted to remain competitive and preserve its leadership within the international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
699 The TPP is an ambitious free-trade agreement that groups members of the North-Atlantic Free-Trade 
Area with Asian communities including Japan.   On American Pacific policy see, for instance, “Pivot or 
Rebalancing,” in The Economist, May 11, 2013; Trefor Moss, “America’s Pivot to Asia: A Report 
Card,” The Diplomat, May 5, 2013.  Initially understood by China and possibly a few members of the 
American National Security Team as a strategy for containing China, American National Security 
Advisor Tom Donilon has stated and restated that the US government aims at forging a “productive and 
constructive relations with China.” 
700 As previous Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson put it, letting these banks fails would have meant 
allowing the “vaporization of the international financial system.” Paulson’s words in The Economist, 
May 11, 2013, p.11.  
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financial system.701 Former Director of American National Intelligence Dennis Blair 
called the financial crisis the “single greatest threat to American strategic interests” 
already in 2008. In 2010 Mike Mullen, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
anticipated “belt-tightening” measures in the military, and Hillary Clinton talked 
endlessly about “smart power,” or power that does not come from the barrel of a gun. 
The American government’s surrender to the orthodox medicine was also clear, in 
2010, with the passage of the Dodd-Frank financial reform laws, which enshrined the 
principle that leading banks are “too big to fail.” The same principles were restated 
through the “sequester,” the series of across-the-board federal spending cuts (including 
cuts in defense) that took effect in March 2013.702   
 Japan has remained unscathed by the global financial meltdown only at a 
surface level. Although no serious bank run or bank failure has occurred (so far at 
least), the Japanese leading political class has lived the past ten to fifteen years under 
the constant concern of an impending financial crisis giving the final blow to an 
especially sluggish national economy. The privatization policies and dovish foreign 
policy pursued by the cabinet of Koizumi Junichiro for most of the 2000s were still a 
response to the decade-long period of banking crises that gripped the country in the 
1990s. The numerous cabinets that led Japan through the meltdown (2007-2012) 
continued to push forward Koizumi template, and promoted low inflation, exchange 
rate stabilization, war on terrorism, the phasing out of nuclear energy, and diplomatic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701 See “The budget. Something for everyone,” in The Economist, April 13, 2013, p.32. 
702 It is worth noting that Obama did not have the intention to newly rank debt reduction as the top 
priority of the American government during its first year of his second term. His inauguration speech 
made this clear. Pressures for deficit and debt reduction were too high however: by the time of the State 
of the Union Address (February 2013), the administration had newly placed control over American 
finances at the top of the agenda.  
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cooperation with China and North Korea. Even Aso Taro, the most hawkish prime 
minister amongst the prime ministers at the head of Japan between 2007 and 2012, 
fostered the Koizumi agenda, recognizing that the national economy was the “greatest 
concern.” As he stated in late 2008, “America is facing a financial crisis. We must not 
allow that to bring us down as well.” 703  
After years of failed orthodox attempts to pull Japan out of its slump and resist 
a financial crisis, Japanese agenda has changed in January 2013. The newly elected 
government of Abe Shinzo welcomed a heterodox strategy (known as “Abenomics”) 
that prioritizes a ¥10.3 trillion stimulus package, reflation (or so-called “new 
dimensions in monetary easing”), exchange rate depreciation, and extensive supply-
side reforms.704 In agreement with the essential logic of the framework, Abenomics is 
as much a financial and economic strategy of financial crisis response as it is a 
military and diplomatic one. Nationalists that desire a geopolitical and constitutional 
rebranding of Japan and reject Japan’s “apology diplomacy” for its wartime misdeed 
compose the entire cabinet.705 On taking office, Abe delighted them by promising to 
“turn Japanese foreign and security policy around,” and since then Japan has adopted a 
tougher stance with China by strengthening Japanese-American ties and threatening 
and planning new military actions to safeguard Japanese maritime interests around the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
703 On the more conservative character of Aso’s policy preferences see his 2006 speech "Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” in Calder and Fukuyama (2008), 
pp.179–180. 
704 The “new dimensions in monetary easing” that the new Central Bank governor Haruhiko Kuroda has 
promised are not the common quantitative easing recipe that the United States, Great Britain and many 
states in central Europe have resorted to throughout the financial crisis. It is not without reason that Abe 
has gushed about an ongoing “regime change” in Japanese economic policy. On this revolution see 
“Win Some, Lose Some,” The Economist, January 26, 2013, p.64.  
705 On this point see, for instance, “Back to the Future,” The Economist, January 5, 2013; “Japan’s 
Master Plan” in The Economist, May 18, 2013, p.13. 
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disputed Senkakus/Diaoyus islands.706 In another significant departure from the pre-
crisis policy of Noda Yushiko government of bringing the state out of nuclear energy 
by 2040, the Abe government announced that it would restart nuclear reactors after the 
passing of new safety tests.707 
Interestingly, in September1931 the Kwantung Army of the Japanese Empire 
organized the incident that marked the first step of the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria, widely in reaction to the official orthodox medicine of financial crisis 
response. A new cabinet and heterodox economic and security policies were 
implemented. In a similar way, in December 2012 the Japanese Self-Defense Force 
(JSDF) sent eight fighter jets to intercept a Chinese surveillance aeroplane that flew 
over the Senkakus, the first Chinese incursion in to Japanese-controlled airspace since 
the 1950s.708 A month later, a new cabinet with a positive economic and security 
agenda was in power. The very different security contexts in East Asia today 
compared to the 1930s makes a swift escalation of military incidents much harder than 
it used to be. The higher international financial success of the orthodox medicine this 
time (so far), compared to the early 1930s, might also put some brakes on Japan’s new 
positive agenda. Yet, the transition to greater assertiveness (and low exposure to high 
finance) is very evident both then and now, and the changed strategy of financial crisis 
response is at the heart of this transition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
706 In April 2013, Premier Abe warned that Japan would “expel by force” any Chinese attempt to land 
on the disputed islands. See “Japan vows to use force if China lands on the disputed islands,” Agence 
France-Presse, April 23, 2013.  
707 On this change in nuclear policy see “Japan to Phase Out Nuclear Power,” Financial Times, 
September 14, 2012;  “Japan’s nuclear future: Don’t Look Now,” The Economist, April 20, 2013.  
708 These days the Japan’s Ministry of Defense is also keen on creating a special assault team fully 
equipped to fortify remote islands and recapture then should an invasion occur.  
	   377 
Due to their membership in the European Monetary Union, Italian authorities 
have had much less room for maneuver than Japanese authorities in responding to the 
eruption of the financial crisis within Italian borders. Orthodox fiscal discipline is the 
glue that hangs EMU members together, Italy, included, and the sacrifices made and 
costs paid (albeit perhaps not in full) to join the EMU fifteen years ago, and the 
benefits collected from it up until the start of the financial crisis give the orthodox 
medicine an advantage. This explains why, after the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
the Italian cabinet in power at the time found itself in scenario LA–HE—not much 
differently from the Crispi government in late 1880s or early 1890s—and, between 
2009 and 2012, Italian national security policies shifted towards greater caution. 
Before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the cabinet of Silvio Berlusconi followed an 
extravagant and controversial fiscal policy and energy policy in total disinterest of 
Maastricht’s (orthodox) financial standards.709 Complementing this fiscal stance was a 
bombastic foreign policy that included close diplomatic relations with Muammar al-
Gaddafi’s Libya (and opposition to the NATO anti-Qaddafi coalition in early 2011), 
close diplomatic partnership with Russia, and continued support to Italian troops in 
Afghanistan.710  
As Italian borrowing costs soared, and after the beginning of a southern-
European-style sovereign debt crisis (2009), the Berlusconi government came under 
increasing foreign financial pressure, like it occurred in the late 1880s and the early 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
709 Wide-spread tax cuts were levied, as promised during the election campaign, and copious amount of 
money were spent on the extension of oil and gas contracts and the development of new oil and gas 
fields (in Libya) by the ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, that is National Institute for Hydrocarbons). 
710 As the financial situation deteriorated throughout the spring of 2011 and as international pressures 
from NATO and the United Nations intensified, Berlusconi backtracked from his ideal foreign policy 
plans and joined the international military intervention front.  
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1890s. Foreign high finance and EU leaders demanded firm plans of debt reduction 
and a solid crisis response strategy. Like Crispi, Berlusconi continued to promote his 
economic and security agenda while denying or trying to assuage financial crisis fears. 
In late 2011, the Italian parliament forced him to resign and approved harsh austerity 
measures to restore Italian economic competitiveness. 711  Committed to regain the lost 
national financial discipline, the non-party government of Mario Monti (2011-2012) 
ordered drastic cuts to armed forces personnel, and took a major step towards long-
term procurement planning by publishing a three-year, itemized defense budget (2013-
2015) to which the newly elected government of Enrico Letta is currently abiding.712 
A published, multi-year defense budget is a clear attempt at improving the 
transparency and financial credibility of the Italian government, and avoiding a 
repetition of the debt crisis.713 The pre-crisis, ambitious threat assessment and war 
prospects have similarly shifted towards caution. Part of this shift has been the result 
of the influence of the global financial crisis on the national security policies of other 
states. For instance, the American planned withdrawal from Afghanistan have changed 
many of the conditions that sustained Berlusconi’s diplomatic and military agenda. 
More importantly, since 2012 the Defense Ministry has stressed the Italian 
government’s pledge to strengthen Italian relations with Arab countries in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
711 On these developments, see, for instance, William L. Watts and Myra P. Seafong, “Rising Italy bond 
yields pressure European leaders,” The Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2011; and Uri Friedman, “Mario 
Monti assumes power in Italy,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2011. 
712 Both Monti and Letta are members of the Trilateral Commission (the powerful financial lobby 
founded by David Rockefeller in 1973), and have strong ties to the international financial circles.  
713 The defense budget dropped to 13.6 billion euro in 2012 thanks to austerity cuts. The overall defense 
spending for 2013 is decreed to be 14.41 billion Euro. In 2014, this amount should decrease to 14.1 
billion Euro in 2014. See 1.1, Italy’s Defense Expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Gary Schmitt, 
“Italian Hard Power: Ambitions and Fiscal Realities,” American Enterprise Institute, November 1, 
2012. 
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economic field, and has promoted armament cooperation deals with Germany to save 
costs—measures that realign Italian national security interests and foreign policy 
decisions closer to Brussels’ financial and economic agenda. The evidence presented 
in this work on the behavior of Italian governments across several financial crisis 
episodes offers a helpful historical perspective against which evaluating these 
developments.  
As for the national economic and security decisions that government officials 
should take after the outbreak of financial crisis, the advice of maintaining a flexible 
approach to revising pre-crisis financial-security agendas and never pushing policy 
revisions too far is seemingly the wisest. Crisis-stricken government should stir 
towards positive financial-crisis economics and assertive national security policies, or 
towards negative financial-crisis economics and cautious national security policies 
depending on the nature of their pre-crisis financial-security agenda. Changing policy 
direction, welcoming compromising solutions, and avoiding fixations with one crisis 
medicine or another will help mitigate political opposition and skewed distributions of 
the costs of the crisis on society. This strategy is also likely to impede radical and 
abrupt changes in national and international security executed under the influence of 
orthodox or heterodox medicines. Literature in international political economy has 
already suggested that responding to financial crises based on this influence is as much 
captivating as mistaken. More should be done to disclose how and why economic 
policies and security policies are both part of this mistake.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
What influence do financial crises exert on states’ security policies, specifically crisis-
stricken states’ military spending, threat assessment, and war prospects? This dissertation 
finds that, after the start of financial crises, the national security policies of crisis-stricken 
governments shift towards greater assertiveness or greater caution. Whether greater 
assertiveness or towards greater caution is realized depends on government exposure to high 
finance, that is the extent to which crisis-stricken governments rely on the largest transnational 
financial and business interests to solve the financial crisis. Specifically, the national security 
policies of a crisis-stricken government will move towards greater assertiveness if the 
government’s exposure to high finance is low, and towards greater caution if the government’s 
exposure to high finance is high. As a result, the national security policies of a crisis-stricken 
government having low affinity with high finance, namely a low predisposition to include the 
financial and economic preferences of high finance in its policy agenda, will be inflated when 
the government has a low exposure to high finance and curbed when the same government has 
a high exposure to high finance. Differently, the national security policies of a crisis-stricken 
government having high affinity with high finance, namely a high predisposition to include 
the preferences of high finance in its policy agenda, will become extra cautious when the 
government has a high exposure to high finance. The theoretical foundations underlying the 
argument of this dissertation do not allow determining the character of the national security 
policies of a crisis-stricken government having a high affinity with high finance and a low 
exposure to high finance. Relying on archival research, process tracing, text analysis, 
numerical data analysis and counterfactual analysis, I demonstrate these relationships over a 
total of 14 instances of financial crises affecting the security policies of a total of six states—
Japan, Italy, the United States, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Great Britain—in the period 
between 1880 and 1940.   
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